# THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919

THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

LAURENCE BADEL, ECKART CONZE, AND AXEL DRÖBER

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919

The Challenge of a New World Order

Edited by
Laurence Badel, Eckart Conze and Axel Dröber

Contents

Illustrations

Acknowledgements

Introduction
Paris 1919: The Challenge of a New World Order

Laurence Badel, Eckart Conze and Axel Dröber

For more than a century, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 has been an object of historical research. It is almost impossible to maintain a general view over the literature on the end of the First World War, the peace treaties of 1919–20 and the effort to prevent a new war by creating a stable international order. The same is true for the consequences and effects of the peace treaties. The Paris Peace Conference, its origins, its course and its results have been and still are important issues in national, international, transnational and, increasingly, global historiography. If 'in 1919 Paris was the capital of the world',[1] this implies that the task of the Peace Conference, which officially opened on 18 January 1919, was not only to end a global war but to construct a new global order. The First World War was a global war not only because it was waged geographically almost everywhere on the globe but also with regard to its consequences. From its beginning, it triggered global dynamics that would reach far beyond the war itself and deep into the post-war era. Hopes, ideas and concepts of a – new – world order arose out of the experience of global war. The political language of the time was full of globality: 'world democracy', 'world revolution', 'world peace'. This did not reflect a mere spatial extension of concepts of order. From the outset, it involved globally diverging and competing visions of order, giving rise to new dynamics of global politics and power. It is these dynamics that this volume is interested in.

From such a perspective, peace did not simply mean ending the war, ceasing military conflict. Far beyond the end of armed hostilities as such, the word 'peace' referred to the future: to a future order. Peace

was not regarded as the day on which the war came to an end but as a long-term condition extending beyond the armistices of 1918 and the peace treaties of 1919–20. Peace, as it was understood at the time, did not mean a simple return to the status quo ante, to the pre-1914 order. Peace meant leaving behind not only the war but the pre-war time and the pre-war order, and creating a new, different, better order – because, many agreed, despite very different perceptions and interpretations, it was the past – the past order – that had led to the war. It was not just that the old order – the order of the nineteenth century, in its basic structures reaching back to the Congress of Vienna of 1814–15 – had come to an end with the Great War. Many contemporary observers agreed that together with individual national policies, this old order had caused the war and had, for this very reason, destroyed itself during the war. Atop its ruins – buried amongst which were millions of dead – a new order had to be built. Against this background, already at the time, the Paris peacemakers explicitly regarded themselves as the architects not just of peace but of a new order – two concepts that were closely interwoven. They were driven by the aim of turning war, destruction and ruin into order: of creating order out of chaos, in the words of David Hunter Miller, the international law expert in the American delegation.[2] For him, there had simply been no international order at all before the war. 'Chaos' in this sense referred not only to the war but to the – real or supposed – international anarchy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which many perceived as a structural cause of the war. Against this backdrop, it was order – above all order of the legal, normative kind, and its institutionalization – that was expected to secure peace and to prevent new war.

The post-1919 global order did not simply emerge. It was created by different actors with different interests and objectives. Although they shared a basic conviction that a new order was necessary, deep conflicts shaped the Paris Peace Conference: conflicts not only between victors and vanquished but also among the victors themselves, as decades of research have shown. Further conflicts and challenges added to these tensions, among them the Bolshevik idea of, and demand for, global order – world revolution – as well as the global, and globally articulated, demand for national self-determination and independence. This latter demand of course referred to the political reordering of Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe after the end of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and, to a certain degree, German continental empires, but also to the non-European world. It was made in response to the continuity of the empires and imperial power of the victors, above all the British and the French.

But a widely shared demand for a new order did not automatically imply a consensus on what this order should look like, how it should be constructed and how it should be stabilized in order to prevent a new war. In Paris in 1919, dissensus on these questions led to both compromise and discontent. Historical research has long pointed to the problems and deficiencies of the Paris order; some have even blamed the weaknesses or mistakes of 1919–20, especially with regard to the peace with Germany, for the outbreak of the Second World War only two decades later. But this view does not do justice to the genuine efforts in 1919 to develop a new international order; indeed, characterizing them as flawed or failed from the outset is ahistorical. For contemporaries, the year 1919 was not the beginning of an 'interwar period' but of a post-war period. Taking the Second World War as the only analytical vanishing point, as difficult as this perspective is to avoid in retrospect, prevents a sober analysis of attempts in 1919 to create a new order, and of the results of these attempts, because it ignores the openness and undeterminedness of the historical situation after the end of the Great War.

In focusing on the notion of 'order' at the end of the First World War, this book takes up an older concept, going back to the time of the Paris Peace Conference itself. In the vast literature on the end of the First World War – the peacemaking and peace treaties of 1919–20 – the notion of order is omnipresent. But the concept of order, international or global, has received new attention as an analytical category in the last thirty years. With the end of the Cold War, the expression 'new world order' became a central element of international political discourse. Ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the events of 9/11 and their consequences further contributed to this discourse, as did the rise of Chinese power and Russia's policy of outward aggression, which became evident in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and, more radically and brutally than before, with Putin's 2022 war against Ukraine. It is hardly surprising that this global transformation since 1990 has had an impact on academic research and discussion. In the field of international history, a number of books have recently been published on the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and can be read against the background of international and global developments since 1990.[3] They are characterized by their attempts to contribute to our understanding of current developments by analysing the dynamics of global transformation and the emergence of a new world order a century ago. This even includes the argument that 'the Cold War did freeze some of the persistent post-Versailles problems of the 1920s and 1930s but when first the Soviet Empire, and then the Soviet Union itself collapsed, many of these issues re-emerged'.[4] Global political developments since 1989 have made 1919 relevant again in a way that it had not been during

the Cold War.[5] Such perceptions and interpretations have a role in political comparisons and parallelizations articulated by political actors. For example, since the 1990s Russian politicians, including Vladimir Putin, have been describing the West's policy vis-à-vis Russia – in particular the eastward enlargement of EU and NATO – as a humiliation, comparing it with the Allies' treatment of Germany in Versailles in 1919. From the beginning, such statements had a threatening tone because the chain of associations – Versailles–Nazism–Second World War – is firmly established in global collective memory and political awareness.[6]

It is thus not surprising that the term and the concept of 'order' as a historical category have garnered increasing academic attention in recent years.[7] This volume aims to make a contribution to this scholarly conversation. The term 'order', derived from the Latin word '*ordo*', refers to the ordered relationship between the parts of a whole, based upon particular laws, rules, or norms. It is used not only in and for political contexts but also in legal, economic, social and religious fields, and even beyond the humanities. At the end of the eighteenth century, its hierarchical, predefined and perennial character (particularly as 'divine order') came increasingly into question. In the light of the upheavals of the time – political and social, domestic and international – it became increasingly clear that orders can change, that order can be created or restored.[8] The term, for example, came to be used more and more to designate the principles, norms and values that unite and characterize states. Over time, epithets specified its quality or its frame of reference: political order, international order, European order. In 1844, for example, François Guizot, France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, defined 'European order' as a 'good understanding among all the great powers and respect for the independence and rights of all the powers, small and great'.[9]

Since 1990, and particularly centring around the bicentenary of the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) and the centenary of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, numerous volumes with the word 'order' in their title or subtitle have been published.[10] This historiographical tendency reflects both concern about the erosion of the Cold War international order and the stability it provided and the search for possible foundations for a new one. Against this background, the interest in looking back once again at the Vienna or Paris order – the latter mostly referred to from a narrowing perspective as the 'Versailles order' – is more than historical. Historical analysis, in fact, has been motivated by an interest in resurfacing 'long forgotten expectations of what international politics could become'.[11] Labelled with all sorts of epithets ('European', 'international', 'regional', 'global', 'imperial', 'Atlantic', or even 'Nazi')[12] or replaced by its antonyms ('counter-order', 'disorder', 'disruption'),[13] the contemporary use of the concept has

been applied to various contexts and different periods. 'Order' has been studied as a historical concept, an expression used by historical actors from Prince Metternich to President Wilson, a word that can be found in historical sources and documents. But 'order' has also – and increasingly – been used in more abstract terms, as an analytical category to describe the basic structures and organizing principles of international politics or, in a wider sense, international relations at a given time.[14] Today, its use also embraces non-Western or non-European notions, challenging the Western origins and inscriptions of the concept. Building on these developments, this book intends to shed new light on both the history of concepts of order and the emergence of new orders through an examination of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and processes surrounding it.

Until recently, the historiography of the 1919 Peace Conference and the resulting peace treaties have most often been situated within the history of the First World War and of the 'post-war period', an expression that, by construction, describes a period of transition, of the demobilization of combatants and societies, thereby highlighting continuities and connections with the war and the remainders of the wartime period that continued beyond 1918. This book does not neglect either the war and its continuing effects, such as the 'war in the heads/minds' of European societies after the end of the military conflict,[15] or the violence persisting within societies on the way to peace. The politicians and diplomats involved in the Paris process did not work and negotiate in isolation. This is a notable difference from other, earlier negotiations: the peacemakers of 1919 worked under observation and pressure from public opinion. The idea of a 'democratic peace' implied 'democratic peacemaking'. The negotiators worked in a metropolis – Paris – that still bore the marks of the bombing. They worked in a climate of violence, hatred and tension, in Europe and the world, with war still ongoing, for example, in Eastern Europe, and new wars, as in Turkey, and with massacres taking place in Greece and Syria. Hatred towards the Germans did not disappear after the Armistice; it influenced the treatment of the German delegation at the presentation of the peace conditions in May 1919, and at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June. But tensions and mistrust also characterized the negotiations between the Allies, leading to continuing diplomatic conflicts. Although the exchanges between the Allied delegations were subject to verbatim records and therefore meticulously documented, they were often ruthless, dominated by personal agendas and dependent on the self-image and mission of the different national delegations and political leaders. As British historian Harold Temperley noted as early as 1920, the conference was 'a dynamic and not a static body', a living and emotional organism.[16]

However, even if the war was still going on, if political and social violence persisted even over the following decade, situating the 1919 Peace Conference solely in the context of the end of the war would mean losing sight of the processes of systemic transformation that were affecting the international order and the relations between societies and their political leaders in the period. The Peace Conference was both the venue and the addressee of long-standing aspirations that, on this occasion and for a historical moment, gained the possibility of international institutional recognition and contributed to the building of a new international order.

Furthermore, it would be pointless to consider this order exclusively in terms of diplomatic history in a narrow sense. Traditional diplomatic history, which took off in the nineteenth century, had its moment of glory in the interwar period. In that context, it is an immediate history, centred around the reconstruction of the decision-making processes that led to the entry into the war. Marked by a highly national approach, the field was quickly confined and locked, under pressure from public authorities in Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Belgium and France, into a Franco-German debate, which has its own temporal logic. In contrast, over the last thirty years, the history of international relations has taken cultural, transnational and even global turns, without abandoning its initial systemic approach. It continues to pay particular attention to the evolution of principles and institutions underpinning the international order, to the ways in which transnational processes are internationalized and institutionalized, shaping actors and spaces, and to the power relations between political and social actors. One part of this volume is devoted to developments that were less widely perceived by contemporaries than Wilson's public promises of self-determination or respect for international law. Here, the focus lies on the reorganization of global economic governance or the reconfiguration of information and communication networks, for instance.

If the Peace Conference seemed to concentrate global affairs in Paris, the book also highlights the aftermath and repercussions of the Paris order in other parts of the world. The implementation of the different peace treaties led to the multiplication of geographical borders; the emergence of new regional orders in many cases was in tension with the intended international/global order and the associated objectives.[17] This constellation begs for analysis at multiple scales. The Peace Conference was first and foremost a Parisian event. Its delegations were spread over the capital's hotels: the Belgians at the Hotel Lotti, the Japanese at the Hotel Bristol, the Uruguayans at the Meurice, the Americans at the Crillon, and the British at the Majestic and the Astoria. In some cases, the same hotel hosted several delegations, such as the Grand Hotel, where

the Ukrainians, Georgians and Albanians all had their lodgings. Life was organized around these hotels as it had been around the Viennese palaces during the 1814–15 Congress. At the same time, glamorous life resumed: Sacha Guitry married Yvonne Printemps on 10 April 1919 to the delight of the popular press. As we know, the capital hosted other conferences in parallel to the diplomatic one: the Pan-African Congress, for example, which was held in February 1919 on the Boulevard des Capucines, at the initiative of the Senegalese deputy Blaise Diagne, the first African member of the French National Assembly, and Gratien Candace, member of parliament from Guadeloupe. The conference was also a national event: the delegates did not all remain in Paris, and some in particular went to visit the devastated cities of northern France. The reception of Australian Prime Minister William Hughes by Mayor of Lyon Edouard Herriot made headlines, as did Woodrow Wilson's late visit to the city of Reims with its destroyed cathedral. Finally, the conference was also an international event: in China, the 'First Tiananmen' of 4 May 1919 echoed, among many other demands, that of rescinding the decision of the Great Four (France, Britain, USA, Italy) to allocate the German concessions on the Shandong Peninsula to Japan. Like every such international event, the conference was both prepared in advance by cohorts of legal and economic experts and improvised in response to diplomatic and international constraints, as both André Tardieu and Harold Nicolson pointed out immediately after the event.[18] It was also subject to hazard and contingency. What course would the negotiations have taken if the anarchist who shot Georges Clemenceau a month after the conference began had succeeded in killing him? In any case, endowed with iron health, Clemenceau went to convalesce in the deserted park of the Château de Versailles, not far from the Hôtel des Réservoirs, where the German delegation was staying. Surprisingly peaceful images of diplomats and politicians walking through the park appeared in the press at the time.

The Congress of Vienna had reconfigured the European order; the ambition of the Paris Peace Conference was to create a new order for the whole world. However, it was a Western, or Westernized, world that was negotiating in Paris, at least on the main stage. In that sense, the 'globalization' of international relations was very relative in 1919, just as the 'world' of the war, its global extent, had been largely restricted to imperial spaces. The reorganization of 1919 did not challenge the political epicentre of global power but confirmed the hegemonic position of the transatlantic sphere, despite the inclusion of the Pacific space and of Pacific powers like Japan, China and, in another way, the United States, at the same time. The expansion of international society in the 1920s

ultimately concerned only non-European states that had already been integrated into the international system through the many administrative unions formed from the 1860s onwards as well as the international conferences of the nineteenth century. However, on the margins of this sphere of Western power projection, regional reorganizations were taking shape. Within the Western world itself, there were two opposing visions of the international order: one supported by the United States, the other embodied by European practice. They represented two opposing approaches to conflict resolution: the diplomatic route and the jurisdictional, involving the promotion of recourse to arbitration in both inter-state conflicts and the private sphere (the International Chamber of Commerce played a decisive role in this area).

The 1919 conference was a unique event: a plethora of delegations (with as many as 200 official delegates in total), including diplomats, experts and their accompanying cohort of secretaries, mimeographers and telegraphers, who often arrived on the first trains; large councils and commissions working alongside each other, and committees that were created ad hoc over the course of the event. Furthermore, negotiations followed each other at an often unprecedented and vertiginous pace: on 7 May 1919, the German delegation was handed the text of the treaty; on 14 May the Austrian delegation arrived in Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Some of the issues examined in Paris were completely new for a peace conference: telecommunications, cultural goods, the environment, international criminal justice, social rights, etc. Putting the debates of the time into perspective can be enlightening for contemporary reflections. The book also includes contributions reminding us of the materiality of international relations, and the power balances at play in the adoption of the economic, technological, political and legal norms that were discussed.

The negotiators of 1919 were heirs to a world based on European international law, which had been gradually imposed on the world through conquest and the accompanying spread of legal norms. President Wilson's vision proposed a *variatio* of this partition, whose content and limits were underlined in his own country by his political opponents. If the order constructed in 1919 was the result of intergovernmental negotiations, it was criss-crossed by new lines of force imposed by other social actors. Voluntarily adopting a form of presentism, in part this book reflects current political and societal concerns about the place of citizens, and of women, in relation to their governments, underlining the existence of alternative negotiation agendas, represented by social groups that were kept on the fringes of the conference but saw it as an opportunity to make their demands heard at a specific and important time and place.

The Paris order was also related to the multiple geographical shifts and territorial conflicts that occurred with the downfall of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, often preceding the Paris negotiations or permanently changing the map of Europe and beyond in parallel with the Allied meetings. Commissions and decision-makers at the Paris Conference tried to formulate regulations on border demarcation and the status of minorities. Russia, which did not participate in the peace negotiations, nonetheless played a central role in many deliberations and decisions as a major absentee. This concerned more than simply the perception of Germany as a protection against Bolshevism, especially on the British side. The Paris negotiators also dealt with areas of the old Tsarist Empire, many of which, due to their geostrategic importance, were in the sphere of interest of other powers that were not represented in Paris, such as Iran. In general – and this can be observed especially at the lowest levels – the Conference's resolutions were not simply implemented and enforced but led to very different national approaches and local reactions, resistances and adaptation strategies.

Finally, the Peace Conference coexisted and often competed with other agendas at the national, supra-regional and international levels.[19] The Pan-African Congress dealt with the administration of the German colonies and the question of indigenous self-government. Also meeting in Paris were the representatives of the Suffragettes of the Allied countries, who, until their appearance before the International Labour Organization and the League of Nations, had sought in vain to make their political voice heard. Not coincidentally, members of women's rights movements were linked to other movements, such as Pan-Africanist and autonomist groups. In general, the decisions of the Peace Conference, as in the case of the Shandong issue, were frequently at odds with the expectations of national movements. Nguyễn Tất Thành – whose birth name was Nguyễn Sinh Cung – worked as a kitchen aid in one of the Paris hotels rented by the Allied envoy groups while he sought contacts with the French Socialists and demanded political autonomy for his native Vietnam in a letter to President Wilson. He did not succeed, and his disappointment contributed to his ideological radicalization; as Ho Chi Minh, he would later lead the struggle against the French and American colonial forces.[20]

With its global perspective and its focus on visions, efforts and the challenge of a new global order, this book is part of a recent body of research on the Paris Conference, the 1919–20 peace treaties and the resulting international order.[21] The blooming of this research literature and this historiography, growing out of more or less national approaches and perspectives but becoming increasingly international and even transnational, has become a subject of historical analysis in its own right.

This historiography can hardly be understood without taking into account its political frames, backgrounds and contexts and how they have changed over time.

Early judgements and interpretations of the peace treaties and the Paris peace order were strongly shaped by the accounts and interpretations of participating actors (politicians, academic experts, journalists), oscillating between (self-)justification and strong criticism. The first of these started to appear in the year of the Conference, 1919. A famous example is John Maynard Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, first published in December 1919, a book that strongly expressed and thus contributed to the spread of an extremely critical view of the peace treaties.[22] While the details of the Versailles Treaty's reparation clauses were still unspecified at the time, Keynes' sharp verdict on the reparations clauses and on the treaty in general set the tone for a number of books and other writings published from the 1920s until the period after the Second World War. These works harshly criticized the Paris peacemakers for having failed to create a stable international order, and for having paved the way to the next war, including the rise of fascism broadly and the rise of Nazism in Germany and its accession to power in 1933 in particular. Up to the years after 1945, Keynes remained the chief witness and major source for every criticism of the decisions of 1919. His arguments and interpretations were extremely important and influential, not least in German historiography up to the 1960s with its national-political agenda. Only recently have his analysis and underlying assumptions been looked at with an increasingly critical eye.[23]

Still, Keynes remains important because his starting point was not, as in many other cases, primarily a national one. His was a criticism of the international economic order created by the peace treaties, especially the Treaty of Versailles. Both in this regard and in terms of its economic focus, Keynes' analysis differed from the majority of publications by participants or academics about the conference and the peace treaties, which came in most cases from a strictly national position and perspective. Despite attempts to overcome this division into national viewpoints – for example, in a joint effort to create a common Franco-German schoolbook as early as the 1920s – this is especially true for French and German historiography. These two examples highlight the degree to which, at least until the 1960s, the interpretation of the peace was an integral part of historiographical and political debates about the origins of the First World War and the so-called 'war guilt question'. Against this background, many analyses and interpretations were less interested in the international order that followed and was established by the Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty, and more in how they could be retrospectively applied

to apportion blame for the beginning of the war, and thus in drawing connections between 1919 and 1914.[24] Despite the huge controversy it caused in Germany and in German historiography, Fritz Fischer's work on the origins of the war and his thesis of German war guilt paved the way for a change in the – German – assessment of the Versailles Treaty. Nevertheless, a bilateral, even bilateralistic Franco-German approach, centred on Franco-German relations as the core of the Peace Conference and its order (and excluding or neglecting other dimensions) remained an important, and in many cases the central, analytical perspective even after the 1960s.

After 1945, more than French or German historiography, Anglo-American research developed interpretations of the 1919 peace efforts, situating them in the perspective of the Cold War and, against this background, the competition between liberal democracy and communism as concepts of global order that were central in influential analyses. In this context, 'world democracy' and 'world revolution', represented by Wilson and Lenin, were understood as representing two global visions of order whose antagonism determined, or at least substantially influenced, decisions in Paris in 1919.[25] In this way, the historical genesis of the Cold War order was projected back in time to the end of the First World War and its immediate aftermath. As much as this perspective may be criticized today and its dependence on its political context emphasized, it nonetheless contributed to liberating historiographical research from its fixation on the Great War and the war guilt question. This shift in perspective helped to pave the way for studies that, without sharing the Cold War narrative, interpret the peace of 1919 and its consequences as a first step – in terms of security policy but also economically – towards an Atlantic or Euro-Atlantic order under American hegemony that was only able to successfully unfold after 1945.[26]

This research literature was also characterized by a growing awareness of the complexity of the peacemaking in Paris – a complexity that resulted both from the experience of the war and from the multiplicity of, and contradictions between, different political, military and economic ideas, and concepts of a peaceful order more generally, that were in play at the Conference.[27] This complexity was partly created by the problem of turning war aims into peace aims, but divergence and tensions between competing national interests within the victors' camp also played a major role.[28] In this context, the connections between, and interdependence of, developments and constellations within particular polities, societies and borders, on the one hand, and in foreign policy and international dynamics, on the other, have been addressed much more systematically in a number of important recent studies than in the older literature.

Together with growing distance from these historical events, these fac-tors help to explain why, by the last third of the twentieth century, the academic discussion on the peacemaking in Paris had become much more sober, depoliticized and international.[29]

Part of this process was the end of the historiographical fixation on the Treaty of Versailles and the peace with Germany. Although there can be no doubt about the constitutive meaning of Versailles for the post-1919 international order, this fixation – expressed terminologically by the term 'Versailles system' – yielded a constricted and reductive perspective. Of course, there was research on the other treaties (St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, Sèvres), but often from the perspective of national histories. It took time to overcome these narrow and limited approaches, making way for first a European and then an international perspective, with the political and historiographical concept of a 'European order' gaining more attention and importance.[30] To a certain degree, this development was driven by the transformation of Europe with the end of the Cold War European order and of the division of the continent after 1990. Since that time, more attention has been given to the histories of Eastern, Eastern Central and South-eastern Europe in the first half of the twentieth cen-tury, and especially after 1919. One reason for this increasing attention is the fact that the geopolitical order after the end of the Soviet Empire was so similar to the territorial order that had emerged in Eastern and South-eastern Europe during and after the First World War. Nations that first became independent in those years, like the Baltic states, gained their independence once again after 1990. In addition, there was an increas-ing awareness that the potential for violence, including genocidal mass violence, in the 'bloodlands' of Eastern and Eastern Central Europe was part, or even a consequence, of the national, or nationalized, dispensation that was an integral element of the 1919 Paris order.[31]

At the same time, historians began to address two important aspects of the order that followed the First World War and the peace treaties of 1919–20. On the one hand, the multinational, multiethnic empires of continental Europe had dissolved. On the other hand, not only did the overseas empires of the European victors, above all Britain and France, continue to exist but it was after 1919 that they reached the zenith of their geographical and power-political extension. With new historiographical attention to the League of Nations in recent years, it has been analysed as both a global institution and an imperial one, organized to stabilize British and French colonial rule.[32] As the results of the Paris Peace Conference and its decisions have increasingly come to be regarded as a global peace, this peace has increasingly been analysed not only in terms of global history but also imperial. Against this background, recent research has

started to address the discrepancy between the Wilsonian idea of national self-determination as a guiding principle of the Paris peace order and the continuity of imperial rule, within Europe (in Ireland) and particularly beyond. Research in this context has stressed the ambiguity of the 'Wilsonian Moment', not least the disappointed hopes and frustrated expectations of movements in the global South for national independence or colonial liberation and the long-term effects of this gap between expectation and reality.[33]

It is important to stress that a global, or global history, perspective on 1919 and the Paris order does not imply a narrative of globalization. The war and the peace were both global but not necessarily globalizing. A global perspective has to address the crises of economic globalization after 1919, and its collapse after 1929.[34] Recent studies have called into question the older interpretation of the Paris Peace Conference as a decisive step on the way from an imperial world order to a national one. Besides the questioning of the linearity of this type of narrative, its contradiction with the continuity of empire(s) beyond the year 1919 has also been noted.[35] We now need to develop a more complex global perspective on the Paris Peace Conference, one that is not determined by the national principle nor limited by the idea of national independence. The Paris order was characterized by the complex and contradictory coexistence of nationality and imperiality as central structural elements. Nationalizing empires and imperializing nation states simultaneously influenced the establishment of this order and contributed to the tensions and conflicts around its development after 1919.[36]

Structure of the Book

The structure of this volume reflects the attempt to understand the Paris Peace Conference as part of a process aimed at creating a new international order after the First World War that would secure peace and prevent another war. Efforts to create such an order, global in its ambition and scope, began as early as the last years of the war and continued beyond the conclusion of the individual peace treaties, in some cases well into the 1920s. The individual contributions deal with different dimensions of order and shed light on international ideas that influenced the Peace Conference or emerged from it. In many cases, these conceptions show the link between national interests and international order, which was always also a tension. The studies in this book show that the actors at the Conference were not seeking to overcome nation states or a nation-state order, but rather to create a multilateral system that would balance

out the predominance of the autonomous nation state, yielding an order of balance and interdependence between the national interests of different polities.

This objective is already clear from the considerations of law, and especially international law, that played a determining role in the Peace Conference, and that were to form the basis for what would be referred to today as rule-based multilateralism, in the League of Nations system (Part I). Beyond the international legal and political-diplomatic aspects of the post-war dispensation, the international economic and financial system formed another central dimension that was characterized by increasing interdependence between different countries. This went far beyond peace treaty reparations (Part II). The global nature of the Versailles order becomes evident in the light of aspirations to establish regional systems during the Peace Conference, often following Western states' interests and reflecting the tension between national self-determination and imperial claims to power and legitimacy (Part III). The idea of national self-determination, programmatically proclaimed by Wilson as the main goal of the peace negotiations and the core of a new world order, was a major challenge to the Allied efforts to establish order in Paris. It was linked to the dynamics of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, the dissolution of multinational empires, and the emergence of a new world of states. With it, new actors entered the stage of international politics (Part IV). But alternative ideas of order were also partly represented in the political class of the great powers, not least the rising world power, the United States.

Opening Part I, Vincent Laniol's contribution deals with the significant role that considerations of law and justice played during the elaboration of the Treaty of Versailles. The clash of divergent, often contradictory views dominated the Allies' talks and negotiations before the Conference even got started and continued to the point when the German delegation travelled to Versailles. Not least in the so-called 'penal provisions' of the Treaty (Articles 227–230) but also in the famous 'war guilt article' (Article 231), concepts and objectives from civil law (liability for damages, etc.) were mixed together with ideas of criminal law, particularly with regard to the prosecution and punishment of war crimes, including the drive to bring the former German Kaiser before an international tribunal. It is precisely here that the Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles belong to the history of international criminal law and international criminal law policy. In Paris, the international order was conceived not only as a legal order in general but more specifically as a penal order. Allied efforts to lay down new principles of legal accountability and criminal prosecution were further encouraged by the idea of creating and securing

peace through international jurisdiction, as well as by public opinion in the victorious states, especially France and Great Britain (as in Lloyd George's famous 1918 campaign slogan, 'Hang the Kaiser!'), for which a just peace had to be a punitive one.

For many German International Law Scholars, too, ideas of peace were first and foremost ideas of law, as Miloš Vec argues in his contribution. The Paris Peace Treaties aimed at an international legal order with broad regulatory reach. As much as German legal scholars in the immediate context of 1919 rejected the Versailles Treaty and sharply criticized the emerging order because of the inferior status assigned to the German Reich, later, under changing political conditions, they recognized the opportunities that the increasing juridification of international relations created for Germany at the same time. Moreover, the extent to which this juridification was also occurring in other fields (economy, technology, science) was in continuity with developments from the period before 1914, when dynamics of internationalization had begun to break through the hard shell of state sovereignty. In other parts of the world and among Allied powers, this increased internationalism challenged traditional politics and diplomatic customs, as was the case of the Japanese Empire. Urs Matthias Zachmann shows how after 1919, in a process of learning and adaptation, Japanese politicians and diplomats adopted the idealistic Wilsonian mode of politics, at least in performative terms. This did not mean leaving behind the ultra-realism that had marked the country's foreign policy since the pre-war period, with its orientation towards clearly defined, and above all confrontationally determined, national goals.

The new order that took shape in Paris also included new actors and institutions in the field of international economic and technical relations: they are the subject of Part II. Martin Bemmann deals with the Supreme Economic Council, founded by the Allies in 1919, and its efforts, driven primarily by the British side, to compile and spread global economic data. The responsibility for producing the *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, initially published by the Council, shifted to the League of Nations as early as 1921. By this time, it was no longer focused solely on economic measures related to the consequences of war and reconstruction but was increasingly guided by the ambition to create a global economic order. Since the end of the war, the compiling and publishing of the *Bulletin* had been driven by government, not primarily private economic actors, unlike previous efforts at compiling large-scale economic statistics. And as it was aimed less at individual countries than at the world, it stood for the emerging global order while at the same time contributing to its further development. There was no contradiction between this global character and the continuing economic competition of national states. Bemmann's

account sheds further light on the simultaneity of internationalism and nationalism as a determining element of the global order of 1919.

Pascal Griset addresses the question of telecommunications, noting that while submarine telegraph cables were a highly visible part of the negotiations at Versailles, the issue of wireless telegraphy was marginal. He highlights the role played by engineers in keeping radio out of the scope of the Conference negotiations. These men, who played a decisive role during the war, succeeded in 1918 in exercising direct control over the projects that would follow it, far from the politicians and diplomats. They wanted to define the mode of governance of world telecommunications using their own criteria, taking an approach that represented an early phase of technocratic internationalism. He observes that although the United States was a driving force in this moment, it cannot be considered a pivotal one in the affirmation of American leadership. In this respect, in the light of the evolution of major technical systems, the Peace Conference is better understood as a parenthesis that revealed the tensions between technical and balance of power logics than as a decisive step towards internationalization. Because of the complexity of the issues at stake and the emergence of new ways of structuring negotiations, to be carried out by actors who had previously been little visible, he considers this process in the first half of 1919 one of the first expressions of an 'innovation diplomacy' that would flourish in the twentieth century.

Jérôme Sgard deals with the emergence of international commercial arbitration, which also occurred in the period immediately after the end of the First World War. It was part of the system of supranational arbitration with its claims to global legitimacy, embodied primarily by the League of Nations. Established as part of the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Court of Arbitration began its work in 1923. It was not created as a result of Western politics or as an instrument of hegemonic powers, first and foremost the United States, but on the initiative of companies and entrepreneurs. The Court nonetheless had a strong political impact: international commercial arbitration modified the boundaries of nation-state sovereignty and contributed to the emergence of early global governance structures that had a significant impact both in the private and the public sphere.

Part III deals with local developments, and thus the relationship between regional and global efforts to establish a new post-war order. Looking at the example of the Caucasus, Etienne Forestier-Peyrat examines the dissolution of multinational imperial structures, emphasizing the dynamics and effects of the downfall of Tsarist Russia and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. More precisely, he analyses the options and opportunities for geographical and political change in a region shaken

by revolution and civil war and trapped between political vacuums at the margins of two collapsing empires, Tsarist and Ottoman. At the same time, and on this basis, it became a sphere of influence of the emerging Soviet Union. The experience of regional disorder and disintegration led to new efforts to restore or establish (new) order, centred around the Paris imperative of national self-determination and sovereignty. But these efforts led to new crises and conflicts, which affected not only the stability but also the legitimacy of the emerging new administrative and political structures.

In his contribution, Thomas Fischer argues that the role of Latin America and Latin American states deserves to be more than just a footnote in accounts of the Paris Peace Conference. Focusing on Brazil and using a 'glocalist' approach, Fischer points out that the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference were a decisive watershed for Latin America. Representatives of several Latin American states were present in Paris, participating actively in the peacemaking process, and the peace treaties and the emerging order had profound repercussions for the Latin American states and their societies. The chapter shows how the Peace Conference provided an opportunity for Latin American states to establish themselves as accepted actors on the international stage. One of their guiding principles was the idea of national greatness, which in the case of Brazil was not only a political message of domestic importance but intended to shape the Paris negotiations and Brazil's role in the League of Nations. From the perspective of international order, the de-Europeanizing and globalizing effects of the presence of non-European states in Paris 1919 should not be underestimated.

The challenges and dilemmas of post-war planning are also the subject of Carolin Liebisch-Gümüş's contribution on proposals for the future of Istanbul after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The author develops the thesis that diverging ideas about the metropolis on the Bosporus not only reflected but also articulated different ideas of international and regional order. Thus, the chapter does not look at the Ottoman Empire or the emerging modern state of Turkey from the established perspective of great statesmen and high politics but focuses on a set of actors whose internationalism, which had grown out of different interests, gave rise to ideas for the creation of an 'international city' – including even the project of making Istanbul the seat of the League of Nations. While their various proposals expressed new ideas of international sovereignty, what seem at first glance to have been progressive visions also reflect the persistence of Western imperial pretensions to hegemony and superiority. And, Liebisch-Gümüş argues, the emancipatory aspect of the Wilsonian imperative of national self-determination was undermined by the denial

of the Turkish nation's right or ability to govern a multinational 'cosmopolis' like Istanbul.

In Part IV of the volume ('Challenges of the Paris Order'), Mona L. Siegel explores the story of Soumay Tcheng, a political activist who was a lawyer and diplomat in the Chinese delegation in Paris. As a woman, Tcheng was an exception on the political-diplomatic stage of the Peace Conference. Moreover, she stood in a specific way for self-determination as a global principle: in her work, she combined the goal of individual self-determination as a woman and national self-determination as a representative of China. She thus linked together feminism and nationalism, particularly when she went to Paris, where she both met French feminists and successfully prevented the head of the Chinese delegation from signing the Peace Treaty that ceded Shandong to Japan. As an opponent of colonialism and as a feminist, Tcheng challenged the – exclusively male – peacemakers, advocating a different global order based on democracy and self-determination. This was contradicted by imperial ideas of domination and the gender stereotypes of the European great powers. Tcheng thus also stood for those women who entered the world stage in Paris to promote their agenda, supporting transnational movements and gaining a global public, even if they did not immediately succeed in realizing their aspirations.

Emmanuelle Sibeud likewise does not present a success story in her chapter, taking a broad perspective on the 1919 Pan-African Congress, which was organized by the US sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois and the Senegalese politician Blaise Diagne, and which took place in Paris at the same time as the peace negotiations. Sibeud critically reassesses historiographical narratives and interpretations that present the Congress either as a doomed visionary initiative that heralded the awakening of people of African descent, or as a cynical concession made by the great powers in the context of the division of the German colonies and the Middle Eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire. For Sibeud, the Pan-African Congress instead brought into relief the formation of a new world order characterized by intensified racialization. While this process did not begin in Paris, the Peace Conference contributed to making 'race' a decisive criterion for belonging to the international community, including in legal, international and diplomatic terms.

At the same time, Woodrow Wilson and his ideas of order may not have prevailed in Paris, or only partially, but he shaped the agenda of the Peace Conference, and especially of the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Versailles. So great and dominant did Wilson appear, whether among his followers or his critics, that we know little about other American concepts of global order at the end of the First World War. Manfred Berg

turns to these alternative conceptions, linking them to concrete manifestations of American nationalism. Berg argues that at the centre of the disputes between Wilson and his domestic political opponents on both the right and left was the question of multilateralism versus unilateralism. In this light, the chapter analyses not only Wilson's ideas on the role of the United States in a liberal world order but also the views of his political rivals, who ultimately succeeded in preventing the country from joining the League of Nations. The challenge of this tension between transatlantic commitment and withdrawal from supranational institutions has shaped American politics up to the present, with ever-new answers in evolving international and global constellations.

The concluding chapter by Eckart Conze underlines the global dimension of the Paris Conference and the intrinsic link between European and global agendas and ideas of order. Following the much-quoted formulation of the 'Wilsonian moment' (Erez Manela), Conze stresses what he calls the 'Paris moment', referring both to the special context in which this event took place and to its aftermath, as well as to the legacy of a long war that did not end everywhere in 1919. Not only were individual peace treaties negotiated and signed in the French capital and in Versailles, not only were particular topics and questions discussed, debated and negotiated over, but a new international order was founded. Now, a century after the Peace Conference, the 'old demons', as French President Emmanuel Macron has called them – nationalism, unilateralism, authoritarianism – are alive again. The findings of research, and of this volume in particular, on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 are thus of more than simply historiographical interest.

* * *

Laurence Badel is Professor of Contemporary History of International Relations at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. A specialist of European diplomatic practices, she is developing work in two directions: the history of women in diplomacy and international relations and the history of diplomatic capitals. Her recent publications include *Diplomaties européennes: XIXe–XXIe siècle* (Presses de Sciences Po, 2021), which won the Institut de France's 2022 Prix Edouard Bonnefous; as editor, *Histoire et relations internationales: Pierre Renouvin, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle et la naissance d'une discipline universitaire* (Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2020); and 'Diplomacy and the History of International Relations: Redefining a Conflictual Relationship', *Diplomatica* (2019). Her latest book, *Ecrire l'histoire des relations internationales, XVIIIe–XXIe siècle: Genèse, concepts, perspectives*, was published by Armand Colin in 2024.

Eckart Conze is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History and Co-Director of the International Research and Documentation Centre for War Crimes Trials (ICWC) at the University of Marburg (Germany). He has held visiting professorships at the Universities of Toronto, Cambridge, Bologna, Utrecht and Jerusalem. His main areas of research are the history of international relations (nineteenth to twenty-first cen-turies), the history of elites and the aristocracy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the history of security. His books include *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (with Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes and Moshe Zimmermann; Karl Blessing, 2010), *Geschichte der Sicherheit: Entwicklung – Themen – Perspektiven* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017) and *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt* (Siedler, 2018). His latest book

is *Schatten des Kaiserreichs: Die Reichsgründung 1871 und ihr schwieriges Erbe* (dtv, 2020).

Axel Dröber is a researcher at the German Historical Institute Paris and visiting lecturer at Université Sorbonne-Nouvelle. He studies nineteenth and twentieth-century Western European history, with a focus on the history of public security and the state monopoly on violence in post-revolutionary Europe. His book-length study on the National Guard during the Restoration and the July Monarchy in France, *Nation, Militär und Gesellschaft*, was published in 2022 (Heidelberg University Publishing). He is currently working on the topic of migration and citizenship after the First World War. Taking a transnational perspective, he is investigating the history of citizenship in the context of the international peace order of 1919, the development of naturalization in France, and transnational German migration.

Notes

1. The first sentence in MacMillan, *Peacemakers*, 1. From a more global, non-Western perspective, see also Goebel, *Anti-imperial Metropolis*.
2. Miller, *My Diary*, 36.
3. See, for example, Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order*; Jackson, Mulligan and Sluga, *Peacemaking*; Bouchard and Ingram, *Beyond the Great War*; Leonhard, *Große Erwartungen*; Davion and Jeannesson, *Les traités de paix*.
4. Sharp, *Consequences of Peace*, 4–5.
5. Or in another way, as Arno Mayer's study on 'containment and counterrevolution at Versailles' demonstrates. See Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy*.
6. See Vladimir Putin, '75th Anniversary of the Great Victory'.
7. See Badel, *Diplomaties*.
8. See Meinhardt et al., 'Ordnung', 1295.
9. In a speech to the Chambre des députés on 21 January 1844: '*la bonne intelligence de toutes les grandes puissances et le respect de l'indépendance et des droits de toutes les puissances, petites ou grandes*': 'Discussion sur l'entente cordiale entre la France et l'Angleterre, au sujet des affaires d'Espagne et de Grèce', Guizot, *Histoire parlementaire*, 190.
10. See, for example, Sluga, *Invention*; Ikenberry, *After Victory*; De Graaf, De Haan and Vick, *Securing Europe*; Jarrett, *Congress of Vienna*; Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order*; Jackson, Mulligan and Sluga, *Peacemaking*; Bouchard and Ingram, *Beyond the Great War*.
11. Sluga, *Invention*, 4.
12. See, for example, Durand, *Nouvel ordre*; Belissa, *Repenser l'ordre*; Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order*; Chomsky, *World Orders*; Dukes, *World Order*; Keylor, *A World of Nations*; Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*; Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations*; Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order*; Krige and Rausch, *American Foundations*; Hoffman, *American Umpire*; Fink, *The Long Gilded Age*; Scott-Smith and Rofe, *Global Perspectives*; Sharman, *Empires of the Weak*; Menzel, *Ordnung der Welt*; Kissinger, *World Order*; Maull, *Rise and Decline*; Maull, 'Die internationale Ordnung'; Mearsheimer, 'Bound to Fail'; Tooze, *The Deluge*.

13.   See Bouchard and Ingram, *Beyond the Great War*.
14.   Osterhammel, 'Weltordnungskonzepte'.
15.   See Krumeich, *Versailles 1919*.
16.   Temperley, *History*, 236.
17.   On Central Europe, see Plyer and Schirmann, *Les traités*.
18.   Nicolson, *Peacemaking*; Tardieu, *La Paix*.
19.   Goebel, *Anti-imperial Metropolis*.
20.   Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 839; Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 216–17; see also Manela, *Wilsonian Moment*, 3–4, and Mishra, *From the Ruins*.
21.   See Jackson, Mulligan and Sluga, *Peacemaking*; Bouchard and Ingram, *Beyond the Great War*, as well as the monographs by Conze, *Die große Illusion*; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*; Schwabe, *Versailles*; Bernardini, *Parigi 1919*; with a focus on questions of international law and the international legal order, Payk, *Frieden*, and Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*; in a broader perspective: Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order* and Tooze, *Deluge*.
22.   Keynes, *Economic Consequences*.
23.   See, for example, Tooze, *Deluge*, or Schuker, 'J.M. Keynes'.
24.   See, for example, in Germany: Ritter, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk*; Erdmann, *Die Zeit*; in France: Renouvin, *Les origines immédiates*.
25.   Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy*.
26.   Jackson, *Beyond the Balance*; Tooze, *Deluge*; Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace*; Cohrs, *The New Atlantic Order*.
27.   See, for example, with their emphasis on the question of reparations: Trachtenberg, *Reparation*; Krüger, *Deutschland*; Marks, *The Illusion*.
28.   Soutou, *L'Or et le sang*.
29.   For a balanced and – at the time – consensual overview of international research 75 years after the conference, focusing on the Versailles Treaty, see Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser, *Treaty of Versailles*. From a broader perspective, see also Steiner, *The Lights*.
30.   See, for example, Payk and Pergher, *Beyond Versailles*.
31.   Snyder, *Bloodlands*; Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*; Bartov and Weitz, *Shatterzone*. With particular attention to the dynamics of nation-building and the concept of sovereignty: Smith, *Sovereignty*.
32.   Henig, *League of Nations*; Pedersen, *Guardians*; Guieu, *Le Rameau*.
33.   Manela, *Wilsonian Moment*; Goebel, *Anti-imperial Metropolis*.
34.   Boyce, *The Great Interwar Crisis*.
35.   Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*.
36.   Hirschhausen and Leonhard, *Empires*, 611.

Bibliography

Armstrong, James D. *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Badel, Laurence. *Diplomaties européennes, XIXe–XXe siècle*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2021.

Bartov, Omer and Eric D. Weitz. *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013.

Belissa, Marc. *Repenser l'ordre européen (1795–1802): De la société des nations aux droits des nations*. Paris: Kimé, 2006.

Bell, Duncan. *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Bernardini, Giovanni. *Parigi 1919: La conferenza di pace*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2019.

Boemeke, Manfred F., Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser (eds). *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Bouchard, Carl and Norman Ingram (eds). *Beyond the Great War: Making Peace in a Disordered World*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022.

Boyce, Robert. *The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Burkman, Thomas W. *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008.

Chomsky, Noam. *World Orders Old and New*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Cohrs, Patrick O. *The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

——. *The New Atlantic Order: The Transformation of International Politics, 1860–1933*. Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Conze, Eckart. *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt*. Munich: Siedler, 2018.

Davion, Isabelle and Stanislas Jeannesson (eds). *Les traités de paix, 1918–1923: La paix les uns contre les autres*. Paris: Sorbonne Université Presses, 2023.

De Graaf, Beatrice, Ido de Haan and Brian Vick (eds). *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Dukes, Paul. *World Order in History: Russia and the West*. London: Routledge, 1996.

Durand, Yves. *Le nouvel ordre européen nazi: La collaboration dans l'Europe allemande (1938–1945)*. Brussels: Complexe, 1990.

Erdmann, Karl Dietrich. *Die Zeit der Weltkriege*. Vol. 1: *Der Erste Weltkrieg, die Weimarer Republik*. Stuttgart: Union Verlag, 1973.

Fink, Leon. *The Long Gilded Age: American Capitalism and the Lessons of a New World Order*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.

Gerwarth, Robert. *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923*. London: Allen Lane, 2016.

Goebel, Michael. *Anti-imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Guieu, Jean-Michel. *Le Rameau et le glaive: Les militants français pour la Société des Nations*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2008.

Guizot, François. *Histoire parlementaire de France: recueil complet des discours prononcés dans les Chambres de 1819 à 1848*. T. 4. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1864.

Henig, Ruth. *The League of Nations*. Edinburgh: Haus, 1973.

Hirschhausen, Ulrike von and Jörn Leonhard. *Empires: Eine globale Geschichte 1780–1920*. München: C.H. Beck, 2023.

Hoffman, Elizabeth C. *American Umpire: The New Rules of World Order, 1776 to the Present*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.

Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Jackson, Peter. *Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Jackson, Peter, William Mulligan and Glenda Sluga (eds). *Peacemaking and International Order After the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.

Jarrett, Mark. *The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013.

Keylor, William R. *A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Keynes, John Maynard. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1919.

Kissinger, Henry. *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*. New York: Penguin, 2014.

Koskenniemi, Martti. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Krige, John and Helke Rausch (eds). *American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012.

Krüger, Peter. *Deutschland und die Reparationen 1918/19: Die Genesis des Reparationsproblems in Deutschland zwischen Waffenstillstand und Versailler Friedensvertrag*. Stuttgart: De Gruyter, 1973.

Krumeich Gerd (ed.). *Versailles 1919: Ziele-Wirkung-Wahrnehmung*. Köln: Klartext, 2001.

Leonhard, Jörn. *Der überforderte Frieden: Versailles und die Welt 1918–1923*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018.

Leonhard, Jörn (ed.). *Große Erwartungen: 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt*. Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War*. London: Murray, 2001.

Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Marks, Sally. *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe 1918–1933*. Basingstoke/ London: Macmillan, 1976.

Maull, Hanns W. 'Die internationale Ordnung: Bestandsaufnahme und Ausblick'. *SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen* 4(1) (2020), 3–23.

Maull, Hanns W. (ed.). *The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Mayer, Arno J. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

Mearsheimer, John J. 'Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order'. *International Security* 43(4) (2019), 7–50.

Meinhardt, Helmut et al. 'Ordnung', in Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer and Gottfried Gabriel (eds), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 6 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 1249–1309.

Menzel, Ulrich. *Die Ordnung der Welt*. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015.

Miller, David Hunter. *My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents*, vol. 3. New York: Appeal Printing Company, 1924.

Mishra, Pankaj. *From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012.

Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking 1919*. London: Constable, 1933.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. 'Weltordnungskonzepte', in Jost Dülffer and Wilfried Loth (eds), *Dimensionen internationaler Geschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 409–28.

Payk, Marcus M. *Frieden durch Recht? Der Aufstieg des modernen Völkerrechts und der Friedensschluss nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018.

Payk, Marcus M. and Roberta Pergher (eds). *Beyond Versailles: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and the Formation of New Polities after the Great War*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2019.

Pedersen, Susan. *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Plyer, Ségolène and Sylvain Schirmann (eds). 'Les traités de paix en Europe centrale: quels potentiels pour quelles réalisations?' *Revue d'Allemagne* 52(2) (2020).

Putin, Vladimir. '75th Anniversary of the Great Victory: Shared Responsibility to History and our Future (2020)'. Retrieved September 2023 from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63527.

Renouvin, Pierre. *Les origines immédiates de la guerre (28 juin–4 août 1914)*. Paris: Alfred Costes, 1925.

Reynolds, Michael A. *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Ritter, Gerhard. *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des 'Militarismus' in Deutschland*, 4 vols. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1959–1968.

Schuker, Stephen A. 'J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations: Part 1'. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 25(3) (2014), 453–71.

Schwabe, Klaus. *Versailles: Das Wagnis eines demokratischen Friedens 1919–1923*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019.

Scott-Smith, Giles and J. Simon Rofe (eds). *Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods Conference and the Post-War World Order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Sharman, Jason C. *Empires of the Weak: The Real Story of European Expansion and the Creation of the New World Order*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Sharp, Alan. *Consequences of Peace – The Versailles Settlement: Aftermath and Legacy 1919–2015*. London: Haus, 2010.

Sluga, Glenda. *The Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021.

Smith, Leonard V. *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Snyder, Timothy. *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*. New York: Basic Books, 2010.

Soutou, Georges-Henri. *L'Or et le sang: Les buts de guerre économique de la Première Guerre mondiale*. Paris: Fayard, 1989.

Steiner, Zara. *The Lights That Failed: European International History 1919–1933*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Tardieu, André. *La Paix*. Paris: Payot, 1921.

Temperley, Harold W. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press, 1920.

Thomas, Martin. *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918–1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Tooze, Adam. *The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931*. London: Allen Lane, 2014.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Chapter 1

The Order of Versailles
A Peace for Law and Justice?

Vincent Laniol

In a text published shortly after his death in 1929, Clemenceau wrote in defence of the peace treaties of 1919–1920 that the victors of the First World War wanted to create a 'Europe of Law' in 1919.[1] This emerging European order, he wrote, was intended not only to be based on the application of new rights, such as the right of a people to self-determination – although this was a fundamental pillar of the order – it was also to give international law a central place in new relationships between states. And all of the belligerent nations, both victors and vanquished, hoped for the establishment of a peace founded on shared legal principles, which for many were embodied in the ideas of President Wilson.

At the same time, the First World War, as a total war, had shattered the insubstantial conventions then in force concerning the laws of warfare, the *jus in bello*, inherited from the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907. Large sections of public opinion, particularly in the victorious states, indubitably felt that sanctions were needed against those accused of being the originators of the conflict. And while the Allies were willing to take the Wilsonian ideas as a starting point, they quickly exceeded the bounds of the US president's peace programme, partly in response to domestic demand for harsher treatment of the vanquished.

This study will examine the unfolding of this debate on law and justice – which was at the heart of the Peace of Versailles from its inception – and seek to analyse the potentially consensual aspect of its legal dimension. A further part will focus on the reception of this 'paix du droit' in public opinion, before evaluating the contributions of lawyers to the development of the treaties and characterizing the contributions of

the Peace of Versailles as the construction of a new international order. Querying the concept of a 'justice' whose definitions diverged between victors and vanquished, it will conclude by estimating how great a role hatred of the enemy played in the constitution of this new world order.

In recent years, the Paris Peace Treaties have been studied from new perspectives, improving our grasp of the role of different actors, the significance of the context and the constraints affecting the decisions taken at Versailles.[2] A key moment was the great conference of 1994, organized by the German Historical Institute of Washington DC and the University of California, Berkeley's Center for German and European Studies, whose conclusions were published under the title *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years*.[3] Following that body of scholarship, the issue of the order established by Versailles is no longer approached in terms of a teleological retrospective reading of events as the inevitable grounds of the Second World War. Instead, scholars seek to place the events of 1918–1920 in their context, emphasizing the representations of contemporaries,[4] most importantly in terms of the dynamics[5] of public opinion marked by hatred inherited from the First World War – the continuation of the 'war in the minds' ('*Krieg in den Köpfen*'), in Gerd Krumeich's expression.[6] As a result of this reassessment of the treaties, the role of the 'entourages' of statesmen is now mainly studied in the field of political history,[7] becoming essential in understanding the decision-making process at Versailles and in particular the origin of the regulations and clauses set out at this international peace conference. Consequently, the group of experts consulted in 1919,[8] and in particular jurists,[9] has been the subject of extensive study in recent years, allowing us to examine Georges-Henri Soutou's claim, summarizing the thoughts of Bertrand de Jouvenel on the subject, that 'the Treaty of Versailles is the work of jurists'.[10]

The Law, a Tool for Consensus?

At the start of the peace process, the legal dimension in all its elements was already present. At the request of Ludendorff and the high command of the German army, a motion to restore peace on the basis set out in speeches by President Wilson, coupled with a request for an armistice, was sent to the US president alone in early October 1918. The approach was skilful: in this way he obtained respite for his troops, and, from Berlin's point of view, offered the least bad possible option for a final peace settlement. Finally, in parallel, it aided the formation of a civil government on which the weight of the possible defeat would rest, and which would have the confidence of the Reichstag. This was the purpose

of the formation of Max von Baden's government in early October 1918. In a series of exchanges consisting of four notes on each side, President Wilson obtained from the German government an end to the submarine war and, ultimately, promises of constitutional reforms that led to Kaiser Wilhelm II's abdication. By the end of October 1918, the German government seemed to be in retreat, having abandoned its political stances and accepted Wilson's programme, as well as giving up the country's military positions on the Western Front. However, Berlin expected to play one last card: approaching and negotiating with Wilson alone might eventually break down the alliance of the Allied countries. Germany had not taken an official position on the conditions of Wilson's peace plan, and it was not clear whether the country's leaders would accept these war aims. Indeed, we know that they almost refused to do so, as Edward Mandell House, the American representative sent to Europe, was forced to pressure the Allies, particularly the French and the English, into making a separate agreement with Germany to obtain a *mezzo voce* acceptance of the Wilsonian points as the basis for a future peace.[11]

The telegrams from Robert Lansing, US Secretary of State, to the German government on 5 November 1918 summarized this acceptance of the Wilsonian premises by both camps: 'Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.'[12]

In the process, two reservations concerning Wilson's speeches had nevertheless been confirmed. The first, concerning the freedom of the seas, came at the request of London: '[The Allied governments] must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.'[13] The inclusion of this proviso was requested in order to clarify the definition of financial reparations and the reconstruction of invaded areas, which were not very explicit in Wilson's points: 'By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.'[14]

The Fourteen Points were not the only conditions that Wilson mentioned. All of his speeches of 1918, and in particular those of 11 February, 6 April, 4 July and finally 27 September, were focused on the preconditions of peace. The last of these was of particular interest to Berlin, as it stated: 'The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between

those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.'[15] The Germans could accept this assertion, which implied a justice that would be truly neutral towards victors and defeated alike, as a central element of a future peace, and they expected to be treated (almost) equally to the victors. Combined with the idea of a ban on selfish economic schemes within the future League of Nations, these principles could easily be approved in Berlin.

However, while all had accepted this consensual legal basis, each power defined the content of the Wilsonian points differently, and retained only those elements that were favourable to its own views. For example, for Paris, the point on Alsace-Lorraine (Wilson's eighth point), which refers to the reparation of the damage done to France in 1871, meant that Germany would simply return this territory to France, while in Berlin, it was expected that at least a referendum would be held to consult the populations of these territories. Moreover, France very quickly moved away from this general acceptance of the Fourteen Points. Its diplomats, for example, rejected Wilson's speeches, starting from the first procedural plans they drew up for the future Peace Conference at the end of November 1918 under the leadership of Philippe Berthelot: 'Nor can they take President Wilson's fourteen proposals as a starting point, as they are principles of public law, which may provide inspiration for the negotiations, but which lack the concreteness that is indispensable to settling upon precise and concrete stipulations.'[16]

While the French proposal to refuse the Fourteen Points was finally abandoned at the beginning of the Peace Conference in favour of a reaffirmation of Wilsonian principles, the fact remained that Paris had always seen this basis for peace as, at a minimum, subject to review and revision. It was in this context that Clemenceau had André Tardieu prepare the memoranda and notes intended to serve as the basis for an approval of French territorial claims in January and February 1919. This involved the division, neutralization and occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, and the annexation of the Saar Basin to the 1814 French borders, elements that exceeded the scope of Wilson's Fourteen Points.

President Wilson had to defend his ideas by going directly to Europe for the Peace Conference – a first for a serving American president – and by successfully placing the League of Nations at the top of the peace agenda. Over a number of sessions in February 1919, the Conference Commission in charge of this matter, chaired by Wilson, prepared a first draft pact. During these sessions, the conference had its most challenging discussions on the idea of the renewal of international law. What would be revolutionized by the new collective security organization under

international law? What new powers would states have in the future Versailles order? What means would be put in place to apply and enforce the regulations of the new organization? Working on the basis of a plan drawn up jointly by the Anglo-Saxon powers, the draft pact quickly rejected the solutions proposed by Léon Bourgeois and the French delegation to equip the organization with its own armed forces[17] or even an international general staff.

The arguments of the jurists on the commission, such as Ferdinand Larnaude,[18] dean of the Faculty of Law in Paris, did nothing to shake Wilson's determination. On 11 February, Larnaude declared: 'I believe that to successfully eliminate the militarism that was the cause of the war, there must be an internationalization of forces',[19] and on 13 February that 'the Law is nothing if it does not have force behind it'.[20] Conversely, Wilson's thinking rested on the existence of a 'transnational community of self-sovereign individuals',[21] which he called the 'court of public opinion', and which was supposed to guarantee peace in the end. In his latest book, Leonard Smith emphasizes that, from Wilson's point of view, it was this 'force' of transnational public opinion that was to act against the threat of an aggressor state, in the form of a 'collective intention' and not a 'military force'. These two visions could not but clash during debates on the future funding of the League of Nations. When Wilson suggested that 'the judgement of the tribunal of public opinion will be much more effective [in this regard] than that of any other tribunal in the world', Larnaude, the jurist, responded: 'Public opinion can judge the great questions better than a court of law, I admit, but questions of law, questions of interpretation are above it.'[22] This did not mean that the French delegates were not prepared to reform international law and support the idea of a collective security organization – much to the contrary. French lawyers were in no doubt about the need for this reform, including the need to address one of the fundamental principles of public international law, that of state sovereignty. Hence, Larnaude declared that 'this idea of absolute sovereignty is, I believe, more abstract than real: in fact, states have long been agreeing to sacrifices of sovereignty. … When it comes to establishing a right, let us see it through completely, and say frankly that we want to create this right and substitute it for the old one in order to bring an end to wars.'[23]

In the end, the Wilsonian vision prevailed, but a fundamental element had been changed when the conditions of peace were delivered to the defeated Germans on 7 May 1919. The drive to open the League of Nations to all international actors was now blocked by the refusal to allow Germany and the other defeated nations to join. It was during Wilson's trip aboard the *George Washington* that he changed his opinion on this subject, suggesting a probationary period for Germany before its

actual entry.[24] The League of Nations would definitely not be an area of agreement. When, for example, the German delegation proposed its own draft pact, primarily based on the ideas of Walter Schücking and several other experts – all of them committed to the Wilsonian ideology – the Allies did not even consider the proposals. In essence, rather than bringing them together, the law ultimately divided the two coalitions. Even more than that, however, it was different visions of justice that ensured that there would be a split between them.

The Law to Deliver Justice

The question of the use of the law during the war and the action of jurists on the 'legal front' has been the subject of various recent studies.[25] Beginning with the violation of Belgium's neutrality, legal arguments were an essential weapon for the Allies against the Central Powers during the conflict. With regard to 1919, they have often been linked to the application of one-sided victors' justice to the defeated, and in particular to the imposition of sanctions. In this respect, French and British public opinion was quite ruthless, particularly against Wilhelm II, who had been the focus of a disproportionate hatred. Large sectors of French opinion, for example, demanded 'justice' in the form of the prosecution of the ex-Kaiser, as illustrated by any number of examples. As early as 20 November 1918, a group of 254 Parisian citizens sent a petition to the French government, which stated:

> We come to you for justice in the name of our dead, justice against the Kaiser, the perpetrator knowingly responsible for the armed banditry that we have just witnessed with horror over these four years, and which has finally ended, thanks to your energy, with the triumph of the gendarmes. … In light of the moral values that are taught to free Men, we do not believe that any difference can be established between Bonnot and the Kaiser, except that the latter has operated on a larger scale, and that is all. The motive is the same: to enrich oneself at others' cost. Any search for another reason for the aggression against us would be futile. These acts are based on the same mentality: the abuse of brutal force using any and all means, whatever they may be, without scruple. Only the result differs. In one case, a few victims; in other, millions of human lives sacrificed, the flower of humanity. And we are to show respect for the great Assassin, while Bonnot was found to be fit for the guillotine? By what right could the latter be sentenced today if the crime of the other remained unpunished?[26]

Members of the population of Paris's tenth and nineteenth *arrondissements* expressed a similar reaction, as noted by the police commissioner in his weekly report:

> It is not possible for Wilhelm II to be dealt with in Holland as a distinguished person and to find peace there when he has unleashed the greatest catastrophe that humankind has ever suffered. The Allies' victory will not be complete until he has atoned for it; he, and his accomplices, must appear before the tribunal of the peoples. It would be incomprehensible if only the German people, who will pay with their money and labour for many years, were to be punished.[27]

The archives of the General Secretary of the Peace Conference hold many complaints from citizens to the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, containing requests for the former Kaiser's extradition from Holland, where he had taken refuge before the Armistice. Many use the same words and the same vocabulary to express the idea of justice as an institution of punishment. For example, a midwife in Honfleur asked Holland to 'hand over Wilhelm the instigator of murder'.[28] On the other hand, the modalities by which people accused of crimes against the laws and customs of war should be judged were subject to debate. Some wanted the adoption of a law and a decree-law with retroactive effect[29] 'for exemplary and terrifying punishment and the mandatory extradition of criminals' on the basic principle 'for exceptional crimes, an exceptional law'.[30] Others wanted civil law to apply to this type of crime.[31] Some French citizens, such as a certain Lapetite, a former notary clerk in Auxerre whose two sons were killed at the beginning of the conflict, even went so far as to file a complaint against the former Kaiser under Articles 296 et seq. of the Code Pénal, 'as the former Kaiser's aggression against France was premeditated', 'as this war was a crime against humanity' and 'as in the eyes of all humanity, he is the main culprit and the main instigator of this atrocious and abominable war'.[32] To summarize, the French considered themselves to have justice on their side.[33]

Some letters even suggested humiliating sanctions, such as the following letter from a group of French and Argentinian citizens:

> Lock the brute in an iron cage and, on board the most magnificent ship in his mighty, now-sold squadron, he would travel the world. Everyone would have the right to see this human beast, this monster, this lava from the Avernus. For one *piastre*, anyone could spit in his face … The resulting profits would be used to support the victims.[34]

It seems clear that the state of mind in Paris was not a conciliatory one. The same was true in London, where the November-December 1918 election campaign focused on the issue of reparations and the prosecution of the Kaiser. Even Labour's George Barnes, joined by Lloyd George, had issued the famous demand to 'hang the Kaiser!' The British National

Archives houses a collection that contains requests for the Kaiser to be extradited and brought to trial from local authorities and workhouses, representing people from all regions of the United Kingdom, including the most impoverished populations. The relatively large size of the corpus demonstrates how widely this demand echoed after the Armistice, even if its wording, reproduced identically in many letters, no doubt reflected a prior agreement between these groups and the political authorities.[35]

Similar noises were being made in US society. The archives of the Conference secretariat also include correspondence from Americans expressing the same thirst for punishment, including the creation of new rules of international law, not merely the application of existing rules, which could prevent the punishment of the defeated: 'Justice, God and Men were never so brutally violated in the history of all time as has been the case in this war. The guilty must be punished. … Shall this crime go unpunished because the criminals have broken through all the safeguards of international law? That cannot be. Crime must be punished in accordance with its enormity.'[36] This was the mood – the 'ambiance', as Pierre Renouvin would have said – surrounding the sometimes-technical discussions at the conference.

It is precisely this question of punishment with or without a prior law or rule that divided the jurists present on the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. The French jurists, and particularly Larnaude, opposed the application of the principle of *nulla poena sine lege* (no penalty without law). At the time, there were no already existing rules on the basis of which acting heads of state could be prosecuted for violations of the law of nations. Larnaude also wanted acts of omission to be subject to prosecution: in other words, he argued that the Kaiser should also be penalized for failing to prevent violations of the laws and customs of war. All of these claims, which were contrary to accepted rules and practices, were challenged by the American delegation, led by Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who published a minority opinion that differed from the position of the other members of the Commission. Larnaude argued that new rules would lead to the development of a 'new sensibility among men'[37] and that public opinion was not germane to resolving this dispute.[38] In the end, the Commission's final report, drafted on 29 March, proposed the creation of a special tribunal for infringements of the law of nations, including for heads of state, and a special body to deal with the matter of individual responsibilities for the violation of Belgium's neutrality. Very early on, however, the commission declared itself to be opposed to any idea of trials and criminal sanctions based on responsibility for the outbreak of the war or for the war as a whole.

The debate was resumed at the Council of Four, where Clemenceau campaigned for the Kaiser to be tried, while Wilson, and to a lesser extent Lloyd George, were more reserved about the fate of a former head of state, even though everyone present agreed that the Allied side had been fighting for justice.[39] Wilson claimed that there was no precedent for the trial of an ex-head of state, citing the principle of *nulla poena sine lege* and saying that he wanted to avoid making the Kaiser a martyr. Clemenceau, for his part, insisted that punishing the instigator of the war was essential to establishing international law even in the absence of a precedent: 'We now have the perfect opportunity to take the principle of responsibility, which is at the basis of national law, and transpose it into international law.'[40] Gradually, as the discussion progressed, the basis of what would become Article 227 took shape: the Kaiser would be indicted not on the basis of his responsibility for the war but for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties – that is, for the violation of Belgium's neutrality, which was guaranteed by the treaties of 1839, to which Prussia was party. As the Italian Prime Minister, the lawyer Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, commented, it was no longer really a matter of law in the strict sense, since the Kaiser would not be judged under a pre-existing law but 'as history is passing by'.[41] In Larnaude's view, it was an act of international morality and an act of 'supreme international policy'.[42]

Moral and legal factors thus gradually came to blend together in this discussion of punishment because of the Allies' definition of justice. A similar imbroglio arose around the issue of reparations. As Leonard Smith has rightly noted in his most recent works, 'justice' in international relations could be pursued either on the model of civil law, targeted at compensation for damage caused to civilian populations (only contained in the pre-Armistice agreement), or on that of criminal law. While the two were theoretically separate, in reality the two discussions would be blended together both voluntarily and unintentionally.

Article 231 and its genesis, on which much has been written, is the legacy of this debate. Pierre Renouvin has clearly demonstrated that this article was born not out of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, but out of the Reparation Commission. It reflected the desire of the American authorities to avoid the mainly British and French claim that Germany should be made to pay all of the costs of the war[43] (and not just to compensate for damage caused to civilian populations), by producing a kind of international civil law identifying its responsibility for the outbreak of the war as the legal basis for reparations. At the same time, Article 232 limited Germany's responsibility based on its capacity to pay. Nevertheless,

the ambiguous wording of Article 231, the seemingly minor addition of the word 'causing' by the young diplomat John Foster Dulles, the word 'aggression' used in his text (although it was also present in the pre-Armistice agreement) and the reference to a war 'imposed upon' the Allies by Germany all gave a moral dimension to Article 231, and thus to reparations. That is how it was to be understood in Berlin. And it was on this very subject of justice that the victors and the defeated were totally opposed.

Conclusion: Justice for the Vanquished?

The clash over the issues of law and justice was resolved when the delegation of the defeated Germans arrived at the end of April 1919. For many months after the Armistice, the German population lived in a kind of illusion described by Ernst Troeltsch as a *Traumwelt*: a dream world in which the acceptance of Wilson's conditions and the pre-Armistice agreement were supposed to prevent them from experiencing the consequences of defeat. But while German public opinion may have lived in this dream, this was much less true of German diplomacy. When Brockdorff-Rantzau took over leadership of the Wilhelmstrasse in December 1918, he sent Chancellor Scheidemann a peace programme in which he already foresaw the option of withdrawing and resigning in the event of a dishonourable peace.

As the negotiations progressed and Berlin profited from indiscretions about the future peace treaty (including via the US Colonel Conger, according to Klaus Schwabe),[44] hope soon dwindled. Within the German cabinet, important discussions concerning the instructions to be given to the delegation took place on 21 and 22 March 1919. These instructions summarized these debates: Germany would oppose any justification of the severity of the peace conditions on the basis of admitting German war guilt, and Brockdorff-Rantzau was to enter into negotiations with the Allies where the question of war guilt would be left aside.[45]

But Brockdorff-Rantzau was fundamentally pessimistic about the conditions of the future peace and came prepared for a confrontation on the origins of the war. The next day, 'under strong public pressure',[46] he reacted to a statement from Paris about a possible verdict claiming 'Germany as the sole originator of the war'.[47] In the *Berliner Zeitung am Mittag* on 5 April, he indicated that he would not admit this interpretation. The German foreign minister was thus very conscious of these issues when he arrived in Versailles. The conditions in which the German delegation found themselves in Versailles undoubtedly played a role in

the psychological conditioning of its leaders before they were confronted with the conditions of the peace as such. Not enjoying complete freedom of movement, anxiously waiting in their hotel rooms to be informed of the content of the future treaty, the members of the delegation clearly perceived the world around them as hostile, a kind of encirclement.

As a result, the minister prepared two texts, one short and the other long and vindictive. When Brockdorff-Rantzau received the peace conditions on 7 May 1919, his first and only face-to-face contact with the Allies, Clemenceau opened the session with the declaration that 'the time has now come for a heavy reckoning of accounts' and explained that there would be no verbal negotiations. Brockdorff-Rantzau chose to remain seated while giving the second speech – a breach of diplomatic practice. Contrary to his official instructions, he focused on the matter of responsibility for the war. 'Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie', he exclaimed – and a betrayal of the notion of justice.

The Allies, he said, had brought with them to the peace negotiations 'an ally' for Germany: '*the Law*, which is guaranteed to us by the agreement concerning the principles of the peace' (i.e. the pre-Armistice agreement).[48] He went on to declare that 'the principles of President Wilson have thus become binding for both belligerents, for you as for us, and also for our former Allies. These various principles demand of us heavy national economic sacrifices'.[49] This was what Brockdorff-Rantzau called a 'peace of justice'. It was on this premise that, from 13 May, the German delegation launched a *Notenkrieg* (a war of notes) against Clemenceau. In the wording of their counter-proposals, they tried to demonstrate that the Allies had violated Wilson's conditions, and that Germany was not the only side responsible for the conflict. Brockdorff-Rantzau consequently demanded justice for Germany and the continuation of its international position as a major power, declaring that 'Germany has a right to discuss the conditions of peace'.[50] It was in the name of justice that Brockdorff-Rantzau called for the organization of a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine and the application of the right of peoples to self-determination to Austrians, Upper Silesians and the inhabitants of the city of Danzig in their desire to unite with Germany. He also requested equal membership of the League of Nations.

The Allies' response to the German counter-proposals was harsh and dismissive. For example, this response in the form of a violent diatribe validated Germany's interpretation of Article 231: 'Germany's responsibility, however, is not confined to having planned and started the war. She is no less responsible for the savage and inhuman manner in which it was conducted.'[51] Germany immediately decried the injustice of this charge, especially as the Allies refused to remove the *Schmachparagraphen*

(paragraphs of shame). The drama of Versailles was largely driven by this misunderstanding around the definitions of Law and Justice: each country had its specific definitions of these notions. For Paris, these concepts meant punishing Germany for its conduct in the war as a judge would have done in a trial in a national court, whereas Berlin wanted justice done to Germany, with the country able to maintain a leading position on the world stage and be treated fairly. The difficulty of defining and specifying the content of these two concepts seems to have made it more difficult for the various parties to accept the conditions for peace than at previous conferences or congresses. In the end, what led to their blurring was the hatred of the sworn enemy inherited from a total war.

Vincent Laniol holds a Ph.D. and an *agrégation* in history. In 2015, he defended his thesis under the supervision of Robert Frank (Paris I/UMR SIRICE) on the process of the 'entry into peace' following the First World War and the international dynamics in play on the cusp of the Peace Conference of 1919. He has recently published articles on diplomats and public opinion at the Peace Conference (in Davion and Jeannesson, eds, *Les traités de paix (1918–1923)*, Sorbonne Université Presses, 2023) and on Clemenceau's negotiating strategy in Paris (in Brodziak and Tomei, eds, *Clemenceau et la paix*, La Geste, 2022). He is a member of the subcommission for the publication of French diplomatic documents (DDF) from the years 1917–19. He has also studied the seizure and looting of materials from archives and libraries in the twentieth century, and (in collaboration with Alexandre Sumpf) edited and published the proceedings of a colloquium on the subject, *Saisies, spoliations et restitutions* (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012).

Notes

1. Clemenceau, *Grandeurs et misères*, 151–70.
2. See the section 'Essai d'analyse de la "mémoire savante" de la Conférence de la Paix et règlement de la paix' of my doctoral thesis: Laniol, 'Entrer en paix?', 41–67.
3. Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser, *The Treaty of Versailles*.
4. Laniol, 'Versailles'.
5. I will use terminology specific to the French school of the history of international relations, stressing the movement and circulation of factors influencing international relations: Frank and Soutou, 'En guise de conclusion', 693.
6. Krumeich, 'Versailles 1919', 53–64.
7. Among many other works, see Tricaud, *L'entourage de Georges Pompidou*; Binoche, 'Pierre Mendès France'.
8. Kitsikis, *Le rôle des experts*; Laniol, 'Etre expert'.
9. Sacriste and Vauchez, 'La "guerre hors-la-loi" (1919–1930)' and Guieu, 'Les juristes français'; see also articles in issue 149 of the journal *Relations internationales* of

January–March 2012, edited by Jean-Michel Guieu and Dzovinar Kevonian, on the topic of 'Juristes et relations internationales', and those in the special issue 7 of the journal *Monde(s)*,titled 'Profession, juristes internationalistes?' published in 2015 and edited by Dzovinar Kevonian and Philippe Rygiel. See also the Ph.D. thesis of Vincent Genin, '"Laboratoire belge" du droit international?', and his book *Le Laboratoire belge*.

10. 'Le traité de Versailles est œuvre de juristes': Soutou, *L'Or et le sang*, 847.
11. See Laniol, 'Entrer en paix?', 160.
12. Fuller and Dennett, *Papers*, 468.
13. Ibid., 469.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 319.
16. 'Ils ne peuvent non plus prendre comme point de départ les quatorze propositions du président Wilson, car ce sont des principes de droit public, dont les négociations pourront s'inspirer, mais qui n'ont pas le caractère concret indispensable pour aboutir au règlement précis de stipulations concrètes.' AMAE, CPC, series A. Paix, vol. 285, Plan de procédure français, 21 November 1918, 35–36.
17. Blair, 'Les origines en France de la SDN', 286. See also Blair's Ph.D. thesis, 'La France et le pacte de la Société des Nations', and Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power*, 582–92.
18. Laniol, 'Ferdinand Larnaude'.
19. 'Je crois que, pour arriver à la suppression du militarisme qui a été la cause de la guerre, il faut une internationalisation des forces'. CHSP, Stenography of the 8th meeting of the League of Nations Commission, 11 February 1919, 20.
20. 'Le Droit n'est rien s'il n'a pas la force derrière lui'. CHSP, Stenography of the 10th meeting of the League of Nations Commission, 13 February 1919, 14.
21. Smith, *Sovereignty*, 31.
22. 'L'opinion publique peut juger les grandes questions mieux qu'un tribunal, je le concède, mais les questions de droit, les questions d'interprétation sont au-dessus d'elle'. CHSP, Stenography of the 7th meeting of the League of Nation's Commission, 10 February 1919, 9–10.
23. 'Cette idée de souveraineté absolue est, je crois, plus abstraite que réelle: en fait, les Etats depuis longtemps, consentent à des sacrifices de souveraineté. … Quand il s'agit d'instaurer un droit, allons jusqu'au bout, disons franchement que nous voulons créer ce droit et le substituer à l'ancien pour faire disparaître les guerres.' CHSP, Stenography of the 13th meeting, 26 March 1919, 17–18.
24. Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 338. See also Schwabe, *Woodrow Wilson*, 175.
25. See, for example, the virtual exhibition 'Des facultés sur le front du droit. Paris et Toulouse dans la Grande Guerre' (edited by Anne-Sophie Chambost, Florent Garnier and Alexandre Gottely), retrieved November 2018 from http://expo-grande-guerre-biu-cujas.univ-paris1.fr. See in particular Vincent Genin's article on this subject, within the virtual exhibition: 'Louis Renault'.
26. 'Nous venons vous demander justice au nom de nos morts, justice contre le Kaiser, auteur responsable et conscient de l'entreprise de brigandage à main armée à laquelle nous venons d'assister avec horreur durant ces quatre années, et qui vient enfin, grâce à votre énergie, de se terminer par le triomphe des gendarmes. … Au regard de la morale qu'on enseigne aux Hommes libres, nous défions qu'on puisse établir une différence entre Bonnot et le Kaiser, sinon que ce dernier a opéré plus en grand, et c'est tout. Le mobile est le même: s'enrichir aux dépens d'autrui. On en chercherait vainement un autre à l'agression dont nous avons été victimes. Les actes procèdent de la même mentalité: abus de la force brutale avec emploi, sans scrupules, de tous les moyens, quels qu'ils soient. Le résultat seul diffère. Ici, quelques victimes; là, des millions de vies humaines sacrifiées, la fleur de l'humanité. Et c'est pour le grand Assassin que l'on aurait des égards, alors que Bonnot a été jugé bon pour la

guillotine? De quel droit le condamnerait-on aujourd'hui si le crime de l'autre restait impuni?' AMAE, CPC, series A. Paix, vol. 65, 5. Jules Bonnot was a French anarchist and head of the 'bande à Bonnot', responsible for a series of hold-ups and murders. He was killed in a police raid in 1912; the other members of the gang were tried the following year.

27. 'Il n'est pas possible que Guillaume II soit traité en Hollande comme un personnage de distinction et qu'il trouve là toute quiétude alors qu'il a déchainé la plus grande catastrophe dont le genre humain ait souffert. La victoire des Alliés ne sera complète que lorsqu'il aura expié; il doit comparaître comme ses complices devant le tribunal des peuples. On ne comprendrait pas que le peuple allemand, qui paiera de son argent et de son travail pendant de longues années, soit seul châtié.' APPP, B_A/ 1614, letter from divisional commissioner Duponnois to the Préfet de Police, 19 November 1918.

28. '… livrer Guillaume instigateur d'assassinats'. AMAE, ASCPA, 1st series, vol. 216, telegram of 28 January 1919.

29. Such a procedure would of course have been contrary to the general principles of law.

30. '… pour châtiment exemplaire et terrifiant et pour extradition obligatoire des criminels.' 'À crimes exceptionnelles, loi exceptionnelle.' Letter from Ballivy, a retired priest from Pont d'Ain, 10 March 1919, AMAE, ASCPA, 1st series, vol. 216.

31. This was the case, for example, of *conseiller* René Accolas at the Cour des Comptes (letter of 15 March 1919, ibid.).

32. '… attendu que l'ex Kaiser a prémédité son agression contre la France'; 'que cette guerre a été un crime contre l'humanité'; 'qu'aux yeux de l'humanité toute entière, il est le principal coupable et le principal auteur de cette guerre atroce et abominable.' Letter from Lapetite, 25 December 1918, ibid.

33. Letter from D. Selbras (from Toulon), 26 February 1919, ibid.

34. 'Enfermer le fauve dans une cage en fer qui à bord du plus magnifique vaisseau de sa puissante escadre vendue ferait le tour du monde. Chacun aurait le droit de voir la bête humaine, ce monstre, cette lave de l'averne. Moyennant une somme d'une piastre, chacun pourrait lui cracher au visage. … Le bénéfice qu'on en retirerait serait destiné à secourir les victimes.' Letter from Bernard Darrac et al., 17 December 1918, ibid.

35. TNA, FO 371/ 3227.

36. 'La Justice, Dieu et les Hommes n'ont jamais été aussi brutalement outragés dans l'histoire de tous les temps que comme cela a été dans cette guerre. Les coupables doivent être punis. … Est-ce que ce crime restera impuni parce que les criminels ont passé outre les garde-fous du droit international? Cela ne peut pas être. Le crime doit être puni eu égard à son énormité.' Letter from W.E. Daniels (from Hot Springs South Dakota), 8 March 1919, AMAE, ASCPA, 1st series, vol. 216.

37. '[Une] sensibilité nouvelle des hommes.' CHSP, Stenography of the 8th meeting of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 24 March 1919, 21.

38. CHSP, Stenography of the 6th meeting of the 3rd subcommittee, 8 March 1919, 7.

39. Mantoux, *Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre*, 122.

40. Ibid., 190–91.

41. Ibid., 192.

42. BPA, LGP, LG/F/147/3/14. Reply of the Allied and associated powers to the observations of the German delegation on the conditions of peace, 16 June 1919, 30–31.

43. Laniol, 'L'Article 231'.

44. Schwabe, *Woodrow Wilson*, 155–59.

45. Luckau, *The German Delegation*, 209.

46. Dreyer and Lembcke, *Die deutsche Diskussion*, 113.

47. TNA, GFM 33/3308, H 233702. 'Die Nachricht dass die Pariser Konferenz beabsichtige einen einseitigen Schuldspruch gegen Deutschland als alleinigen Urheber des

Weltkrieges zu fällen, und dass ein Ententegerichtshof eingesetzt werden solle, um die Schuldigen zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen, muss ich als wenig wahrscheinlich bezeichnen. Die Deutsche Regierung würde sich ein so einseitiges Verfahren, auf den Versuch uns eine Schuld ohne jede objektive und unparteiliche Prüfung des Sachverhalts zuzusprechen, nicht gefallen lassen.'

48.   '… allié: *le Droit*, qui nous est garanti par la Convention relative aux principes de la Paix.' CHSP, Stenography of the meeting of 7 May 1919.

49.   'Les principes du Président Wilson ont donc créé une obligation pour les deux belligérants, pour vous comme pour nous, ainsi que pour nos anciens Alliés. Ces divers principes exigent de nous de lourds sacrifices au point de vue national et économique.'

50.   Fuller and Dennett, *Papers*, 803.

51.   BPA, LGP, LG/F/147/3/13, 3.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve (AMAE), Archives of the General Secretary of the Peace and Ambassadors Conferences (ASCPA), Commercial and political correspondence (CPC)

Archives of the Préfecture de police, Paris (APPP)

The National Archives, Kew (TNA)

British Parliamentary Archives, London (BPA), Lloyd George Papers (LGP)

The Sciences Po Centre for History, Paris (CHSP)

Published Sources

Binoche, François et al. 'Pierre Mendès France et ses conseillers pour les affaires internationales'. *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 4 (2014).

Blair, Scott G. 'La France et le pacte de la Société des Nations: le rôle du gouvernement français dans l'élaboration du pacte de la SDN, 1914–1919', Ph.D. thesis. Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, 1991.

——. 'Les origines en France de la SDN: La Commission interministérielle d'études pour la Société des Nations 1917–1919'. *Relations internationales* 75 (1993), 277–92.

Boemeke, Manfred F., Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Gläser (eds). *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Clemenceau, Georges. *Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire*. Paris: Plon, 1930.

Dreyer, Michael and Oliver Lembcke. *Die deutsche Diskussion um die Kriegsschuldfrage 1918/19*. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1993.

Frank, Robert and Georges-Henri Soutou. 'En guise de conclusion: Démocratie et relations internationales', in Robert Frank (ed.), *Pour une histoire des relations internationales* (Paris: PUF, 2012).

Fuller, Joseph V. and Tyler Dennett (eds). *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1918, Supplement 1, The World War, vol. 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933.

——. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, vol. 6, Document 89. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946.

Genin, Vincent. *Le Laboratoire belge du droit international: Une communauté épistémique et internationale de juristes (1869–1914)*. Brussels: Académie royale de Belgique, 2018.

——. 'Louis Renault: légitimer le droit international en France'. *Des facultés sur le front du droit*, 1 July 2018. Retrieved 20 September 2021 from http://expo-grande-guerre-biu-cujas.univ-paris1.fr/louis-renault/.

——. '"Laboratoire belge" du droit international? Réseaux internationaux, expériences et mémoires de guerres des juristes belges (1869–1940)', Ph.D. thesis. Université de Liège, Liège, 2017.

Guieu, Jean-Michel. 'Les juristes français, la Société des Nations et l'Europe', in Jacques Bariéty (ed.), *Aristide Briand, la Société des Nations et l'Europe, 1919–1932* (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007), 185–99.

Jackson, Peter. *Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Kitsikis, Dimitri. *Le rôle des experts à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919: Gestation d'une technocratie en politique internationale*. Ottawa: Editions de l'université d'Ottawa, 1972.

Krumeich, Gerd. 'Versailles 1919: Der Krieg in den Köpfen', in Gerd Krumeich and Silke Fehlemann (eds), *Versailles 1919: Ziele, Wirkung, Wahrnehmung* (Essen: Klartext-Verlag, 2001).

Laniol, Vincent. 'Versailles: L'échec n'était pas inscrit'. *L'Histoire* 449 (2018), 50–62.

——. 'Etre expert à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919: Tentative de comparaisons internationales', in Stanislas Jeannesson, Fabrice Jesné and Eric Schnakenbourg (eds), *Experts et expertises en diplomatie: La mobilisation des compétences dans les relations internationales du congrès de Westphalie à la naissance de l'ONU* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2018), 145–69.

——. 'Entrer en paix? Dynamiques internationales et phase préparatoire de la Conférence de la Paix: Opinions, images de l'ennemi et dissensions interalliées (4 octobre 1918–18 janvier 1919)', Ph.D. thesis. Université de Paris 1, Paris, 2015.

——. 'L'Article 231 du traité de Versailles, les faits et les représentations: Retour sur un mythe'. *Relations internationales* 158 (2014), 9–25.

——. 'Ferdinand Larnaude: Un "délégué technique" à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919 entre expertise et "culture de guerre"'. *Relations internationales* 149 (2012), 43–55.

Link, Arthur S. (ed.). *Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 53. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Luckau, Alma. *The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941.

Mantoux, Paul. *Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars–28 juin 1919)*, vol. 1. Paris: CNRS, 1955.

Sacriste, Guillaume and Antoine Vauchez. 'La "guerre hors-la-loi" (1919–1930): Les origines de la définition d'un ordre politique international'. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 151–52 (2004), 91–95.

Schwabe, Klaus. *Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918–1919*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

Smith, Leonard. *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Soutou, Georges-Henri. *L'Or et le sang: Les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre mondiale*. Paris: Fayard, 1989.

Tricaud, Sabrina. *L'entourage de Georges Pompidou (1962–1974): Institutions, hommes et pratiques*. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2014.

Turpin, Frédéric et al. 'Pierre Mendès France et ses conseillers pour les affaires internationales'. *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 128(4) (2014).

Chapter 2

Purging the Dross?
German International Law Scholars on the Treaty of Versailles and the Post-war Order

Miloš Vec

What is 'peace'? In 1919 as at any other time, the answer very much depended on who one asked. 'Peace' has always been a contested concept with shifting semantics.[1] International law has played a central role in its history.[2] 'Peace' can be read as the realization of security, justice, (social) welfare and/or the absence of violence, and thus a welcome condition. But to others, the very same 'peace' may symbolize suppression, deprivation and blatant disregard for sovereignty, autonomy and rights. As Thomas Hippler and I have noted elsewhere, 'one man's peace is another man's oppression and one man's fight for justice is another man's breach of a peaceful order'.[3]

In a letter to Ernst Jünger of 10 April 1981, the notorious German jurist Carl Schmitt made an autobiographical reference to Versailles. This letter, written four years before Schmitt's death, is one of his last to Jünger. Schmitt wrote: 'My point of orientation at that time (1936) was (and always will be) the egregious stupidity of Versailles.'[4] He confessed that thinking about Versailles had been a red thread running through his (long) life, in the course of which he encountered four different political systems.[5] Of course, changing political contexts over time must be considered when reading and interpreting Schmitt's writings from different periods.[6] In a little booklet issued in 1926,[7] he attacked the League of Nations and the new world order on a number of different grounds. Similar objections can be found in the writings of other German legal scholars,[8] but Schmitt's were formulated in an exceptionally precise, elegant and also aggressive manner (as noted by contemporary reviewers).[9] In his rhetorical assault on the new post-war order, Schmitt denied the very existence

of an international community. He declared that state sovereignty was still the basis of international relations, and that the League of Nations had no instruments to compel any member to comply with international rules. He saw the League's various bodies and regulations as imperialist structures and criticized inequalities among the member states.

The Paris Peace Treaties of 1919 were thus not only 'technical' regulations, giving legal form to terms concluded between contracting parties. They represented the inherently utopian, and fundamentally disputed, ambition to establish a new and better world order.[10] In this, they were in line with the peace treaties of 1648 and 1815.[11] The treaties 'merged older ideas of sovereignty and legitimacy with early twentieth-century concepts of public consent, population politics, state responsibility, and universal interdependence, creating, or at least contributing to, a new understanding of how a stable international order ought to operate in the future'.[12]

This utopia clashed with the realpolitik of post-war societies. Many reminisced in anger about the battlefields of the First World War. This created pressure for post-war actions to give meaning to the sacrifices made by the peoples of Europe in the name of a better future for their various fatherlands.[13] This future now had to be realized.

In this context, international law and lawyers played an important and complex role. Soon after the end of the war, the American political scientist James Wilford Garner[14] and the French jurists Alexandre G. Mérignhac and Ernest Lémonon[15] wrote thick treatises reassessing the events of the past years in the light of international law. Many more booklets, pamphlets, articles and contributions followed. All of these works simultaneously affirmed the importance of international law and showed that it was undergoing a categorical transformation.[16] The Paris Peace Treaties were also a 'laboratory of sovereignty',[17] satisfying some peoples and nations and dissatisfying many others. Although I cannot provide precise and quantitative evidence, I would claim that no other country engaged as deeply in reassessing past and future events from the point of view of international law as Germany. This German scholarship met high standards of jurisprudential methodology[18] and drew on rich traditions of public law.[19] After the war, this German literature took on a new political dimension, driven by an 'Anti-Versailles furor'[20] in the interwar years.

This fight against Versailles and the League of Nations was often marked by highly moralized language, addressing a great variety of questions large and small. The content and mood of these general political debates on Versailles shaped the legal perception of the post-war dispensation and framed discussions within the community of international legal scholars. German legal scholars were not cut off from this political

and moral climate but participated in creating it. Specialists in public law in particular had to address the legal consequences of the war and the outlook for a future world order.[21] Was it possible *not* to take a stand?

This nationalistic debate in Germany was an important one, as the Versailles treaty specifically aimed to legally regulate Germany's situation within the post-war international order at a level of detail so extreme that it was probably without historical precedent.[22] The combination of this development with the League of Nations, including its sub-organizations and their own abundant regulations, pushed things even further in that direction of further juridification of international relations.[23] German international lawyers quickly noted the League's expansionist tendency.[24] More and more subjects and regulatory matters came into the scope of the League and its legal instrumentarium, and as such called for critical examination. In addition, the new international order was intertwined with the national order through the international law created in Paris: it was also closer than ever before. International law and constitutional law interacted, and it was not only Germany's domestic order that had to respect the externally imposed political guidelines. In other words, for proponents and critics alike, Versailles and the League of Nations were at the centre of the most important political debates of the time. And at the very heart of those political debates were legal language and instruments.[25] What did German international law scholars write about this new world order? Of course, surveying even all of the basic topics and interventions is beyond the limited scope of this chapter. Its aim is simply to sketch general outlines in order to offer the reader some insights into the places, structure and features of that debate. The questions of whether and how the quoted voices can be generalized, and how they should be interpreted, may remain open to debate.

Criticisms of the international legal order, like that of Schmitt quoted above, were common in Germany. Some of the country's international lawyers imagined very radical political alternatives to the Paris Peace Treaty system. How representative was Schmitt of international legal thinking in the 1920s in Germany in this respect? And what did the German scholarly debate about the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations look like in general?

A Juridification of International Relations: Legal Views on Foreign Policy

As stated above, I take it not only that this German debate was more intense than in other countries but that questions of international law – in

a very specific sense – played a more prominent role than they did elsewhere. In this section, I will argue that the intensity of this debate was due to the sheer quantity and stringency of regulations included in the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations system (1), the expansion of their scope (2), and the astonishing corresponding quantity and variety of printed publications in particular (3).

A Transformation of International Law: Comprehensive Treatment of the Regulations

The widely shared impression that the debates about Versailles and about the League of Nations were everywhere in Germany obviously had something to do with the vast scope of the explicit regulations that they introduced, the multiple political ambitions underlying them and the challenges posed by their legal interpretation. It has been said that the extent of these regulations exceeded all peace treaties of the modern age.[26] But there was some clear continuity with the pre-war period in this respect. The last decades of the nineteenth century and the years around 1900 brought intense quasi-legislation into international law by way of law-making treaties. The main factors behind this development were the Industrial Revolution, with its risks and opportunities for economy and technology,[27] along with the attempts at the Hague conferences at disarmament and establishing international rules for conduct during war and peace.[28]

Reading German international law textbooks from the 1920s, it is clear that discussing the ongoing doctrinal shifts and formulating comments and commentaries adequate to the challenge of addressing the emerging new international legal order in all its complexities was a considerable challenge for authors of the time. International law spread into new regulatory fields, and its Paris architects attempted to experiment with new legal structures. The regulations of the peace treaties and their provisions concerning the League of Nations affected the widely shared understanding of the international community and its past and recent development. As they brought new regulatory fields into the scope of international law, they affected its sources as well. And finally, these regulations also stimulated scholars to think about the legal characteristics of the new order. The registers of major international law textbooks from the time feature literally hundreds of references to pages on the presentation of the specific regulations that emerged only in 1919.[29] As a result, these references spread to nearly all sections of international law textbooks.[30] In the 1920s, this international legal order showed a tendency to expand its regulatory scope to new fields of international relations beyond questions

of war and peace: issues of economics, social welfare and many other sub-
jects came to be a much greater focus than before. This was another golden
age for multilateralism and the conclusion of even more treaties.[31] This
development in turn fuelled international legal discourse further and led
to intense scholarly interactions with institutions and publishing forums.

Intensity and Institutions of Discourse: The Continuing Professionalization of German International Law

The second factor behind the intensity of German national discourse on
the international system and its new legal order was the sheer number of
participating German institutions and publishing forums. It was not only
official political institutions, such as the (revisionist) Zentralstelle für
Erforschung der Kriegsursachen (Centre for the Study of the Causes of the
War),[32] that were observing the new world order and its legal provisions.
Scholarly and other associations also took an active interest. Among them
were the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Politik des Rechts (founded in 1919
in Heidelberg),[33] the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht (founded in
1917),[34] the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft[35] and the Deutsche Liga für
den Völkerbund,[36] to name only a few. At German law faculties, insti-
tutes and chairs of international law were established. A central point
of the new academic activism on international law was Kiel,[37] where
in 1914 Theodor Niemeyer had founded the Institut für Internationales
Recht, a hub of international law scholarship during and after the First
World War.[38] Kiel was the only law faculty with a chair in international
law until 1930, when the University of Cologne established one (appoint-
ing Hans Kelsen).[39] The next such centre to be founded, in 1923, was
Hamburg's Institut für Auswärtige Politik, directed by the international
lawyer Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy.[40] But Germany's attempts to
confront the challenges of the new legal order did not end here. To com-
pensate for the lack of scholarship in the field of international law at
German universities[41] and fill the perceived gap between academic treat-
ment and the urgent political need for foreign policy advice, the Kaiser-
Wilhelm-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
was founded in 1924–25.[42] In addition to its journal, first published in
1929, the Institute had a documentation system and a library.[43]

The intensification of the German international legal discourse can
be interpreted as a reaction to the juridification of foreign relations.
International law represented a particular challenge to the German
political class, which had probably underestimated it as a justification
narrative before the First World War.[44] The war was fought in the name
of international law, particularly by the Allies.[45] The Paris Peace Treaties

were aimed at establishing a new order through legal agreements, but in contrast to the Viennese order of 1815 and its non-codified establishment of the principle of the balance of power, the Paris dispensation had no such informal agreement at its heart. Instead, in 1919, numerous provisions of the treaties explicitly spelled out what kind of order the major powers intended to establish – and what kind of regulations they planned to impose on the defeated. Versailles would become the master prototype for all of the Paris Peace Treaties.[46]

As a result, international legal discourse flourished in Germany after 1920. At least four German legal journals of the time that were partly or exclusively devoted to the study of international law. These were the *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts* (from 1885);[47] the *Zeitschrift für Internationales Recht*;[48] the *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht* (founded in 1907),[49] and the *Jahrbuch des Völkerrechts*, launched in 1913.[50] While the important *Friedens-Warte* was not an academic legal journal as such, it nevertheless devoted some of its pages to issues in international law, peacemaking and arbitration. And the *Monatszeitschrift für Völkerbund und Völkerrecht* was published between 1934 and 1938. All were packed with intense exchanges about questions of international law arising out of the Paris Peace Treaties and the associated regulatory challenges.

As mentioned above, international law textbooks were filled with references to the new regulations. Here, the challenge was greater for textbooks that had already been published before the Paris Peace Treaties, and whose authors and publishers thus faced the difficulty of integrating numerous changes into their existing structure. A great number of monographs were also published in this time. One particularly noteworthy development was the founding of new specialized book series exclusively devoted to addressing regulatory questions arising out of the Paris Peace Treaties, such as the *Abhandlungen zum Friedensvertrage*, published by Partsch und Triepel beginning in 1921.[51] The *Monographien zum Völkerbund* were published by the Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund.[52] Other book series on international law, such as the *Völkerrechtliche Monographien*, edited by Walther Schücking, Karl Strupp and Hans Wehberg, also devoted considerable space to these questions. And while the highly influential *Handbuch des Völkerrechts* series of monographs was launched in 1912, the majority of its volumes appeared in the interwar period.

The biggest innovations took place in the fields of lexicons and commentaries. Legal lexicons already existed before the First World War, but some of the multivolume classics of the nineteenth century made no reference at all to international law as a legal subdiscipline.[53] After the First World War, this changed dramatically. References to international law and to the League of Nations were now ubiquitous in legal lexicons.

From 1924 to 1929, three thick volumes of the first German international law lexicon, the *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts*, were published.[54] Its second edition was published in the 1960s,[55] followed in the 1980s by its successor, the *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (1981–1990). Today, the *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts* is presented as the precursor to the online Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL).[56]

The *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts* attempted (along with its pursuit of other scholarly and political aims) a systematic, comprehensive and critical disquisition on the Paris Peace Treaties. The number of articles featured in the *Wörterbuch* is astonishing in comparison to other publications of the time, while the choice of included topics offers a portrait of what the editors considered to be key topics. At 112 pages, volume III is a little monograph in itself and is divided into numerous subsections on specific subjects written by different authors. It includes a major entry titled 'Versailler Frieden'.[57] At the beginning of this master entry, the reader's attention is drawn to other relevant articles in the *Wörterbuch*. Some are located in the supplement at the end of volume III, published only in 1929 and reflecting shifts in perception of the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations system in Germany in the late 1920s.[58] Another main entry covers the pre-history of the League of Nations up to 1920.[59]

The lexicon was not the only innovation in publishing on international law in Germany in the period. The post-First World War era also brought the first commentaries in the field to the German market. Commentaries are a particular genre of legal literature, as Kästle-Lamparter (2016) has recently pointed out. By commenting on a legal text, commentators affirm its continuing relevance, even if they are criticizing it. Two particularly noteworthy commentaries on the Covenant of the League of Nations were published in the post-war years. The first, that of Schücking and Wehberg, initially appeared in 1921, with a second edition in 1924.[60] The second, more conservative treatise on the subject was that of Axel Freiherr von Freytagh-Loringhoven; it had only one edition.[61] Other publications appeared separately as monographs but were fashioned as parts of a larger commentary.[62] It is no coincidence that it was only in the 1920s that the first commentary on international law appeared in Germany. No previous international legal text had had anywhere near the importance for German international relations of the Paris Peace Treaties and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Counterbalancing Past Omissions: Failures and False Estimations

The story of the reception and reading of the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations could be told as one of the

professionalization of international law as a discipline in Germany. In the course of this process, the volume and scope of international legal discourse expanded, and new institutions and publishing forums were founded. This unprecedented activity in international law as a legal discipline in Germany was a direct reaction to the Allies' attempts to juridify international relations.

But such an account omits some important aspects of German relations with international law. The most delicate point was the Germans' own neglect of international law. Of course, all of the belligerents in the First World War had violated international legal provisions. But only recently has Germany's particular handling of international law been discussed in complete detail by the international scholarly community – with interesting conclusions. According to these recent accounts, it was the Germans who first committed violations of international law at central decision points.[63] Examples of these breaches of international law included, for example, the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg and its shocking, Machiavellian justification,[64] and the use of poison gas at the Western front at Ypres.[65] Here, a fatal inclination to prioritize reason of state over international law became apparent.

The political motivation behind this neglect cannot be easily identified. International legal historians often cite a lack of sources. It seems, however, that the political and military leaders of the German general staff had underestimated the pertinence of international law as a potential justification for military and political acts at these crucial points.[66] International legal scholarship was present in the German academic world, astonishing numbers of international law textbooks had been published in German, and yet this knowledge and awareness did not reach those in charge of making the decisions in the authoritarian, highly militarized political environment of the German Kaiserreich.[67] Military leaders denied the validity of international law, or at least believed in ideas such as 'extreme military necessity', which gave them a blank cheque to overrule legal restrictions on warfare.[68] But European public opinion understood international law as a stronger justification narrative for political action than the German authorities had expected. During and particularly after the First World War, German politics faced pressure to catch up with this normative order, its doctrinal standards and the associated options for action.

The Entanglement of National Interests with the International Order: Beyond Juridification

This narrative of professionalization is only one facet of the reaction of Germany and German international law scholars to the Paris Peace Treaties. This section discusses parallel developments under the headings of emotionalization (1), politicization and blazing nationalism (2) and alienation (3), which seem to have been equally important features of the German international law debate. Here, the dominant attitude in German international law scholarship is one of erudite, scholarly rejection of this new order. Interestingly, mental consistencies with both pre-war and wartime dispositions are apparent – as is their slow transformation.[69]

Emotionalization: On Being Humiliated

The often observed and emphasized emotional treatment of the Versailles Treaty amongst the German general public can also be seen in the field of international law. Particularly in the early days after the Paris peace negotiations and the signing of the Versailles Treaty, German international lawyers made use of highly emotional language. As German nationals, they expressed feelings of humiliation, anger, debasement and sadness.[70] This may be seen as a continuation of the style of the First World War publications of international lawyers, which also used emotionally charged language that was in stark contrast to their mostly neutral academic tone during times of peace. In this, German international lawyers seem to have been reflecting the heated public discourse of the Weimar Republic. Even the entries in the *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts* sometimes display a polemical tone that is unusual for a genre of literature that typically aims at sobriety, objectivity and neutrality.

Politicization and Blazing Nationalism: Towering German Contributors and Their Mindsets

The same can be said about the politicization of the overall German discourse on international law, international relations and the German position in the post-war world. Here, German international law scholars openly acted in the name of the political interests of their fatherland. Although they were writing about international law, their perspective was clearly not international, but national.[71] It arose from within the boundaries of the German national state of the Weimar Republic and was decisively etatist.

Consequently, the perception of the other as 'enemy' had endured through the First World War and the Armistice.[72] This politicization went

hand-in-hand with blazing nationalism, and again was similar to that of the war period and its 'impeccable patriotic line'.[73] German international lawyers had cut off their international academic contacts soon after August 1914, blaming their colleagues abroad for destroying and denying international law (as their colleagues did of them). The ideas and aims of the German peace movements were never mainstream among German international lawyers before the outbreak of the First World War. On the contrary, militarism was strong in the years around 1900, as was the inclination among the vast majority of Germany's international law scholars to support and justify imperial enterprises.[74] This mindset may have had something to do with the peripheral position in which these scholars found themselves both academically and politically, driving them to justify nationalism, imperialism and militarism. In case of military necessity, liberal cosmopolitanism was – unlike in times of peace – no longer an ethical option.

This political turn can be observed even within the individual writings of the most eminent German international law scholars before and after 1914–19 (figures such as Josef Kohler and Heinrich Triepel).[75] Scholars of international law quickly came to feel they had a moral duty to support their fatherland and to justify its political and military actions. Similar observations about loyalty can be made for the German historians who took part in a field that has recently been described as 'research on war innocence'.[76] These scholars published files on historical events that, while presented as objective, neutral, serious academic work from original sources,[77] presented narratives and arguments aimed essentially at justifying past, present and future political and military actions. This was not a German speciality but a transnational phenomenon, and it resulted in a 'war of the documents'.[78] So called 'Books in Colour'[79] spread across European countries and were published under the conditions of censorship but with the pretence of independence. These books characteristically claimed that only their respective national governments had complied with standards of international law and morality, and represented thinly disguised propaganda.[80] In Germany, the political establishment supported the collection and publication of such documents. They did so not only to address the domestic public sphere; fuelling national resentment against the Versailles Treaty also seemed a useful foreign policy tool, serving as an attempt to renegotiate its conditions.[81]

This nationalistic polarization in 'us versus the others' terms thus continued from wartime to the signing of the Versailles Treaty and beyond. International law journals, for example, did not return to their pre-war internationalism in terms of perspectives and authors. The German

national political interest remained very close to the centre of publications in the country on international law. The contributors, overwhelmingly German, reviewed the two books mentioned above on the First World War and international law by French and English authors, criticizing them harshly and in highly emotional terms.[82]

This nationalization did, however, extend to authors from German-speaking ally Austria, who were frequent contributors to Germany's international legal journals.[83] German and Austrian international lawyers shared a common interest in the interwar period, first in drafting ideas for the dawning project of a League of Nations,[84] and later in the rejection or at least revision of the outcomes of the Paris Peace Conference.[85] Their publications often addressed this issue across the German-Austrian border.[86] French, American and English international lawyers were only particularly welcome authorities to be cited where and insofar as their publications supported German historical or legal claims.[87] It was only in 1925–26 – with the normalization represented by the Locarno Pact, bringing to an end the period of adjustment and peacemaking and leading to Germany's admission to the League of Nations[88] – that the *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht* again started publishing contributions in foreign languages from scholars abroad.[89]

Alienation: Not Our World Order

This expressive and persistent nationalism of German international lawyers was directed against the internationalism of the Paris Peace Conference. Due to their hurt national pride, these authors sought a clear-cut return to national sovereignty – again, a demand that was already a feature of the German pre-war political attitude.[90] Their condemnation of the Versailles Treaty was unanimous,[91] and their accusations, while long, often address similar points. It is not difficult to compile a long list of impressive quotations in which jurists dismiss the Paris order. Hans Martin Henningsen accused the League of Nations in a political lexicon in 1923 of being not a League of Nations but a League of War.[92] In doing so, he referred to the eminent conservative international jurist Philipp Zorn, who wrote in 1920:

> The 'Council' [*sic*!] is … not an organ of a general league of nations, but the permanent organization of the coalition of victorious states. It is not the legal organ of a common will of all peoples, but the coercive organ of the will to vanquish, into which the neutral states have been inserted. … For this reason, the new League of Nations is entirely modelled on the system of the Holy Alliance, as a dictatorship of a few great powers. … *It is the organ of a global government in the sense of the imperialistic will to vanquish.*[93]

Henningsen openly concluded that the League of Nations was a complete failure, particularly on all political issues of major relevance and in the face of the violation of weaker nations by major military powers.[94] Others pointed in the 1920s to the League's lacking or ineffectual sanctions.[95] What kind of order was this if the organization could not compel transgressors to comply with the rules that were supposed to guarantee collective security among the members? Were the agreement on arms limitations and the prohibition of war 'as an instrument for national policy' in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928[96] only empty words? Such a critique could have focused on pointing to the indisputable flaws in the construction of the League of Nations.[97] Instead, it was formulated in a way that left open the possibility that there was no such thing as 'international law' at all.[98] In some radical interpretations, legal scholars went so far as to deny international law – there was only state sovereignty, and no legal order ruling over nations.[99]

Probably the innovation that was most intensely attacked by German legal scholars was the new international criminal law.[100] They thoroughly rejected the idea of indicting the former Kaiser Wilhelm II for 'a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties'.[101] The imposed duty to surrender German citizens to the allies (Art. 228, 239) to be judged as war criminals abroad was condemned as 'a rape of international law'.[102] The corresponding absence of provisions on amnesty in the Versailles treaty was criticized, notably in comparison to other past and present peace treaties.[103] In a deviation from the original plan, these trials took place in Leipzig in 1921, and German courts were allowed to judge their own citizens. Unsurprisingly, the mood around the trials, viewed as a juridical innovation imposed on Germany and Germans by the vengeful former war enemy, was very hostile.[104] In German eyes, this was another clear proof of the treaty's one-sidedness (and in the case of the moralization of prosecution and the imposition of new ethical principles, they were probably right).[105]

The mood among mainstream German international lawyers was thus an unambiguous one, while international lawyers who deviated from the general line, such as Hermann Kantorowicz with his dissenting report (which would only finally be published in 1967),[106] were marginalized and silenced.[107] The new positive international legal order struck some jurists as so unjust that they returned to natural law[108] and fundamental or natural rights[109] as a source of argumentation. Natural law supplied them with a yardstick to measure the failures and demand reforms or to dismiss the whole unwanted and unloved institution.

Scholarly Efforts Towards a Fairer Assessment

It is noteworthy that within this panorama, some German professors of international law treated the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations in a more balanced way. This chapter will conclude with a short look at the writings of two among them, Franz von Liszt and Karl Strupp.

Franz von Liszt (a cousin of the composer) was the author of the most important textbook on international law of the time, first published in 1898.[110] Its final, twelfth edition was published in 1925, in collaboration with Max Fleischmann. Liszt discusses the traits of the new world order and the Paris Peace Treaties at numerous points throughout the volume. He criticizes the degrading inequality in the treatment of war prisoners and burial plots;[111] the inconsistencies between Allied promises on the one side and positive regulations in the field of war contributions on the other;[112] the lack of transparency and secrecy of procedures;[113] the lack of an official institution in charge of the interpretation of legal provisions;[114] and the general inequality among the contracting parties.[115] The treaty appeared to him as the result of 'a political action', and, in oracular mode, he wrote: 'The merely political is ephemeral; it is – entirely without regard to the formal validity of the treaty – an arrangement of merely subjective legal relations.'[116]

However, he also attempted to offer an overall assessment of this order. Liszt conceded that

> the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization [are] truly great ideas and an advancement of immeasurable scope in international law, whose significance should not be diminished either on the basis of the fact that they were able to draw on important [existing] approaches or of the traces that the League of Nations, an organization tainted with political dross, bears of its origins.[117]

Another summary followed at the end of the section on Liszt's more doctrinal account of the League of Nations. It was separated graphically from the main text and reads as follows: 'The League of Nations will only exist if states see it and handle it as a tool to bring states' conflicting interests into a reasonable balance, not as a tool to suppress states' legitimate vital interests – [in that case,] the League of Nations will not be.'[118] Liszt's critique addressed numerous points and was in line with the views of other German international lawyers at that time. But he also addressed and clearly named positive aspects of the new order. He summarized this admixture of grand ideals and corruption in a metaphor: the League was 'tainted with political dross' ('*mit politischen Schlacken behaftet*').[119]

In particular, Liszt saw the attempts to prevent war through arbitration and the installation of the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague in 1922 as auspicious developments.[120] He also acknowledged that international law would now return the regulation of trade and economic life into a balance, step by step.[121] These less political regulatory fields promised an intensification of international cooperation beyond the delicate core fields of state sovereignty. Here, 1920s discourse connected to pre-war aspirations and noble visions of a future world order, given a structured articulation by international legal experts.

It is less clear how the work of other German international scholars should be classified. This applies notably to textbooks by Karl Strupp and Theodor Niemeyer. The immediately striking aspect, when reading Strupp's *Grundzüge des Völkerrechts*,[122] is that he systematically abstains from judging the Versailles Treaty and League of Nations. Indeed, his scholarly account of these matters is fact-oriented and neutral. Strupp is well known to have been one of the German international law scholars who changed his mind over time. After starting as a nationalistic supporter of the German government during the First World War, in the 1920s he became an internationalist and enthusiast of efforts to outlaw war.[123] His review of Schmitt's booklet on *Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes* displays sympathy and critique at the same time,[124] which makes the absence of political positioning in his textbook even more noteworthy. *Theorie und Praxis des Völkerrechts*, published in 1925, maintained this attitude throughout. In it, the League of Nations is mentioned numerous times, but Strupp refrains from any comment.[125] In a highly politicized environment, so harshly judgemental towards the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, such a silence was a loud one.[126] The choice not to comment might be read as a comment in its own right.

Or is this just pure over-interpretation and wishful thinking? Maybe it was just the literary genre of a legal compendium for students, written 'in telegraphic style',[127] without higher intellectual ambitions, that led Strupp and Niemeyer to write in such a way. Comparable international law compendiums display the same trait,[128] suggesting the possibility that this restraint reflected not a political motivation but only the style of publications of a particular type.

Keep Calm and Study International Law: A Short Stopover in Mare Tranquillitatis

This voluntary moderation and cautious optimism in the mid-1920s was quite a contrast to the highly emotional and negative assessments of international lawyers writing in the opening years of the decade. Even now,

it was not shared by all international lawyers. Freytagh-Loringhoven, a nationalistic antisemite (and later a National Socialist), who was mentioned above, published his commentary on the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1926. Instead of stating his beliefs outright, it might be said that he hid behind the façade of an objective assessment of antagonistic positions among his colleagues, culminating in a scarcely disguised assessment of his own belief:

> Some still see [the League of Nations] as the bearer of the idea of peace and believe that it would only have to eliminate some dross [*Schlacken*] and defects to emerge as the embodiment of a grand ideal. Others still consider it to be a mere tool of the main powers in the World War, and even an immortalization of the Entente. It is precisely this perception that leads the wilfully national elements within the defeated peoples to reject the League of Nations; and even in once neutral states, and still more so in those of Eastern Europe, it inspires an undeniable distrust of the League.[129]

The reference to Franz von Liszt is clear, although his name is not mentioned. But Freytagh-Loringhoven picked up his metaphor of '*Schlacken*' or dross, rejecting the idea that the League of Nations might be a manifestation of peace.

However, while conservatives continued to direct heavy political fire at the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Treaties, the overall tone in German international legal publications shifted slightly over the years. Jurists increasingly offered neutral assessments, abstaining from emotional condemnations, political verdicts and denunciations of the Paris order. In a (short) phase in the second half of the 1920s, Germany had reached *Mare Tranquillitatis*. Internally, the Weimar Republic experienced years of stability (in comparison to what came before and what would follow); externally, it became a member of the League of Nations in 1926 and succeeded in obtaining a revision of the most economically pressing reparation provisions in the Versailles treaty. These foreign policy successes supported the inclination to abstain from radical and authoritarian political models, whether on the national or international level. Instead, jurists took a more optimistic attitude, were open to the new international legal structures, and expressed thoughts on how to contribute to a better national and international future within them.

Among these were Göttingen-based public law professors Julius Hatschek and Hans Wehberg. Hatschek, an outsider at his faculty, co-edited the *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts* with Strupp. He published two compendiums on international law, a textbook in 1923[130] and a shorter reference book in 1926.[131] As in the case of Strupp, Hatschek surprised readers by refraining from political judgements on the Versailles Treaty

and the League of Nations. Hans Wehberg's intentions, on the other hand, were much clearer and more explicit. Largely for good reason, he was labelled a pacifist among German international lawyers.[132] In his preface to the commentary to the Covenant of the League of Nations that he co-authored with Schücking,[133] he expressed the hope that the book, 'despite its flaws, will contribute to spreading knowledge on what the League of Nations as an international working group has managed to achieve in a wide variety of areas. This will strengthen belief in the idea of a League of Nations, which is what the League in Geneva so urgently needs in order to develop further'.[134]

This tone can also be found in many of the articles in the third volume of the *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts*. The volume was published in 1929. The text indicates that some articles were completed in the years before, and thus in the immediate aftermath of Germany's admission to the League. It seems likely that this development fuelled the moderate optimism of the contributing international lawyers.

At the end of the 1920s, some German international lawyers even warmed to the idea that a better and peaceful world could be brought about through the League of Nations system. In 1929, Rolf Knubben evaluated the aim of disarmament and protection from any attacks at the very end of his entry on the 'prevention of war' in the *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts*. He concluded by contrasting this lofty aim with achievements to date.[135] Utopia might in fact be realized, Knubben summarized, and he saw the recent developments in international law on the prevention of war as an advancement without precedent in the history of mankind. German international law scholars increasingly approved the promotion not only of collective security but also other things such as social welfare,[136] a just European and global economic order,[137] and the pursuit of cooperative relationships between nations instead of antagonistic radical nationalism. Many no longer perceived a simple return to state sovereignty as the best arrangement for Germany's foreign relations. State sovereignty and international community could instead be balanced against each other once more, this time with a stronger inclination towards the latter.

Conclusion

Was there too much international law after the Great War in the 1920s? Carl Schmitt thought so. In his 1926 booklet on the League of Nations, he criticized the 'juridification' of the time ('*Verrechtlichung und Juridifizierung*').[138] In 1934 he wrote triumphantly that the blossoming of international law in the 1920s had been illusory ('*Scheinblüte des*

Völkerrechts').[139] But the majority of German international lawyers did not agree with him on this particular point, although many of his other remarks were written in an intriguing intellectual style and political tone that resonated widely with his colleagues. Instead, with the passing years, German international lawyers had finally found a fragile peace with the new legal world order. In their scholarly publications, they used the League 'to enhance Germany's position vis-à-vis the victorious powers'.[140] Internationalism and juridification seemed to be promises with manifest advantages for Germany but also for the global order. The entries on international law[141] and on the League of Nations[142] in the fifth edition of the Catholic Görres-Gesellschaft's *Staatslexikon*, issued in the early 1930s, followed the pattern of cautious optimism.

International law was in transformation, as was the overall situation. But in contrast to the undercurrent of panic in the early 1920s, the authors of the late 1920s recognized the continuity within the big picture. Juridification ran as a red thread through the years: the expansion of international law had not started in 1919 but earlier. The spread of the law into non-political areas such as economic life, technology, science, social welfare, etc. was widely welcomed. German international lawyers increasingly interpreted this process of juridification in the terms of the international institutions that existed before 1914, international administrative unions. This helped to bring out the path dependency of the contemporary dispensation, and also to underline the 'apolitical' part of an internationalization that also came with a loss of state sovereignty.

It was thus not the juridification of international relations as such that German international law scholars had objected to, but rather its inconsistencies. The unequal treatment of Germany in particular had fuelled a particular critique of 'Versailles'. It was thus partly but not exclusively out of patriotic duty that they articulated their criticisms of the expansion and transformation of international law in the opening years of the Paris order. It is important to differentiate and to consider how the same criticisms were deployed afterwards in a changed political context. German international law scholars widely shared a critique of the imperial, hegemonic structures of the new world order of positive international law.[143] As observed above, this critique addressed real flaws in the Paris Peace Treaties and the League of Nations and pointed to genuine faults in their construction. The general tone in which they addressed these issues changed over the course of the 1920s, from an outcry to a language of reform.

However, other options lay hidden within this critique, in its most radicalized interpretations. One possibility was the total dismissal of the international legal order: in other words, the denial of international

law. There was only power politics, no legal norms. Such a rejection on principle could be found in the writings of some jurists. But this denial of international law was probably less attractive, and politically less adept, than another option, whose chief proponent was Carl Schmitt. In many of his arguments, Schmitt seemed to agree with the criticisms of the League of Nations articulated by the deniers of international law. But rather than setting aside the principle of international law altogether, he modified its basic concepts – particularly when he attempted the construction of a new legal order in the 1930s after Germany's National Socialists came into power. In these writings, Schmitt dismissed the international community of the League of Nations. In its place, he described an international legal order based on inequality and hegemonic powers,[144] legitimized by imperialist structures within the imperfect order of the Versailles system.[145] Competing internationalisms and international legal orders also clashed in the international legal doctrine of these years. In short, Schmitt set out to use the critique of post-1919 international law to destroy the international legal order.

Miloš Vec has held the Chair in European Legal and Constitutional History at the University of Vienna since 2012. From 2016 to 2020, he was also a Permanent Fellow at the Institut für die Wissenschaft vom Menschen (IWM), Vienna. He received his habilitation in modern legal history, legal philosophy, legal theory and civil law from the University of Frankfurt whilst he was employed at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History and Legal Theory in 2006. He also works as a freelance journalist, particularly for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and is co-editor of the *Studien zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts* and the *Journal of the History of International Law*.

Notes

1. Janssen, 'Frieden', 545–56; Kampmann, 'Friede'; Schumann, 'Frieden'.
2. Vec, 'From Invisible Peace'.
3. Hippler and Vec, 'Peace as a Polemic Concept', 4.
4. Jünger and Schmitt, *Briefe 1930–1983*, 447. German original: 'Mein Orientierungspunkt damals (1936) war (und bleibt) die ungeheuerliche Dummheit von Versailles.' All English translations of German quotations by Vera Vogelauer and Paul Reeve.
5. Schmitt, 'Das Doppelgesicht'; Schmitt, 'Der Status quo'; Schmitt, 'Der Völkerbund'; Schmitt, 'Die Rheinlande'. See: Mehring, *Carl Schmitt*, 192; Schmitt, 'Völkerrechtliche Formen'; Hull, 'Zwischen Konservatismus und Revolution', 105–118.
6. Neumann, *Der Staat im Bürgerkrieg*, 182.
7. Schmitt, *Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes*. See: Mehring, *Carl Schmitt*, 198, 225.
8. Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts*, 425; Kraus, *Versailles und die Folgen*, 104, 117.

9.   Strupp, 'Review of Carl Schmitt, *Die Kernfrage*'.
10. Tooze, *The Deluge*.
11. Stråth, *Europe's Utopias*; Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 492.
12. Payk and Pergher, 'Introduction', 5.
13. Hardtwig, *Politische Kulturgeschichte*.
14. Garner, *International Law*.
15. Mérignhac and Lémonon, *Le droit des gens*.
16. Koskenniemi, 'Nationalism, Universalism, Empire', 25.
17. Smith, *Sovereignty*, 13.
18. Schröder, *Recht als Wissenschaft*.
19. Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*.
20. Kolb, *Der Frieden von Versailles*, 103: 'Anti-Versailles-Furor'; MacMillan, *Peacemakers*, 489–90; Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 465; Lorenz, '*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht!*', 411–12; Krumeich, *Die unbewältigte Niederlage*; Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*, 203.
21. Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. 3, 380–92.
22. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 1.
23. Erpelding, 'Introduction'; Pedersen, *The Guardians*.
24. Saager, 'Völkerbund', 1130.
25. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*
26. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 1; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 968.
27. Vec, *Recht und Normierung*, 1–164.
28. Dülffer, *Regeln gegen den Krieg?*
29. Liszt, *Das Völkerrecht*, 760–63.
30. Hatschek, *Völkerrecht als System*, 427–28.
31. Neff, *Justice*, 361–62.
32. Established by the Kriegsschuldreferat des auswärtigen Amtes; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 1217.
33. Weinke, *Gewalt*, 44–107, 88–103; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 898.
34. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*, 232–36.
35. Hueck, 'Die Gründung', 410.
36. Ibid., 397, 409.
37. Arnauld, *Völkerrecht in Kiel*; Delbrück et al., *Aus Kiel in die Welt*.
38. Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. 3, 89.
39. Link, *Ein Realist*, 179, 189.
40. Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. 3, 259, 274, 395.
41. Nippold, *Die Grundsätze*, 16.
42. Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. 3, 89. See also for the Institute's history Bogdandy and Glahé, 'Institutsgeschichte'.
43. Hueck, 'Die Gründung', 411–12.
44. Nippold, *Die Grundsätze*, 16–17. On the concept of the 'justification narrative' (*Rechtfertigungsnarrativ*), see Forst, 'Zum Begriff'.
45. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 3, 79–80, 107; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 1266.
46. Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 81, 457.
47. Hueck, 'Die Gründung', 399–403.
48. Ibid., 403–7.
49. Ibid., 407–16.
50. Link, *Ein Realist*, 30.
51. See for example the first volumes in the series: Triepel, *Virtuelle Staatsangehörigkeit*; Kaufmann, *Deutsche Hypothekenforderungen*; Isay et al., *Studien*; Rabel, *Rechtsvergleichung*; Barclay, Struycken and Kaufmann, *Studien*.
52. For example Thadden, *Völkerrecht*; Rothbarth, *William Penns Völkerbundplan*.
53. Weiske, *Rechtslexikon*. This reference work includes no entries on 'Völkerrecht', etc.

54. Hatschek and Strupp, *Wörterbuch*.
55. Schlochauer and Strupp, *Wörterbuch*.
56. Retrieved December 2021 from http://www.mpil.de/de/pub/forschung/nach-rechts gebieten/voelkerrecht/max-planck-encyclopedia.cfm.
57. Mettgenberg, 'Versailler Frieden'.
58. 'Kriegsentschädigungen und die Reparationen'; 'Versailler Frieden: Schiedsgerichte, gemischte'; 'Frankreich'; 'Reichsland, ehemaliges'; 'Kehler Hafen'.
59. Rothbarth, 'Völkerbund', 170–81.
60. Schücking and Wehberg, *Die Satzung*. On Wehberg see: Denfeld, *Hans Wehberg*.
61. Freytagh-Loringhoven, *Die Satzung*.
62. Kraus and Rödiger, *Urkunden zum Friedensvertrag*, 769–1453.
63. Hull, *A Scrap of Paper*.
64. 'Not kennt kein Gebot', which roughly translates to 'There is no law in an emergency'.
65. Vec, 'Challenging the Laws'.
66. Toppe, *Militär und Kriegsvölkerrecht*, 103–38.
67. Nippold, *Die Grundsätze*, 16–17, 21, 25; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*.
68. Großer Generalstab, *Kriegsbrauch*, 3. This scandalous booklet was translated several times by Germany's enemies before and during the First World War. See also Lingen, *'Crimes Against Humanity'*, 169; Vec, 'All's Fair in Love and War'.
69. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*: see ch. 3, 'International Law as Philosophy: Germany 1871–1933', 179–265.
70. Henningsen, 'Völkerbund', 899; Liszt, *Das Völkerrecht*, 57–58.
71. Roberts, *Is International Law International?*.
72. Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 250, 379; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 893; Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 540.
73. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*, 229.
74. Stolleis, *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. 3, 88.
75. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*, 214–16; Hueck, 'Die Gründung', 409; Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 123.
76. '*Kriegsunschuldsforschung*': see Große Kracht, 'Kriegsschuldfrage'; Weinke, *Gewalt*, 107; Sharp, *The Versailles Settlement*, 105.
77. Sauerbeck, *Der Kriegsausbruch*; Bendix, 'Völkerrechtsverletzungen'; Hoeniger, *Russlands Vorbereitung*; Hosse, *Die englisch-belgischen Aufmärsche*.
78. MacMillan and Quinton-Brown, 'The Uses of History', 184; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 902, 1217–19.
79. 'Farbbücher': e.g. Auswärtiges Amt, *Deutschland schuldig*; id., *Weißbuch*.
80. Weinke, *Gewalt*, 93; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 1218.
81. Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 468.
82. Strupp, 'Review of Mérignhac and Lémonon, *Le droit des gens*'. Strupp's review of Garner, *International Law*, was much more moderate.
83. For an overview of the Austrian approach to international law at that time, see Spitra, 'After the Great War', 1–22.
84. Lammasch, *Der Völkerbund*; Zorn, *Der Völkerbund*; Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund, *Der Völkerbund-Vorschlag*; Bernstein, *Völkerrecht und Völkerpolitik*, 178–87; Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts*, 423. On the treaty concerning Austria see Kalb, Olechowski and Ziegerhofer, *Der Vertrag von St. Germain*.
85. Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts*, 425, 441; Schwabe, *Versailles*, 176.
86. Kunz, *Die Revision*.
87. MacMillan and Quinton-Brown, 'The Uses of History', 184. On such French and British critiques of the Versailles Treaty, see Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 478.
88. Goldstein, *The First World War*, 94; Neiberg, *The Treaty of Versailles*, xiii, 92.
89. Hueck, 'Die Gründung', 410.

90. Carty, 'The Evolution'; Lingen, *'Crimes Against Humanity'*, 142.
91. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*, 181.
92. Henningsen, 'Völkerbund', 899.
93. 'Der "Rat" ist somit nicht Organ eines allgemeinen Völkerbundes, sondern die dauernde Organisation der siegreichen Weltkoalition, er ist nicht Rechtsorgan eines allgemeinen Völkerwillens, sondern Gewaltorgan des Siegerwillens, dem die Neutralen eingefügt werden. … Damit ist der neue Völkerbund völlig dem System der Heiligen Allianz als einer Diktatur einzelner Großmächte nachgebildet. … *[Der Rat] ist das Organ der Weltregierung im Sinne des imperialistischen Siegerwillens.'* Zorn, *Deutschland und die beiden Haager Friedenskonferenzen*, 80, emphasis in original.
94. Henningsen, 'Völkerbund', 900.
95. Saager, 'Völkerbund', 1129; Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts*, 435.
96. Hathaway and Shapiro, *The Internationalists*; Roscher, *Der Briand-Kellogg-Pakt*.
97. Lingen, *'Crimes Against Humanity'*, 187; Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts*, 452.
98. Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts*, 443.
99. See Hahnenkamp, 'The Deniers'.
100. Mettgenberg, 'Versailler Frieden', 44. See Weinke, *Gewalt*, 44–107; Lingen, *'Crimes Against Humanity'*, 169, 147–73; Lewis, *The Birth*.
101. Schabas, *The Trial of the Kaiser*.
102. Hatschek, *Völkerrecht als System*, 7.
103. Hatschek, *Völkerrecht als System*, 370; MacMillan and Quinton-Brown, 'The Uses of History', 184; Steiger, 'Peace Treaties', 87.
104. Wiggenhorn, *Verliererjustiz*; Hankel, *Die Leipziger Prozesse*; Hankel, *The Leipzig Trials*; Segesser, *Recht statt Rache*, 225–31.
105. Steiger, 'Peace Treaties', 98; Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 4.
106. Kantorowicz, *Gutachten*.
107. Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 1217.
108. Kohler, *Grundlagen des Völkerrechts*, III, 3–6.
109. Schmitt, *Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht*, 7–9, 24; Neumann, *Der Staat im Bürgerkrieg*, 182.
110. Herrmann, *Das Standardwerk*.
111. Liszt, *Das Völkerrecht*, 58.
112. Ibid., 58.
113. Ibid., 63.
114. Ibid., 64.
115. Ibid., 64.
116. 'Das bloß Politische ist vergänglich; ist – ganz abgesehen von der formalen Rechtswirksamkeit des Vertrages – ein Gestalten nur subjektiver Rechtsverhältnisse.' Ibid., 64.
117. 'Der Völkerbund und die internationale Organisation der Arbeit – wahrlich große Gedanken und eine Fortbildung des Völkerrechts von unabsehbarer Tragweite, deren Bedeutung weder dadurch gemindert werden soll, dass sie an belangvolle Ansätze anknüpfen konnten, noch dadurch, dass namentlich der Völkerbund, mit politischen Schlacken behaftet, merkbar die Spuren seines Ursprungs trägt.' Ibid., 65.
118. 'Der Völkerbund wird nur sein, wenn die Staaten in ihm ein Werkzeug sehen und handhaben, das die widerstreitenden Interessen der Staaten einem vernünftigen Ausgleich zuführt, nicht ein Werkzeug zur Niederhaltung berechtigter Lebensinteressen des einzelnen Staates – – – der Völkerbund wird dann nicht sein.' ibid., 403.
119. 'Der Völkerbund und die internationale Organisation der Arbeit – wahrlich große Gedanken und eine Fortbildung des Völkerrechts von unabsehbarer Tragweite, deren Bedeutung weder dadurch gemindert werden soll, dass sie an belangvolle

Ansätze anknüpfen konnten, noch dadurch, dass namentlich der Völkerbund, mit politischen Schlacken behaftet, merkbar die Spuren seines Ursprungs trägt.' ibid., 65.

120. Ibid., 71.
121. Ibid., 71.
122. Strupp, *Grundzüge*.
123. Link, *Ein Realist*, 335, 338.
124. Strupp, 'Review of Schmitt, *Die Kernfrage*'.
125. Strupp, *Theorie und Praxis des Völkerrechts*.
126. A similar work in this respect is Niemeyer, *Völkerrecht*.
127. Link, *Ein Realist*, 184.
128. Schaeffer and Brode, *Völkerrecht*, 2, 82–84.
129. 'Immer noch sehen in ihm die einen den Träger des Friedensgedankens und glauben, daß er sich nur von einigen Schlacken und Unvollkommenheiten zu befreien brauche, um als Verwirklichung eines erhabenen Ideals dazustehen. Immer noch betrachten ihn die anderen als bloßes Werkzeug der Hauptmächte des Weltkrieges, ja, als Verewigung der Entente. Gerade aus dieser Auffassung heraus lehnen ihn die bewussten nationalen Elemente innerhalb der unterlegenen Völker ab und selbst in den einst neutralen Ländern, noch mehr in den osteuropäischen Staaten beruht auf ihr ein nicht vorzuleugnendes Mißtrauen gegen den Völkerbund.' Freytagh-Loringhoven, *Die Satzung*, III.
130. Hatschek, *Völkerrecht als System*.
131. Ibid., *Völkerrecht im Grundriß*.
132. Denfeld, *Hans Wehberg*.
133. On both: Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*, 215.
134. '… wir sprechen die Hoffnung aus, daß [unser Buch] trotz seiner Mängel dazu beitragen wird, Kenntnisse davon zu verbreiten, was der Völkerbund als eine internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft auf den verschiedensten Gebieten schon geleistet hat. Dadurch wird der Glaube an den Völkerbundgedanken gestärkt werden, dessen der Genfer Völkerbund zu seiner Fortentwicklung so dringend bedarf.' Schücking and Wehberg, *Die Satzung*, X.
135. 'Daß dies heute keine lebensfremde und weltferne Utopie mehr ist, wenn es auch noch gestern so schien, sondern daß dies die Entwicklung von morgen sein *kann*, ist einleuchtend ersichtlich geworden durch die Entwicklung des Kriegsverhütungsrechtes in den letzten 10 Jahren, die ihresgleichen sucht, die in heftigem Sturm und Drange in einem Jahrzehnt so weit fortgeschritten ist, wie nie zuvor im Laufe von Jahrhunderten, ja Jahrtausenden.' See: Knubben, 'Völkerbund und Kriegsverhütung', 1187 (emphasis in original).
136. Sluga, 'Remembering 1919', 32.
137. Clavin, *Securing World Economy*; Erpelding, 'Introduction', 21.
138. Schmitt, *Die Kernfrage*, 41.
139. Schmitt, *Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht*, 9: 'merkwürdige *Scheinblüte des Völkerrechts*' (emphasis in original); 22: 'Scheinblüte eines aufgeblähten Völkerrechtsbetriebes'.
140. Quoted in Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer*, 249.
141. Held, 'Völkerrecht'.
142. Seipel and Schreiber, 'Völkerbund', 888–900.
143. Schmitt, 'Völkerrechtliche Formen'; Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 548–51.
144. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 559.
145. Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts*, 447–50.

Bibliography

Arnauld, Andreas von. (ed.). *Völkerrecht in Kiel: Forschung, Lehre und Praxis des Völkerrechts am Standort Kiel seit 1665*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2017.

Auswärtiges Amt (ed.). *Deutschland schuldig? Deutsches Weißbuch über die Verantwortlichkeit der Urheber des Krieges*. Berlin: Heymann, 1919.

——. *Weißbuch betreffend die Verantwortlichkeit der Urheber des Krieges*. Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1919.

Barclay, Thomas, Antonius A.H. Struycken and Erich Kaufmann. *Studien zur Lehre von der Staatensukzession: Drei Gutachten*. Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1923.

Bendix, Ludwig. 'Völkerrechtsverletzungen Großbritanniens: Nach englischen Parlamentspapieren'. *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht* 11, supplement 3 (1919), 1–149.

Bernstein, Eduard. *Völkerrecht und Völkerpolitik: Wesen, Fragen und Zukunft des Völkerrechts*. Berlin: Cassirer, 1919.

Bogdandy, Armin von and Philipp Glahé. 'Alles ganz einfach? Zwei verlorene Weltkriege als roter Faden der Institutsgeschichte'. Retrieved in June 2024 from https://mpil100.de/2024/04/alles-ganz-einfach-zwei-verlorene-weltkriege-als-roter-faden-der-institutsgeschichte/.

Carty, Anthony. 'The Evolution of International Legal Scholarship in Germany during the Kaiserreich and the Weimarer Republik (1871–1933)', in Jost Delbrück, Thomas Griegerich and Andreas Zimmermann (eds), *German Yearbook of International Law*, vol. 50 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008), 29–90.

Clavin, Patricia. *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Conze, Eckart. *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt*. Munich: Siedler, 2018.

Delbrück, Jost et al. *Aus Kiel in die Welt: Kiel's Contribution to International Law*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014.

Denfeld, Claudia. *Hans Wehberg (1885–1962): Die Organisation der Staatengemeinschaft*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008.

Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund. *Der Völkerbund-Vorschlag der deutschen Regierung*. Berlin: Engelmann, 1920.

Dülffer, Jost. *Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haager Friedenskonferenzen von 1899 und 1907 in der internationalen Politik*. Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1978.

Erpelding, Michel. 'Introduction: Versailles and the Broadening of "Peace Through Law"', in Michel Erpelding, Burkhard Hess and Hél Ruiz Fabri (eds), *Peace Through Law: The Versailles Peace Treaty and Dispute Settlement After World War I* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019), 11–28.

Forst, Rainer. 'Zum Begriff eines Rechtfertigungsnarrativs', in Andreas Fahrmeir (ed.), *Rechtfertigungsnarrative: Zur Begründung normativer Ordnung durch Erzählungen* (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2013), 11–28.

Freytagh-Loringhoven, Axel von. *Die Satzung des Völkerbundes: mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen*. Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1926.

Garner, James Wilford. *International Law and the World War*, 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920.

Gerwarth, Robert. *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923*. London: Allen Lane, 2016.

Goldstein, Erik. *The First World War Peace Settlements, 1919–1925*. Oxford: Routledge, 2002.

Große Kracht, Klaus. 'Kriegsschuldfrage und zeithistorische Forschung in Deutschland: Historiographische Nachwirkungen des Ersten Weltkriegs'. *Zeitgeschichte-online* (2004). Retrieved in February 2022 from http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/thema/kriegsschuldfrage-und-zeithistorische-forschung-deutschland.

Großer Generalstab. *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*. Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1902.

Hahnenkamp, Paul. 'The Deniers of International Law in the 19th Century', Ph.D. thesis. University of Vienna, 2021.

Hankel, Gerd. *Die Leipziger Prozesse: Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen und ihre strafrechtliche Verfolgung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003.

——. *The Leipzig Trials: German War Crimes and Their Legal Consequences After World War I*. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2014.

Hardtwig, Wolfgang (ed.). *Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918–1939*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005.

Hathaway, Oona A. and Scott J. Shapiro. *The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017.

Hatschek, Julius. *Völkerrecht als System rechtlich bedeutsamer Staatsakte*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1923.

——. *Völkerrecht im Grundriß*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1926.

Hatschek, Julius and Karl Strupp (eds). *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie*, 3 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1924–1929.

Held, H.J. 'Völkerrecht', in Julius Bachem (ed.), *Staatslexikon*, vol. 5 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1932), 915–30.

Henningsen, Hans. 'Völkerbund', in Paul Herre (ed.), *Politisches Handwörterbuch*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Koehler, 1923), 892–900.

Herrmann, Florian. *Das Standardwerk: Franz von Liszt und das Völkerrecht*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001.

Hippler, Thomas and Miloš Vec. 'Peace as a Polemic Concept: Writing the History of Peace in Nineteenth Century Europe', in Thomas Hippler and Miloš Vec (eds), *Paradoxes of Peace in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 3–16.

Hoeniger, Robert. *Russlands Vorbereitung zum Weltkrieg: Auf Grund unveröffentlichter russischer Urkunden*. Berlin: Mittler, 1919.

Hosse, Karl. *Die englisch-belgischen Aufmärsche gegen Deutschland vor dem Weltkriege: Eine militärische Studie über die 'Conventions anglo-belges' mit neuen Dokumenten*. Vienna: Amalthea, 1930.

Hueck, Ingo J. 'Die Gründung völkerrechtlicher Zeitschriften in Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich', in Michael Stolleis (ed.), *Juristische Zeitschriften: Die neuen Medien des 18.–20. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1999), 379–420.

Hull, Isabel V. *A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law During the Great War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.

——. *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

——. 'Zwischen Konservatismus und Revolution: Carl Schmitts völkerrechtliche Schriften', in Uwe Hohendahl and Erhard Schütz (eds), *Perspektiven konservativen Denkens: Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten nach 1945* (Bern: Lang, 2012), 105–18.

Isay, Hermann et al. *Studien zum Ausgleichs- und Liquidationsrecht: Vier Beiträge*. Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1923.

Janssen, Wilhelm. 'Frieden', in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Klett, 1975), 543–91.

Jünger, Ernst and Carl Schmitt. *Briefe 1930–1983*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1999.

Kalb, Herbert, Thomas Olechowski and Anita Ziegerhofer (eds). *Der Vertrag von St. Germain: Kommentar*. Vienna: Manz, 2021.

Kampmann, Christoph. 'Friede', in Friedrich Jaeger (ed.), *Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit*, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006), 1–21.

Kantorowicz, Hermann. *Gutachten zur Kriegsschuldfrage 1914*. Frankfurt a.M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1967.

Kästle-Lamparter, David. *Welt der Kommentare: Struktur, Funktion und Stellenwert juristischer Kommentare in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016.

Kaufmann, Erich. *Deutsche Hypothekenforderungen in Polen: Ein Beitrag zur Liquidations-, Valuta- und Entschädigungsfrage*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1922.

Kleinschmidt, Harald. *Geschichte des Völkerrechts in Krieg und Frieden*. Tübingen: Francke, 2013.

Knubben, Rolf. 'Völkerbund und Kriegsverhütung', in Julius Hatschek and Karl Strupp (eds), *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie*, vol. 3, 1151–87.

Kohler, Josef. *Grundlagen des Völkerrechts: Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, Zukunft*. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1918.

Kolb, Eberhard. *Der Frieden von Versailles*, 3rd edn. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2019.

Koskenniemi, Martti. 'Nationalism, Universalism, Empire: International Law in 1871 and 1919'. Paper presented at the conference 'Whose International Community? Universalism and the Legacies of Empire', Columbia University, 29–30 April 2005. Retrieved February 2022 from https://fdocuments.in/document/nationalism-universalism-empire-international-law-in-.html.

——. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Kraus, Hans-Christof. *Versailles und die Folgen: Außenpolitik zwischen Revisionismus und Verständigung 1919–1933*. Berlin: be.bra, 2013.

Kraus, Herbert and Gustav Rödiger (eds). *Urkunden zum Friedensvertrag vom 28. Juni 1919*, vol. 2. Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1921.

Krumeich, Gerd. *Die unbewältigte Niederlage: Das Trauma des Ersten Weltkriegs und die Weimarer Republik*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2018.

Kunz, Josef L. *Die Revision der Pariser Friedensverträge: Eine völkerrechtliche Untersuchung*. Vienna: Springer, 1932.

Lammasch, Heinrich. *Der Völkerbund zur Bewahrung des Friedens: Entwurf eines Staatsvertrages mit Begründung*. Olten: Trösch, 1918.

Leonhard, Jörn. *Der überforderte Frieden: Versailles und die Welt 1918–1923*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018.

Lewis, Mark. *The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919–1950*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Lingen, Kerstin von. *'Crimes Against Humanity': Eine Ideengeschichte der Zivilisierung von Kriegsgewalt 1864–1945*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2018.

Link, Sandra. *Ein Realist mit Idealen: Der Völkerrechtler Karl Strupp (1886–1940)*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003.

Liszt, Franz von. *Das Völkerrecht*, 12th edn. Berlin: Springer, 1925.

Lorenz, Thomas. *'Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht!' Der Versailler Vertrag in Diskurs und Zeitgeist der Weimarer Republik*. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2008.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War*. London: John Murray, 2001.

MacMillan, Margaret and Patrick Quinton-Brown. 'The Uses of History in International Society: From the Paris Peace Conference to the Present'. *International Affairs* 95(1) (2019), 181–200.

Mehring, Reinhard. *Carl Schmitt, Aufstieg und Fall: Eine Biographie*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009.

Mérignhac, Alexandre and Ernest Lémonon. *Le droit des gens et la guerre de 1914–1918*, 2 vols. Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1921.

Mettgenberg, Wolfgang. 'Versailler Frieden', in Julius Hatschek and Karl Strupp (eds), *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie*, vol. 3, 36–148.

Neff, Stephen C. *Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.

Neiberg, Michael S. *The Treaty of Versailles: A Concise History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Neumann, Volker. *Der Staat im Bürgerkrieg: Kontinuität und Wandlung des Staatsbegriffs in der politischen Theorie Carl Schmitts*. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1980.

Niemeyer, Theodor. *Völkerrecht*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1923.

Nippold, Otfried. *Die Grundsätze der deutschen Kriegführung*. Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1919.

Payk, Marcus M. *Frieden durch Recht? Der Aufstieg des modernen Völkerrechts und der Friedensschluss nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018.

Payk, Marcus M. and Roberta Pergher. 'Introduction', in Marcus M. Payk and Roberta Pergher (eds), *Beyond Versailles: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and the Formation of New Polities after the Great War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2019), 1–15.

Pedersen, Susan. *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Rabel, Ernst. *Rechtsvergleichung vor den Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshöfen*. Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1923.

Roberts, Anthea. *Is International Law International?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Roscher, Bernhard. *Der Briand-Kellogg-Pakt von 1928: Der 'Verzicht auf den Krieg als Mittel nationaler Politik' im völkerrechtlichen Denken der Zwischenkriegszeit*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004.

Rothbarth, Margarete. 'Völkerbund (Geschichte)', in Julius Hatschek and Karl Strupp (eds), *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie*, vol. 3, 170–81.

——. *William Penns Völkerbundplan*. Berlin: Engelmann, 1920.

Saager, Adolf. 'Völkerbund: Geschichte von 1920 bis zur Gegenwart', in Julius Hatschek and Karl Strupp (eds), *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie*, vol. 3, 1129–51.

Sauerbeck, Ernst. *Der Kriegsausbruch: Eine Darstellung von neutraler Seite an Hand des Aktenmaterials*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1919.

Schabas, William A. *The Trial of the Kaiser*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Schaeffer, Carl and Heinrich Brode. *Völkerrecht*. Leipzig: C.L. Hirschfeld, 1922.

Schlochauer, Jürgen and Karl Strupp (eds). *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts*, 2nd edn., 4 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960–1962.

Schmitt, Carl. *Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes*. Berlin: Dümmler, 1926.

——. 'Das Doppelgesicht des Genfer Völkerbundes (1926)', in *Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923–1939* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1988), 43–44.

——. 'Der Status quo und der Friede (1925)', in ibid., 33–42.

——. 'Der Völkerbund und Europa (1928)', in ibid., 88–97.

——. 'Die Rheinlande als Objekt internationaler Politik (1925)', in ibid., 26–33.

——. 'Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus (1932)', in ibid., 162–80.

——. *Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht*. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1934.

Schröder, Jan. *Recht als Wissenschaft: Geschichte der juristischen Methodenlehre in der Neuzeit (1500–1990)*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2021.

Schücking, Walter and Hans Wehberg (eds). *Die Satzung des Völkerbundes*. Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1921.

Schumann, Eva. 'Frieden', in Albrecht Cordes, Heiner Lück and Dieter Werkmüller (eds), *Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Schmidt, 2008), 1807–21.

Schwabe, Klaus. *Versailles: Das Wagnis eines demokratischen Friedens 1919–1923*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019.

Segesser, Daniel Marc. *Recht statt Rache oder Rache durch Recht: Die Ahndung von Kriegsverbrechen in der internationalen wissenschaftlichen Debatte 1872–1945*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010.

Seipel, J. and G. Schreiber. 'Völkerbund', in Julius Bachem (ed.), *Staatslexikon*, vol. 5 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1932), 888–900.

Sharp, Alan. *The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking after the First World War, 1919–1923*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Sluga, Glenda. 'Remembering 1919: International Organizations and the Future of International Order'. *International Affairs* 95(1) (2019), 25–43.

Smith, Leonard V. *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Spitra, Sebastian M. 'After the Great War: International Law in Austria's First Republic, 1918–mid 1920s'. *Clio@Themis* 18 (2020), 1–22.

Steiger, Heinhard. 'Peace Treaties from Paris to Versailles', in Randall Lesaffer (ed.), *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late*

Middle Ages to World War One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 59–99.

Stolleis, Michael. *Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland. Vol 1: Reichspublizistik und Policeywissenschaft, 1600–1800*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988.

——. *Vol. 2: Staatsrechtslehre und Verwaltungswissenschaft, 1800–1914*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992.

——. *Vol. 3: Staats- und Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft in Republik und Diktatur, 1914–1945*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999.

Stråth, Bo. *Europe's Utopias of Peace: 1815, 1919, 1951*. London: Bloomsbury, 2016.

Strupp, Karl. *Theorie und Praxis des Völkerrechts: Ein Grundriß zum akademischen Gebrauch und zum Selbststudium*. Berlin: Liebmann, 1925.

——. *Grundzüge des positiven Völkerrechts*. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1922.

——. 'Review of Carl Schmitt, *Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes*'. *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht* 14 (1927), 120–21.

——. 'Review of James Wilford Garner, *International Law and the World War*'. *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht* 12 (1923), 216–24.

——. 'Review of Alexandre Mérignhac and Ernest Lémonon'. *Le droit des gens et la guerre de 1914–1918. Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht*, 377–81.

Thadden, Reinold von. *Völkerrecht und Völkerbund: Eine Studie zur Rechtsnatur zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen*. Berlin: Engelmann, 1920.

Tooze, Adam. *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order 1916–1931*. London: Allen Lane, 2014.

Toppe, Andreas. *Militär und Kriegsvölkerrecht: Rechtsnorm, Fachdiskurs und Kriegspraxis in Deutschland 1899–1940*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008.

Triepel, Heinrich. *Virtuelle Staatsangehörigkeit: Ein Beitrag zur Kritik der Rechtsprechung des Französisch-Deutschen Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshofs*. Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1921.

Vec, Miloš. '*All's Fair in Love and War* or the Limits of the Limitations. Juridification of Warfare and its Revocation by Military Necessity', in Matt Killingsworth and Tim McCormack (eds), *Civility, Barbarism and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law: Who Do the Laws of War Protect?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024), 34–60.

——. 'Challenging the Laws of War by Technology, Blazing Nationalism and Militarism: Debating Chemical Warfare Before and After Ypres, 1899–1925', in Bretislav Friedrich et al. (eds), *One Hundred Years of Chemical Warfare: Research, Deployment, Consequences* (Cham: Springer, 2017), 105–34.

——. 'From Invisible Peace to the Legitimation of War: Paradoxes of a Concept in 19th Century International Law Doctrine', in Thomas Hippler and Miloš Vec (eds), *Paradoxes of Peace in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 19–36.

——. *Recht und Normierung in der Industriellen Revolution: Neue Strukturen der Normsetzung in Völkerrecht, staatlicher Gesetzgebung und gesellschaftlicher Selbstnormierung*. Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2006.

Weinke, Annette. *Gewalt, Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit: Transnationale Debatten über deutsche Staatsverbrechen im 20. Jahrhundert*. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016.

Weiske, Julius (ed.). *Rechtslexikon für Juristen aller teutschen Staaten, enthaltend die gesammte Rechtswissenschaft*, 16 vols. Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1840–1862.

Wiggenhorn, Harald. *Verliererjustiz: Die Leipziger Kriegsverbrecherprozesse nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005.

Zorn, Philipp. *Der Völkerbund: Eine Kritik der Entwürfe für die Verfassung des Völkerbundes*. Berlin: Engelmann, 1919.

——. *Deutschland und die beiden Haager Friedenskonferenzen*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1920.

Chapter 3

The Subversive Internationalist

Japanese Responses to the Paris Peace Conference and
Their Impact on Its Interwar and Wartime Political
Performance

Urs Matthias Zachmann

The history of Japanese political thought, and especially foreign policy
thought, has often been narrated in terms of stark contrasts, as a quasi-
Manichaean battle between the high idealism of 'the people', on the one
hand, and a Japanese brand of ultra-realism found mostly among profes-
sional party politicians, on the other hand.[1] The post-war discussion on
Article 9 of Japan's Constitution (1946), the so-called 'peace article' that
renounces war as a means to solve conflicts, is an illustrative case in
point. Scholars have long pitted the pacifism of 'ordinary people' and lib-
eral intellectuals against the realism of 'Machiavellian' prime ministers,
who, a mere six years after Japan's defeat in 1951, concluded a security
alliance with the United States that hedges against international conflicts
through military assistance, and that remains the mainstay of Japan's
foreign policy today.[2] This antagonism has simmered on, bubbling up
again in the 1990s on the subject of revising Article 9, without any clear-
cut resolution to date.

Going even further back, stark contrasts also dominate the picture of
Japan's pre-war foreign policy thought. After a period of vigorous and
militant expansion during the late nineteenth century, historians gener-
ally characterize the following period (which, for Japan, means the years
between 1905 and 1931) as a phase of political détente, an era of relative
cooperation and, at times, even idealistic commitment to international
institutions and global governance. Examples include Japan's very active
participation in the League of Nations, as well as its commitment to
a number of international treaties during the 1920s aimed at military
retrenchment and even outlawing war (the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928,

the ancestor of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution).[3] However, an observer persuaded by this narrative would be taken wholly by surprise when militarism suddenly raised its head again with Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931, launching another cycle of expansion and occupation that would only end with the country's defeat in 1945.

Interwar contemporaries were indeed caught up in this binary perspective and were consequently blindsided when, apparently out of nowhere, the country seemingly flipped from pacifism to militarism. In a telling passage of *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939), E.H. Carr sardonically commented on the naïve idealism of his contemporaries: 'On 10 September 1931, Lord [Robert] Cecil told the Assembly of the League of Nations that "there has scarcely ever been a period in the world's history when war seemed less likely than it does at present." On 18 September 1931, Japan opened her campaign in Manchuria.'[4]

Of course, on the objective, factual level, contingency may play an important role in history when external forces suddenly derail the accustomed course. But with regard to the subjective responses of individual actors to these external forces, one would expect at least a certain path dependence, with some intrinsic consistency even under radically altered circumstances. How else could one understand the otherwise surprisingly smooth transition of Japan's elite from one regime to another, especially at the two great watersheds that define modern Japanese history, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and defeat in 1945?[5]

To explain the apparent ease of these regime transitions, studies in recent years have thus emphasized trans-war continuities, rather than representing 1945 as a fundamental break.[6] This chapter applies a similar perspective to Japan's course during the interwar years and traces the common thread that binds together Japan's realist imperialism of the nineteenth century, the often-assumed idealist internationalism of the 1920s, and the seemingly random expansionism of the 1930s. Of course, consistency does not mean immutability, as appearances may change, particular in the realm of rhetorical performance, but the substance will remain. I would like to demonstrate this specifically in the case of the Japanese responses to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and the particular ways in which these experiences radiated into visions, or rhetorical representations, of interwar and even post-war order. The contention is that the Paris Peace Conference shone a dark light into the 1920s and 1930s that tainted not only the formation but also the formulation and rhetorical performance of Japanese foreign politics. Seen in this light, 1919 was much closer to 1931 and the Second World War than it may appear from a European perspective.

Japanese Responses to the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations

It is a well-known fact that in the beginning the Japanese government was less than enthusiastic about the Paris Peace Conference and Woodrow Wilson's proposals and tried to avoid international entanglement as much as possible.[7] However, when it became clear that the tide could not be turned against multilateralism, the Japanese government changed course, jumping on the multilateral bandwagon with alacrity. This evolution in the government's stance stood in stark opposition to the course of public perception. Initially, the Japanese public was full of enthusiasm for the Japanese government's proposal of a racial equality clause in the Versailles Treaty and censured the Japanese delegation for its lacklustre attitude at the talks. But bitter disappointment soon followed when the racial equality clause was rejected, turning into scorn for the Western powers' hypocrisy and the Japanese delegation's incompetence. This contrasting double reversal of attitudes would prove a fateful one.

While for Europe the Great War was the original catastrophe that traumatized successive generations, Japanese observers met the event with detached bemusement at the ferocity of the carnage and with a more clinical interest in the strategies and technologies involved for future military reference. They also considered it a 'golden opportunity' for Japan to consolidate its own empire in the East.[8] The term *Ōshū sensō* ('European war') – widely used in newspapers – aptly illustrates this detached view of the war, seen as a mere 'fire across the river' (*taigan no hi*). Rather than an epic battle between fundamental principles, as it was often interpreted in Europe, the Japanese government thus took the affair rather lightly, as a good opportunity to further consolidate Japan's position in East Asia and the Pacific. Much against the wishes of Britain, in August 1914 Japan declared war against Germany in order to capture its possessions in Shandong and Northern Micronesia. Buoyed by the success of this gambit, it also presented China with the so-called Twenty-One Demands, the first of which aimed at more firmly securing Japan's newly acquired possessions. This was also the main remit of the delegation that the Japanese government sent to Paris in 1919.

Japan's rather lukewarm and, to some extent, even passive-aggressive attitude towards the Paris Peace Conference can be gauged from the size, composition and behaviour of its delegation.[9] The little group of sixty-four members that Japan sent was diminutive in comparison, for example, to the US delegation with its more than a thousand staff members. Considering that at the time Japan was the third-strongest military power after the United States and the United Kingdom, a delegation of such

size grievously under-represented Japan. Its composition was also light-weight: while it is true that the roster of the delegation reads as a who's who of the Japanese diplomatic and military elite of the 1930s, at the time most were still quite junior. Furthermore, the delegation was headed by Prince Saionji Kinmochi (1849–1940), who, although certainly a venerable statesman, was not particularly known outside Japan, and who in any case was no match – in terms either of status or of temperament – for the heads of state representing the other great powers. And the delegation came late: the conference started in mid-January 1919, but the Japanese delegation arrived in Paris only in March. Finally, while there, the Japanese representatives mostly played 'a watching part',[10] letting the Big Three conduct most of the business and limiting their contributions to the narrow remit they were given in Tokyo. Other delegates thought this aloofness and parochialism on the part of the Japanese delegation strange, and Wilson's press reporter Baker quite aptly characterized them as 'the one-price traders of the Conference'.[11]

The Japanese public shared this negative impression and criticized the delegation for its apparent indifference and lacklustre performance. In May 1919, for example, the popular newspaper *Yorozu chōhō* published a caricature that sums up the general disappointment quite well. It shows the Japanese delegate sitting alone at the head of a long table inscribed 'Peace Conference', while at the other end stand the representatives of the Big Four (Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando), their heads gathered close together, deep in negotiations. The caption of the caricature reads: 'Look at the gentlemanly attitude of our representative!'[12] While at first sight it may seem as if the Japanese delegate is shunned by his colleagues, the caption clearly puts the blame on the delegation itself, for failing to act more assertively.

The caricature was quite observant of the Japanese government's 'gentlemanly' attitude towards the Paris Peace Conference. In fact, the newspaper was less than thrilled when it heard of Wilson's Fourteen Points, particularly the idea of 'open covenants of peace, openly arrived at' (no. 1) and the idea of self-determination (no. 5), especially with respect to its Korean population.[13] It is well known that the government sent the delegation to Paris with instructions to try and obstruct the establishment of such a covenant (the League of Nations) and get on board only if the majority of great powers were in favour. Thus, even Shidehara Kijūrō (1872–1951), at the time vice-foreign minister, is said to have commented:

> If such a round-table conference will be convened, it is already a foregone conclusion that we, with delegates like me who just sit there with dumb faces and awkwardly participate in the discussions, will suffer disadvantages.

It would be such an annoyance [*meiwaku shigoku*] if our fate should be decided by such a multilateral conference. If possible, I would rather that this arrangement [the League of Nations] were not to come into existence. However, since it seems that this can no longer be stopped, we have no other choice than to adapt ourselves to these new developments [*taisei junnō*] and to thoroughly analyse the new situation.[14]

This comment is all the more remarkable given that Shidehara is credited with being one of the most liberal diplomats of his time, to the extent that Japan's relatively cooperative foreign policy during the 1920s is often called 'Shidehara foreign policy' (*Shidehara gaikō*).[15]

The question, then, is why even a liberal internationalist such as Shidehara would have such an ingrained aversion against multilateralism. The answer lies partly in Japan's somewhat traumatic experience with multilateralism in the past. Time and again, Japan's experiences with foreign policy seemed to prove that it would only stand to lose if confronted with a multiplicity of actors at once. This was the case when the Western powers collectively refused to renegotiate the diplomatic and commercial treaties of the 1850s and 60s (the 'unequal treaties'); the deadlock was only broken when the Japanese government finally decided to negotiate treaties one by one, and made a breakthrough with Britain in 1894.[16] It was the case again when the country found itself at the sharp end of a tripartite intervention by Russia, France and Germany in 1895 after it had forced China to cede the Liaodong Peninsula as the spoils of war.[17] And again, during the so-called Yokohama Tax House Case that went before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 1902, and ended badly for Japan in 1905 – an experience that, it is said, instilled a strong dislike for international adjudication in Japan for many generations to come.[18]

These negative reasons were also reinforced by a more positive experience, namely Japan's history of enormous success with the unilateralism of traditional imperialist politics. Socialized into international politics during the age of high imperialism, Japan over the course of less than sixty years rose from being a small isolationist state in East Asian backwaters to the only non-Western colonial power with great power status. In the process, it had achieved a hegemonic position in East Asia by faithfully applying the precepts of the Great Game to its neighbours and competitors.[19] As a power that had not experienced the existential destruction of the Great War, it was reluctant to let go of these principles that had served it so well for so long in favour of the principles of Wilson's 'new diplomacy'.[20]

Echoes of these sentiments can be found in statements from Japanese delegates. The international law scholar Tachi Sakutarō (1874–1943), for

example, who was the official advisor of the Japanese Foreign Ministry during the 1920s and 1930s, went with the delegation to Paris. On his return to Japan, he published a series of scholarly articles and treatises in which he dissected the Covenant of the League of Nations and its role in international politics.[21] Characteristically, he sought to downplay every novel aspect of the League and to fit it into the framework of traditional nineteenth-century politics. In opposition to the principle of national self-determination, Tachi argued that the League was, in fact, *not* a league of 'nations' at all and instead, if anything, was closer to the classical military alliances of sovereign states. The 'people' too, who appear in the Covenant, were a stumbling block for Japanese observers. In a constitutional monarchy whose Prussian-inspired constitution placed all power (nominally) in the hands of the emperor, and that saw the emperor as the non-negotiable core of its 'national polity' (*kokutai*), any mention of a role for 'the people' was a sensitive subject. But most of all, Tachi opposed the League on principle, as can be seen from an article that he wrote in 1918, even prior to his departure for Paris:

> No nation will be persuaded [of the benefits of peace] by beautiful words alone. It will be no small task to make all nations of the world realize the benefits of peace and shoulder the onerous burdens of the League of Nations, as long as there are still nations that in peacetime monopolize immense natural resources, completely shut out other nations from them and refuse to share a piece of the so-called 'place in the sun' [*himukai no basho*], and as long as some nations take it as their mission to suppress and persecute nations of different race, language, culture or thought.[22]

Tachi here offered what was already a standard criticism of the Western powers (particularly the United States and Britain): namely, that they were hiding their greed and avarice under pretty words in order to justify imperialist deeds. While in the nineteenth century colonization and unequal treaties had been justified using beautiful words such as 'civilization' and 'progress', now it was the heady rhetoric of multilateralism and humanitarianism that served this purpose. The later prime minister Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945), an unofficial member of the Japanese delegation, took an even less diplomatic approach, publishing an article (again in 1918, before even going to Paris) that called outright for a rejection of the 'Anglo-American centred peace'.[23] In it, he lambasted Wilson and Lloyd George as demagogues who were deceiving the world (and the Japanese government) with flowery talk of 'democracy' and 'humanitarianism' while in reality having only their own country's interests in mind. 'As a result', he continued, 'not only Germany but all other late comers find no room for expansion and development'.[24]

Tachi Sakutarō seemed to share Konoe's sentiments when he accused the Western powers of shutting out all others who seek their 'place in the sun'. This phrase, originally in German ('Platz an der Sonne'), was famous in Japan. It was coined by the German Foreign Minister Bernhard von Bülow (1849–1929) during the Far Eastern Crisis, when Germany occupied Jiaozhou in 1897, two years after it had denied Japan a similar foothold on the continent in the Tripartite Intervention mentioned above. However, despite the irony that Japan had just wrested Jiaozhou away from Germany, Tachi and Konoe clearly sympathized with Germany's lot after the war, as did many Japanese observers. They saw in Germany a similar latecomer nation that was denied its rightful place and that was also 'persecuted' for its difference in race, language, culture and thought. The fact that Japan was now a great power with substantial colonial possessions and a near-dominant position in the East seemed to count for little against its ingrained identity as a victim nation and 'underdog' empire.[25]

Both statements, Tachi's and Konoe's, thus betray a deep mistrust of Western-led multilateralism, denouncing the Covenant as yet another 'unequal treaty' aimed at keeping Japan down. While Tachi only indirectly challenged the peace by arguing that no nation would be sufficiently persuaded to keep the peace when other powers profited from it disproportionately, Konoe had no qualms about speaking his mind: 'Pacifism and humanitarianism are not necessarily the same. We must sometimes abandon peace for humanity. … Japan, being in an international position rather like Germany's, should desire the destruction of the status quo.'[26]

It might be argued that the Japanese delegation's proposal of a racial equality clause during the Paris negotiations chimed rather well with Wilsonian rhetoric, and as such represented a somewhat uncharacteristic departure from the country's otherwise single-minded pursuit of territorial rights. But a closer look at the origins of this proposal shows that, far from a disinterested position in favour of universal equality, it was very clearly motivated by the abovementioned victim consciousness. More specifically, it was intended to counter the discrimination against Japanese labour migrants that had troubled Japanese-US relations since 1906 and that had considerably worsened after Wilson took office in 1913.[27] In fact, the proposal was probably never meant to succeed in the first place and had instead always been intended as a bargaining chip on the Japanese side in view of obtaining Shandong over Chinese protest. The proposal to enshrine racial equality in international law predictably met with the fatal opposition of the Commonwealth states as well as the personal veto of Wilson, who despite his fondness for 'the peoples of the world' was never above racial discrimination.

This strategically calculating stance on the part of the Japanese government and its delegation stood in stark contrast to the Japanese public's keen enthusiasm for the racial equality clause. It has been observed that Wilson's Fourteen Points, particularly on the issue of self-determination, evoked a 'moment' of enthusiasm among non-Western peoples that was arguably never intended as such by its originator and that was subsequently matched in its intensity only by the resolute turn towards anti-colonialism that followed the bitter disappointment of these hopes by the outcome of the Paris negotiations.[28] The same mechanics applied to Japan's racial equality clause, which for all its doubtful sincerity and ambiguous evocations could be called 'Japan's Fifteenth Point'. The initial degree of its popularity can be gleaned, for example, from the fact that commercial advertisers in Japanese newspapers began to associate their products with the racial equality clause in an early case of 'virtue signalling'. No matter the actual link between the product and the issue, be it toothpaste, soap, stomach medicine or sweets, their advertisements all proclaimed their undying support for world peace and racial equality.[29] This made the fall all the harder when news broke that the clause had been rejected. Commentators predictably denounced the Western powers as hypocrites – which became a sort of standing epithet for Great Britain and the United States in the public sphere – and declared Japan and East Asia as the 'better' and 'more civilized Europe'.[30] The disillusionment was complete when, in 1924, the United States enacted the Immigration Act, effectively banning all immigration from Asia. The public thus joined the government in its rather detached attitude towards the League of Nations.

For the Japanese government, participation in the Paris Peace Conference thus yielded mixed results. On the one hand, the delegation was successful in securing the Shandong Peninsula despite the vocal protests of the Chinese delegation. It was, of course, unable to prevent the establishment of the League of Nations, but at least it was granted a permanent seat on the Council as a great power. Moreover, it was able to extract an assurance, if only an informal one of dubious authority (from a member of Colonel House's staff), that the political remit of the League was intrinsically European and did not bear on Japan's interests in East Asia.[31] Whether or not this was in accordance with the wishes of the other great powers, Japan in any case pursued its role in the League and the related institutions (such as the Permanent Court of Justice) very much in line with this understanding.[32]

From a public relations perspective – and the Paris Peace Conference was also very much a media-driven event – Japan's participation in the conference was an unmitigated disaster.[33] Not only did the Japanese

delegation confuse the other powers and the international audience with its erratic behaviour – withdrawn and fixated on limited issues on the one hand, contrary and unrealistic with its racial equality clause on the other – and clearly lose out in the media battle to the Chinese delegation, which stated its case with aplomb and dexterity (albeit with little success regardless).[34] It also created the impression at home that its members were incompetent and Japanese diplomacy useless, thereby only reinforcing the ingrained popular belief that when it came to international politics might after all *was* right. Thus, an ultra-nationalist observer condemned Japan's participation, writing that: 'The Japanese people ought to die of shame in face of the fact that they sent to the Peace Conference such ineffective and disgraceful representatives.'[35] This was at a time when the Japanese political elite was already quite nervous about public opinion, having in the recent past witnessed – since the Hibiya Riot of 1905 following the Portsmouth Peace Treaty – an accelerating series of mass protests triggered by international and domestic grievances. The junior members of the delegation thus travelled back to Japan dispirited and thoroughly disillusioned with their experience.[36]

Consequences: Japan's 'Dark Wilsonianism'

In terms of diplomatic performance and public perception, the Paris Peace Conference had therefore been a fiasco for Japan. Although the delegates succeeded in their original remit to secure the former German possessions for Japan, in the eyes of the public they had failed miserably. A decade before, the backroom negotiations and power plays of the Japanese delegates may have been seen as good imperial craftsmanship. Now, they suddenly seemed outdated, a relic from the not-so-belle époque, tone-deaf to requirements of doing international politics with the new Wilsonian flourish, and therefore incapable of suitably representing Japan in its newly acquired great power status. As Naoko Shimazu has argued, these criticisms greatly weakened the Japanese Foreign Ministry's standing in politics during the 1920s.[37]

But tracing the course of Japan's foreign policy, and the particular ways in which it was performed from the 1920s into the 1930s, it is hard not to wonder whether Japanese politicians and diplomats had in reality actually caught on quite quickly to the changed rules of the game and sought to bend them in the direction of their own agenda. Japanese politicians had shown similar alacrity in the mid-nineteenth century, when Japan was suddenly confronted with the rules of imperialist politics and, after some misadventures, adopted them in their foreign

policy with spectacular success (from the Japanese perspective).[38] This repeated itself – albeit as a tragedy – in the twentieth century with the new performative rules of diplomacy, whose assimilated product might be called Japan's 'Dark Wilsonianism'. This would account for much of the strange mixture of idealism and ultra-realism that was so conspicuous in Japan's 1930s and wartime propaganda. The argument in this second part of the chapter is that much of the performative aspect of Japan's pre-war and wartime foreign policy could be seen as an echo, albeit distorted, of Japan's experiences during the Paris Peace Conference and its subsequent socialization within the so-called Versailles-Washington system. Japanese diplomats and politicians quickly mastered the performative aspects of the 'new diplomacy' and applied them even after the Versailles-Washington system had crumbled (partly due to Japanese action) and different orders were on the horizon.

In the years after the Paris Peace Conference, Japan pursued a policy of relative cooperation and retrenchment vis-à-vis the Western powers. This was especially observable in the treaties that resulted from the Washington Naval Conference (1921), most notably the Naval Treaty, which limited Japan's sea power vis-à-vis Great Britain and the United States. Again, this conciliatory stance did not go wholly uncontested domestically. In fact, a rather large number of Japanese prime ministers and high-ranking politicians fell victim to assassinations by ultra-nationalist forces (often close to the Japanese military) during the 1920s and early 1930s, which eventually ended the dominance of political parties and prepared the swerve towards military cabinets in Japan and renewed expansion.

However, when the tide turned, this did not mean that the rhetoric changed. On the contrary, the more militant Japan became, the more 'Wilsonian' was its rhetorical performance. A first glimpse of this disconnect could be seen as early as Japan's manoeuvring during the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.[39] This beacon of interwar internationalism, which sought to outlaw war as a means to resolve political conflicts (and is the intellectual ancestor of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution), when seen from behind the scenes, at least from the Japanese perspective, has a much more sinister aspect.

For Japan, the French-American initiative of 1928 came at a most inopportune time. In this year, relations between Japan and China took another turn from bad to worse, and Japan repeatedly sent expeditionary forces to the Chinese coast to protect its assets and nationals. It was also in the same year that ultra-nationalist forces in the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria blew up the train of Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin (1875–1928), just a couple of months before the Treaty was

signed. Thus, while war seemed more distant in Europe at the time, the treaty stood to very much affect the situation in East Asia in the short term.

Nonetheless, as in the case of the League of Nations, international prestige and fear of abandonment overruled practical considerations, so that there was never any question of Japan not joining the Pact. And as in that case, there was never any question on the Japanese side that it should ever apply to East Asia, particularly to Manchuria. The Japanese cabinet discussed making this reservation formally known, as the British had done with regard to 'certain regions' in which it had vital interests (presumably Persia and Egypt). But it eventually decided against making such a statement, in order to avoid repeating the same blunder in Paris twice and provoking the suspicion of the Western powers once again. Instead, the cabinet members argued that since Britain had carved out a reservation for 'certain regions' of special interest, Japan equally could invoke this 'British Monroe Doctrine' for its own purposes if it came to blows in Northeast Asia.[40] Hence, in internal documents and legal analyses by Japanese international law scholars, the Kellogg-Briand Pact became the anchor point for a nascent 'Japanese Monroe Doctrine' that would later be reintegrated into the legal framework of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It is an irony of history, and a reflection of the legal quality of the Pact, that the same treaty was used by Japan to justify its expansion before 1945 and by the Allies after 1945 as the legal basis to condemn Japan for it in the Tokyo Trial.

Other commentators in Japan, it should be mentioned, outright rejected the Pact as a merely aspirational document that did more harm than good. It was a *bel idéal*, they argued, that demanded the impossible, as no country could be persuaded to adhere to it as long as the international community did not provide effective mechanisms to address grievances, leaving military conflict as the only means to seek redress.[41] Thus, commentators repeated the same criticisms formerly angled at the League of Nations, whose Covenant had been similarly denounced as a collection of beautiful but empty words. And yet the Japanese government had learned from its mistakes and acceded to the Pact without openly expressing any reservations while internally declaring it to be without effect on its interests in Manchuria.

When the so-called 'Manchurian Incident' occurred in 1931, the world may have been shocked, as E.H. Carr observed with wry amusement, but from the Japanese side, the arguments used to justify it had been laid out well in advance. It is interesting, however, to observe that Japanese diplomats avoided pulling the 'Monroe card', so as not to provoke the Western powers even further. Instead, they framed their argument in

terms of self-defence, which was an acknowledged exception to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. They also argued that the newly founded state of Manzhouguo (Manshūkoku) was in fact the expression of Manchurian self-determination, thus infusing Wilson's mantra with a second life as justificatory basis for the installation of a puppet regime.[42] It is true that the Lytton Commission rejected these claims out of hand in 1933. What is often overlooked, however, is the fact that the same Commission, in its recommendations, basically handed Manchuria to Japan on a silver platter, recommending turning Manchuria into an autonomous region under international protection with Japan as the dominant actor in the arrangement.[43] Thus, Japan's lip service to the new rules may actually have paid off. It is one of the more irrational blunders of Japanese foreign policy to have walked out of the League of Nations in 1933 regardless.

Manchuria became the starting point of Japan's renewed wave of expansion on the continent but also the kernel for its Pan-Asianist propaganda.[44] Thus, it was a perfect symbol of the chimerical nature of Japan's continental policy: part idealistic rhetoric, part ultra-realist politics.[45] In reality, these Pan-Asianist pretences were nothing but a repackaging of Japan's Fifteenth Point, adapted to the emerging reality of geopolitical blocs. Already the very flag of the newly founded state of Manzhouguo was a reprise of Japan's posture of promoting 'racial equality': its colour scheme was supposed to symbolize the five different ethnicities represented in the territory living together in harmony (the reality was of course starkly different: for example, the Japanese army used parts of Manzhouguo as the testing ground for biological weapons during the war).[46]

This ambivalent pattern continued and expanded each time the scope of conflict and war expanded. After the Sino-Japanese war erupted in full in 1937, the Konoe cabinet issued its 'Declaration of a New Order in East Asia' in 1938. Again, it conjured a vision of a 'tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination' between Japan, Manzhouguo and China, whose objective would be to fight Communism and 'to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia'.[47] This vision reached its maximum extension with the project of the so-called 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' (*Dai-Tōa kyōeiken*) that was announced in parliament in January 1941. According to its declaration, this project aimed at nothing less than a 'moral union of the Asiatic peoples', based on the principles of equality and reciprocity. Japan strived to enable all nations of the world each to take its own proper place, in accordance with the spirit of *hakkō ichiu* (the Japanese wartime slogan of 'Eight Corners of the World under One Roof'), 'the very ideal

which inspired the foundation of our empire'.[48] Finally, in 1943, Japan and co-opted 'members' of the Co-Prosperity Sphere issued a statement on occasion of the Greater East Asia Conference that condemned the Western powers for exploiting the region (thus echoing the criticism of 1918–19) and jointly reconfirmed the principles of regional cooperation, reciprocity, self-determination and racial equality.[49]

This was a far cry from the unilateral, paternalistic invocations of 'civilization' and 'progress' that cost Korea and Taiwan their independence at the turn of the century. Clearly, Japanese politicians and diplomats had since learned the lesson of Paris and were casting their agenda in the terms of the new internationalist rhetoric. When Japan left the League of Nations in 1933, the imperial rescript that announced Japan's withdrawal set the tone, declaring that although Japan was leaving it would nonetheless continue to support the ideals behind the League and work towards international peace by 'cooperat[ing] … with all manner of peace activities'.[50] Commentators took up this theme and clarified that Japan's departure was merely due to a difference in opinion regarding Manchuria, 'so it is not a fundamental repudiation of the true spirit of the League'.[51] This meant more concretely Japan's continued participation in the agencies and commissions of the League until 1938. More widely interpreted, however, it also meant that Japan, although now in an antagonistic position to the League and the Western powers, would nonetheless continue to adhere to the performative standards that had been set in Paris and Geneva.

Of course, there were multiple intentions behind the above declarations, and they were by no means wholly directed towards the outside. They also had a domestic audience in mind and sought to overcome internal opposition and contain the notoriously fractured state of Japanese politics. Thus, when the Konoe cabinet insisted in its New Order Declaration that it was 'imperative to carry out all necessary reforms'[52] to achieve its lofty goals, and when the statement declaring the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere argued that the principle of *hakkō ichiu*, each nation finding its proper place, was 'the very ideal which inspired the foundation of our empire',[53] this was directed towards internal forces, and particularly the often rather independently acting military forces – exhorting them to know their proper place – as much as to international audiences.[54] The military was very much alive to this fact and countered every such attempt at containment with the complaint that such visions as the New Order and the Co-Prosperity Sphere were far too vague to be of any use in war. They rejected the internationalist rhetoric associated with these concepts and clearly expressed their reluctance to pursue the war on any basis other than national interests.[55] But most importantly, from early on,

ultra-nationalist voices criticized any visions of an East Asian community as 'miniature versions' of the odious internationalism of the 1920s that went against Japan's 'national polity', which therefore should be branded 'un-national' (*hikokumin-teki*).[56]

These criticisms were actually not far from the truth. The Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference in 1943, for example, was intended by its originator, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887–1957), as a response in kind to the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the Declaration by the United Nations of the following year. Shigemitsu envisioned this 'Greater East Asian Alliance' based on the Joint Declaration as a decision-making institution for issues affecting the whole region, based on equal rights, just like the League of Nations.[57] However, during its drafting period, the Ministry of the Navy and the Greater East Asia Ministry rejected the all too liberal promises of reciprocity and equality as detrimental to Japan's war effort and insisted that the Declaration be toned down in favour of Japan's role as leader nation (*shudō-koku*).[58]

In the end it did not matter, as neither the Co-Prosperity Sphere nor the Alliance ever took on any tangible reality. Less than two years after the Joint Declaration, Shigemitsu had to sign the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. And yet although the capitulation came as a shock to many of the country's citizens, who had been deluded into thinking that the war could still be won, political actors weathered the transition into the post-war regime under US occupation with remarkable adroitness. Again, this manifested itself in a continuity of rhetorical performance. The internationalist mode that Japanese politicians and diplomats had mastered and perfected during the 1920s and 30s now proved to be a valuable asset that helped to ensure a smooth transition. Although a more detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter,[59] just a brief glimpse at the post-war career of Shigemitsu Mamoru provides a good illustration of this point. Intermittently held in prison in the following years for his role during the war (especially his last additional role as Minister for Greater East Asia), he was released in 1950. In 1954, after the end of the occupation, he was made Foreign Minister again. In this role, he introduced Japan into the United Nations and gave his maiden speech to the General Assembly in December 1956.[60] Although there is a new thematic focus on nuclear disarmament, international trade and economic development, the speech is riddled with tropes familiar from the time when Shigemitsu had been Minister for Greater East Asia. Again, Japan figures as a 'country with the history and tradition of an Asian Nation' that seeks the 'liberation of mankind' and pursues relations of 'mutual cooperation and common destiny' with the countries of Asia.[61]

The scope of internationalism reverted from the Asian to the universal, but the rhetoric remained largely unchanged.

Conclusion

These few examples should suffice to demonstrate how the Paris Peace Conference influenced discourse on international order in interwar and wartime Japan. As demonstrated in the first part, while in Paris, the Japanese delegation felt out of their depth and were completely wrong-footed by the new, internationalist mode of conducting foreign policy, at least on the performative and rhetorical level, as it was exercised by Wilson and his peers. They had paid little attention, or attributed little importance, to the new style in the beginning, as it suited neither Japan's strategy nor its interests, and stuck instead to their proven methods of imperialist diplomacy of pre-war times, while other delegates were already aglow with the heady spirit of interwar internationalism. Although Japan realized most of its immediate goals and, out of fear of abandonment, joined all Western multilateral initiatives (and, having decided to do so, engaged with them very actively), this discrepancy was seen as a failure in both domestic and international opinion. Japanese diplomats and politicians, always very sensitive to issues of prestige (amplified by heightened concern for domestic public opinion in the age of party politics), soon learned from this mistake and reformed their political performance. Parisian tropes thus became a standard part of Japanese foreign policy rhetoric, despite shifting political contexts and agendas. This accounts for much of the curious mixture of idealism and ultra-realism that is so particular to Japan's wartime ideology, and that stands in such stark contrast to wartime reality. The ultra-realism had been there all along – this is the element of consistency throughout Japan's modern foreign policy – but the thin veneer of internationalist idealism was a distinct development in the aftermath of Paris 1919.

Urs Matthias Zachmann is Professor of Modern Japanese History and Culture at Freie Universität Berlin. He is the author of *China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period* (Routledge, 2009), *Völkerrechtsdenken und Außenpolitik in Japan, 1919–1960* (Foreign Policy and International Law Discourse in Japan) (Nomos, 2013), and editor of the volume *Asia After Versailles: Asian Perspectives on the Paris Peace Conference and the Interwar Order, 1919–1933* (Edinburgh University Press, 2017). He is currently leading an ERC-funded project on Japanese military justice during the Asia-Pacific War.

Notes

1. For a similar critique of such binary narratives, see Sakai, *Kindai Nihon*, 3–17.
2. Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children*, 179–259.
3. Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy*, 125–51.
4. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, 36.
5. For the transition after 1945, see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*; for 1868, a study of similar focus is lacking.
6. See, for example, Abel, *International Minimum*, or Lang, *Competing Visions*.
7. Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality*, 1–12; Burkman, *Japan and the League*, 29–59.
8. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention*, 34–36; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 312.
9. On the Japanese delegation's performance at the Paris Conference, see Shimazu, 'Cultural History of Diplomacy'.
10. The British observer H.W.V. Temperley as quoted in MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 307.
11. Ibid., 307.
12. Reprinted in Tamai, *Pari kōwa kaigi*, 333.
13. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention*, 204–37.
14. Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, *Shidehara Kijūrō*, 136–37; see also Burkman, *Japan and the League*, 44.
15. Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy*, 125–51.
16. Perez, *Japan Comes of Age*, 64–86.
17. Zachmann, 'Imperialism in a Nutshell'.
18. Howland, 'The Japan House Tax Case'.
19. On the ambivalent effects of Japan's socialization into the Western international order during the late nineteenth century, see Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire*.
20. This was also a generational matter among Japanese diplomats and politicians. See Nakatani, 'Making Peace'.
21. On Tachi, see Zachmann, *Völkerrechtsdenken*, 109–14.
22. Tachi, 'Kokusai renmei', 14; see also Zachmann, *Völkerrechtsdenken*, 113f.
23. Translated in Hotta, 'Konoe Fumimaro', 315–17.
24. Ibid., 316.
25. On Japan's early victim complex, see Conroy, 'Lessons from Japanese Imperialism'.
26. Hotta, 'Konoe Fumimaro', 316.
27. Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality*, 68–88; Burkman, *Japan and the League*, 80–86; MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 316f; Minohara, 'The Elusive Equality', 129–31; Terada, *Actors of International Cooperation*.
28. Manela, *Wilsonian Moment*, 3–13. For an 'Asian' perspective on Versailles, see the contributions in Zachmann, *Asia After Versailles*.
29. For a selection of such advertisements, see Tamai, *Pari kōwa kaigi*, 318–27.
30. See, for example, LoBreglio, 'Dashed Hopes'.
31. Burkman, *Japan and the League*, 79.
32. See Akami, 'Divide and then Preside'; Zachmann, *Völkerrechtsdenken*, 100–2.
33. Shimazu, 'Cultural History of Diplomacy', 115–116.
34. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 322–44.
35. Quoted in Shimazu, 'Cultural History of Diplomacy', 117.
36. Ibid., 116–17.
37. Ibid., 117.
38. For the field of international law, see, for example, Howland, *International Law and Japanese Sovereignty*.
39. Zachmann, *Völkerrechtsdenken*, 121–57.
40. Ibid., 138–44.
41. Ibid., 155–57, quoting Taoka Ryoichi.

42. Ibid., 178–85.
43. Ibid., 176–77.
44. On the history and nature of Japanese Pan-Asianism, see Saaler, 'Pan-Asianism'.
45. On the 'chimerical' nature of Manzhouguo, see Yamamuro, *Manchuria Under Japanese Dominion*.
46. Guillemin, *Hidden Atrocities*.
47. Brown, 'The Konoe Cabinet's "Declaration"', 169.
48. Saaler, 'Matsuoka Yōsuke', 225.
49. Translated in Narangoa, 'The Assembly', 248.
50. The imperial rescript as quoted in Abel, *International Minimum*, 35.
51. Matsuda Michikazu (1933) as quoted in Abel, *International Minimum*, 35–36.
52. Brown, 'The Konoe Cabinet's "Declaration"', 170.
53. Saaler, 'Matsuoka Yōsuke', 225.
54. Zachmann, *Völkerrechtsdenken*, 209–13.
55. Arima, 'Dare ni mukatte', 269.
56. Sakai, 'Sengo gaikō-ron no keisei', 125.
57. Narangoa, 'The Assembly', 245.
58. Sakai, *Kindai Nihon*, 55.
59. See Dower, *Embracing Defeat*; Zachmann, 'Sublimating the Empire'.
60. Abel, *International Minimum*, 74–75.
61. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Address of his Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu' (online).

Bibliography

Abel, Jessamyn. *The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan's Global Engagement, 1933–1964*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015.

Akami, Tomoko. 'Divide and Then Preside: The Dilemma of the First Asian President of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Age of Empires, a Review Essay on Yanagihara Masaharu and Shinohara Hatsue Eds, *Adachi Mineichirō* (2017)'. *Journal of the History of International Law* 21 (2019), 421–42.

Arima, Manabu. 'Dare ni mukatte kataru no ka: "Dai-Tōa sensō" to shin-chitsujo no gensetsu' [Speaking to whom? The discourse of the 'Greater East Asia War' and the New Order], in Tetsuya Sakai (ed.), *'Teikoku' Nihon no gakuchi*, vol. 1: *'Teikoku' hensei no keifu* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2006), 252–85.

Brown, Roger H. 'The Konoe Cabinet's "Declaration of a New Order in East Asia", 1938', in Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds), *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume 2: 1920–Present* (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2011), 167–73.

Burkman, Thomas W. *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007.

Carr, Edward H. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillan, 1939.

Conroy, Hilary. 'Lessons from Japanese Imperialism'. *Monumenta Nipponica* 21 (3/4) (1966), 334–45.

Dickinson, Frederick R. *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999.

Dower, John. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999.

Guillemin, Jeanne. *Hidden Atrocities: Japanese Germ Warfare and American Obstruction of Justice at the Tokyo Trial*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.

Hotta, Eri. 'Konoe Fumimaro, "A Call to Reject the Anglo-American Centered Peace", 1918', in Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds), *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume 1: 1850–1920* (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2011), 311–17.

Howland, Douglas. *International Law and Japanese Sovereignty: The Emerging Global Order in the 19th Century*. London: Palgrave, 2016.

_____. 'The Japan House Tax Case, 1899–1905: Leases in Perpetuity and the Myth of International Equality'. *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht* 75 (2015), 413–34.

Lang, Heiko. *Competing Visions of Japan's Relations with Southeast Asia, 1938–1960: Identity, Asianism and the Search for Regional Role*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020.

LoBreglio, John. 'Dashed Hopes: Japanese Buddhist Perspectives on the Paris Peace Conference', in Urs Matthias Zachmann (ed.), *Asia After Versailles* (Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 144–74.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2003.

Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'Address of His Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan, before the United Nations General Assembly on the Occasion of Japan's Admission to the United Nations on 18 December 1956'. Retrieved February 2022 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/address5612.html.

Minohara, Tosh. 'The Elusive Equality: Versailles as a Turning Point in U.S.–Japan Race Relations', in Tosh Minohara and Evan Dawley (eds), *Beyond Versailles: The 1919 Moment and a New Order in East Asia* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020), 125–57.

Minohara, Tosh and Evan Dawley (eds). *Beyond Versailles: The 1919 Moment and New Order in East Asia*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020.

Nakatani, Tadashi. 'Making Peace from the Great War: A Generational Shift in Japanese Diplomacy in 1919', in Tosh Minohara and Evan Dawley (eds), *Beyond Versailles: The 1919 Moment and a New Order in East Asia* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020), 159–84.

Narangoa, Li. 'The Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations, 1943', in Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds), *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume 2: 1920–Present* (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2011), 243–53.

Nish, Ian. *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

Perez, Louis G. *Japan Comes of Age: Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision of the Unequal Treaties*. London: Associated University Press, 1999.

Saaler, Sven. 'Matsuoka Yōsuke and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, 1941', in Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds), *Pan-Asianism:*

A Documentary History, Volume 2: 1920–Present (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2011), 223–27.

Saaler, Sven and J. Victor Koschmann (eds). *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*. London: Routledge, 2007.

——. 'Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire', in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (eds), *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge, 2007), 1–18.

Saaler, Sven and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds). *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History*, 2 vols. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.

Sakai, Tetsuya. 'Sengo gaikō-ron no keisei' [The Formation of the Foreign Policy Discourse of the Postwar Era], in Kitaoka Shin'ichi and Mikuriya Takashi (eds), *Sensō, fukkō, hatten* (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppan-kai, 2000), 106–60.

——. *Kindai Nihon no chitsujo-ron* [The Political Discourse of International Order in Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami, 2007.

Samuels, Richard J. *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and their Legacies in Italy and Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan (ed.). *Shidehara Kijūrō*. Tokyo: Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 1955.

Shimazu, Naoko. *Japan, Race and Equality: The Race Equality Proposal of 1919*. London: Routledge, 1998.

——. 'A Cultural History of Diplomacy: Reassessing the Japanese "Performance" at the Paris Peace Conference', in Urs Matthias Zachmann (ed.), *Asia After Versailles: Asian Perspectives on the Paris Peace Conference and the Interwar Order, 1919–1933* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 101–23.

Suzuki, Shogo. *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with the European International Society*. London: Routledge, 2009.

Tachi, Sakutarō. 'Kokusai renmei' [A league of nations], *Gaikō jihō* 329 (1918), 1–14.

Tamai, Kiyoshi Kenkyūkai. *Pari kōwa kaigi to Nihon no masu media* [The Paris Peace Conference and the Japanese mass media]. Tokyo: Keiō gijuku daigaku hōgakubu seiji gakka, 2004.

Terada, Kuniyuki. *Actors of International Cooperation in Prewar Japan: The Discourse on International Migration and the League of Nations Association of Japan*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018.

Yamamuro, Shin'ichi. *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

Zachmann, Urs Matthias. 'Imperialism in a Nutshell: Conflict and the "Concert of Powers" in the Tripartite Intervention, 1895'. *Japanstudien* 17 (2005), 57–82.

——. 'Sublimating the Empire: How Japanese Experts of International Law Translated Greater East Asia into the Postwar Period', in Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov (eds), *The Dismantling of Japan's Empire in East Asia: Deimperialization, Postwar Legitimation and Imperial Afterlife* (London: Routledge, 2016), 167–81.

——. *Völkerrechtsdenken und Außenpolitik in Japan, 1919–1960*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013.

——. 'War and International Order in Japan's International Legal Discourse: Attitudes among Japanese International Lawyers during the 1920s'. *Review of Asian and Pacific Studies* 35 (2010), 103–20.

Zachmann, Urs Matthias (ed.). *Asia after Versailles: Asian Perspectives on the Paris Peace Conference and the Interwar Order, 1919–1933*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017.

Chapter 4

When the World Economy Came into Being

The Supreme Economic Council and the Establishment of World Economic Statistics

Martin Bemmann

One month after the signing of the Peace Treaty in Versailles, the London weeklies *The Economist* and *The Statist* introduced a new journal to their readers. The *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (MBS) was 'to bring together such published statistics as have a bearing on the economic conditions prevailing in as many of the leading countries of the world as possible before, during and after the war with a view to afford some measure of their progress towards normal conditions'.[1] The MBS was indeed a remarkable periodical. In 1919, it was without precedent or competitors.[2] Within months, politicians and public administrations, journalists and economists, and even businessmen had begun to see the MBS as one of the most important sources for summary information on the state of production, trade, finance and employment in many states of Europe and beyond. For almost two years it was officially published by the Supreme Economic Council of the Allied Powers (SEC). But in reality it was the British Board of Trade that prepared and distributed it in the first years. In the spring of 1921, the MBS was taken over by the League of Nations. The Geneva-based organization would expand its focus, which would no longer be limited primarily to Europe but cover the entire world. In 1946, the United Nations Organization eagerly sought, and obtained, the related source material and the rights to continue publication. Thus, in July 2019 the MBS celebrated a century of observing the ups and downs of the 'world economy' as a whole and the development of economic phenomena in individual countries. Probably because of the countless statistical indicators that surround us today, the MBS is not very widely known, and maybe not as much used as it continued to be up until the

mid-twentieth century. Nonetheless, it remains a lively remnant of the Paris Peace Conference.

The relevance of the MBS as an object of historiographic study is not limited to its origin. The MBS must also be understood as part of a broader process: the emergence of what I call 'world economic statistics'. This specific, novel form of international economic statistics differed from an older form in several ways and began to emerge only at the end of the First World War. In contrast to international economic statistics as they had been developed since the mid-nineteenth century, world economic statistics were a product of state activism rather than private interests, focused primarily on the world as a whole, rather than on specific countries, and their compilers sought to collect the data on the basis of common concepts from the outset, instead of trying to make it comparable after their collation. Consequently, world economic statistics depended to a high degree on the acknowledgement and application of certain conceptual and methodological standards in individual countries. Moreover, strong statistical institutions at both country and international levels were required, as was a well-functioning international infrastructure that would enable the quick collection, collation, analysis, printing and distribution of statistical data.[3] The MBS of 1919 did not represent world economic statistics in this sense. But the journal nevertheless marked the beginning of its emergence, and the journal's tables and columns reflected the development of the new form of international economic statistics in the subsequent years. The launch of the MBS was thus a key moment in the emergence of a new way of observing, describing and understanding international economic interdependencies. Before the war, the notion of a single, all-encompassing 'world economy' (*Weltwirtschaft*) was common almost exclusively in the German-speaking world, while in English terms like 'world industry' or 'world commerce', and in French '*économie internationale*', were used. While these latter terms suggested that the entirety of the world's economic entities could be thought of as a kind of global sum, the German concept implied the existence of an integrated global phenomenon that represented more than just the sum of national parts. The new perspective provided by the emerging world economic statistics helped to shape a specific vision of global economic entanglements, exchanges and dependencies, and to make the 'world economy' an object of political, public and scientific concern. Indeed, in the years after the end of the war, it also became common in English and French to think, speak and write of the 'world economy' or the '*économie mondiale*'.[4]

Given that there was no lack of international economic statistics before 1914, and considering that statisticians had been at the forefront of energetic efforts towards an international standardization of concepts

and methods since the mid-nineteenth century[5] – albeit with limited success – the question of why world economic statistics emerged only after the war remains open. After all, this was a period when global economic entanglements were breaking down, as trade walls of all kinds hampered the exchange of goods, capital and people.[6]

Without a doubt, every possible answer to the question involves numerous factors. One prerequisite was the existence of well-functioning statistical authorities in as many states of the world as possible. In a number of countries, especially in Europe, North America and the British dominions, this was already the case before the war. But the global conflict led to a major shift. The statistical machinery of practically all of the countries involved in the war was massively expanded to cope with the needs of organizing a war economy. By and large, this machinery continued to function after the war was over. States now had to face economic and social problems on the national and international levels whose extent and nature were uncertain (inflation and unemployment probably the best known among them). Means were thus needed to describe, explain and solve these problems. Statistics were seen as among the most important of these means, and as a result, statistical authorities, institutions, learned societies and publications proliferated in almost all countries of the world.[7] Furthermore, so-called business cycle research boomed in many industrialized countries in the 1920s, reflecting trends towards increasing quantification in economics, along with the hope of more accurate forecasting of economic developments. This research was mainly based on intensified, extended and accelerated statistical observations and the correlation of as many data series as possible. Closely connected was the upswing of commercial forecasting agencies.[8] Last but not least, the availability and increasing application of modern administrative technologies like card indices and hanging files or data-processing devices like punch card machines helped make it possible to handle an ever-increasing mass of data.[9]

Although there are numerous studies on these developments, most neglect the international angle of the story. This chapter uses the event of the Paris Peace Conference to shed light on this international angle. It seeks to explain why world economic statistics began to emerge at the end of the war. The connection of economic statistics to the Paris Peace Conference necessarily brings into focus the Supreme Economic Council, a body founded by the Western Allies in February 1919. Focusing in on the establishment of the MBS within this institutional framework not only contributes to the relatively little-known history of the SEC[10] but also reveals that the main motive behind the emergence of world economic statistics was governments' increasing need and desire to compete

with each other on the basis of comparable numbers. This increased drive reflected efforts to decrease the high levels of uncertainty felt by businesses and governments in a fundamentally changed international economic environment. It was also spurred by highly politicized and emotionalized public debates on the economic consequences of the war and the peace. The First World War can therefore be interpreted as a catalyst of a new worldview that has continued to influence how global economic phenomena and processes are observed and understood.

In the first section, this chapter highlights the attempts of the British government in 1918 to provide the country's companies with better information on economic developments abroad. The underlying intention was to support private interests in international economic competition, which was expected to become fiercer in the post-war period. To a certain degree these efforts constitute the origins of the MBS. At the same time, the British government was closely involved in the establishment of a new type of intergovernmental cooperation between the Allied powers in the field of statistics, which was supposed to help contribute economically to winning the war. These endeavours, which are sketched out in the second section of this chapter, reflected the functional relevance of international economic statistics obtained during the war. They also revealed the huge practical problems that faced the actors involved when they began to establish an international statistical infrastructure from scratch. Focusing on the SEC, the third section addresses the question of why governments were still interested in this type of cooperation after the Armistice eliminated the original functional relevance of international economic statistics as part of the war effort, and why they agreed to establish the MBS in the summer of 1919.

The Board of Trade's Efforts to Provide British Businesses with Reliable International Economic Statistics in 1918

The origins of the MBS can be traced back to the efforts of the governments of belligerent countries to prepare for the economic challenges of the post-war period, and to the endeavours of the Allied powers to pool their economic resources during the last year of the conflict. Without a doubt, world economic statistics were a product of the First World War.

After the inter-Allied economic conference in Paris in June 1916, the French and British governments began to think more thoroughly about ways to help their respective private sectors to cope with the challenges of what they expected to be a fundamentally changed international economic environment.[11] Before the war, both countries already had

authorities responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of economically relevant information on foreign countries. During the war, commercial intelligence collected, collated and analysed by their respective war ministries became a strategic weapon, crucial to ensuring the effectiveness of the economic blockade of Germany.[12] But in 1917 the French and British governments decided to restructure and intensify the work of their economic intelligence branches with the aim of preparing both themselves and their respective business sectors for the post-war period. In France, a Service de l'information économique was set up within the Ministry of Commerce, headed by Daniel Serruys, an official who was deeply involved in inter-Allied cooperation efforts. Because Serruys himself explicitly referred to a British institution as a model for this new unit, and because the immediate origins of the MBS lie in the reorganized authorities in London, I deal in greater detail with developments on the British side.[13]

Institutionally, the reshuffle in Britain took place in two steps. First, a Department of Overseas Trade was established in the summer of 1917. The new body was co-directed by the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade. Its task was to collect and disseminate information on trading conditions in foreign countries at the national level. This was the body Serruys saw as a model for his own newly established service.[14] Second, the Board of Trade itself was reorganized in November 1917. This included the re-founding of a distinct Statistical Department within the Board, after an older bureau of the same name, established in the 1830s, had been merged with other departments in subsequent decades.[15]

In April 1918, Arthur Steel-Maitland, head of the Department of Overseas Trade, asked the Board to initiate 'a careful statistical survey of foreign markets, country by country, and of the extent of their import and export trade with the United Kingdom and our principal competitors'. Such a survey, he maintained, was 'absolutely necessary' in the interest of British businesses, and it had to be conducted by a professional body. Naturally, the head of the Board's new Statistical Department, Alfred W. Flux, welcomed the idea. However, he was aware of the great challenge that such an endeavour presented. About forty of his staff members, he estimated, would have to work for about a year in order to be able to provide a reliable opinion on the United Kingdom's trade outlook.[16] The research group was established, and it finished its first report shortly before the Armistice. In the end, this report did not forecast any developments but considered only Britain's 'Losses in the Export Trade' during the war.[17]

The highly scattered archival material does not reveal how many people were actually involved in this project, or how long it continued after the end of the war. But the episode does highlight two things.

First, it shows that at the end of the war, governments and private businesses alike were very keen to obtain reliable, comparable and up-to-date information about economic conditions in foreign countries. By obtaining such information, they hoped to decrease the high degree of economic uncertainty that characterized this unstable time. Second, it became very clear that obtaining such information was a huge challenge. This was true even for the British government, which possessed one of the most sophisticated systems for the statistical observation of international economic developments in the world, and whose related periodic publications had been widely renowned and used for many years in many parts of the world.[18] It was thus a consequential development when the Board of Trade linked up these endeavours with the work of international bodies in which the British played a crucial role and began to sketch out the future MBS in the spring of 1919.

The Statistical Activities of the Allied Maritime Transport Council

Since 1914, the governments of the Allied powers had been establishing a rudimentary system for the mutual consideration of their economic needs and possibilities.[19] It was only in the last year of the war, however, that they were forced to cooperate in earnest. Severe losses of shipping capacity due to Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare, the withdrawal of Russia from the Allied group, and the catastrophic defeat of the Italians in the autumn of 1917 had forced the governments of Britain, France, Italy and the United States to agree to pool their shipping tonnage and to coordinate their import demands.[20] It was only in March 1918, though, that they established the Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC). This new body was made responsible for arranging the planned pooling measures and played an important role in winning the war economically.[21] Its activities depended crucially on the availability of reliable, comparable and up-to-date statistical data on the import needs and available shipping capacities of the countries involved. Civil servants, statisticians, economists and businessmen from the participating states met at the AMTC's offices in London to construct the machinery that would deliver such data.

It very quickly became clear that the task was a difficult one. The AMTC faced three major problems: first, no previous knowledge and experience was available on how an international body should and could collect, collate, analyse and prepare statistical information from multiple countries in a way that made it usable for decision-makers and that allowed it all to

take place within very short intervals. The intergovernmental statistical offices of the pre-war period (like that of the International Institute of Agriculture)[22] had been rather small institutions with similar aims but without the need to present up-to-date figures. But the AMTC's mission was to inform politicians and officials who were trying to win a war in real time. This meant a considerably changed role for international economic statistics in decision-making processes. For the first time, they would have an immediate functional purpose in government activities. Second, the lack of common statistical concepts and methods hampered the collation of received national data and made comparisons difficult. Third, and most important, there was a lack of mutual trust between the participating governments. After all, the war allies were also the world's biggest commercial rivals. The US administration in particular was very reluctant to share data with the European powers. This contributed to the suspicion felt by some officials from the other Allied powers about the Americans' actual willingness to fully engage in these shared efforts.[23] Even the experts in the American delegation in London complained about a slow and rudimentary flow of information from Washington to the British capital. In May 1918, James A. Field, head of the statistical branch of the American delegation, claimed that this had already 'doubtless hurt … the prestige' of the United States within the AMTC.[24]

A major step on the way to overcoming these problems was the establishment of a so-called 'non-national' statistical office in June 1918. Its head, the young Harvard economist Joseph S. Davis, who had been a member of the American delegation to London, envisaged an office to which the participating governments would report their numbers on a monthly basis according to its own methodological instructions. Afterwards, the office would analyse and process the data, using it to prepare understandable reports for the actual decision-makers.[25] Of course, there was little time for this system to develop before the war came to an end. Nonetheless, even before the Armistice, Davis and his small team were able to achieve two important results. The first was that he and his colleagues in the AMTC's national branches established a common nomenclature for commodities, to be used for regular reporting within the body.[26] Such a 'working uniformity of classification', Davis underlined in May 1918, was 'well-nigh essential' for all international cooperation efforts.[27] Given the previous decades-long period of disappointed efforts at international standardization in statistics, their relatively quick agreement was unquestionably a success. The group's second achievement was their presentation, in September 1918, of a detailed plan for allocating the scarce shipping tonnage of the combined Allied fleet to certain commodities over the upcoming year on a monthly basis.[28]

More important than these immediate achievements, however, was that the work of the AMTC's statistical office served as an important lesson for intergovernmental cooperation in the field. Although it underlined the difficulties of launching a well-functioning statistical infrastructure and agreeing on common concepts and methods, it also showed that such difficulties could be overcome. The achievements of Davis and his small team showed that it was possible to work impartially in the interest of all participating states. In particular, they revealed the crucial importance of informal personal networks and the establishment of mutual trust between civil servants from the different participating countries.

Distrust between the cooperating governments did not vanish simply because a new office had been established. When Davis detailed what data the national administrations should submit on a monthly basis in June 1918, even the US authorities remained very reluctant to abide by his instructions. 'Anything of [this] sort', Davis wrote to a colleague, 'would "scare people"' in administrations.[29] This hesitant stance reflected how unusual, and uncomfortable, the practice of sharing up-to-date and unpublished data with an international body and, indirectly, with other administrations continued to be. Similar to previous observations on inter-Allied wartime cooperation in general,[30] it was officials working in London on a daily basis with colleagues from other countries who were persuaded of the necessity and feasibility of sharing information in order to achieve mutual aims. Indeed, without such data sharing, the AMTC's work was simply not possible. Therefore, in the summer of 1918, Davis concentrated on establishing good working relations with his colleagues in the AMTC's national branches, as well as with other statisticians and officials from the cooperating countries who worked in other contexts in London. Only they would be able to convince their respective governments to cooperate in earnest. Unfortunately, the rudimentary archival evidence does not allow Davis's endeavours to be reconstructed in detail. It is revealing, though, that after two months Davis characterized his networking activities as a 'time-consuming process' that occupied most of his time and got in the way of regular statistical work. Tellingly, he wrote to a colleague in August 1918 that 'we have been building slipways and keels rather than launching or completing vessels'.[31]

After the Armistice, Davis remained in London until the spring of 1919. During this time, he witnessed the debates about possible international cooperation in the economic field and the role that a future League of Nations might play in it.[32] This drove him to consider how the many problems he had faced when establishing the AMTC's statistical machinery could be 'minimized for the international secretariat of the League of Nations'. He was sure that his and his colleagues' 'experience,

th[ough] in war time, will be a guide of some value in this matter'.[33] And indeed, although Davis himself played no part in the establishment of the League of Nations' statistical machinery – which has been praised for its pioneering and path-breaking activities ever since[34] – it was constructed under the guidance of Arthur Salter, one of the leading figures within the AMTC.[35]

International Economic Statistics, the Supreme Economic Council and the Establishment of the *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*

The high-flying plans of the European Allies to extend their economic cooperation into the transition period, and beyond into peacetime, failed because of fierce American opposition. Although a number of the Allied bodies survived the Armistice, including the AMTC, most quickly lost their crucial role, particularly due to the dismantling of national control mechanisms in the United States and Great Britain.[36] Consequently, the fledgling international statistical infrastructure lost its immediate, functional significance. What remained, however, and indeed increased over the following months, was the relevance of statistical data for political debates between the Allied powers and other participants in the Peace Conference. Numbers became an important ingredient of semi-public debates about the many economic, financial and social problems emerging from the war and its aftermath. A major forum for such debates during the Peace Conference was the Supreme Economic Council.

The SEC was established by the Council of Ten in February 1919. It consisted of ministers and senior officials from the four Western Great Powers and, later, Belgium. It was intended to coordinate all the measures taken by the Allied and associated countries to reconstruct Europe's productive capacities and its infrastructure, and to feed the continent's starving population. To this end, all of the still-existing Allied bodies were officially put under the SEC's control. This included the AMTC, which was now called the SEC's Shipping Section, as well as the Supreme Council for Supply and Relief, led by Herbert Hoover, which was now called the SEC's Food Section. None of the SEC's six sections possessed any executive powers, but all had statistical offices. Among the tasks of the different sections, each staffed with people from all of the participating countries, was to collect statistical data and other information concerning their respective fields of action, to discuss appropriate measures and to formulate related recommendations on the decisions of the SEC.[37] Given the widely differing economic, financial and social interests of the

involved countries, plus the unclear scope of the SEC's authority and the highly uncertain future of international cooperation in the economic field, it comes as no surprise that the SEC was assessed very differently in different quarters. On one side were people like Woodrow Wilson's press secretary Ray Stannard Baker. He agreed with some other liberal internationalists of the time that the SEC represented 'a kind of world economic government' and that it was 'the most powerful economic organization the world has yet known'. Others such as Herbert Hoover took an opposing view. The future president of the United States argued that the SEC was a body that mainly produced 'words and reports that had no practical effect'.[38] Later historians have also disagreed about the SEC's role and importance.[39] In reality, however, no thorough study on this body has yet been published.

What is clear, in any case, is that the SEC collected a huge mass of information on the economic state and development of Europe in the first half of 1919.[40] The data and related analyses were not published at the time and could therefore only indirectly reach a mass public. They nonetheless triggered political controversies that spoke to the emerging political significance of international statistics. Hoover played a crucial role in one of these disputes. In March 1919, he submitted one of his regular memoranda to the SEC in his capacity as Director General of Relief. In it, he outlined the actual and expected import needs of the different European countries, calculated the necessary tonnage for the associated shipping and its allocation to different nations, and discussed the required and available finances. A British official asked the statistical office of the SEC's Shipping Section to evaluate the figures. In their report, Joseph S. Davis and his colleagues concluded that Hoover's numbers were 'distorted' and that the memorandum overestimated the actual available shipping tonnage of the British merchant fleet, and thereby underestimated the relative strain placed on it by the allocated shipments. The report more or less openly accused the United States of 'seeking to establish a position' at the cost of the British mercantile shipping industry using these distorted figures. Implicitly, it thereby confirmed assumptions of British officials that their American partners were not actually doing as much as they could.[41] This statement led to a fierce attack from the US delegation on the statisticians. Hoover even tried to have Davis removed from his post. Davis defended himself by stating that he had not acted as a member of the delegation of his home country but as an 'Allied officer' and by order of an 'Allied council'. And he did not withdraw his criticism.[42] Davis's experiences in this case foreshadowed similar irritations on the part of national administrations about the new status of international civil servants, some of which were described tellingly by Arthur

Salter in his memoirs.[43] Another similar case within the SEC arose a few weeks after the dispute between Davis and the US delegation. This time, the French delegates Louis Loucheur and Étienne Clémentel complained about allegedly false numbers from the SEC's Raw Materials Section on coal production and trade.[44]

Both episodes reflected the new role that international economic statistics were beginning to play in political and diplomatic discourses after the war. Using numbers in such discourses, in particular to legitimate decisions, quickly became both commonplace and a matter of public concern. These statistically induced disputes within the SEC were only arguments between a limited group of experts about relatively simple numbers and statistical analyses based on them. Very quickly, however, the controversies multiplied and became much more politicized and emotional as the complexity of statistics increased and came to be discussed in broader public forums. The most prominent and important of these were of course the debates about war debts, reparations and Germany's capacity to pay, most famously addressed by John Maynard Keynes as early as 1919.[45]

From the perspective of governments of the time, then, the basis on which statistics were produced and the identity of those who produced them were matters of real consequence. The point was not so much that actual or allegedly false numbers circulated. It was that as long as governments and public administrations did not engage fully with international statistical work they could not really control what numbers emerged from the statistical offices of intergovernmental bodies, which then had an effect on what was seen as true and false. For governments, then, it seemed favourable, on the one hand, to have a (supposedly) impartial office whose numbers they could use without subjecting themselves unduly to the criticism that they were arguing with biased figures. On the other hand, governments were eager to control what information such international bodies received and disseminated. In 1919, both considerations led them to the conclusion that it was reasonable, and in their interests, to participate in this type of statistical apparatus.

This conclusion added to governments' impression that economically relevant data from as many countries as possible were needed to support their own private sector. After all, it seemed both cheaper and more feasible to provide an international institution with data – and receive information on the economic situation in other countries in return – than for states to establish infrastructure to gather and analyse such information on their own. Consequently, officials of the Allied powers informally endorsed a British proposal in June 1919 to establish a central statistical section within the SEC. This department was to have offices in London

and Paris, and to be financed, staffed and controlled by the participating governments. Its task would be to collate and publish statistical information on the economic and social situation, predominantly in European states, on a monthly (and for some measures, even weekly) basis.[46] The Board of Trade in London took this informal endorsement as sufficient grounds to instruct Alfred W. Flux, who had been in charge of the statistical enquiry conducted in 1918 by the Board's Statistical Department, to prepare a pilot issue of the MBS. This issue was printed and informally disseminated in July 1919. It was this pamphlet whose publication would be announced in the pages of *The Economist* and *The Statist*.

With the pilot issue of the MBS already on the table, the SEC's member states officially sanctioned the new journal as its own periodical at the beginning of August 1919. This represented a major shift: all of the statistics previously prepared by the inter-Allied bodies had remained unpublished. The SEC established an international editorial board for the MBS, staffed by officials of the Allied powers. Flux represented the British government, Daniel Serruys the French. Furthermore, the states agreed to share the costs of the publication and to transfer it to the League of Nations as soon as the new organization had sufficiently consolidated.[47] The editorial board began to meet in September 1919, and in December of that year, the SEC even agreed to publish the MBS in the participating countries' respective languages. A French version of each issue – in fact a translation of the English version prepared by Serruys' Service d'information économique – was published from December 1919 onwards, an Italian one from February 1920.[48] However, the non-English issues were not widely distributed – not even the Board of Trade received copies[49] – and their preparation was discontinued in the first half of 1920. What remained was the Board of Trade's *Bulletin*, which was taken over by the Secretariat of the League in the spring of 1921.

Conclusion

In 1919, it became quite clear from the vantage point of many capitals that international economic statistics had become an important means to improve the ability of both governments and businesses to compete with each other on the international level. As in the example of the abovementioned investigation of Britain's Board of Trade, governments and public administrations now sought to offer greater support to the private sectors of their respective countries than before the war, in the form of reliable, comparable and up-to-date information on the evolving economic situation in other countries. At the same time, governments came to seek

control over the numbers concerning their respective countries, which were used in political debates and negotiations, and which circulated in the international public sphere. The easiest and cheapest way to accomplish both goals was to cooperate with other governments by means of mutually financed and controlled international bodies, which then laid the institutional, infrastructural and conceptual foundations for world economic statistics.

To be sure, in 1919 the MBS was not yet a survey of the 'world economy'. It only presented some monthly updated figures on coal and iron production, foreign trade, wholesale prices and some other factors that were available for only a few countries. However, for the first time in history, the MBS made the permanent observation of 'the economic conditions' of many states in an internationally comparative framework a permanent task of an intergovernmental body. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was no direct statistical representation of the 'world economy' – no consensus would be reached about what this actually was until the Second World War. But the successive extensions of the MBS's coverage in terms of contents and geographical range created an increasingly detailed, multifaceted and dynamic view of economic phenomena and processes around the world. Together with the periodic publications of other institutions – mainly from Germany, Britain and the United States – this resulted in a statistical image of seemingly 'global' developments, which many took as a reflection of an actually existing single 'world economy'.[50]

Importantly, moreover, international tables like those in the MBS created a permanent framework for an up-to-date comparison of the economic performance of individual countries. They could be used for new kinds of inter-state competition. Already in 1919 for example, India successfully strived to be recognized as one of the world's eight chief industrial countries, chosen to permanently staff some of the seats of the executive organ of the newly established International Labour Organization.[51] But the tables comparing countries could also have comforting effects. In August 1919, the London *Times* commented that the MBS would reveal that '[m]ost of the ills we suffer from are world-wide'.[52] Whatever contemporaries read in them, the MBS's tables reflected the fledgling world economic statistics emerging out of the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference.

Martin Bemmann is a lecturer (Privatdozent) in the History Department of the University of Freiburg (Germany). He is interested in European history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in global contexts, as well as in economic and environmental history from a global perspective.

Currently, he is investigating the international research collaboration of Eastern European socialist countries in the 1970s and 1980s and the history of wood-based businesses in Europe from the mid-nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries. His recent publications include a monograph on the emergence and development of international economic statistics (*Weltwirtschaftsstatistik: Internationale Wirtschaftsstatistik und die Geschichte der Globalisierung, 1850–1950*; De Gruyter, 2023) and an edited special issue of the *European Review of History* (vol. 30, no. 1, 2023) that explores the history of the International Statistical Institute.

Notes

1. Supreme Economic Council, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*; 'Monthly Bulletin of Statistics', *The Statist*, 26 July 1919, 160; 'Official Economic Statistics', *The Economist*, 26 July 1919, 129.
2. There were at the time increasing numbers of monthly periodicals produced by public and private bodies, presenting comparative international statistical data on certain economically relevant variables. But in 1919, none covered as many different phenomena as the MBS, and none was as up-to-date as the new journal. See, for instance, the *Bulletin* of the International Institute of Agriculture; or the *Bulletin mensuel* of the Institut International de Statistique, published from 1920 to 1932 (monthly only from November 1923 onwards).
3. I explore these characteristics in detail in my book *Weltwirtschaftsstatistik*. For some preliminary considerations, see Bemmann, 'Internationale und Weltwirtschaftsstatistik', 204–10.
4. Bemmann, 'Sidelined'; on the career of the 'world economy' concept, see Pohl, *Aufbruch*; Slobodian, 'How to See'.
5. Bemmann, *Weltwirtschaftsstatistik*, chs. 2–3; Horstmann, *Halbamtliche Wissenschaft*; Horváth, 'Le concept'; Menges, 'Versuch'; Nixon, *A History*; Randeraad, *States and Statistics*; Zahn, *50 années*.
6. See the classic overviews of Aldcroft, *From Versailles*, and Kindleberger, *History*. A more recent account is Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, *The World Economy*.
7. On related developments in the major belligerent countries, see Alchon, *The Invisible Hand*, 21–32; Cuff, 'Creating Control Systems'; Godfrey, *Capitalism at War*; Mespoulet, *Statistique et révolution*, 110–15; Prévost, *A Total Science*, 104–20; Prévost and Beaud, *Statistics*, 63–89; Randeraad, *States and Statistics*; Stapleford, *The Cost*; Stanziani, *L'économie en révolution*, 153–82; Tooze, *Statistics*.
8. See Alchon, *The Invisible Hand*; Barnett, *Kondratiev*; Friedman, *Fortune Tellers*; Lenel, 'Mapping the Future'; Morgan, *The History*, part I; Tooze, *Statistics*; Coenen, *"Konjunkturforschung"*; Kulla, *Die Anfänge*.
9. See Agar, *The Government Machine*; Beniger, *The Control Revolution*; Krajewski, *Zettelwirtschaft*; Tooze, *Statistics*, 25–27.
10. Apart from a few more or less casual mentions in various studies, the most elaborate accounts of this body remain two doctoral dissertations based mainly on published sources: Fitzgerald, 'The Supreme Economic Council', and Scogin, 'Britain'.
11. On these discussions, see Bunselmeyer, 'The Cost of the War', 41–122; Orde, *British Policy*; Soutou, *L'or et le sang*; Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation*, chs 4–6.
12. Ferris, 'War Trade Intelligence Department'; Bourlet, 'Jean Tannery'.

13. Badel, *Diplomatie*, 51; on Serruys' biography, see Badel, *Un milieu libéral et européen*, 93; Malégarie, *Notice*.
14. Badel, *Diplomatie*, 44–49; Lojko, 'The Age of Illusion?'; MacClintock, 'The British Foreign Commercial Service'.
15. Minutes of the 265th Meeting of the War Cabinet, 5 November 1917, 5, TNA, CAB 23/4/39; see the related memorandum of the president of the Board of Trade Albert Stanley of 10 October 1917 together with a report of an expert committee of August 1917, TNA, CAB 24/4/13; Llewellyn Smith, *The Board of Trade*, 69, 71, 216, 219–20, 222.
16. Minutes of the Morning Meeting of the Board of Trade Council, 30 April 1918, with Related Memoranda of Arthur Steel-Maitland, Department of Overseas Trade, 18 April 1918 (M.M.172), and of Alfred W. Flux, Board of Trade, n.d. (M.M. 172A), TNA, BT 198/2.
17. 'United Kingdom: Losses in the Export Trade 1913–1917', Confidential Report, October 1918, TNA, BT 198/4; some of the results of the report were published after the war as 'War and Export Trade: An Analysis, 1913–1917', *Board of Trade Journal* 101 (1918), No. 1150 [12 December 1918], 736–38.
18. See Bemmann, *Weltwirtschaftsstatistik*, 78–94.
19. Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*; Clémentel, *La France*; Larigaldie, 'Les organismes'; Soutou, *L'or et le sang*; McClure, *Earnest Endeavors*, 136–51; Greenhalgh, *Victory*, 102–32, 265–80; Holthaus and Steffek, 'Experiments'; Piétri, 'Jean Monnet'; Trachtenberg, *Reparation*, 6–10.
20. For an account of these developments, see Leonhard, *Die Büchse*, 615–33.
21. Balderston, 'Industrial Mobilization', 226; Greenhalgh, *Victory*, 91; Leonhard, *Die Büchse*, 832; Tooze, *The Deluge*, 204, 251; the most recent account of the AMTC's activities and relevance is provided by Martin, *The Meddlers*, 30–44.
22. See Wieth-Knudsen, 'Die statistische Tätigkeit' (1910, 1912); D'Onofrio, 'Agricultural Numbers'.
23. McClure, *Earnest Endeavors*, 148.
24. James A. Field to Edwin F. Gay, Division of Planning and Statistics of the US Shipping Board, Washington, D.C., 1 May 1918, HIAS, Papers of Edwin F. Gay, Box 2, Folder 5.
25. 'Allied Maritime Transport Council. Statistical Office. Tentative Formulation of General Policy', Memorandum, Joseph S. Davis, 20 June 1918; 'Allied Maritime Transport Council. Statistical Office. Preliminary Statement of Material Desired From Each Co-operating Nation', Memorandum, Joseph S. Davis, 20 June 1918, HIAS, Gay Papers, Box 2, Folder 5.
26. Davis to Edmund F. Gay, 13 August 1918, HIAS, Papers of Joseph S. Davis, Box 5, Folder 'Personal Data'.
27. Davis to Edmund F. Gay, 20 May 1918, HIAS, Gay Papers, Box 2, Folder 5.
28. Salter, *Allied Shipping Control*, 204–10.
29. Davis to Edmund F. Gay, 13 August 1918, HIAS, Davis Papers, Box 5, Folder 'Personal Data'.
30. McClure, *Earnest Endeavors*, 145–48; Trachtenberg, *Reparation*, 20–21; Tooze, *The Deluge*, 205; Heaton, *A Scholar*, 116–18.
31. Davis to Edmund F. Gay, 13 August 1918, HIAS, Davis Papers, Box 5, Folder 'Personal Data'.
32. Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*; Decorzant, *La Société*; Martin, *The Meddlers*.
33. Davis to unnamed 'Friends' 25 January 1919, HIAS, Davis Papers, Folder 'Trip to London'.
34. For example: Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*, 36, 345, 350; Ekbladh, 'Exile Economics', 1–3; Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', 1109; Slobodian, *Globalists*, 70.

35. On the close links between Salter's leading role in the work of inter-Allied bodies and the establishment of the League's secretariat, see Holthaus and Steffek, 'Experiments'; for a very detailed biography of Salter, see Aster, *Power, Policy and Personality*.

36. Bunselmeyer, 'The Cost of War', 9–146; Fitzgerald, 'The Supreme Economic Council', 23–29; Hogan, 'The United States'; McClure, *Earnest Endeavors*, 154–63; Nash, *The Life of Herbert Hoover*, 477–90; Orde, *British Policy*, 5–31; Tooze, *The Deluge*, 291; Trachtenberg, *Reparation*, 1–27.

37. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, 339–42; Fitzgerald, 'The Supreme Economic Council', 65–67; Scogin, 'Britain', 97–100.

38. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, 335, 340; Hoover, *Memoirs*, 298–99.

39. Stressing the role of the SEC as a kind of training ground for future international organizations and officials, Katie Scogin and Oscar Fitzgerald offer a rather positive assessment of the SEC. Scholars looking at the organization's immediate economic impacts, such as Derek Aldcroft and Anne Orde, have been much more sceptical about its actual relevance. Scogin, 'Britain'; Fitzgerald, 'The Supreme Economic Council'; Aldcroft, *From Versailles*, 60; Orde, *British Policy*, 35.

40. See the Council's minutes and circulated official documents in United States Department of State, *Papers*, vol. 10.

41. 'Food Supplies for Europe', Memorandum, Herbert Hoover, 21 March 1919; 'Report from Statistical Section, Allied Maritime Transport Council', 28 March 1919, in United States Department of State, *Papers*, vol. 10, 91–96, 116–19.

42. Joseph S. Davis to H.M. Robinson, 1 April 1919, to Edwin F. Gay, 2 April 1919, and to Carson S. Duncan, 2 April 1919, HIAS, Gay Papers, Box 2, Folder 9; Interview of Raymond Henle with Dr. Joseph S. Davis, 11 October 1967, 3–5, HHPL, Oral History Collection; Notes of Joseph S. Davis for Sidney Aster, 1 March 1975, CAC, SALT 7/4.

43. Salter, *Memoirs*, 160.

44. Minutes of a Meeting of the Raw Materials Section of the SEC, 4 April 1919, LSE, Papers of Edward M.H. Lloyd, LLOYD 3/1; 'Coal Situation in Europe', Memorandum, Raw Materials Section of the SEC, n.d. [April 1919], in United States Department of State, *Papers*, vol. 10, 181–85; Protest of the French Delegates in the following 13th session of the SEC on 22 April 1919, in United States Department of State, *Papers*, vol. 10, 177.

45. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences*.

46. 'Memorandum of Statistical and Information Bureau for the Raw Materials Committee of the Supreme Economic Council', n.d. [probably June 1919], LSE, Lloyd Papers, LLOYD 3/2.

47. United States Department of State, *Papers*, vol. 10, 498–99; United States Department of State, *Papers*, vol. 3, 150.

48. Minutes of the Board of Trade Council's Morning Meeting, 2 December 1919, 4, TNA, BT 198/5; Report of André de Kerchove, Belgian delegate to the SEC's Permanent Committee, on the seventh meeting of this body, 19 December 1919, in: NAB, T044/1875; Supreme Economic Council, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, no. 6, IV/ no. 8, IV.

49. Thomas S. Gibson, Board of Trade, to Alexander Loveday, League of Nations Secretariat, 3 June 1920, NCL, Papers of Alexander Loveday, Box 3.

50. Slobodian, *Globalists*, 71; Bemmann, *Weltwirtschaftsstatistik*, ch. 10.

51. Gidney, 'The Development Dichotomy'; Bemmann, *Weltwirtschaftsstatistik*, 419–31.

52. 'Economic Conditions in Peace', *The Times*, 26 August 1919.

Bibliography

Archival Resources

Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge (CAC)
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa (HHPL)
Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford (HIAS)
London School of Economics and Political Science, Archives and Special Collections, London (LSE)
National Archives of Belgium, Brussels (NAB)
Nuffield College Library, Oxford (NCL)
The National Archives, Kew (TNA)

Published Sources

Agar, Jon. *The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.

Alchon, Guy. *The Invisible Hand of Planning: Capitalism, Social Science, and the State in the 1920s*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.

Aldcroft, Derek H. *From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919–1929*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977.

Aster, Sidney. *Power, Policy and Personality: The Life and Times of Lord Salter, 1881–1975*. CreateSpace, 2015.

Badel, Laurence. *Un milieu libéral et européen: Le grand commerce français, 1925–1948*. Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1999.

——. *Diplomatie et grands contrats: L'État français et les marchés extérieurs au XXᵉ siècle*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2010.

Balderston, Theo. 'Industrial Mobilization and War Economies', in John Horne (ed.), *A Companion to World War I* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 217–33.

Baker, Ray S. *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. 2. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922.

Barnett, Vincent. *Kondratiev and the Dynamics of Economic Development: Long Cycles and Industrial Growth in Historical Context*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.

Bemmann, Martin. 'Internationale und Weltwirtschaftsstatistik: Beobachtungen, Überlegungen und Thesen zur Genese internationaler Wirtschaftsstatistik in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren', in Stefan Haas, Michael C. Schneider and Nicolas Bilo (eds), *Die Zählung der Welt: Kulturgeschichte der Statistik vom 18. bis 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2019), 195–217.

——. 'Sidelined but Essential: The International Statistical Institute, the League of Nations and the Statistical Observation of the "World Economy" after the First World War'. *European Review of History* 30(1) (2023), 101–22.

——. *Weltwirtschaftsstatistik: Internationale Wirtschaftsstatistik und die Geschichte der Globalisierung, 1850–1950*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023.

Beniger, James R. *The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.

Bourlet, Michaël. 'Jean Tannery (1878–1939): À l'origine de la guerre économique'. *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 214(2) (2004), 81–95.

Bunselmeyer, Robert E. 'The Cost of the War: British Plans for the Post-War Economic Treatment of Germany, 1914–1918', Ph.D. thesis. Yale University, New Haven, 1986.

Clavin, Patricia. *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Clémentel, Étienne. *La France et la politique économique interalliée*. Paris: Presses universitaires, 1931.

Coenen, Étienne. *La "Konjunkturforschung" en Allemagne et en Autriche, 1925–1933*. Leuven: Nauwelaerts, 1964.

Cuff, Robert D. 'Creating Control Systems: Edwin F. Gay and the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, 1917–1919'. *Business History Review* 63(3) (1989), 588–613.

Decorzant, Yann. *La Société des Nations et la naissance d'une conception de la regulation économique internationale*. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011.

D'Onofrio, Federico. 'Agricultural Numbers: The Statistics of the International Institute of Agriculture in the Interwar Period'. *The Agricultural History Review* 65(II) (2017), 277–96.

Ekbladh, David. 'Exile Economics: The Transnational Contributions and Limits of the League of Nations' Economic and Financial Section'. *New Global Studies* 4(1) (2010), art. 9.

Feinstein, Charles H., Peter Temin and Gianni Toniolo. *The World Economy Between the World Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Ferris, John Robert. 'The War Trade Intelligence Department and British Economic Warfare during the First World War', in Thomas G. Otte (ed.), *British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, c. 1830–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 24–45.

Fitzgerald, Oscar P. 'The Supreme Economic Council and Germany: A Study of Inter-allied Cooperation after World War I', Ph.D. thesis. Georgetown University, Washington DC, 1971.

Friedman, Walter A. *Fortune Tellers: The Story of America's First Economic Forecasters*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Gidney, Thomas. 'The Development Dichotomy: Colonial India's Accession to the ILO's Governing Body (1919–22)'. *Journal of Global History* 18(2) (2023), 259–80.

Godfrey, John F. *Capitalism at War: Industrial Policy and Bureaucracy in France, 1914–1918*. Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. *Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France During the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Heaton, Herbert. *A Scholar in Action: Edwin F. Gay*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Hogan, Michael J. 'The United States and the Problem of International Economic Control: American Attitudes Toward European Reconstruction, 1918–1920'. *Pacific Historical Review* 44(1) (1975), 84–103.

Holthaus, Leonie and Jens Steffek. 'Experiments in International Administration: The Forgotten Functionalism of James Arthur Salter'. *Review of International Studies* 42 (2016), 114–35.

Hoover, Herbert. *Memoirs: Years of Adventure, 1874–1920*. New York: Macmillan, 1951.

Horstmann, Jan-Philipp. *Halbamtliche Wissenschaft: Internationale Statistikkongresse und preußische Professorenbürokraten*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2020.

Horváth, Robert A. 'Le concept de statistique internationale et son évolution historique'. *International Statistical Review* 40(3) (1972), 281–98.

Institut International de Statistique. *Bulletin mensuel*. The Hague, 1920–32.

International Institute of Agriculture. *Bulletin de statistique agricole*. Rome: International Institute of Agriculture, 1910.

Keynes, John M. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. London: Macmillan, 1919.

Kindleberger, Charles P. *History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century. Vol. 4: The World in Depression, 1929–1939*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973.

Krajewski, Markus. *Zettelwirtschaft: Die Geburt der Kartei aus dem Geiste der Bibliothek*. Berlin: Kadmos, 2002.

Kulla, Bernd. *Die Anfänge der empirischen Konjunkturforschung in Deutschland 1925–1933*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996.

Larigaldie, Pierre. 'Les organismes interalliés de contrôle économique', Ph.D. thesis. Université de Paris, 1926.

Lenel, Laetitia. 'Mapping the Future: Business Forecasting and the Dynamics of Capitalism in the Interwar Period'. *Economic History Yearbook* 59(2) (2018), 377–413.

Leonhard, Jörn. *Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014.

Llewellyn Smith, Hubert. *The Board of Trade*. London: Putnam, 1928.

Lojko, Miklos. 'The Age of Illusion? The Department of Overseas Trade Between the Two World Wars: Three Case Studies', in John Fisher, Effie G.H. Pedaliu and Richard Smith (eds), *The Foreign Office, Commerce and British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 115–40.

MacClintock, Samuel. 'The British Foreign Commercial Service'. *The University Journal of Business* 1(1) (1922), 69–80.

Malégarie, Charles. *Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Daniel Serruys (1875–1950)*. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1952.

Martin, Jamie. *The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2022.

McClure, Marc E. *Earnest Endeavors: The Life and Public Work of George Rublee*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

Menges, Günter. 'Versuch einer Geschichte der internationalen Statistik von ihren Vorläufern im Altertum bis zur Entstehung des Völkerbundes (An Essay on the History of International Statistics from Forerunners in Ancient Times to the Inception of the League of Nations)'. *Statistische Hefte* 1 (1960), 22–64.

Mespoulet, Martine. *Statistique et révolution en Russie: Un compromis impossible (1880–1930)*. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2001.

Morgan, Mary S. *The History of Econometric Ideas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Nash, George H. *The Life of Herbert Hoover, vol. 3: Master of Emergencies, 1917–1918*. New York: Norton, 1996.

Nixon, James W. *A History of the International Statistical Institute, 1885–1960*. The Hague: International Statistical Institute, 1960.

Orde, Anne. *British Policy and European Reconstruction After the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Pedersen, Susan. 'Back to the League of Nations'. *American Historical Review* 112(4) (2007), 1091–117.

Piétri, Nicole. 'Jean Monnet et les organismes interalliées durant la Première Guerre mondiale', in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens (eds), *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de de la paix* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), 23–30.

Pohl, Hans. *Aufbruch der Weltwirtschaft: Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989.

Prévost, Jean-Guy. *A Total Science: Statistics in Liberal and Fascist Italy*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009.

Prévost, Jean-Guy and Jean-Pierre Beaud. *Statistics, Public Debate and the State, 1800–1945*. London: Routledge, 2016.

Randeraad, Nico. *States and Statistics in the Nineteenth Century: Europe by Numbers*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010.

Salter, Arthur. *Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1921.

——. *Memoirs of a Public Servant*. London: Faber & Faber, 1961.

Scogin, Katie E. 'Britain and the Supreme Economic Council, 1919', Ph.D. thesis. North Texas State University, Denton, 1987.

Slobodian, Quinn. 'How to See the World Economy: Statistics, Maps, and Schumpeter's Camera in the First Age of Globalization'. *Journal of Global History* 10(2) (2015), 307–32.

——. *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018.

Soutou, Georges-Henri. *L'Or et le sang: Les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre mondiale*. Paris: Fayard, 1989.

Stanziani, Alessandro. *L'économie en révolution – Le cas russe, 1870–1930*. Paris: Albin Michel, 1998.

Stapleford, Thomas A. *The Cost of Living in America: A Political History of Economic Statistics, 1880–2000*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Supreme Economic Council, British Department. *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* 1(3) (1919/1920).

Tooze, Adam. *Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

——. *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order, 1916–1931*. London: Allen Lane, 2014.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Trentmann, Frank. *Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption, and Civil Society in Modern Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

United States Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. 3. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943.

——. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. 10. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.

Wieth-Knudsen, Knud A. 'Die statistische Tätigkeit des Internationalen Landwirtschaftsinstituts'. *Deutsches Statistisches Zentralblatt* 2 (1910), 161–66.

——. 'Die statistische Tätigkeit des Internationalen Landwirtschaftsinstituts'. *Deutsches Statistisches Zentralblatt* 4 (1912), 129–36.

Zahn, Friedrich. *50 années de l'Institut International de Statistique*. Munich: n.p., 1934.

Chapter 5

The Treaty of Versailles and Transatlantic Telecommunications
Technical Diplomacy, *Sortie de Guerre* and a New Techno-Strategic Paradigm

Pascal Griset

While the importance of economic and financial experts in the reconstruction of the international order after the First World War has long been emphasized, the importance of telecommunications engineers as experts is little known in this specific historiography. Technology was very present in the negotiations during the Paris Peace Conference, but it was often more implicit than explicit. Telecommunications took up a small but significant place in the negotiations. Exploring the place of this field in the context therefore stands to help us to better understand aspects of the conference that have not yet been addressed.

At the time the conflict began, a network of submarine telegraphic cables built since the 1850s irrigated a large part of the planet.[1] This network was at the heart of the first battles in the war, and the question of who should possess the German cables, which were cut and then confiscated, was a considerable, and sometimes very tense, issue among the Allies. This story has been told in a somewhat cursory and peripheral – but nevertheless complete – fashion by scholars of the history of international relations. Archives directly linked to the Peace Conference have allowed the negotiations to be thoroughly documented and the question of telecommunications apparently dealt with in a satisfactory manner. But these sources leave a blind spot.

Wireless telegraphy, still a young technology – although it had been developing since the beginning of the century[2] and played a major role in the course of the conflict – seems to be absent from the debates. It appears only in a handful of texts and in certain articles of the Treaty of Versailles aimed at settling details relating, for instance, to the future of

Germany's colonial possessions. The first question addressed here will therefore be to understand why this technology is almost absent from this picture. What relationship between diplomacy and technology does this apparent absence reflect? Addressing these two domains together in order to consider intercontinental telecommunications as a global object will also allow me to address the question of the United States' role in the resolution of the conflict – and, because the two are linked, whether and how the First World War constituted a key moment for US power, a sort of first step in the construction of a global leadership that would mark the rest of the twentieth century. More specifically, the aim will be to understand what role, if any, the Wilsonian ideology[3] played in this very specific field of telecommunications to enhance or diminish the global influence of the United States.

Finally, highlighting the role of engineers in ending the war will allow us to examine the Versailles period through the prism of technocratic internationalism.[4] For there were indeed crucial negotiations in the first half of 1919 on the future of world radio and telecommunications. These negotiations were conducted at the same time as the Conference, and in close proximity to it, but without being integrated into it. The construction of this specific space confirms the key role of a technocratic vision in a process that would structure post-war power relations and help to define the rules of international relations in the 1920s and 1930s. The three principal questions explored here in order to expand our understanding of the Paris Peace Conference, then, concern the relationship between diplomacy and technical expertise, the specific place of the United States in the world order, and the possible emergence of an international technocracy in the space of negotiations.

To do this, the Paris moment must be situated in the *longue durée* of large technical systems, from the last third of the nineteenth century until 1918. Understanding this affirmation of the centrality of the new technology of radio, in its interactions with a considerably older domain, that of submarine cables, is key to understanding these few months of negotiations and their consequences. Secondly, it is important to understand the specific place of radio in the negotiations – neither fully outside the Conference, nor directly integrated into it. This specific place, which was consciously constructed and defended by the engineers involved, may reveal the scope of the influence of their decisions in Paris on the evolution of telecommunications networks during the 1920s and 1930s but also the limitations of that influence.

1860–1918: A Changing Balance of Power and the Dynamism of Technical Systems

The first telegraph cable was laid in 1851 to link England to France. Until the early 1880s, British supremacy in this new industry was absolute. England housed the only companies capable of manufacturing, laying and operating an intercontinental submarine cable. London also had a monopoly on the crucial strategic resource gutta-percha. This natural resin, which was indispensable in insulating conductors, was only produced in territories controlled by the British Empire.[5]

Transatlantic Connections by Submarine Cables: From British Hegemony to American Domination (1860s–1912)

In 1914, Great Britain remained the globally dominant power in submarine telegraphy thanks to its imperial network and the activity of the Eastern Telegraph Company, which was very well supported by the state. Its mastery of the technology was optimal and its capacity to intervene at sea, supported by the Royal Navy, unequalled. It had nearly thirty cable ships, against France's five and the United States' two.[6] On the Atlantic, however, British interests had receded considerably. While still dominant in the South Atlantic thanks to long-standing exclusive concessions, they had been driven out of the North Atlantic. Whereas in the early 1880s all transatlantic cables were owned by the Anglo-American Company, or integrated into the cartel it led, since 1911 not a single cable had been directly or indirectly operated by this pioneering British business.[7] Instead, the market was now shared between two American companies, Western Union and the Commercial Cable Company. The latter had formed an alliance with German interests through traffic agreements, which meant its own cables and those of the Felten & Guilleaume Carlswerk Actien-Gesellschaft had been embedded in a coordinated system since 1899.[8]

Operated by private companies, the cable connections did not depend on the agreements made within the International Telegraphic Union, an essentially European institution,[9] of which the United States was not a member. In 1913, a telegram sent from San Francisco to London would be delivered either by Western Union or by the Postal Telegraph Company and its subsidiary, the Commercial Cable Company. Only the segment between the British coast and London was provided by the Post Office within the state-owned electric telegraph monopoly. Only this very small part of the revenue escaped the American duopoly. The Atlantic had become a sort of extension of the American domestic network, creating

a corridor that concentrated the largest and most lucrative share of the world market.

Wireless Telegraphy: The Dynamism of Technical Innovation for a Crucial but Limited Market (1900–1914)

Appearing at the end of the nineteenth century with the experiments of Guglielmo Marconi, wireless telegraphy significantly transformed the technical possibilities for intercontinental telecommunications, which had evolved only slightly over the previous half-century. In 1896, convinced of the economic potential of his invention, the young Italian left his native country for England.[10] He filed his first patent on 2 June 1896 and formed the Wireless Telegraph and Signal Company the following year.[11] Until 1914, given the performance of its devices and very strong demand from both civilian and military fleets, Marconi and his competitors concentrated their efforts on equipping ships with radiotelegraphy stations.[12] Marconi's attempt to impose a monopoly on these services through his patents was the trigger for the first international conference on wireless communications. In 1903, the Reich, worried about the effects of these dangerous English claims on the German company Telefunken – founded that year by the engineer and industrialist Emil Rathenau – proposed to the world's major postal, telegraph and telephone authorities a meeting in Berlin for a 'preliminary' conference to examine problems around the organization of international radio communications. In fact, their only real reason for holding this conference was 'to cover the point as to whether any company should be allowed to act as the Marconi Company had acted'.[13] With the exception of England and Italy, all delegations signed a protocol on 13 August 1903 opposing 'Marconism'.[14] The conference simultaneously laid down the founding principles of dialogue and coordination towards the regulation of the radio spectrum and began a long series of meetings of these authorities. In the following years, the United States also participated while remaining absent from the International Telegraphic Union.[15] An International Radiotelegraph Convention and a set of Radio Regulations were adopted at the first plenary conference in Berlin on 3 November 1906.[16] The last conference before the Great War took place in London in June 1912. Forty-three delegations allocated frequencies to new services. The process was still essentially concerned with sea links, which had taken on greater importance in the aftermath of the Titanic disaster.[17]

From the early days of wireless communications, there was great hope that the technology would quickly come to compete with cable systems, which were increasingly criticized. 'The cable companies have been just

as incapable of improvement as the canals of the planet Mars, and their management has been made with about as much interest in the needs and wants of the inhabitants of the earth', ridiculed the *New York Times* in 1907.[18] Marconi was relentless during the 1900s, consuming the profits made in equipping commercial and military fleets in ruinous investments to challenge this 'monopoly that the public loved to hate'.[19] The contract he signed in 1913 to build an imperial radio network for the British Post Office was an initial but very limited success because 'the strategists remained quite clear in their minds that the wireless must only be seen as a valuable reserve in addition to cable communication'.[20] The declaration of war abruptly halted the project.

In both Great Britain and France, with their state-owned telecommunications monopolies, relatively little room was left for private enterprise in the domain. The naval forces of both countries, although the first to make use of the new technology, were unable to take a dominant role in the governance of the new networks. The postal and telecommunications administrations were the (sometimes punctilious) representatives of the interests of States that were jealous of their prerogatives.[21] In the United States, in contrast, there was no single administration with the legal instruments to face off with the country's dynamic companies and bring order to the development of wireless technology – which many observers considered to be somewhat disorganized – and there was some competition between different administrations to take a leading role in this domain. As early as 1904, this drove President Theodore Roosevelt to issue a directive recognizing a specific role for the US Navy, 'in order to calm the competitive spirit between the different departments wishing to control the coastal stations'.[22] On the eve of the First World War, wireless telegraphy was essentially a tool of marine communication, both civilian and military.[23] The regulations and international agreements established in 1912 applied only to this field of activity, as long-distance links between fixed points were not considered reliable or likely to become economically profitable.

The War: Changing Roles and New Perceptions

During the night of 4 August 1914, the cable ship HMTS Alert left the port of Dover. Carrying out pre-established orders, it cut German cables running to Brest, Vigo, Tenerife and Faial. Between that year and 1918, the cable network remained somewhat static. It was impossible to envisage the installation of new lines in the middle of the conflict. Radiotelegraphy had thus suddenly become an important resource to complement and potentially replace these cables. For Germany, the Nauen station, built by

Telefunken, proved to be essential to maintaining intercontinental links, specifically with America. France, which was less well prepared, reacted quickly to maintain links with the eastern Allies, which in normal times were routed via lines running over land through the Central Empires. Two 150-kilowatt stations installed at Lyon-la-Doua in September and at the Eiffel Tower in October allowed an important flow of traffic to Russia, Romania, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia. The entry of the United States into the war increased the importance of wireless telegraphy even more. As a US Navy report later recalled, a radiotelegraph system was essential 'in the event that the enemy should cut all or part of our cables, or should the enemy make it difficult to repair cables cut by natural causes'.[24]

This rise of the power of radio was also confirmed by its increasing use on the battlefield. The 1912 convention being de facto suspended, a mode of governance allowing the Allies to operate their radio systems in harmony had to be adopted. On 19 April 1917, a text titled 'Protocol US-F (TSF)' was signed to define the Franco-American Radiotelegraphic Service. In Paris, the US Ambassador was assigned the call sign 11111, the Ministry of the Navy 2222, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 44444.[25] The American military's evaluation of French radiotelegraphic capabilities was positive, with the quality of the stations already in operation judged 'quite good'.[26] The Signal Corps also established its own networks on French soil in a rapid and particularly efficient manner.[27] But the first serious studies conducted by US forces concluded that the equipment already in place would soon be insufficient. As early as August 1917, the evaluation of the constraints imposed by the limited number of available transatlantic cables led to the conclusion that the use of radio links, far quicker to set up than new submarine cables, was essential. This led to exchanges between the Etablissement Central de la Radio Militaire, under Colonel Ferrié, and the US Army.[28] Gustave Ferrié had been France's radio pioneer since the 1900s. He proposed to rapidly increase transatlantic telegraph capacity using wireless telegraphy. On 4 October 1917, the American Radiotelegraphy Commission requested that a very high-powered station be installed in France to strengthen communications links with the United States. This resulted in the construction of the Bordeaux Lafayette station in Bordeaux.[29]

But coordination could not be limited to France and the United States working together: to guarantee fluid transatlantic connections, it had to be more global. Starting on 31 October 1917, this coordination was handled by an Inter-Allied Commission convened for the purpose, which brought together American, British, French and Italian officers.[30] The Commission's report of 31 December 1917 confirmed the new place of wireless telegraphy. It clearly stated that wireless telegraphy, 'which is

used in principle only in case of interruption or deficiency of cable service, is in fact regularly employed for the transmission of official radiotelegrams of information'.[31] Wireless telegraphy was no longer simply a means of communicating over short distances or from ships. It had become a routine means of long-distance point-to-point transmission – one that was crucial to the Allied war effort and directly administered by the military. A new techno-strategic paradigm, based on two complementary technologies (cables and radio), was established. It still dominates today.

Preparing the Peace Conference

The key role given to the military in the management of long-distance telecommunications was a logical development in wartime. The end of hostilities could have allowed a quick return to the previous situation, with civilian administrations reassuming their supervisory role. Instead, after the Armistice the role of military engineers was confirmed, giving them a de facto mandate to determine the foundations of a new system that would eventually replace the obsolete 1912 convention.

Communicating during the Peace Conference

As early as 6 November 1918, the American services were anticipating the need for secured links in view of the Peace Conference, whose location had not yet been decided.[32] According to a telegram sent from the Navy office in Paris to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington on that date: 'Comprehensive study of problem of handling communication between House mission and probable Peace Conference and Washington DC has been made by those representatives of Signal Corps, Naval, Embassy and House Mission who are more familiar with situation in Europe and United States.'[33] These units examined the questions arising from the choice of location. The organization of encryption was also an operational as well as a symbolic issue within the administration. A collaboration was initially considered. From the same telegram: 'State Department should have entire supervision communications to and from House Mission and Peace Conference but needs assistance in material codes and ciphers personnel.'[34] The networks that the Signal Corps had already established on the continent, well connected to the submarine cables, would be mobilized.

> Signal corps has arranged to care for whatever expansion develops and is ready to build line to any point in Europe at shortest notice if existing lines are

> not adequate or satisfactory. Signal Corps system leads primarily to London, England where Navy Department is equipped to handle cable transmission through to Washington in most expeditious manner possible.[35]

The services of commercial enterprises were considered

> inadequate to care for Peace conference communication for Paris, for Switzerland or elsewhere without utilizing all resources Signal Corps has developed on this side. It is unanimously agreed that Navy has best system of codes and ciphers … therefore, it will be necessary to establish communication offices at Headquarters of Peace conferences and in State Department manned by Naval personnel, these offices to be under immediate supervision of State Department Representative at both ends. … The only exception would be that special Navy cipher and cipher box would be furnished to the President or his personal representative at the White House and to Colonel House or his personal secretary for enciphering messages between President and Colonel House.[36]

The exchange, which refers to other messages, goes on to detail the specific issues of codes, their rotation, etc.

Here we see new efforts by the US Navy to impose itself as a central player in this strategic domain. But they would not succeed. The State Department instead mobilized the necessary means to manage transatlantic communications itself. The US Navy was relieved of this responsibility, as confirmed in a December 6 dispatch: 'Owing to fact State Department Personnel is now on way on *George Washington* to handle communications Navy personnel now assisting them here [Paris] will be withdrawn upon arrival State Department Personnel from Washington.'[37] While the secrecy of communications was crucial, so was their continuity during the negotiations. All possibilities for interruption were under consideration, including strikes by employees of the British cable companies. In such an event, all traffic from Europe to the United States would have to pass through the station in Lyon.[38]

A Wilsonian Vision That Poorly Integrated Business and Telecommunications Technologies Realities

The preparation of the Conference concerned telecommunications as a tool for the smooth running of the negotiations but also as an issue at stake within them. Within the American administration, the future of international telecommunications was expected to be in line with the Fourteen Points and therefore offer the most complete opening of networks possible. This is the line proposed by Breckinridge Long on 25 November 1918 in a memorandum addressed to the Secretary of State on the preparation

of the Peace Conference.[39] Long contributed to Wilson's re-election in 1916 and then joined the State Department in 1917 to devote himself to the implementation of a global telecommunications policy for the United States. His text is based on the work of an interdepartmental committee he chaired.[40] It proposes that the American negotiators' main objective should be

> the removal of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions. … The cable and the radio are the avenues through which rapid economic, industrial and financial exchanges are effected. Their present management is a barrier … exclusive rights should be abolished and territorial waters and cable landing rights thrown open to the citizens of all nations on an equal basis.[41]

For wireless telegraphy, he recommends:

> An international agreement, something on the order of the Postal Union, in which each government in the world agrees to supervise the operation of all radio stations … The development of the radio has reached a higher stage today in the United States than in any other country. Experiments during the war have reduced the wireless to a high degree of science. Other countries will gradually arrive at the state at which we have arrived and may surpass us. While we are in the ascendency we can generously and graciously take the initiative in a movement to establish regularity by universal governmental agreement, even going so far as to internationalize continental stations.[42]

The memo even explicitly links the future of international connections to that of the League of Nations:

> Cable and radio apparati assume an international importance under a League of Nations. They are the only rapid means of communication between the members of such a League and between the citizens and subjects of each of them. They should be controlled by the League. If such were the case no hostile messages and no disturbing intrigues could be carried out through these means. Equable arrangements could be made which would ensure the common use of the world's system for the common good.[43]

The analysis points to the harmful role of Great Britain, which, on this account, had built a system that imprisoned intercontinental networks under its sole control. The British Empire is even explicitly designated as the blockage likely to prevent the advent of such a universal agreement. Consequently, Long concluded, constraints should be imposed on it: 'To permit of the laying of cables wherever wanted and their free operation the League of Nations must – 1. Make England its mandatory to manufacture and sell cables and instruments to any nations, or 2. Make

available the British gutta-percha supply and internationalize all present and future patents on cables or cable instruments.'[44] The end of what he saw as British hegemony was thus precisely underlined as an indispensable prerequisite. Long sent his report to Secretary of State Lansing but also addressed a copy to Colonel House, Wilson's closest advisor on international issues.

This universalist vision, in a context of great competition between the various actors, seems in retrospect to have been somewhat utopian and based on an imprecise evaluation of the respective situations of the actors. Long's approach integrates submarine cables and radio technologies into the same reasoning. But the two were subject to very different logics and time frames. Submarine cables were based on technologies that had been almost fixed since the nineteenth century and were part of a classic geostrategic logic of control of maritime spaces (oceans, islands, straits, isthmuses, capes). Radio, in contrast, was a very young technology that was evolving extremely rapidly. With the still-nascent emergence of electronics, it generated a radically new technical system. Globally, wireless communications no longer fitted into the territorial logics of the nineteenth century. More than the control of spaces by military means, it is the control of innovation by research and investment that determined the balance of power. While the destinies of the two domains were linked, integrating them, at that time, into a global project aimed at setting up a coherent system was quite challenging. To associate them explicitly together in a single viable geopolitical project was therefore hardly a realistic prospect, as the actors involved in the two domains were acting on different logics and had interests that were not really compatible, to say the least.

Submarine Cables and Radio in Separate Negotiation Circles

The management of wavelengths, protocols, the need to take jamming into account and the constant evolution of techniques were all elements of complexity that posed major barriers to the uninitiated. Cables, on the contrary, were well known to politicians and diplomats. The imaginary that they conveyed was easily integrated into the analytical schemes of strategists, politicians and diplomats. The materiality of the cables, which, in contrast to radio waves, were precisely localized, made this appropriation even easier. These elements explain, at least in part, why issues around cables and wired telegraphy were directly integrated into the Versailles negotiations, whereas the radio question was left to the engineers and the bodies they had created during the conflict and since the Armistice.

Submarine Cables at the Heart of the Conflictual Logic of the Peace Conference

'Although the cables were only a small part of the total agenda at the various meetings, a remarkable amount of time was required before the Allies adjourned with a tentative agreement. The delay was caused, primarily, by the inability of the Americans to agree with the British and the French.'[45] The Allies' positions were not only contrasting but remained particularly rigid throughout the Conference. The materiality of the cables offered favourable conditions for governments to apprehend the related problems in very simple terms. Those who had seized the cables considered them to be war captures. Consequently, the British, French and Japanese wanted to keep the German cables. On the other hand, the United States wanted to have them restored to their pre-war state, in the hands of their previous owners. The Italians, who had not seized anything, followed the lead of the United States. The negotiations were mainly conducted by the British, the French and the Americans, whose positions were clearly established on 31 January 1919 during a vote at the Admiralty in Paris. Two voices, those of Admiral Wemyss of the Royal Navy and of the French Vice Admiral de Bon, who argued that the main cables should not be returned to Germany, opposed the voice of Admiral Benson of the US Navy, who stated that this would be 'contrary to international law and contrary to American interests'.[46] Benson's statement was part of the more global position of the United States, strictly defended by Secretary of State Lansing, who favoured an international order based strictly on law. It was also more specifically linked to the United States' desire to limit Britain's future influence in international telecommunications. It was also, de facto, favourable to the Commercial Cable Company, which was working relentlessly to ensure that its German partner regained its footing and its place in the transatlantic cartel established at the beginning of the century.

After receiving a mandate from the Council of Ten on 1 February to deal with this matter, the Naval Peace Terms Committee discussed it at a meeting on 7 February. The representatives of the five powers met together this time, and Italian Vice Admiral Grassi and Japanese Admiral Takeshita officially joined the delegates of the three great victorious countries. Benson and Wemyss nevertheless confirmed that their positions were orthogonal. The Englishman expressed himself unambiguously: 'I … put down here … all these cables shall not be returned to German companies.'[47] In the course of the exchanges, he did consider the idea of compensation for private companies but confirmed that he would not retreat an inch: 'I want to see all these cables taken away from

Germany for manipulation and I do not know whether what we got here is sufficient.'[48] The debates became bogged down throughout February and March. The diversity of the arguments and their plasticity over time reflected, on the one hand, the great confusion over the definition of the principles that should govern the final decision (a commission was even appointed to fix them, without success) and, on the other hand, the difficulty of articulating political objectives and practical data. The question was completely blocked when it was considered on 30 April by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.[49]

The Council of Ten finally included the question of the cables in its discussions on 1 May. Wilson, who had taken up the issue since April, proposed an internationalization of the cables, declaring that he would be satisfied 'if the enemy cables could be turned over to the Allied and Associated governments as trustees, and managed under the terms of an International Convention'.[50] Despite his perseverance, his wishes would not be satisfied. During these long debates, questions concerning the role played by the American companies were never directly addressed. It seems that some of the speakers were not even aware of the previous relationship between the Commercial Cable Company and German interests. The Council of Four ended the discussion, at least in the context of the Peace Conference. The seizure of the German cables was finally recognized while providing for the modalities of compensation to the private companies.

Radio Issues Outside the Peace Conference Framework

Radio was not directly addressed by a specific working group within the Peace Conference. In continuity with the organization adopted during the war, the Inter-Allied Technical Radio Commission was made responsible for defining the way in which the wireless issue would be addressed. It was thus the technical dimension of the radio problems, privileging the role of technical experts, that was foregrounded. The commission met on 25 January 1919 in Paris to establish an organization and working methods. The Peace Conference had opened a week earlier in Versailles. The great figures of the field were present. Admiral Bullard led the US delegation. The French delegation, placed under the authority of Consul General Péan, included Colonel Ferrié in the second rank. Captain J.A. Slee led the British delegation, while Rear Admiral Grassi headed the Italian delegation. While the commission was chaired by Baron de Berckheim, minister plenipotentiary, its composition, which included the personalities who had marked the development of the field during the war, suggested that the military engineers would conduct the process in their own way.

Nevertheless, in opening the work, the President emphasized that the issues at stake and the players involved were now different:

> The conditions under which our Commission is now called upon to deliberate are different from those under which it has continued its labours during the war. In fact, up to now, the problems which have been submitted to it concerned exclusively the state of war and exacted quick solutions. The Allied services of the Army and Navy were the only services qualified to consider and pass upon them and they alone had the means of inaugurating these decisions in practice. The situation is now no longer the same: the questions which are under consideration no longer exclusively concern the state of war; they interest not only other Allied services than those of the Army and of the Navy but also other countries than those which are represented on this Commission.[51]

As it was impossible to return to the procedures defined in 1912 'without producing grave inconveniences in so far as concerns the security of navigation', the first objective was for the participating countries (at least provisionally) to adopt the new procedures, which would then have to be adopted by all the Allied countries by the next international conference. The other task would consist in a cautious process of preparing for the future. 'At all events, the opinion of the Commission will constitute, for the services which will have to prepare for the next International Conference, valuable suggestions which can only be considered as of the highest importance.'[52] Because of the experience and competence gathered within the Commission, these proposals would

> have the greatest chance of being adopted by the aggregate of countries employing radiotelegraphy … It is permissible to hope that all the allied governments may sanction the proposals of the Commission: the combination thus constituted will very probably be able to impose its views on the next International conference and lead the Neutral powers employing Radiotelegraphy and having to communicate with Allied stations to likewise adopt the policy above considered. The opinions of the present commission are therefore susceptible to having a more extended repercussion … [53]

In other words, the decisions taken by the four victorious countries within the Commission would be extended to the whole planet.

The Question of the Scope and Time Horizons of Decisions

The discussions on the first day were long. They of course focused in part on questions of the organization of the future commission (number of members per country, creation of subcommittees, etc.) but also elements defining the concrete perimeter of its remit. The British and the Americans presented two distinct texts. They were very detailed and did

not differ on any really important point. The Italian delegation limited itself to a six-line declaration approving the principle of the Commission and calling for it to act as quickly as possible. Several points of a more global and political nature were specified in a consensual manner. The first was to clearly postulate the scope of the decisions taken, recalling that they must be systematically validated by the governments of the four countries represented and then submitted to the future International Conference.

It is the connection to this future conference that would become one of the key elements of the debates, by raising the question of the legitimacy of the Commission. While this point was not debated by the military, which had a large majority, it was questioned by the representative of the French colonial administration within the Commission.[54] The colonial administration, which had been in conflict with the PTT administration for many years, did not look positively on the omnipresence of the military in the organization of the body appointed to prepare the future of international wireless communications. The colonial representative 'makes first of all the observation that the complexity and the consequences of the questions which are on the program of the day appear to exceed the competence of an essentially military interallied commission'.[55] He proposed a completely different option, requesting the convening of an international conference as soon as possible, recalling that those planned in Paris in 1915 and in Washington in 1917 had not been able to meet. This conference, he suggested, could be held in parallel with the Peace Conference. 'If it is possible in a few months to assemble a Congress of Nations, it would seem with greater reason that there can be no essential difficulty in organizing an International Conference.'[56] He emphasized that the best experts would already be in Paris, since they were to be called upon to support the peace negotiations.

> The neutral countries would doubtless eagerly accept such invitation, which would give their delegate the opportunity of being in Paris at the time of the signature of Peace … We would thus, and in this way only, establish a policy which would be at the same time complete, intelligent and fruitful. The Allies acting with one accord could easily impose their essential demands on the other neutral states … if the meeting of the great international conference necessary [*sic*] be deferred, it is to be feared that the Neutrals and Small States might acquire an influence greater than that which they would have at the present time. For all these reasons, the Colonial department proposes that the allied governments come to an agreement with the object of assembling a great International Conference on Communications at Paris this year. Preparations for this Conference would be made by the extended Interallied Commission.[57]

The American and British delegations definitely did not share this vision. In a joint proposal, they proposed that an intermediate structure be set up based on the various commissions established during the war, which would prepare a major radiotelegraphic conference to be convened later. This proposal won out and gave birth to the EU-F-GB-I Radiotelegraphic Commission. The participants were now to constitute an autonomous group of military experts, working without any direct connection to the Peace Conference, and with the necessary time to begin planning the future of radio networks, with a view to then convening an international conference that would be bound in advance by the decisions of the group. Things were all the more likely to unfold in this way given that the members of the Commission would most probably represent their respective countries at the future conference. The proposal of the Ministry of the Colonies, although it was rejected, nevertheless raised the question of the relationships between the field of radio communications and the negotiations carried out at the Peace Conference. It opened a debate that doubtless continued in February.

Linking the Technical Commission and the Peace Conference to Compel Germany?

The autonomy of the radio engineers could not mean total independence with regard to the negotiations at Versailles. While resisting direct integration into the process, the experts had to adapt to connect their work to the Peace Conference, and thus obtain the final validation of their own conclusions at the governmental level.

Technical Autonomy: Pretext or Real Constraint?

This desire for autonomy and for the reservation of the time needed for work between experts – conditions they presented as necessary for the preparation of their technically complex decisions – was once again called into question when the Section on Economic Treaties of the Peace Conference, during its session of 19 March, addressed the question of the 1912 Radio Convention. It was the French delegate who requested 'the abrogation of this convention because it did not include in its provisions the regulation of communications between fixed stations and because the Allied navies have brought in the course of the war in radiography [*sic*] new practices that the provisions of 1913 did not provide for'.[58] These arguments were to some extent supported by a rather hazily identified set of technical and practical facts. However, it quickly focuses on

what appears to be the main point: 'If the revision was decided, one could envisage the possibility of negotiating between allied and even neutral powers, the modifications to be introduced into the text of 1912, reserving the right to impose on Germany the obligation to adhere to these new provisions.'[59] The debate was long and involved extensive exchanges between the delegates and their technical advisors. England was opposed to hasty action and proposed to extend the 1912 convention by one year. The French delegate replied that it was possible to function without doing so since the new rules adopted by the Allies during the war were available, written down, and could be communicated to the neutral and Allied powers. For the most part, the substance of the dispute concerned not practical issues but fundamentally political questions. The adoption of the British proposal, which featured the extension of the 1912 Convention, would therefore have postponed negotiations on new regulations, likely offering Germany the chance to rejoin the process. By abrogating the Convention and quickly establishing new rules, France hoped that they could be set down, or at least strongly oriented, in the context of the Peace Conference, and thus without German involvement.

In the end, the decision was taken to consult the EU-F-GB-I Radiotelegraphic Commission. In a letter, the Section on Economic Treaties expressed its desire

> to receive as soon as possible the proposals of the Allied radiotelegraph services concerning the modifications and additions which would have to be made to the Convention of 1912 to take account of the progress made during the war and of the new radiotelegraph services which had not been provided for or regulated by the above-mentioned convention.[60]

Baron de Berckheim, no doubt alerted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reacted very quickly. The very next day, he proposed to the members of the EU-F-GB-I Commission the creation of a subcommittee specifically charged with answering these questions to meet the following Thursday (27 March). It was to consist of 'one or two delegates from each of the four powers … The full Commission would be convened in due course to consider the proposals of the sub-committee'.[61]

Had this proposal been adopted, the resulting procedure would have led the Commission to draw up a decision among technicians without its being submitted to the governments of the various delegates, since it would have been transmitted directly to the Conference's Section on Economic Treaties. The proposal could then have been potentially considered and reviewed by each state via its representatives in the Section, but given the highly technical nature of the points addressed, it would

have been very difficult for people without the necessary technical skills to question the substance of the documents drawn up in a restricted circle of military personnel (and without Germany). Such a procedure would also have had the consequence of providing the Peace Conference with a committee of experts directly linked to a section of its Commission on Economic Questions. The scope of the work of this section would thus have included the validation, if not the elaboration, of the future regulatory framework for wireless communications.

The Autonomy of the Radiotelegraphic Commission Preserved

The Anglo-Saxon reaction to this turn taken in the development of the process for establishing the future framework was totally negative. The British used the short time frame as an excuse to rule out any participation from their side in the meeting scheduled for 27 March. As early as 22 March, the US Naval Attaché made it known that no modification of the 1912 Convention could be envisaged before the convening of a new international conference. This made their opposition very clear: the Americans objected to this rushed time frame, and indeed did not wish to be involved in any future decisions that were to be taken in this institutional context. The US Navy, however, wanted as much information as possible to preserve its own interests. It managed to obtain permission for two observers to attend the 27 March meeting of the new subcommittee as 'witnesses'.[62] This situation led to numerous exchanges that quickly clarified the situation of the EU-F-GB-I Commission – it would not be directly integrated into the Peace Conference process.

   The new subcommittee met on 4 April to consider more precisely its role in the process of updating the framework around wireless communications established in 1912. The minutes of the meeting stated:

> [T]he members of the Commission present expressed the opinion that it was appropriate to request that the EU-F-GB-I Commission be officially charged with the task of drawing up proposals of a purely technical nature concerning the essential additions and modifications that would have to be made to the 1912 Convention so that this Convention could be put back into force or maintained in force after the signing of the peace and while awaiting the meeting of a new International Conference.[63]

The minutes specified: ' … the length of time required for a study of this magnitude is out of proportion to the relatively short period of time within which a decision must be taken by the Peace Conference concerning the radiotelegraphic regime to be adopted between the signing

of the peace and the next international conference'.[64] The Chairman of the Commission therefore proposed 'to leave it to each of the [four] delegations represented in the Commission to provide the necessary documentation to their representatives in the Sub-Commission [Section] on Economic Treaties'.[65]

They thus proposed a return to a more traditional system, in the form of a procedure whereby the diplomats present at Versailles would be directly informed by their own country's experts. They also proposed that the new subcommittee in charge of preparing the proposals work within and for the EU-F-GB-I Commission, and not for the Section on Economic Treaties of the Peace Conference. He concluded:

> It was important to me to clearly define this situation, which offers greater freedom from the point of view of the duration of our work and which seems likely to dispel any misunderstandings concerning the ambit of our ongoing investigations. Under these conditions, we hope that the American delegates will be willing to attend the meetings only not as witnesses but as deliberating members.[66]

The procedure finally adopted respected the separation of powers between the experts and the diplomats. The latter would be able to negotiate among themselves, as political representatives of sovereign states, on the basis of solutions transmitted directly to them by their national experts. Nevertheless, Baron Berckheim still hoped to preserve the coherence of the solutions worked out by the Radiotelegraph Commission. '[I]n a personal capacity only', he called on its members to transmit opinions that were 'as concordant as possible' to their delegations.[67]

Telecommunications in the Treaty of Versailles

The Versailles Treaty reflected quite well the fundamental differences in the ways in which negotiations concerning cables and radio were conducted. Cables were treated as physical assets that had to be controlled. Article 244 of the Treaty: 'Germany renounces on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights, titles or privileges of whatever nature in the submarine cables set out below, or in any portions thereof.'[68] Here, Wilsonian telecommunications internationalism, as formalized by Breckinridge Long, was thus totally abandoned. The treaty simply formalized the wartime confiscations. Britain obtained one of Germany's North Atlantic cables, France the other. The French also obtained the German line to South America, while the Pacific cable was divided between the Americans and the Japanese. Annex VII of Article 244 added: 'The value of [these] cables

or portions thereof in so far as they are privately owned, calculated on the basis of the original cost less a suitable allowance for depreciation, shall be credited to Germany in the reparation account.' The current conventions were mentioned in Article 283: 'the International Telegraphic Conventions signed at St. Petersburg 10, 22 July 1875. Regulations and Tariffs drawn up by the International Telegraphic Conference, Lisbon, 11 June 1908', which the treaty specified that Germany should apply and accept.[69]

Wireless telegraphy posed much more complex problems, as we have seen. These fell largely outside the negotiators' sphere of competence. In reality, however, some issues were quite simple to resolve. For instance, Article 130 obliges Germany to cede all the radio equipment located

> in the German Concessions at Tientsin and Hankow or elsewhere in Chinese territory. … diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not included, and … no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the German public and private property situated within the so-called Legation Quarter at Peking without the consent of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers which, on the coming into force of the present Treaty, remain Parties to the Final Protocol of September 7, 1901.

With respect to the long term, the policy imposed by the United States and Great Britain prevailed, but France's concerns about Germany's future attitude, which had led it to seek an immediate revision of the 1912 Convention, were also taken into account. Article 284 thus states that

> the High Contracting Parties shall apply … the International Radio-Telegraphic Convention of July 5, 1912, on condition that Germany fulfills the provisional regulations which will be indicated to her by the Allied and Associated Powers.
>
>   If within five years after the coming into force of the present Treaty a new convention regulating international radio-telegraphic communications should have been concluded to take the place of the Convention of July 5, 1912, this new convention shall bind Germany, even if Germany should refuse either to take part in drawing up the convention, or to subscribe thereto.
>
>   This new convention will likewise replace the provisional regulations in force.

These clarifications therefore ruled out any possibility of Germany blocking the drawing up of the next convention. Article 197, which imposed restrictions on the use of stations located in Germany for three months, would have little impact. It also stipulated that 'during the same [three-month] period Germany shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey'. No confiscation was planned, patents would be

honoured, the Nauen station preserved, and the major interests of the radio industry in Germany and beyond unaffected. Telefunken's return to the corporate fold was already implicitly planned.

Affirmation and Failure of an International Technocratism

Having succeeded in creating and maintaining a degree of autonomy, the radio experts thought they could realize their vision of an international system dominated by public administrations. Opposition to this project, however, proved vigorous. It was voiced not by political decision-makers or diplomats but by private companies, who were kept out of the process and wished to play their own part.

The EU-F-GB-I Radio Protocol of 25 August 1919: A Technically Logical and Balanced Framework

Following this interlude, the Commission resumed its work during the month of April, plunging in depth into the technical consideration of questions of wavelengths in particular. The files show that the Commission's work was methodical and at points highlights the difficulty of finding appropriate solutions in a still fluctuating scientific and technical environment. More generally, it formulated the principles for the organization of world telecommunications that would be applied throughout the 1920s. Merging the cable and radio conventions was set as a goal for the next international conference. This was a major turning point in the history of world telecommunications and for the place of the United States in the concert of nations. The paragraph in the final report that deals with this point indicates that the cables are to be included in a process whereby all means of communication, including those that might be developed in the future, can be managed.

> In consequence of the proposal of the British Government, which has already a commission working on some of the details … and the difficulty of having experienced personnel assembled for the length of time required at any one place, the Commission requests that the preparation of the regulations and method of procedure to be submitted to the next International conference should be entrusted to the British Government … The Commission desires that the U.S, French and Italian Governments should convey to the British Government as soon as possible their approval of this method.[70]

These provisions were then examined by a sub-commission and confirmed in a text examined between 25 August and 8 September 1919. The

document takes up the proposals of the April protocol, adjusts certain provisions to make them compatible with the Peace Treaty, establishes the main provisions for the revision of the 1912 Convention, and creates an Inter-Allied Committee for the intermediate period (Appendix VI).[71] This text, henceforth referred to as the EU-F-GB-I Radio Protocol of 25 August 1919, set out a roadmap, and the organization needed to revise the 1912 Convention and organize the future of global radio communications. Drawn up by the Allies, it was imposed on the Germans under Article 284 of the Treaty of Versailles, which set a five-year deadline for the revision of the 1912 Convention.

Another important decision was taken: the place where the next international conference was to be held. 'During the course of this meeting, Admiral Bullard, senior member of the American Delegation advises the Allied Delegation concerning the interest which the Government of the United States attaches to the meeting of the Congress at Washington, which meeting has been the subject of an official communication from the Secretary of State to the Allied Governments interested.'[72] Prepared by the British services and scheduled in Washington, the future conference already had an undeniable Anglo-Saxon colour. After these months of work, at the last session on 8 September, Baron de Berckheim concluded: 'The President expresses the view that all the efforts of the Commission may not prove sterile and that the work effected may be continued by a new commission more appropriate to the status of Peace.'[73]

An International Technocratism Contested by Private Companies …

As radio telecommunications developed, a number of companies became major players, targeting the world market. As we have seen, Marconi and Telefunken formed the first generation at the origin of the development of the sector. A second generation appeared in the context of the First World War. In France, the creation of the Compagnie Générale de Télégraphie Sans Fil (CSF), in the spring of 1918, grew out of the desire of the main players in the field in France to group together French investments in radio. After dismissing the interests of Marconi that were still present in France and some negotiations, the state granted the company a concession to develop a French radio network with coverage of the entire globe. In the United States, a later sequence led to the same result. The American Marconi Company, which was dominant on the US market, had to abandon its activities in the country under pressure from the government. It sold its assets, which then formed the basis of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), founded in the fall of 1919 by General Electric, Westinghouse, and AT&T.

Thus, four companies, one from each of the four great powers of the post-war period, can, in a way, be seen as having been mandated by their governments to guarantee their country a major place in the future network. All had close links with the military. Marconi and Telefunken had been supported by the navies of their respective countries. All of the engineers who formed the CSF's management team, starting with the director Emile Girardeau, a graduate of the École Polytechnique, had served under or worked with Ferrié since 1914. Admiral Bullard virtually considered the RCA his personal project, even going so far as to leave the negotiations in Paris in April 1919 to return to the United States and convince the directors of General Electric not to enter into a contract with Marconi but instead to participate in the creation of the new, all-American company.

The delegations that met in Washington on 8 October 1920 hoped to implement the decisions taken at the end of the summer of 1919 in Paris, and no doubt counted on these companies bearing the colours of the three Allied powers (Germany was not present) to take up the ordained places in the scheme that they had conceived. The delegations' concern was essentially focused on the balance of power that might emerge on the way to establishing a convention that would bring together the governance of cables and radio.

It quickly became apparent that the US delegates, working alongside the British and French on advancing the project they had agreed upon in Paris, had absolutely no support from private companies. Prior to the conference, the main players in the US market had met to oppose the EU-F-GB-I Radio Protocol of 25 August. In their view, it gave too small a role to American companies. Before the Washington conference opened, the major companies published a statement criticizing many points that were to inspire the work of the delegations. In particular, the scenario of a merger of the two authorities, the International Telegraph Union and the International Radiotelegraph Union, was totally rejected.[74] The Commercial Cable Company was the most explicitly hostile of the two. It virulently opposed the project, combining a fierce opposition to the very principle of a merger of the two unions with an expression of its sense of having been robbed by the confiscation of the German submarine cables. In a letter to the US delegation on 15 November 1920, they wrote:

> [W]e strongly urge that the US and the public will best be served by relying on the continuance of competitive enterprise … The telegraphs of Europe have been under the domination of the International Telegraph Convention since 1858 and we believe it will be agreed that no one in America with experience of Europe has found anything there in the telegraph service to make him desire similar institutions over here.[75]

The American delegation stood firm, despite a consultative meeting with the companies organized on the sidelines of the discussions between delegations on 4 November 1920. The Washington conference produced a draft convention in line with the Protocol of 25 August 1919. It provided for a merger of international regulations for cables and radio and entrusted the leadership of the European PTT administrations, along with the military representatives of the US administration, with the development of the networks. With it, opposition from companies ranging from cable companies to RCA to AT&T only grew stronger.[76] Although they expressed their opposition less virulently, probably because they were more used to dealing with administrations whose power was based on the existence of state-owned monopolies, European companies followed in the footsteps of their American counterparts.

… And Imposing Their Own Logic

The logic of the development of the global radiotelegraphy network was thus determined by private companies. The return of German interests, which was an unspoken part of the negotiations, was a rapid one. In the domain of wireless communications, Telefunken was almost immediately reintegrated, at least unofficially, into the discussions and quickly began contracting with RCA, Marconi and CSF to establish long-distance links. Of course, these companies had to rely on their governments, but in the final analysis they were the only actors able to evaluate the balance of power in a competitive market and to create and adapt technologies to it.[77] South America constitutes a good example of this system increasingly dominated by corporate logic. Bullard's project of a 'Wireless Monroe Doctrine'[78] failed. RCA was not able to block the European companies from taking their share of the South American market. An agreement was signed on 19 September 1921 whereby the four major companies pooled all of their previously separate concessions in South America. A Centralization and Coordination Committee, chaired by an American but based in Paris, was tasked with developing radio links between South America and other continents in the name of the partners' common interests.

The merger of cable and wireless telecommunications companies, which was vigorously opposed by private companies in 1920, was launched on their own initiative in the second half of the 1920s. This process proved indispensable in that period, when the development of shortwave links made the competition between cables and radio too aggressive. From then on, all of the networks had to be managed in a coherent fashion, and global governance was forced to accommodate

the new forms of organization adopted by private companies. The International Telecommunication Union was created for this purpose at the Madrid Conference of 1932, bringing to fruition the project laid out in the 1919 Protocol. Thus, despite tensions and sometimes direct conflict, companies and nation states could not durably pursue divergent strategies. Mutual understanding between diplomats, armed forces, governments and these private actors was essential.

Conclusion

The overall negotiations process over telecommunications discussed here was constructed by, on the one hand, the governments and diplomats at the Peace Conference and, on the other hand, the military engineers, who successfully kept the field of wireless communications under their exclusive control. The telegraph companies were not represented either in Versailles or in the various bodies dealing with wireless telegraphy, and their interests, if not completely disregarded, were given only marginal consideration. The process thus represented an attempt to prolong a period of strong influence for state actors with a decisive role during the war, a time when economic logics had been largely put aside. While defending their respective national interests, technical experts also acted to maintain their common power in the face of other forms of governance. Under their influence, the agreements concluded in Paris (the Treaty of Versailles and the Protocol of 25 August) aimed to draw up a road map to formalize the assignment of this leadership role to the PTT and military administrations that had conducted the negotiations.

The frame that was operative here, connected to economic diplomacy,[79] also reflects the rise of techno-diplomacy, in the context of international telecommunications. Previously confined to the arena of expert assemblies, techno-diplomacy at Versailles came to be directly linked to geopolitical issues.[80] Through a highly diverse range of procedures and vectors, it became an integral part of the global diplomacy of nations.[81]

Technocratic internationalism was integrated but not to be confused with these new forms of diplomacy. The military officers in charge of wireless communications were in many ways technocrats. They used the technical nature of the matters at issue as an argument to construct a decision space that belonged to them, based on their field of expertise. They also constituted an international group that made decisions together on the basis of a consensus. This consensus was not built solely on a common technical culture. Other cultural proximities favoured the common approach of these 'radio men', who were all civil servants, as

they attempted to move beyond national logics and define a future order founded on the supremacy of state organizations. The forms of solidarity involved in this approach were built not only on a convergent vision of the role of public administrations in organizing the world's communications networks but also on a constructive complicity between brothers in arms who wanted to see what they saw as their shared work in progress through to completion. These men were not dealing with a mature technology, and they were not trying to preserve established situations. Rather, they wanted to provide the best possible conditions for a future, still uncertain, technology in order to be able to make the best of it. Working at the cross-roads of technical, economic and scientific domains, they were engaged in what, in contemporary terms, could be called 'innovation diplomacy'.[82]

This period did not result in a significant redistribution of power relations between states in the domain of telecommunications. Nor did it see a major inflection in the influence of the United States on world affairs more generally. In Washington, the emergence of radio as a means of long-distance communication was mostly perceived as a risk rather than an opportunity. After all, it came at a time when, after thirty years of efforts, American companies had finally succeeded in establishing complete domination over the transatlantic cables. The fact that Marconi was able to develop a worldwide wireless telegraphy network ahead of any American company had revived the spectre of British domination of world telecommunications. This concern, which seems in many ways excessive, indicated the rapid resurgence of old American perceptions of the British Empire as powerful and untrustworthy. In the end, neither the United States nor Great Britain would succeed in establishing a hegemony in this sphere during the interwar period.

The Wilsonian vision, although strongly expressed at Versailles for submarine cables, does not seem to have had any influence on international telecommunications. It had no more influence than the pacifist campaigns in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to obtain protection for submarine cables in times of war, a sort of neutralization intended to maintain the capacity for exchanges and negotiations between even warring states. Here, I will look at a relevant exchange between Donald Meinig and Peter Hugill, in order to nuance both of their accounts. Hugill challenges Meinig's view[83] that Wilson's ambitions at Versailles were fundamentally internationalist.[84] But while Wilson admittedly did not refrain from a broad consideration of the interests of the United States, the vision that he pursued with regard to telecommunications cables was nonetheless free from the pursuit of narrowly conceived short-term national interests. In adopting a geopolitical vision framed in terms of the balance of power between the United States and

Great Britain, Hugill's analysis only partially recognizes the complex reality and multiplicity of actors involved in the organization, governance and regulation of international telegraphy. Rather than US versus Great Britain, or nationalism versus internationalism, it is probably the private versus public axis that provides the clearest understanding of the real long-term international issues that were at stake in this context.

To return more specifically to the negotiations, it is worth noting that the two texts drawn up between January and August 1919 were both, at different scales, destined to fail. The Treaty of Versailles, because of its non-ratification by the United States in March 1920, failed to become the foundation on which the Wilsonian order was to be established. On a smaller but nonetheless significant scale, the Washington Conference in October 1920 failed to concretely establish the global governance of international telegraphy by national administrations.

While it is true that the destinies of these two texts were both sealed in Washington, it is also the case that the influence of the United States (understood as the action of a whole range of players, not limited solely to government) is manifested more by what it was able to block than in any capacity to impose its own vision. In both cases, too, the country's changing action over time was ultimately the result of power struggles between institutions or political currents with opposing objectives. Consequently, as far as global information networks are concerned, the time of the Peace Conference was not a major turning point that created or revealed new balances of power. In this way, the Versailles period was more like an '*entre-deux*', in which the pre-war balance of power and global governance, despite various attempts to change the order of things, was in fact consolidated.

The precise analysis of the different circles of negotiations highlights the growing place that technical innovation and the issues that it raises were taking, perhaps for the first time, in a major international negotiations process involving the heads of government.[85] This place would only grow over the course of the twentieth century, becoming a sphere of diplomacy in its own right.

Pascal Griset is Professor of Modern History at Sorbonne Université. His research focuses on innovation, research policies and research organizations in France and Europe. A former Fulbright Visiting Fellow and auditor of the Institute for Industrial Strategy, he is currently president of the Scientific Committee for the history of INSERM (the French National Institute of Health and Medical Research), vice president of the Association pour l'histoire des télécommunications et de l'informatique (AHTI), and member of the Committee for the economic and financial

history of France (IGDPE), the Conseil scientifique de la recherche historique de la défense, and the Scientific Council of the Comité pour l'histoire de La Poste.

He was a founding member of the steering committee of the 'Tensions of Europe' international academic network. First chairman of the CNRS National Committee's Section 42 (Interdisciplinary research on communication), he was then director of the Institute of Communication Sciences (ISCC-CNRS) (2013–2018). He has recently been coordinator and PI on the EU Horizon 2020 project *InsSciDE* (Inventing a Shared Science Diplomacy for Europe) (2018–2022) and chaired the EU Science Diplomacy Alliance.

Notes

1. Ahvenainen, 'The Role of Telegraphs'.
2. Fickers and Griset, *Communicating Europe*.
3. Walworth, *Wilson and His Peacemakers*.
4. Schot and Lagendijk, 'Technocratic Internationalism'.
5. Müller-Pohl, 'Working the Nation State'.
6. Kennedy, 'Imperial Cable Communications', 740.
7. De Cogan and de Cogan, 'A History of the Anglo American Telegraph Company', 280.
8. See the testimony by J.H. Carson in Anglo-American and Direct United States Cable Company, *Minutes of Evidence*, 50.
9. Laborie, *L'Europe*.
10. His mother was of Irish descent, and he spoke perfect English. See Pocock, *The Early British Radio Industry*, and Marconi, *My Father*.
11. Guagnini, 'Patent Agents'.
12. See for instance Pocock and Garatt, *The Origins*. On military aspects: Hezlet, *The Electron and Sea Power*; Howeth, *History of Communications-Electronics*.
13. Waterbury, 'The International Preliminary Conference', 664.
14. Laborie, *L'Europe*, 156–57.
15. Balbi and Fickers, *History*.
16. They would come into effect in July 1908. See also United States Department of State, *Report*, 1513–16.
17. Nearly double that of 1906, see Brett et al., 'Wireless aboard the Titanic'.
18. *New York Times*, 26 September 1907.
19. Douglas, 'Exploring Pathways', 236–37.
20. Kennedy, 'Imperial Cable Communications', 749.
21. Griset, 'L'État et les télécommunications'.
22. File containing the main decisions of the federal administration in the field of radiotelecommunications, NARA, RG 45, Box 943.
23. Aitken, *The Continuous Wave*.
24. Commandant Woodworth, US Navy, 12 February 1920, NARA, RG 45, Box 77.
25. Summary note of 31 December 1917, NARA, RG 45, Box 119.
26. The superficiality of the process, due to the lack of available experts, explains this indulgence, in my view. Note received by the Navy Department, to inform it of the state of the connections with Europe, 25 October 1917, NARA, RG 45, Box 119.
27. John and Laborie, '"Circuits of Victory"'.

28.   Memorandum from Colonel E. Russel, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, to Commander Sayles, U.S. Naval Attaché Paris, 15 August 1917, NARA, RG 45, Box 119.

29.   Griset, 'La télégraphie sans fil'.

30.   Its exact title, which may be marginally shortened in some documents, was 'Radio Telegraphic Commission, Inter-Allied'. Many documents refer to it as the 'US-F-GB-I Radio Telegraphic Commission', in reference to the four countries.

31.   In the spring of 1918, the throughput capacity of the transatlantic radiotelegraph links was 30,000 words per day from the United States to Europe and 25,000 words per day in the reverse direction. Note from the War Department, Code and Cipher Section and Central Office of Wireless, 31 December 1917, NARA, RG 45, Box 119.

32.   The choice of Paris would be ratified at the London Conference on 2/3 December 2018. See Badel, 'Reconstruire le monde', 159, and Fleury, 'L'enjeu du choix de Genève'.

33.   Telegram, 6 November 1918, NARA, RG 45, Box 119. This telegram is a summary transmitted by the Naval Staff Representative in Paris, under Admiral Sims' authority (US Navy in London), to Director of Naval Communications and Commander Ingersoll. 'Simsadus' was Admiral Sims's telegraphic address. See Leighton, *Simsadus*. Royal Eason Ingersoll was Assistant for Communications, and Communication Officer, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. He was awarded the Navy Cross and cited 'for distinguished service in the line of his profession in organizing, developing, and administering the Communication Office of the Navy Department'. In February 1919, he returned home in the USS George Washington with the Presidential party, handling messages for President Woodrow Wilson on the voyage across the Atlantic. For more information on Ingersoll, see https://www.usna.edu/Ethics/bios/ingersoll.php.

34.   Ibid.

35.   Ibid.

36.   Ibid.

37.   Telegram, 6 December 1918, Amnanvar Paris to Simsadus, NARA, RG 45, Box 119.

38.   Telegram, 5 February 1919, Simsadus to Amnanvar Paris, ibid.

39.   Memorandum, 25 November 1918, Breckinridge Long to Landing, in United States Department of State, *Papers*, 535–38.

40.   Members: Major-General Squires (USA), Captain Todd (USA), Mr. Rogers of the Committee on Public Information.

41.   Memorandum, 25 November 1918.

42.   Ibid.

43.   Ibid.

44.   Ibid.

45.   Marusak, 'The German Submarine Cables', 55.

46.   Meeting at the French Admiralty, 31 January 1919, William S. Benson Papers, LOC, Manuscript Division, Box 40.

47.   Report of the proceedings of a Conference held at the French Ministry of Marine, 7 February 1919, ibid.

48.   Ibid.

49.   Council of Foreign Ministers, 30 April 1919, United States Department of State, *Papers*, 645.

50.   Council of Ten, 1 May 1919, ibid., 486.

51.   EU-F-GB-I Protocol (Radio) of 25 January 1919, Paris, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Archives Hall), US Navy, NARA, RG 45, Box 569, 3.

52.   Ibid., 4

53.   Ibid.

54.   Without doubt Eugène Colin.

55. EU-F-GB-I Protocol (Radio) of 25 January 1919, 19.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., 20.
58. Commission on Economic Questions, Economic Treaties Section, minutes no. 4, meeting of 19 March 1919, NARA, US Navy, RG 45, Box 569.
59. Ibid.
60. Minutes of the EU-F-GB-I Radiotelegraphic Committee, 20 March 1919, submitted by the Baron de Berckheim, NARA, US Navy, RG 45, Box 569.
61. Ibid.
62. Captain Evans and Colonel Hitt. Declaration of 4 April 1919, Baron de Berkheim, NARA, US Navy, RG 45, Box 569.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Annex VII: Emden-Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo; Emden-Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest; Emden-Teneriffe: from off Dunkirk to off Teneriffe; Emden-Azores (1): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal; Emden-Azores (2): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal; Azores-New York (1): from Fayal to New York; Azores-New York (2): from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax; Teneriffe-Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia; Monrovia-Lome: from about lat.: 2° 30' N.; long.: 7° 40' W. of Greenwich; to about lat.: 2° 20' N.; long.: 5° 30' W. of Greenwich; and from about lat.: 3° 48' N.; long.: 0° 00', to Lome; Lome-Duala: from Lome to Duala; Monrovia-Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco; Constantinople-Constanza: from Constantinople to Constanza; Yap-Shanghai, Yap-Guam, and Yap-Menado (Celebes): from Yap Island to Shanghai, from Yap Island to Guam Island, and from Yap Island to Menado.
69. Additionally, Article 89 states that 'Poland undertakes to accord freedom of transit to telegraphic and telephonic services under the conditions laid down by the conventions referred to in Article 98'.
70. Annex V to protocol of 15 April 1919, NARA, US Navy, RG 45, Box 570.
71. Minutes of meeting on 8 September 1919, NARA, US Navy, RG 45, Box 370.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. *EU-F-GB-I Radio Protocol of 25 August 1919, as Modified and Commented Upon by a Committee Appointed by the Secretary of Commerce* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), per Schwoch, *The American Radio*, 88.
75. Letter of 15 November 1920 from Commercial Cable Company to Secretary of State, NARA, M 580, Roll 165. The argument is developed over many pages and to a very large extent repeats the disputes between the company and the French government.
76. Schwoch, 'The American Radio Industry', 293.
77. Sturmey, *The Economic Development*. My periodization of the relative influence of nation states and firms, at least as far as the main North Atlantic market is concerned, is somewhat different from that proposed by Richard John. See John, 'When Techno-Diplomacy Failed'.
78. Term used by Admiral Bullard: 'Report to the Board of Directors of the Radio Corporation of America', 1, AT&T Archives, September 1920, Box 50.
79. Badel, 'Economic Diplomacy'.
80. Arapostathis and Laborie, 'Governing Technosciences'.
81. Oreskes and Krige, *Science and Technology*.
82. Griset, 'Innovation Diplomacy'.

83. Meinig, *The Shaping*.
84. Hugill, 'The American Challenge'.
85. Skolnikoff, *The Elusive Transformation*.

Bibliography

Archival Resources

Library of Congress, Washington DC (LOC)
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC (NARA)

Published Sources

Ahvenainen, Jorma. 'The Role of Telegraphs in the 19th Century Revolution of Communication', in Michael North (ed.), *Kommunikationsrevolutionen: Die neuen Medien des 16. und 19. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1995), 73–80.

Aitken, Hugh G.T. *The Continuous Wave: Technology and American Radio, 1900–1932.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.

Anglo-American and Direct United States Cable Company. *Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Inter-departmental Committee on Cable Communications* (1901). London: Wyman and Sons, 1902.

Arapostathis, Stathis and Léonard Laborie. 'Governing Technosciences in the Age of Grand Challenges: A European Historical Perspective on the Entanglement of Science, Technology, Diplomacy, and Democracy'. *Technology and Culture* 61 (2020), 318–32.

Badel, Laurence. 'Economic Diplomacy', in Gordon Martel (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Diplomacy* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2018).

——. 'Reconstruire le monde en 1919: La fausse "mondialisation" des relations internationales', in Pierre-Cyrille Hautcœur et al. (eds), *La Rupture? La Grande Guerre, l'Europe et le XXᵉ siècle* (Paris: IGPDE-CHEFF, 2021), 149–64.

Balbi, Gabriele and Andreas Fickers (eds). *History of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU): Transnational Techno-Diplomacy from the Telegraph to the Internet.* Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020.

Brandenburger, Adam and Barry Nalebuff. *Co-opetition: A Revolution Mindset That Combines Competition and Cooperation.* Cambridge: Harvard Business Press, 1996.

Brett, Allan, Jerry Proc and Parks Stephenson. 'Wireless Aboard the Titanic'. Retrieved March 2022 from http://jproc.ca/radiostor/titanic.html.

De Cogan, Donard and Dominic de Cogan. 'A History of the Anglo American Telegraph Company as Seen through its Litigation', in Andrea Giuntini and Ana Paula Silva (eds), *Economics and Politics in Submarine Telegraph Cables (XIXth and XXth Centuries): A Global Perspective between History, Heritage and Preservation* (Naples: Istituto di Storia Economica, 2014), 267–86.

Douglas, Susan J. 'Exploring Pathways in the Ether: The Formative Years of Radio in America, 1896–1912', Ph.D. thesis. Providence: Brown University, 1979.

Fickers, Andreas and Pascal Griset. *Communicating Europe: Technologies, Information, Events.* London: Palgrave, 2019.

Fleury, Antoine. 'L'enjeu du choix de Genève comme siège de la Société des Nations', in Saul Friedländer, Harish Kapur and André Reszler (eds), *L'Historien et les relations internationales: Recueil en hommage à Jacques Freymond* (Geneva: IHEID, 1981), 251–78.

Griset, Pascal. 'Innovation Diplomacy: A New Concept for Ancient Practices?' The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3 (15) (2020), 383–97.

——. 'La télégraphie sans fil et les premiers développements de l'électronique: Les ingénieurs français et américains entre alliance et concurrence face au premier conflit mondial', in Olivier Chaline and Olivier Forcade, *L'engagement des Américains dans la guerre, 1917–1918* (Paris: Presses Sorbonne Université, 2020), 363–80.

——. 'L'État et les télécommunications internationales au début du XXᵉ siècle: un monopole stérile'. *Histoire, économie et société* 6(2) (1987), 181–207.

——. 'The Beginnings of the Radio Communications Industry', in Michael J. Lynskey and Seiichiro Yonekura (eds), *Entrepreneurship and Organization: The Role of the Entrepreneur in Organizational Innovation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 354–72.

Guagnini, Anna. 'Patent Agents, Legal Advisers and Guglielmo Marconi's Breakthrough in Wireless Telegraphy'. *History of Technology* 24 (2002), 171–201.

Headrick, Daniel R. *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Hezlet, Arthur. *The Electron and Sea Power*. London: C. Davies, 1975.

Howeth, Linwood S. *History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

Hugill, Peter J. 'The American Challenge to British Hegemony, 1861–1947'. *Geographical Review* 99(3) (2009), 403–25.

John, Richard. 'When Techno-Diplomacy Failed: Walter S. Rogers, the Universal Electrical Communications Union, and the Limitations of the International Telegraph Union as a Global Actor in the 1920s', in Gabriele Balbi and Andreas Fickers (eds), *History of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU): Transnational Techno-Diplomacy from the Telegraph to the Internet* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 55–76.

John, Richard and Léonard Laborie. '"Circuits of Victory"': L'entreprise Bell et l'engagement du Signal Corps en France', in Olivier Chaline and Olivier Forcade (eds), *L'Engagement des Américains dans la guerre, 1917–1918* (Paris: Sorbonne Université Presses, 2020), 341–62.

Kennedy, Paul M. 'Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914'. *English Historical Review* 86(341) (1971), 728–52.

Laborie, Léonard. *L'Europe mise en réseaux: La France et la coopération internationale dans les postes et les télécommunications (années 1850–années 1950)*. Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2010.

Marconi, Degna. *My Father Marconi*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

Marusak, Leonard F. 'The German Submarine Cables and United States Diplomacy, 1914–1927'. MA thesis. Denton: North Texas State University, 1967.

Meinig, Donald W. *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*. Vol. 4: *Global America 1915–2000*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

Müller-Pohl, Simone. 'Working the Nation State: Submarine Cable Actors, Cable Transnationalism and the Governance of the Global Media System, 1858–1914', in Isabella Löhr and Roland Wenzlhuemer (eds), *The Nation State and Beyond: Governing Globalization Processes in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Berlin: Springer, 2013), 101–23.

Oreskes, Naomi and John Krige (eds). *Science and Technology in the Global Cold War*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014.

Pocock, Rowland F. *The Early British Radio Industry*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.

Pocock, Rowland F. and Gerald R.M. Garatt. *The Origins of Maritime Radio: The Story of the Introduction of Wireless Telegraphy in the Royal Navy between 1896 and 1900*. London: Stationery Office, 1972.

Schot, Johan and Vincent Lagendijk. 'Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks'. *Journal of Modern European History* 6(2) (2008), 196–217.

Schwoch, James. 'The American Radio Industry and International Communications Conferences, 1919–1927'. *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 7(3) (1987), 289–309.

——. *The American Radio Industry and its Latin American Activities, 1900–1939*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990.

Skolnikoff, Eugene. *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Sturmey, S.G. *The Economic Development of Radio*. London: Duckworth, 1958.

United States Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. 1. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1938.

——. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. 4. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1943.

——. *Report of the American Delegation: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906*, vol. 2. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909.

Walworth, Arthur. *Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*. New York: Norton, 1986.

Waterbury, John I. 'The International Preliminary Conference to Formulate Regulations Governing Telegraphy'. *The North American Review* 177(564) (1903), 655–66.

Chapter 6

The International Chamber of Commerce
Multilateralism and the Invention of International Commercial Arbitration

Jérôme Sgard

International commercial arbitration is one of the most influential institutions in the governance of today's global economy, but it is also a thoroughly neglected and misunderstood one. Most economists, political scientists and historians of the twentieth century have only vague ideas as to how it works and to what purpose. In particular, its century-long intellectual and political history, with its roots in the early years of the League of Nations, has mostly been ignored, including by arbitration professionals themselves.

In practice, two multinationals with a conflict over the execution of a contract will typically avoid bringing their case to the official public courts of either of their respective home countries. Think, for instance, of Airbus and an American supplier. If a dispute arises about the quality of a spare part, rather than going to a court in Toulouse or Chicago, they will most often go to arbitration. In the simplest case, they each choose one independent arbitrator, with a joint say in selecting a third one, who will preside over the panel or private tribunal. The parties may also choose which national arbitration and contract laws will apply. Critically, they commit themselves *ex ante* to accept the eventual decision, or 'award'. If the loser reneges on this promise, then, in most countries, courts will enforce the said award: bank accounts, real estate assets or securities will be seized almost as easily as in the case of an official domestic judgment. In legalese, states guarantee the execution of arbitral awards in the last resort. Thus, commercial arbitration amounts, on the one hand, to a powerful, largely self-regulated, transnational private justice system that staunchly defends its capacity to resolve commercial disputes more

effectively and smoothly than sovereign jurisdictions; but on the other, it also relies on the executive powers of sovereign states, in an alliance that makes it perfectly adapted to integrated global markets. Twenty-first century global capitalism would look very different without it.

Still, international commercial arbitration as we know it is not a post-1990 development or a subchapter of the Washington Consensus, nor is it a late outgrowth of the post-1945 settlement, like the World Trade Organization. In fact, it was not even invented and developed by a global hegemon, whether Britain or America. And although it was born in Paris in the early 1920s, in the unique context of the post-war years, the phrase 'international commercial arbitration' does not appear in the 1919 Peace Treaty, and it was not a leitmotiv of the negotiations, or even a subject of dinner chat, at Versailles.[1] At its origins, we find not statesmen and diplomats but the national Chambers of Commerce of Allied countries, primarily the United States, Britain and France, whose International Congresses had already been pushing for its development before August 1914. At their first post-war congress, in Atlantic City in the autumn of 1919, shortly after the statutes of the League had been adopted, they created their own organization, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which would be headquartered in Paris. Critically, it was also decided at Atlantic City that the new ICC would establish its own, self-standing Arbitration Court.

After a series of preparatory meetings held between February 1921 and May 1922, the Court was inaugurated in January 1923, in Paris, with the President of the Republic and a representative of the League in attendance.[2] The first cases were soon taken on, although during the interwar period, the Court's docket consisted mostly of ridiculous disputes over bowler hats, bicycles, fountain pens and wedding gowns. Only gradually did it see a trickle of more complex industrial cases, in areas such as machine tools, intellectual property or private debts.[3] Still, from the outset, the small group of institutional entrepreneurs who staffed the new court came to see themselves as both architects and activists: they did not have an exact model of the court they wanted to build, but they had a sense of the direction in which they wished to proceed, and also of the routes they did not want to take. Reading the hundreds of pages of archives left by the ICC Arbitration Court, one is quickly impressed by the combination of its understated character with the sense of purpose expressed by these actors and their deliberate, constructive approach.

In the long run, and in hindsight, the ICC was the place where a new practice of international commercial arbitration was developed, tested and institutionalized. From the 1950s onward, dozens of arbitration forums would be established around the world, following in the footsteps

of the Parisian court. Even today, the latter remains the *primus inter pares*, or the 'Old Lady' of the profession. 'Hard cases' often end up at the ICC because of the authority and legitimacy of its rules and procedures, also because of the quality of its awards, as recognized by the legal profession. Large US law firms, for instance, have substantial representative offices in Paris in good part because of their arbitration practice, not because of any innate taste for the civil law tradition.

The rest of this chapter unfolds as follows. The next section discusses how the project of an Arbitration Court emerged at the ICC and how, almost immediately, it established direct and increasingly close ties with the new League of Nations, in particular the staff of its Economic and Financial Organization. The following section then discusses the three main political and legal influences that shaped the court's early development: the experience of interstate arbitration, as exemplified by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague; the well-established English practice of private arbitration, as developed on commodity or financial markets; and the US approach, which was deeply influenced by the large-scale domestic campaign in favour of arbitration conducted in the United States in the 1920s. The fourth section then analyses how the court gradually became a self-standing, entrepreneurial institution in its own right, with its own resources, governance and project, and how it entered into a defining conversation first with the League of Nations then the United Nations.

The ICC and International Commercial Arbitration

While today the Arbitration Court is the flagship body of the ICC, in its early decades it was a rather marginal operation. In 1919, the Chambers of Commerce wanted primarily to establish a brand-new model of non-governmental organization – a lobby – that would represent and defend the interests of private international businesses at the League. An explicit parallel was made at that time with the International Labour Organization (ILO), which was mainly supported by trade unions. Tellingly, the US-based General Electric Company, perhaps the first modern multinational firm, was a strong force beyond the whole project. Its chairman, Owen Young, who would play a major role in the German debt renegotiations of the 1920s, was a dominant figure here.[4] Another key player was Etienne Clémentel, the first President of the ICC and a former French Minister of Commerce during the war. He had played at that time an important role in organizing the supply of strategic resources to Allied countries, together with Jean Monnet[5] and Arthur Salter,[6] both of whom

would soon occupy pre-eminent positions at the League.[7] Hence, the ICC was definitely a pro-business, free-trade organization although, at least initially, it also saw itself as a full participant in an international, progressive and somewhat technocratic attempt to rebuild an international economic order on a stronger, more integrated basis. Clémentel in particular very much represented an emerging international liberal establishment that would shape European construction a generation later.[8]

The ICC's connection to the League of Nations, and later the United Nations, is critical to our understanding of the long-term development of international commercial arbitration. From the very beginning, a dynamic relation emerged between the small group of institutional entrepreneurs who developed this project at the ICC and the leadership and staff of the League: the latter were keen indeed to take on new issues of international governance and try to establish the new organization not just as a discussion forum but as an effective policy agency. Anyone who has spent half a day in the archives of the League must be impressed by how quickly policy issues popped up on its agenda, and how soon experts and policy wonks from all horizons congregated in Geneva. The League opened up a new institutional and political scene, where new actors, including private actors, stood up, took the initiative, negotiated and tried to build an institutional and regulatory niche for themselves that would help advance their interests. A few weeks or months after the League started operations, they were already meeting in its conference rooms, offices and lobbies, and in nearby hotel lounges. Very soon they were debating and negotiating ways to better address a host of issues, ranging (in economic matters) from bills of exchange to international fiscal coordination, the regulation of international banks – and, indeed, international commercial arbitration.[9]

The ICC was immediately very active in this context. It was often represented in the expert groups that prepared the interstate negotiations and drafted conventions. It also served as a channel of information and influence for American interests. It did not exactly become an economic adviser to the League, fully equipped with a programme of economic reordering. It was first of all an effective lobby, fully recognized by the League, which shared its sense that international markets had to be backed up by stronger formal rules and institutions. Quite soon, private correspondence, information and expertise flowed back and forth between them, building and consolidating support for converging policy views and common ideals: internationalism, economic liberalism, reformist activism and formal depoliticization.[10]

In particular, the ICC court established its own communication channels with officials in the Economic and Financial Organization of the

League Secretariat, and later the equivalent departments of the United Nations. Rather than lobbying national governments and trying to obtain their support, from the beginning it prioritized the new multilateral body. This continuing relationship proved essential in the intellectual, legal and political construction of this new regime of private international justice. Officials from the League and the UN offered a strategic route to approach sovereign states and negotiate with them the critical settlements on the basis of which commercial arbitration would eventually thrive. But they were also key interlocutors in this long process of institutional innovation, at a time when the whole arbitration project, as envisaged in Paris, was still remarkably shallow. When the ICC and its Court were launched, in 1923, nobody had a clear view of how this new practice would work, in terms of procedures and overall legal architecture. Even the key questions that were to be addressed and the experiences that should be drawn upon were not clear. To what extent should awards be governed by national contract laws? Which guarantees of execution should, or could, be given to the parties? Could they be represented by legal counsel, or should they plead their cases themselves?

In the following years, three main sources of influence weighed on the early thinking of the Arbitration Court architects, before they found their own path. The first was interstate arbitration, as at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague. The second was the well-tested English experience of commercial arbitration. The third and final source of influence was the US domestic campaign in the 1920s in favour of arbitration and 'alternative dispute resolution'.

International Arbitration: From Utopia to Legal Engineering

Beginning in the 1870s, in the wake of the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars, across the Western world 'arbitration' progressively became the catchword for a remarkably broad, progressive, often utopian imaginary, widely shared by politicians and ordinary citizens, public intellectuals and civic movements, and even churches. It thus came to be associated with the sunny promise of a peaceful world, where disputes between states would be settled amicably with the help of a few wise (white) men, taming their warring instincts at last. In those years, arbitration was the most potent discursive force opposing the hard, divisive legacy of the long nineteenth century – that is, Westphalian politics and the Concert of Europe. Take, for instance, this passage by one Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, in his 1899 book *The Federation of the World*:

> Arbitration gives time for passion to cool. It affords opportunity to hunt up all the facts in a given case. … It costs a mere pittance compared with war. It carries questions of right and justice to the forum of reason. … It leaves no bitter ranklings behind, no broken families, no devastated lands, no international feuds. … It removes prejudices and misjudgements. It creates sympathy and fellowship.[11]

Hundreds of pages like these could be quoted, drawing from grand speeches by great statesmen, sermons by pseudo-prophets, and pæans from trade unionists, *chansonniers* and concerned citizens – as well as Chambers of Commerce. Judging from this literature of celebration, arbitration could be understood as almost anything, as long as a third party was invited to help resolve a dispute. Nothing bad, it seemed, could ever come of it.

Interstate Arbitration

This grand discourse was especially defended by the Americans, who became the main advocates of arbitration, framing it, in classic Rooseveltian fashion, as an alternative to the backward, oppressive rule of the old European imperial powers.[12] The main outcome of this broad movement was the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), established in The Hague in 1899. It was seen in its early years as a major breakthrough in the struggle for the pacification of international relations, suggesting that arbitration could become in fact the very principle of a new paradigm of international ordering.[13] In the final years before the war, the possibility of creating a commercial chamber within the PCA was also envisaged. While these discussions did not have much impact at the time, they attest to the perceived need for stronger rules of dispute resolution in commercial matters, and to the appeal of arbitration as an alternative to interstate judicial cooperation.[14]

After the war and Versailles, this quasi-judicial model of international governance was no longer seen as the sole foundation of a new, fairer, stable international order. The notion of an 'international administration', which emerged during the war, made that shift clear, and the early years of the League soon confirmed that much more structured forms of collective action were needed, backed up by stronger, hence more potentially divisive rules – including, if necessary, economic sanctions. During the 1920s, the generic discourse on arbitration and the Hague court itself became part of a broader, more structured 'international architecture' that directly coordinated the governments – and hence the executive and administrative powers – of member states.

A more low-key example of interstate arbitration was the Mixed Tribunals created in 1919–1920 to settle private disputes between former enemies left over from the war, such as contracts and debts that had been suspended in 1914, or stocks of goods owned by foreign firms that had been seized early in the conflict. During the following years, a number of experts and arbitrators would actually move back and forth between these Tribunals and the ICC Court. Another is the series of reforms proposed by the French government at the 1927 Geneva Economic Conference, including the creation of a special chamber of the Permanent Court of International Justice to arbitrate or resolve commercial conflicts between member states (not firms). This plan thus foreshadowed the Dispute Resolution Mechanism of today's WTO. Procedures were adopted and an expert panel was nominated in 1932, but they did not leave further traces.

The English Lineage

The sponsors of the International Chamber of Commerce and its Arbitration Court were men of their times, and as such they drew enthusiastically on the generic, utopian discourse on arbitration, though they placed a more than usual emphasis on its anti-state/anti-sovereignty implications. Commercial arbitration, they kept repeating, was an expression of the peaceful instincts of mankind and, indeed, of commerce. It would enable all future disputes to be resolved on the basis of pragmatism, honesty and well-meaning sentiments among merchants. They thus endlessly rehashed the old trope, inherited from Montesquieu, of commerce as inherently a force for peace. In the process, it became a kind of all-purpose, default ideological prop, which would even find its way into the first official history of the ICC, *Merchants of Peace*.[15] Take, as a representative example, the speech delivered by R.S. Fraser, a leader of the British Chambers of Commerce, at the 1912 International Congress in Boston:

> Commercial men realize to the full the limitations of politicians and diplomatists, and that it is for the commercial world to take its destinies into its own hands and do their thinking for themselves as to the problems of to-day, including the organisation of peace, of which commercial arbitration is an integral … part. Indeed, it may be claimed that commercial arbitration constitutes the foremost plank in the platform of world-wide peace and solidarity.[16]

Yet, in 1923, when the ICC entrepreneurs started building the Court, they fell almost instantly from the world of utopia and wishful thinking into the realization of how poorly equipped they in fact were. The

Chambers' initial project was not just ill conceived; in fact it was largely not conceived at all. The only thing that was explicit was their aim of building their own court without relying on sovereign States and their governments, hence also their reluctance to draw or lean on the experience of pre-war interstate arbitration. They thus turned to a second, long historical lineage, which was directly rooted in real-world, commercial practices. Since at least the 1870s, and hence during the heyday of the first global era, the London-based, global markets all practised arbitration on a large scale. The London Stock Exchange (where sovereign bonds, for example, were typically listed), Lloyds (for most types of insurance) and the markets for corn, cotton or rubber all settled disputes among investors and merchants through private, in-house arbitration. In these latter cases, trade associations controlled by elite merchants regulated the respective markets, adopted standards for products, drafted standard contracts and arbitrated disputes.[17] On the one hand, these non-regulated markets operated under English law and the more or less distant oversight of official London courts, in particular King's Bench and the Commercial Court. The 1889 Arbitration Act, the first modern statute on the subject, formalized this relationship. On the other hand, these privately established markets had a de facto global jurisdiction: merchants in Buenos Aires, Riga and Antwerp adopted their standard contracts and usually accepted their arbitral awards. Failure to do so could lead to exclusion from those markets, a sanction that would severely affect their competitive position. Privately ordered law and market power, more than the sovereign authority of official courts, was decisive in these market models, which were both local and global, London-based and imperial. Without question, this was the main practical antecedent of the twentieth-century ICC model of commercial arbitration. As they later made clear to their interlocutors, in Paris or Geneva, the English had their own solutions to defend, and they had no doubt that in the matter of arbitration they knew better.

And yet, this conversation soon stopped: by the mid-1920s a clear antagonism had emerged between the English practice and the emerging approach to arbitration, in the Paris Court. Whereas English arbitration always works under English law and under the supervision of English courts, the ICC practice was immediately founded on the alternative principle of full recognition of national legal systems and the need to coordinate between them. In other words, the former was de facto local and extra-territorial, while from the onset the latter was to be multilateral.

Beyond this discrepancy, there was also a deep conflict of doctrine regarding the discretion that could be given to the arbitrator. In England, the arbitrator remains an assistant or a substitute to the official judge

and can never interfere in legal interpretation. The emerging Continental practice would endow him with considerably more autonomy in justifying his decisions; for example, when identifying precedents or using past arbitral awards as precedents. This debate would lead, in the 1960s, to the long, mostly academic debate on whether international arbitration had become a specific source of law, fully adequate to international markets, in other words a 'New Lex Mercatoria', in a (loose) reference to the practice of medieval fairs and merchants' guilds.[18] In London, this prospect was regarded with horror.

The American Experience

The conversation with the representatives of the US Chambers of Commerce proved more involved and initially influential, primarily, one surmises, because of their large influence on the ICC as a whole. And they came with a blueprint, which the ICC staff in Paris sorely needed: for the first three years, they were more than ready to listen and take note when the members of the New York Chamber made proposals. Owen Young was even sent to Paris to brief them.[19]

Since the turn of the twentieth century, large US firms and banks had become increasingly dissatisfied with the long delays they faced in domestic courts, as well as with the highly formalistic approaches taken there, which made it difficult to address the new, more technical cases that came with large-scale industrialization, the emergence of large conglomerates and (gradually) a regulatory state.[20] The New York Chamber of Commerce had taken the lead in a long campaign in favour of a more supportive federal statute on domestic commercial arbitration, which was eventually adopted in 1925. In the same year, these legal reformers and businessmen created the American Arbitration Association, which, in the space of just a few years, developed an incredibly dense network of arbitration venues across the whole country, including in small towns.[21] This laid the foundation for a specifically American, early embrace of alternative dispute resolution in general.[22]

Significantly, the same reformist business interests were highly influential at the (national) US Chamber of Commerce, then at the ICC and, of course, in the drive to create an international Arbitration Court. The very first framework for an arbitration court at the ICC was thus proposed in 1922–23 by the same people at the New York Chamber who at the time were also leading the campaign in favour of a Federal Arbitration Act. But their views were still shaped by their domestic programme and their correspondingly limited international experience. As they saw it,

international commercial arbitration could simply apply the organizational principles that they were striving to establish in the United States. In practice, they signed bilateral agreements with foreign chambers of commerce aimed at enabling contractual disputes to be resolved without any intervention or influence from local jurisdictions. In this sense, their approach was quite similar to the English approach, insofar as it rested, at least implicitly, on a de facto extraterritorial strategy. The prototype accord of this type was negotiated with the Buenos Aires Chamber, in 1915, and was then proposed (actually, carbon-copied) to similar bodies across Latin America. A few years later, the same approach and a similar blueprint were proposed to the Paris Court.

Inventing the ICC Court of Arbitration: New Rules of Engagement with Sovereign States

Extraterritoriality

Still, by 1925, the Americans had also lost interest in the Paris experiment, presumably because of its tiny size and the obvious disinterest of US businesses. With the English rapidly moving towards a stance of outright opposition, the ICC Court became a mostly continental civil law club where the dominant language was French, which it remained until the 1970s. Over this time, only a few token English and American lawyers would attend the Paris meetings of the various arbitration panels and internal committees, most often because they were themselves practising in Paris. However, this did not mean that international commercial arbitration inadvertently became a French endeavour. Although the ICC Court eventually established cosy relationships with the Parisian high courts (the Cour d'appel and the Cour de cassation), it was not in any sense sponsored by the French authorities. Parisian political and technocratic elites essentially ignored international arbitration until the early 1980s, by which time the ICC had been recognized for at least twenty years as the most influential arbitration forum, and in fact as the 'hub' of a now well-established international practice.

This, then, is the background of the ICC Arbitration Court's continuing engagement and negotiations, first with the League of Nations and later with the United Nations. The Arbitration Court certainly benefited at this point from the organizational and political support of the International Chamber as such, but its own internal evolution was also decisive: from the mid-1920s onwards, it grew into a largely self-governed actor, clearly distinct from the ICC as a whole, which gradually conceived and developed a new, original model of international commercial arbitration.

There is little indication that the rest of the ICC had any direct influence on this evolution.

In spite of its unremarkable track record, at least until the 1960s, the ICC developed not only a knowhow but in fact a jurisprudence for international commercial arbitration. Two collegial expert bodies were created early on that played a decisive role. First, lawyers from the main member countries started to systematically review all awards in order to make them legally stronger and to build up the Arbitration Court's credibility as a fair and competent dispute-resolver. If the award was against a Danish or Italian firm, it was important to make sure that its wording made it as acceptable – and hence enforceable – as possible in those countries' legal systems. In parallel, a Comité d'Etudes de l'Arbitrage worked from a more medium-term perspective, taking stock of the Court's accumulating experience and discussing critical points of jurisprudence so as to guide its evolution and its negotiations with outside powers. The ICC Court added here a constructive, reflective dimension to its otherwise utterly pragmatic, grassroots approach. From its early years onwards, it capitalized on its own experience and started to develop novel arbitration practices far removed from both English jurisprudence and the shallow proposals of the New York Chamber of Commerce. The Court thus had, if not a fully-fledged plan, at least an emerging strategy, both legal and political, and also an adequate governance.

This changing stance is well illustrated by two international negotiations on arbitration that took place first at the League, in the late 1920s, then at the United Nations, post-war. They built in practice on a first 'Protocol on Arbitration Clauses', adopted in 1923, which made the commitment to arbitrate binding on the parties once they had endorsed it in their initial contract. The underlying risk was that once a problem arose one party might refuse to go to arbitration in favour of litigating in a court in its home country; or it might take the same step after having lost the arbitration, hoping for a better outcome in the hands of a judge. In that case, it seemed, arbitration might end up as a kind of antechamber to the official courts, with little more impact than mere mediation. Closing the pathway back to the courts, or making it more difficult to take it, was the main objective of the 1923 League Protocol on the recognition of foreign arbitration clauses.

The discussion in Geneva was conducted by government representatives at a time when the ICC court was not yet fully in place. It thus had no practical influence here, even though it served well its overall project. The British Board of Trade took the lead in this negotiation, seeking in the process mainly to establish a stronger international basis for well-established English arbitration practices. But they summarily rejected

any further step towards a more comprehensive regime of commercial international arbitration. Critically, they did not want to commit themselves to enforcing foreign arbitration awards against British defendants.

Two years later, things changed. At its 1925 Third Congress, in Brussels, the ICC (i.e. the Arbitration Court) requested that the cross-border enforcement of awards be put on the agenda of the League. No national government endorsed this proposal, but having 'noted with pleasure how much the commercial world valued the action of the League', its Economic Committee nevertheless proposed to make a detailed survey of the question and decided to convene an expert group.[23] The League staff then explicitly drew on the ICC expertise, in particular its detailed review of the arbitration laws of the member countries.

After protracted negotiations, an expert report and a draft convention were sent to national governments for comments, which proved highly critical. A second report was prepared, this time by government officials, and a second draft Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards was eventually adopted by the League's Annual Assembly, in September 1928. But, contrary to the 1923 Protocol, this second international agreement on arbitration had relatively little impact. In fact, governments still resisted any commitment to enforcing foreign awards, adding so many pre-conditions and exit options that, in practice, any step in this direction remained very difficult. Simply said, states were not yet ready to bargain on their judicial sovereignty.

In 1951, the ICC Court of Arbitration relaunched its efforts, from exactly the same perspective and with the same core argument: arbitration is a contractual practice, which is ultimately founded in 'the will of the parties'.[24] There is no reason, the ICC argued, for states not to respect and enforce such private decisions: the governments' executive powers would only be instrumental, and sovereignty would not be violated. Awards, in this perspective, should be viewed as intrinsically international, without any substantive link to any national legal and judicial order.

For all intents and purposes, the ICC laid siege to the UN's Economic and Social Council, establishing close relations with its staff, lobbying national governments, and fighting its way through successive working groups. In the process, three proposals for a convention on the execution of awards were drafted before an international conference was finally convened, in May 1958, in New York. At that point, members of the ICC Court lobby could be seen at work all over the place. They had been directly involved in the expert groups though they later entered some national negotiating teams (such as the Dutch); they also lobbied lukewarm delegations (like the Swiss) and gained the tacit support of others

(such as the French). On the other hand, the United States and Britain held their historic line and only sent observers to the conference, without a negotiating mandate: they would sign the convention much later, at the turn of the 1970s. But in spite of this abstention by the present and the former hegemonic powers, the 1958 convention proved a great success: it made it possible for foreign arbitral awards to be enforced by national courts with great ease and considerably less restrictions than under the 1927 League Convention.[25] As an increasing number of countries ratified the new text, which remains the touchstone of the regime to this day, international commercial arbitration flourished.

Conclusion

What is remarkable with this narrative is, first, how it takes us entirely outside the classic story of enlightened American hegemony that so deeply structures our common perspective on the twentieth century, with the great collapse of 1933–1945 in the middle. Not only were the hegemonic powers and the succession between them largely absent from the intellectual and political story of international commercial arbitration. But this process of collective invention also went on continuously from the 1920s till the 1960s, with the ICC's small network of institutional entrepreneurs at its core.

The other main lesson is how, very early on, the ICC entered the new multilateral scene of the League of Nations and found in it a strategic pathway to approach sovereign powers collectively, and to negotiate the critical settlement on which commercial arbitration would eventually be founded. The failed League Convention of 1927 and the successful UN 1958 one made it perfectly clear that the long-term challenge was to negotiate some of the core judicial prerogatives of states, redrawing the perimeter of what they understood as their own sovereignty.

The ICC, with its own international structure, was the conduit towards this multilateral arena. It literally opened its doors and endowed the nascent Arbitration Court with substantial legitimacy, as was seen in 1925, when the ICC Congress became the launching pad of the campaign to put the enforcement of awards onto the League agenda. It is doubtful that the United States or the British Chambers of Commerce could have obtained this result on their own. Yet, there was also here a dimension of tacit, mutual recognition between the ICC and its Arbitration Court, on the one hand, and the League (and later the UN), on the other. Both organizations recognized that establishing a framework for international

commercial arbitration was a problem of international governance, and they addressed it from a shared, yet specific, transnational perspective. In other words, they were in sympathy.

In turn, the ICC Court and its small network of lawyers were also shaped by these negotiations in Geneva and New York. These conversations with state representatives and with the League and UN staff were for them essential ones: they had a major influence on how they conceived, tested and gradually assembled over decades a novel regime of commercial dispute resolution, outside official judiciaries though with the last resort support of sovereign states. In fact, there were few interlocutors with the capacity to engage with these institutional entrepreneurs while also guiding them as they approached sovereign powers. This is why international commercial arbitration is a distant yet unmistakable heir to the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty.

Jérôme Sgard has been Professor of Political Economy at Sciences-Po (Paris) since 2008. Earlier, he was a senior researcher at CEPII, also in Paris, and Adjunct Professor at Université de Paris-Dauphine. His early research dealt primarily with economic reforms in emerging and transition economies, though he now works mostly on the history of global economic governance, primarily sovereign debts and international commercial arbitration. In 2023 he published *The Debt Crisis of the 1980s: Law and Political Economy* (Elgar).

Notes

1. This chapter discusses only the case of international commercial arbitration, which is exclusively used for contractual disputes between private firms. It should not be confused or merged with either interstate arbitration, as practised by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in The Hague, or with investment arbitration, which is essentially a post-1990 practice. Domestic arbitration is also very common in many countries but is not considered in this chapter. Accordingly, throughout the chapter, terms such as 'arbitration' or 'international arbitration' refer only to arbitration of the international commercial variety.
2. ICC, *Inauguration*.
3. There are indications that the staff of the Arbitration Court had already resolved some cases before it was formally established, but these cases are not counted in the official statistics.
4. Tarbell, *Owen D. Young*.
5. Jean Monnet (1888–1979) had, at a very young age, become a key technocrat in the economic management of the First World War, particularly at the Allied Maritime Transport Council. He then became Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations (1919–1922), though he remains much better known for his role in European construction after the Second World War.

6. Arthur Salter (1881–1975) was Monnet's British counterpart at the Allied Maritime Transport Council, before becoming the head of the Economic and Financial Organization of the League (1919–1930).
7. Monnet, *Mémoires*; Salter, *Memoirs*.
8. Badel, 'D'Étienne Clémentel à Laurent Fabius'; Tooze, *The Great War*, 290; Slobodian, *Globalists*, 34–42.
9. Hill, *Economic and Financial Organization*; Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*; Decorzant, *La Société des Nations*.
10. Alessandro, 'Global Economic Governance and the Private Sector', 89–111.
11. Trueblood, *The Federation of the World*, 109–11.
12. Koskenniemi, 'The Ideology of International Adjudication'.
13. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*; Mamolea, 'Saving Face'.
14. Mutzner, 'Das Postulat'; Wehberg, *Ein Internationaler Gerichtshof*.
15. Ridgeway, *Merchants of Peace*.
16. Boston Chamber of Commerce, *Fifth International Congress*, 284.
17. Dowling, *The Exchanges of London*; Sgard, 'A Tale of Three Cities'.
18. Goldman, 'Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria'.
19. Young, 'International Commercial Arbitration'.
20. Kessler, 'Arbitration and Americanization'.
21. Kellor, *American Arbitration*.
22. MacNeil, *American Arbitration Law*.
23. League of Nations, Economic Committee. Report to the Sixteenth Session of the Council, 31 August–5 September 1925 10/47913/28600.
24. ICC, *Arbitrage commercial international*.
25. ICC, *International Commercial Arbitration and The Convention of New York*.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

League of Nations Archives, Geneva (LNA)

Published Sources

Badel, Laurence. 'D'Étienne Clémentel à Laurent Fabius: Regard historien sur la diplomatie économique de la France', in Marie-Christine Kessler and Guy Rousseau (eds), *Étienne Clémentel (1864–1936): Politique et action publique sous la Troisième République* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2018), 435–49.

Boston Chamber of Commerce. *Fifth International Congress of Chambers of Commerce and Commercial and Industrial Associations: September and October 1912*. Boston: Boston Chamber of Commerce. 1913.

Clavin, Patricia. *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

D'Alessandro, Michele. 'Global Economic Governance and the Private Sector: The League of Nations' Experiment in the 1920s', in Christof Dejung and Niels P. Petersson (eds), *The Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration: Power, Institutions, and Global Markets, 1850–1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 89–111.

Decorzant, Yann. *La Société des Nations et la naissance d'une conception de la régulation économique*. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011.

Dowling, S.W. *The Exchanges of London*. London: Butterworth & Co, 1929.

Goldman, Berthold. 'Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria'. *Archives de philosophie du droit* 9 (1964), 177–92.

Hill, Martin. *The Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations: A Survey of Twenty-Five Years' Experience*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 1946.

ICC. *Inauguration of the Court of Commercial Arbitration: 19 January 1923*, Brochure no. 22. Paris: ICC, 1923.

——. *Arbitrage commercial international et liberté contractuelle*. Paris: ICC, 1951.

——. *International Commercial Arbitration and The Convention of New York*. Paris: ICC, 1960.

Kellor, Frances. *American Arbitration: Its History, Functions and Achievements*. New York: Harper & Brother, 1948.

Kessler, Amalia D. 'Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform'. *Yale Law Journal* 124(8) (2015), 2940–93.

Koskenniemi, Martti. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

——. 'The Ideology of International Adjudication and the 1907 Hague Conference'. Colloques/Workshop Series, *The Hague Academy of International Law* (7 September 2007).

MacNeil, Ian R. *American Arbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization, Internationalization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Mamolea, A. 'Saving Face: The Political Work of the Permanent Court of Arbitration', in Ignacio de la Rasilla and Jorge E. Vinuales (eds), *Experiments in International Adjudication* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 193–210.

Monnet, Jean. *Mémoires*. Paris: Fayard, 1976.

Mutzner, Paul. 'Das Postulat eines internationalen Gerichtshofes für Streitigkeiten aus dem Internationalen Privatrecht'. *Zeitschrift* für *internationales Recht* 24 (1–2) (1914), 78–104.

Ridgeway, George. *Merchants of Peace*. New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1959.

Salter, Sir Arthur. *Memoirs of a Public Servant*. London: Faber, 1961.

Slobodian, Quinn. *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2018.

Sgard, Jérôme. 'A Tale of Three Cities: The Construction of International Commercial Arbitration', in Grégoire Mallard and Jérôme Sgard (eds), *Contractual Knowledge: One Hundred Years of Legal Experimentation in Global Markets* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 153–84.

——. 'The Simplest Model of Global Governance Ever Seen? The London Corn Market (1885–1930)', in Eric Brousseau, Jean-Michel Glachant and Jérôme Sgard (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Institutions of International Economic Governance and Market Regulation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Tarbell, Ida M. *Owen D. Young: A New Type of Industrial Leader*. New York: MacMillan, 1932.

Tooze, Adam. *The Great War: America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931*. New York: Viking, 2014.

Trueblood, Benjamin F. *The Federation of the World*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co, 1899.

Wehberg, Hans. *Ein Internationaler Gerichtshof fûr Privatklagen*. Handelspolitische Flugschriften (Cahier 7). Berlin: Liebheit & Thiesen, 1911.

Young, Owen D. 'International Commercial Arbitration'. *Digest* 3 (1921), 1–4.

Regional Disorder, Partial Sovereignty and Multilevel Negotiations
The Caucasus, 1917–20

Etienne Forestier-Peyrat

'The Chairman said that the present position in the Caucasus was more confused than any with which the Eastern Committee had had to deal during the last year and a half.'[1] This laconic observation was the opening statement of Lord Curzon, former viceroy of India (1899–1905) and now member of the War Cabinet, on 6 March 1919, during one of the first of the sessions of the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs to be fully devoted to the situation in the Caucasus. Curzon singled out the region as one into which the British had been dragged 'insensibly' since the last months of the war, and he emphasized the necessity of reducing British military commitment and expenditure there – although the general state of things from the Black Sea to the Caspian was admittedly far from settled, and this 'confused' state had the potential to threaten British interests in the Middle East.[2]

This sense of confusion, easily conceivable as a feature of the perspective of remote policymakers, was to a large extent shared by populations in the Caucasus at the time. The region had been progressively integrated into the Russian empire, beginning in the early nineteenth century. North Caucasian populations had conducted a protracted guerrilla war against the Tsarist armies, culminating in landmark events such as the capture of Imam Shamil, a leader of indigenous resistance in the North Caucasus, in August 1859.[3] At the same time, Russia waged several wars against its Persian and Ottoman neighbours, leading to a series of annexations that were formalized by the Treaties of Turkmenchay (1828) and Adrianople (1829).[4] After military operations along the Caucasian border at the time of the Crimean War, notably a six-month long siege of the fortress of Kars,

there was a final inter-imperial conflict between the Porte and Russia in 1877–78. This last confrontation culminated in Russia's annexation of further areas, notably the Kars region and Adzharia, on the Black Sea coast, two districts with very diverse populations.[5] For the first time in almost a century, the collapse of Tsarism coupled with the final months of the First World War reopened the possibility of a non-Russocentric regional order for the Caucasus, where 'the dynamics of global interstate competition interacted with local and regional agendas to produce new forms of political identity'.[6]

Seen in this light, the situation in the Caucasus differed little from the turmoil that was simultaneously engulfing Central Europe, where the collapse of the Wilhelmine Reich and the Habsburg Empire created a vast zone of political and military instability, as well as serious threats of economic and social breakdown. While Central Europe could be considered a 'marginal' region in the European political order in the early twentieth century, it nonetheless occupied a major place in the discussions at the Paris Peace Conference.[7] Pacifying Central Europe and redrawing its borders was widely considered one of the keys to a more stable and democratic continental order. The events that unfolded in these areas helped reshape the understanding of notions such as sovereignty, minorities and borders.[8] By contrast, the Caucasus was often seen, to borrow Curzon's words at the same meeting of the Eastern Committee, as a 'secondary theatre of operations', a phrase that Caucasian delegates to the Paris conference often used themselves.[9]

Situated at the periphery of the European periphery, the Caucasus did not fit conventional mental maps. It did, however, stand out, in comparison to other formerly Tsarist territories such as Central Asia, due to its close connection to the Middle East, where the post-Ottoman territorial legacy had also emerged as a complicated settlement between the British and French colonial powers.[10] It is through the prism of the region's status as the product of a combined marginality, with respect to both the Middle East and the former Tsarist space, that this chapter will look at the situation. While Caucasian realities could be assessed from Russian and Ottoman post-imperial points of view, they could not be entirely encapsulated by either one. Trapped between two political vacuums, the regional disorder that shaped the Caucasus from late 1917 to 1920 was also a testing ground for new sovereignties, as the newly independent republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Denikin's Volunteer Army, the North Caucasian Republic, the Arax Republic, the South-West Caucasian Republic, etc.) vied with each other and with other military and political forces for legitimacy and actual control over the land. The very survival of the region during these years

of hardship was contingent on the role of grey areas that did not fall within the state framework, such as the port of Batumi on the Black Sea. Simultaneously, the region witnessed the multiplication of negotiations that did not necessarily abide by the accepted rules of international relations, and that challenged European practices of interstate diplomacy.[11] Interpersonal knowledge, more than formal diplomatic norms, played a key role in the interactions between fledgling states, whose political elites had often sat together on the benches of the Russian Duma, or met in the context of other Tsarist institutions or through underground activities.[12]

The Collapse of Tsarist Power in the Caucasus

Although generally considered a 'minor theatre' of the First World War, the Caucasus was exposed to the main forms of mass violence that marked the war.[13] The Armenian genocide (1915–16), in addition to its tragic death toll in Ottoman Anatolia, led approximately 200–300,000 refugees to flee to the Caucasus and Iran.[14] Starting from the early weeks of 1916, Tsarist forces gained the upper hand through a general offensive, from the Black Sea to the Bingöl region, aimed at crushing the Ottoman Third Army. The scorched earth policy ruthlessly implemented by the commander of the Third Army, Mahmut Kâmil Pasha, did not prevent the fall of the key city of Erzurum by mid-February. This gave the Russians strategic access to the Anatolian plateau, threatening central parts of the Ottoman Empire.[15] On 18 April 1916, the port of Trabzon fell to the Russians. Their furthest advance was to the cities of Bayburt and Erzincan, which they conquered in August.[16] Russia was now in control of vast stretches of land across the Eastern Ottoman provinces.

Those conquests came at a time when, from a wider perspective, the Tsarist Empire was weakened by two years of conflict, with major setbacks experienced on the Western front. The management of Eastern Anatolia was entrusted to the viceroy of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who was also in charge of military operations in the region. On 5 (18 in the Julian Calendar) June 1916, Nicholas II signed 'Rules for the Temporary Administration of Turkish Areas Occupied by the Right of War', laying out the form of a local administration that carefully sought to avoid any decision as to the final status of the region. Tsarist administrators were wary of demands for a mass return of Armenian refugees to their homeland and would only tolerate limited forms of local self-government.[17] In addition to the tragic humanitarian situation on the ground, this reluctance might also be explained by the negotiations that

Foreign Minister Sazonov was pursuing with the French and the British concerning the partitioning of Ottoman lands in the Middle East. Their exchanges of notes in April and May 1916 on the creation of an autonomous Armenian territory show that this remained a moot point.[18]

News of the February Revolution (23–28 February/8–13 March 1917) quickly reached the Caucasus. After initial efforts to maintain public order for military reasons, Nikolai Nikolaevich stepped down after the Provisional Government decided to abolish the viceroyalty and create a Special Transcaucasian Committee (Osobiy zakavkazskiy komitet, or Ozakom) on 5 (18) March, a hotchpotch of political figures that was soon under pressure from the local Soviets.[19] All over the Caucasus and the occupied territories of Anatolia and Northern Iran, the revolution evoked considerable interest, and local populations eagerly added their voices to a chorus of critique of Tsarism that also spoke widely of underlying arguments about the traditional hierarchy between national groups, imperialism and social justice.[20] However, the deepening economic crisis and the political powerlessness of the Provisional Government led connections with Petrograd to unravel as early as the summer of that year. The Ozakom, Caucasian military staff and regional Soviets competed for power without succeeding in either restoring order or solving the pressing economic and food problems of the day.

By November 1917, the decisions of Ozakom were without effect. National political parties such as Armenian Dashnaks, Georgian Mensheviks and Azeri Musavatists were gaining in influence and constituted so-called national councils in order to better represent their interests.[21] In the days that followed the Bolshevik Revolution, on 5 (18) December 1917, the Armistice of Erzincan was signed. On the 'Russian' side, the treaty was actually signed by the Caucasian Military Command and by the Transcaucasian Commissariat, a new institution that replaced the Ozakom and that refused to acknowledge the Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd. The Commissariat was no longer an emanation of central Russian institutions. Its composition gave more power to the three national parties and their key political figures (such as the Mensheviks E. Gegechkori and A. Chkhenkeli, the Dashnaks G. Ter-Gazarian and A. Ohandjanian, and the Musavatists M. Djafarov and Kh. Melik-Aslanov). It did not, however, lay claim to full independence, calling instead on the Russian Constituent Assembly to establish the constitutional basis of a democratic Russian polity, demonstrating the difficulty of building new sources of legitimacy in the borderlands.

Central Powers and the Elusive Quest for a Regional Order

When the Bolshevik Revolution erupted, Ottoman leaders were facing defeat to British forces in the Near East. Following the loss of Jerusalem at the end of December 1917, the perspective of regaining a modicum of military prestige by taking advantage of Russia's weakening appealed to the Minister of War Enver Pasha. With the Russian army in trouble due to the political and economic collapse of the region, an outflow of Slavic soldiers leaving the Caucasian front for their home regions, and uncertainty surrounding political power in Transcaucasia, Enver and General Vehip Pasha decided to launch a general offensive.[22] In diplomatic circles, the purported aim of this expedition was to defend Muslims in Eastern Anatolian occupied territories and the Caucasus against mass violence.[23] On 12 February 1918, Ottoman forces moved eastward and quickly entered Erzincan, sending shockwaves across the region and leading the Transcaucasian Commissariat to call for a ceasefire, in vain.[24]

The following weeks saw a succession of Ottoman victories. The capture of Batumi, on 14 April, was met with euphoria in the press. The famous journalist Yunus Nadi hailed the 'Recapture of Batumi' (*Batum'un İstirdâdı*), and Enver Pasha toured the Black Sea coast to celebrate the reintegration of the 'three provinces' (*Elviye-i Selâse*) lost in 1878.[25] As far as the Caucasus was concerned, the success of the Ottoman eastward campaign opened the way for a first round of peace negotiations. The settlement was necessarily conceived under the tutelage of the Porte, which enjoyed a few weeks as the regional hegemon, with Germany intervening as a go-between and moderator between Istanbul and local political forces.

In a tense context, a peace conference began in Trabzon in mid-March 1918, followed by another in Batumi in May 1918.[26] While Trabzon had been suggested as a neutral ground for negotiation by the new Transcaucasian Assembly – the Seim – by the time the conference began, more than ten days after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the circumstances had been significantly transformed. The negotiations were focused on the European borderlands with Russia, but Article 4 of the treaty provided for the retrocession of eastern Anatolia as well as the Kars and Batum provinces to the Ottomans.[27] In this regard, Transcaucasian politicians were trapped in a quandary due to their continuing loyalty to the idea of restoring a Russian democratic polity. Many of these politicians, such as the head of the delegation, Akaki Chkhenkeli (1874–1959), had been engaged in the struggle of social democracy against Tsarism, had trained in Russian law and politics, and could not seriously envision the possibility of full independence in the early weeks of 1918. If Transcaucasia

did not proclaim its independence, Ottoman Prime Minister Talât Pasha argued, it should be bound by the clauses of Brest-Litovsk and allow unimpeded access to the Ottoman forces that were marching into the region.[28] The Ottomans clearly made instrumental use of the contradictions exposed by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which reflected the hesitation of Caucasian leaders to abandon the imperial framework altogether.

For that reason, negotiations between the Transcaucasian delegation and the Ottomans were tightly connected to an internal struggle that emerged in the region over the nature of this de facto polity. The members of the Transcaucasian delegation were arguing as much among themselves as with the Ottomans. Chkhenkeli, its head, had to deal with 43 members and, if technical staff was included, a delegation of over a hundred.[29] In Trabzon, the Ottomans quipped that the Transcaucasian side was 'too small if it represented the entire population of the country, but too big if it was supposed to be one delegation'.[30] While several members drew on skills in law, languages, geography and demographics, they often pursued personal aims, as demonstrated by Azerbaijani leader Mehmed Emin Rasulzade, who used his connections in the Ottoman Empire and Persia as well as his political background in the Musavat Party to rise to the chairmanship of the Azerbaijani National Assembly. Halil Bey, Minister of Justice and head of the Ottoman delegation in Batumi, adopted a harsh line towards his counterparts, and Ottoman military successes intensified the pressure on Transcaucasian statesmen. On 22 April, faced with an existential military threat, the Transcaucasian Seim finally proclaimed the independence of the region as a Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, with the support of the region's main political forces. Noe Zhordania, the leader of the Georgian Social Democratic Party, captured the uncertainties of this turn in his speech 'On the Independence of Transcaucasia', where he lamented the failure to establish a democratic Russia comprising the Caucasus.[31]

This independence was itself short-lived, since domestic tensions grew between nationalist forces, leading to unrest and a growing political stalemate. The Transcaucasian delegation lacked unity, and individual members tried to negotiate separate clauses with the Ottomans, as demonstrated by Nikolay Chkheidze's efforts to reach a secret deal on Batumi, notwithstanding his position as Chairman of the Seim.[32] Confronted with the impossibility of bringing the negotiations to a close due to new Ottoman demands, Georgian leaders were the first to look to the prospect of establishing a national government under German protection. They pursued side talks with General von Lossow, the German delegate at the conference, which emboldened Georgian statesmen.[33] On 26 May 1918, the Georgian National Council declared Georgia's independence,

followed by the Muslim Council and, more reluctantly, by Armenians, who made a claim to self-government while carefully avoiding the word 'independence'.[34] The territorial claims of these republics remained unclear: Azerbaijan was founded without a capital and the declaration referred only to 'Eastern and Southern Transcaucasia', while all three had to face local attempts at establishing other authorities.[35]

Peace Treaties 'Alaturca'

On 4 June 1918, bilateral peace treaties were signed between the Ottoman Empire and the three republics, providing for the settlement of interstate borders, as well as exchanges of prisoners of war, terms of trade, customs duties and minority and religious matters.[36] Despite the collapse of the Transcaucasian Federative Republic, the vision of the Caucasus as a buffer zone made up of client states remained popular among Ottoman military and civilian leaders.[37] After years of marginality within the European state system, they could finally assert their own regional order, centred on the Empire itself. Thanks to a German military and economic presence, Georgia was slightly less exposed to Ottoman power, while Azerbaijan and Armenia were, each for different reasons, under strong Ottoman influence and enjoyed only limited sovereignty.[38] In Azerbaijan, the Ottomans effectively undertook full-fledged state-building, supported by Azerbaijani émigrés returning home after years of exile abroad, such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, an intellectual and journalist living in Istanbul since 1910, who became a political advisor to the Ottoman Supreme Command and to Azeri leaders.[39] Ottoman military, economic, educational and political support was an essential and coveted part of the early Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, a fact that has continued to this day to be much propagandized in public uses of history in both Turkey and Azerbaijan.[40]

By contrast, the Armenian government faced the daunting prospect of becoming a rump state and an Ottoman satellite, a particularly grim prospect given the harsh legacy of the preceding years. In what was a clear sign of its inferior status, Armenia was forced to accept a right of free passage for Ottoman troops until the end of the war and was prevented from establishing diplomatic relations with countries that were at war with the Ottomans.[41] The need to salvage what might remain of Armenian sovereignty in this context was illustrated by the additional negotiations held in the border city of Alexandropol (Giumri), in June–July 1918. General Kâzım Karabekir supervised the conference, which was mainly dedicated to economic relations, border security and

the issue of Armenian refugees.[42] The Armenian negotiators, headed by General Ter Akopov, were put under constant pressure by their inter-locutors. Ottoman Turkish was made the main language of the negotia-tions, removing Russian and French to the background, with Armenian entirely set aside. The threat of military action was always present, as the Ottomans frequently complained about bandit attacks along the border and suggested the possibility of armed reprisals.[43] Most importantly, the Ottomans categorically opposed the prospect of a return of Armenian ref-ugees to Eastern Anatolia. The Republic of Armenia argued that it could not even feed a population in the former Yerevan province, which had tripled in the preceding years, and offered an agreement on the mutual rights of Muslim and Armenian minorities. But Karabekir was adamant that the only way to stabilize the region was an exchange of minorities, and he refused to consider the admission of Armenian refugees back to their homelands.[44]

These additional negotiations outlined what a *pax ottomanica* could look like, even though it was never fully implemented. It was, in many regards, quite similar to what had been achieved by imperial hegemons in the nineteenth century and included all the elements of superiority and legitimacy, notably financial help and humanitarian relief, as dem-onstrated by grain shipments to Armenia in summer 1918.[45] In order to legitimate the reintegration of the *Elviye-i Selâse*, the Ottomans held a provincial referendum, in which an overwhelming majority were said to have voted to return to Ottoman rule. Quite similarly, in the very last weeks of their participation in the war, the Ottomans decided to organize a conference in Istanbul to discuss further regional issues concerning the Caucasus, which brought delegates of the three Transcaucasian republics to the Turkish capital. While Azerbaijani leaders were keen to empha-size their autonomy, Armenian delegates tried to reach out to Ottoman and Ottoman Armenian public opinion to improve their situation with respect to borders, refugees and trade, as evidenced by the attention paid by the press in the lead-up to the conference.[46] The tools and practices of Ottoman peacemaking in 1918 thus had significant similarities with the features of the general war settlement in the hands of the Allies.

Levels of Conflict and Negotiation

The circumstances of Ottoman surrender under the terms of the Moudros Armistice (30 October 1918) abruptly altered the balance of power in the region, and the retreat of Ottoman forces created a military and political vacuum. Overburdened by other commitments in the Balkans and the

Middle East, Entente forces did not effectively fill this vacuum in the following weeks. Curzon's trouble in understanding the regional situation in spring 1919 partially reflected the confusion that reigned among the local representatives of the Allied powers, as conflicts flared up all over the region. While tensions were already visible among Armenians and Turkish-speaking populations in Eastern Transcaucasia, war suddenly erupted between Georgia and Armenia over the strategic border district of Lori, which was crossed by the Tbilisi-Alexandropol railroad. The district had been subject to competing claims by the Georgian and Armenian national councils since June 1918, but Ottoman soldiers had initially pre-empted the conflict by occupying the district.[47] As the Ottoman military started to depart the area, on 18 October 1918, Armenians and Georgians vied for control over the Sanain train station, and tensions mounted. Efforts to bring about a multilateral initiative to solve the crisis failed, and outright hostilities flared up in December. Solving this conflict by dividing the disputed area and creating a buffer zone between the two states would be one of the Entente's first actions in the Caucasus, bringing about a ceasefire on 31 December.[48]

Facing a highly unstable regional situation, Entente governments did not enjoy a significant military foothold in the Caucasus. Great Britain, the most directly involved power due to its presence in Persia, established a military presence at the two extremities of the Caucasian Isthmus, in Baku and Batumi, securing these two ports against unexpected threats. In late 1918, General Thomson, who was in command of the region, had fifteen battalions at his disposal. The French presence was limited to the military mission headed by Colonel Chardigny (1873–1951), who found it hard to compete with British influence given France's limited interests in the region, in contrast to the Levant.[49] Chardigny's mission provided military expertise to Georgian and Armenian forces and had sections devoted to health issues and propaganda.[50] Italy also entertained hopes of gaining a foothold in a region where it had significant economic and commercial interests. The British War Council even voted on 9 April 1919 to leave Transcaucasia to Italy, despite diplomatic concerns that 'the Italians [would] not be able to cope with the very difficult situation'. The Gabba military mission, touring Transcaucasia in May 1919, duly noted that considerable means would have to be invested in order to control and stabilize the region. But the fall of the Orlando government at the end of June suspended any idea of an Italian 'protectorate' over the region.[51]

A major asset of the Entente in regulating regional relations was control over access to the Peace Conference in Paris, demonstrating the still very hierarchical nature of the new international system.[52] The representation of Armenian interests was facilitated by an international

mobilization in favour of reforms in the Ottoman Empire that had begun in the late nineteenth century, as well as support for Armenians during the genocide. Boghos Nubar Pasha (1851–1930), a member of the Ottoman-Egyptian Armenian elite and founder of the Union Générale Arménienne de Bienfaisance (UGAB), had since 1912 headed an Armenian National Delegation and was able to use his international recognition to approach the Conference. The main issue was coordination between Nubar, who spoke mainly for Armenians living in Ottoman lands, and Avetis Aharonian (1866–1948), the head of a delegation representing the Republic of Armenia.[53] While Aharonian was instructed to claim six former Ottoman *vilayets* and a corridor to the Black Sea, Nubar defended the creation of an Armenia from the Caucasus to Cilicia.[54] Other delegations, however, struggled even to reach the Conference, due to French and British reluctance to accept them at the negotiating table as legitimate governments. On 2 March 1919, the representatives of the Don, Kuban, North Caucasus and Azerbaijan republics protested against the 'scarcely understandable' grounds on which they were prevented from leaving Istanbul for France and being admitted to the conference.[55]

The interplay between levels of negotiation and action was a key factor in explaining the confusion that reigned in the region. Transcaucasian polities were simultaneously laying claims to a seat at the Peace Conference while struggling to make their way among the ruins of empire. The production of expert knowledge in cartography, statistics and political economy was a challenge for governments that lacked the very material basis of their daily work and that often produced contradictory claims.[56] In January 1919, the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fathali Khan Khoyski, asked his delegate to the conference, Ali Mardan Topchibashi, to send reference works on international law – but also on the geography and ethnography of the Caucasus – 'from Europe'.[57] In Tsarist times, the region was managed and developed as a whole, and the former provinces of the Caucasian viceroyalty were highly interdependent. Railroads, customs, waterworks and finances were regional prerogatives. Tbilisi was, by and large, the administrative and intellectual core of the region, while Baku rivalled it in economic and cultural terms. Yerevan, by comparison, was a squalid town, overflowing with refugees and with little capacity to take on a role as capital.[58]

Negotiating the material, financial and territorial legacy of Tsarism was a highly sensitive issue that required multilateral and bilateral efforts. These took place mainly in Tbilisi, where each government sent representatives to take part in a Transcaucasian liquidation committee.[59] On the face of it, the process resembled negotiations that took place in other regions affected by the collapse of empires, and in particular former Habsburg

lands, where technical issues related to material and immaterial assets led to innovative compromises.[60] There was uncertainty surrounding the participants' legal status as well as the demands of additional actors to have a say in the process – such as the Abkhazian National Council, which voted a resolution asserting its own claims to a portion of Transcaucasian assets.[61] The liquidation of financial, customs and military institutions was particularly complicated, as was the resolution of monetary issues, and this panoply of problems was not to be fully resolved during the short period of independence. In this context, seasoned lawyers such as Georgian advisor Zurab Avalov and his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts became interested in the possibility of using arbitration as a tool to defuse tensions.[62] While it had been eclipsed during the war, arbitration had been a favoured tool of international negotiations during the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and its use was a way of demonstrating full adherence to modern diplomatic practices.[63]

As far as territorial conflicts were concerned, 1919 also saw a mix of local and interstate negotiations and Entente interventions. The ethnic and geographical diversity of the Caucasus limited the applicability of an exclusively national approach to sovereignty. In 1917, out of a total of 1.78 million Armenians living in Transcaucasia – 22 per cent of its total population of 7.5 million – significant communities could be found in Yerevan province (60 per cent of the local population), Elisavetpol (33 per cent), Kars (30 per cent), Tbilisi (28 per cent) and Baku (9 per cent), as well as smaller groups in other provinces.[64] The case of Karabakh, a disputed region between Armenia and Azerbaijan, involved local politics, self-proclaimed regional governments and British interference. Armenians accounted for 70 per cent of the local population in the mountainous districts of Karabakh but were outnumbered in the lowlands.[65] The British initially supported Baku in sending a governor general to Karabakh, Khosrov Bek Sultanov, but violence soon erupted in the region. Meanwhile, Nakhichevan and Zangezur, which were under Armenian rule, experienced inter-ethnic unrest, and US Colonel James Rhea was mandated by the Entente to help local elites sign a peace agreement.[66] But each of these deals was precarious due to the lack of forces to implement them and to the multiple forms of social, religious and political identities on which the different states based their claims of sovereignty over territories and populations.

A Regional System between Europe and the Middle East

The experience of regional diplomacy was not limited to interactions between Transcaucasian governments and Western powers. Leaving

aside Turkey, where the beginning of the nationalist movement in Central Anatolia created considerable confusion, the Transcaucasian authorities also had to deal with another regional power: Iran. Officially neutral during the conflict, Iran was successively occupied by Russian, Ottoman and British forces.[67] As the war drew to a close, the Iranian authorities grew wary of the new situation in the Caucasus. Of particular concern for them was the emergence of new states that did not fit into imperial patterns and that made novel claims to sovereignty. The creation of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan particularly irked Iranian newspapers, which rejected the underlying irredentism of the name. Azerbaijan was, Tehran reminded all foreign powers in a note of protest, 'a Persian province' with direct connections to the crown – a reminder of the fact that heirs to the imperial throne had customarily spent their youth as the governors of Iranian Azerbaijan, in Tabriz.[68] It could not be accepted, they complained, that 'a newly formed state entity appearing at Iran's very borders took the name' of this province.[69]

The Iranians were not, however, idle bystanders in the disaggregation of Transcaucasia, and Prime Minister Vosugh Ed Dowleh developed a consistent policy aimed at obtaining reparations for war damages.[70] Some Iranian statesmen had been arguing since March 1918 that the state should take advantage of the political vacuum in the region to assert historical rights to 'Persian provinces in the Caucasus' lost to Russian imperialism in the nineteenth century. The Iranian ambassador in Istanbul, Arfa' Ed Dowleh, a former consul general in Tbilisi and an expert on Russia, actively lobbied for Tehran to promote such claims. Adopting the logic of the right to self-determination, he suggested circulating petitions among local populations and *mohajirin* (i.e. Muslim exiles from Russian lands who had settled in Iran) in order to lay claims to parts of Yerevan and Elizavetpol provinces.[71] In December 1918, a special committee of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs completed a study devoted to the claims that the country could present at the Peace Conference. Their 'maximal program' demanded the restitution of all territories ceded since the Treaty of Turkmenchay.[72]

Those claims were presented as part of the general effort by Iranian elites to restore their country's prestige and use the difficulties of the 'Northern bear' to decrease their dependence on a foreign power that had established a quasi-protectorate over northern Iran after 1907. Territorial claims were just one aspect of this broader programme, which involved a critique of various extraterritorial rights and capitulations imposed on Iran since the nineteenth century that would continue to generate resentment until their abolition by Reza Shah in 1927–28.[73] Starting in late 1918, Iranian authorities started to consider terminating extraterritorial rights

for former Tsarist subjects from the Caucasus. The immediate justification was that Transcaucasian states had officially seceded from Russia and should not inherit the privileges once granted to their motherland, as they were not a successor state. Interestingly enough, the first protests against these changes came in spring 1919 from the White Russian embassy in Tehran, whose head held on to the idea of a single Russian state and was intent on maintaining the legal fiction of extraterritoriality for Caucasians.[74] At the same time, Azerbaijan decided to send a delegation to Tehran, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Adil Khan Ziyadkhanov, in order to improve bilateral relations.[75]

A third dimension of Iran's growing role in the Caucasus during these years was the role played by Iranian authorities in mediating between conflicting sides, in particular concerning violence in the peripheral district of Nakhichevan. In late 1918, local Muslim elites appealed to authorities in Tabriz to help them in their conflict with the Armenians, and the Qajar heir offered to send two intermediaries – one Muslim and one Armenian – to negotiate a local truce.[76] Requests for protection and delegations were not confined to Caucasian Muslims, as many Iran-born Armenians lived in the Caucasus and were hopeful that these mediations would succeed. Northern Iran, for its part, was heavily dependent on the possibility of maintaining commercial ties through the Caucasus and the Black Sea, as emphasized by the Consul General in Tbilisi, Moazzez Ed Dowleh.[77] Economic interests played a significant role in these interventions, but they were also motivated by the sense that there was some prospect that such mediations could lead to the recovery of lost lands. A few kilometres away from the border of Nakhichevan, the Khan of Maku openly called on Tehran to help local elites in order to promote the region's reintegration into Iran.[78] In his pursuit of such policies, the Khan was increasingly at variance with the policy of the government, which considered that the fate of the district should be settled at the Paris Peace Conference. Contradictory strands of diplomacy and political influence were therefore pursued at multiple levels in Transcaucasian-Iranian relations, highlighting once again the state of flux in which the region continued to exist in 1919.

Belated Agreements

Starting from the summer of 1919, the prospect of British withdrawal and the impact of the Russian Civil War created stronger incentives for the consolidation of a regional order in the South Caucasus. The Caucasus Conference created during the Georgian-Armenian tensions of autumn

1918 continued to convene as a permanent negotiating body in Tbilisi and discuss military and diplomatic matters, in particular external threats. In spring 1919, General Denikin's attacks on the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus were a particular source of concern. While Georgia and Azerbaijan strongly supported the Mountainous Republic, Armenia took a different stance, due to its geopolitical interests and its closeness with White forces, which did not threaten it directly. Georgian Defence Minister Noe Ramishvili nonetheless obtained from the Armenian delegate a commitment to 'benevolent neutrality' in case of a military conflict against Denikin.[79] The diplomatic activity of the Transcaucasian states, in the last months of 1919 and the early weeks of 1920, until the fall of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan to the Bolsheviks (April 1920), led to three kinds of attempts at building a regional order.

Still towering over the agenda was the hope of gaining official recognition from the Entente powers. The Versailles Treaty did not specify the fate of former Russian territories, leaving the Caucasian republics to fend for themselves. While admission to the Peace Conference had been their main aim in the first half of 1919, recognition was now considered a key broader objective, in order to consolidate wobbling institutions. In January 1920, following the southward thrust of the Red Army, the Allied Supreme Council granted a first stage of recognition to the three Transcaucasian republics. But it was not until Azerbaijan and Armenia fell to Bolshevik aggression (in December 1920) that the Inter-Allied Conference decided to consider full recognition for Caucasian and Baltic states. Lloyd George and Aristide Briand favoured *de jure* recognition of Georgia, by now the only *de facto* independent state in the region. On 27 January 1921, Briand notified Evgeni Gegechkori, the Georgian Foreign Minister, about the recognition of his government, just a few weeks before it too was brought down by the combination of a military offensive and local insurrections.[80]

A second major objective was to consolidate a regional system of alliance against external threats, in particular coming from the North, and to support new forms of interdependence. Georgian leaders, who still considered Tbilisi the natural capital of the Caucasus and who had not entirely abandoned the prospect of rebuilding some sort of Caucasian confederation, were eager to maintain coordination bodies. Relations between Tbilisi and Baku were particularly strategic, due to their overlapping geopolitical fears – protecting their northern border against side effects of the Russian Civil War – and economic interests – maintaining an east-west rail and oil connection that was the lifeline of the region during the entire period of independence. The mutual defence pact between the two countries signed on 16 June 1919, in anticipation of attacks by White

forces, was typical of this close relationship.[81] Armenian-Azerbaijani antagonism nonetheless prevented attempts at closer coordination between the three Transcaucasian states until a preliminary agreement was reached between the two countries, during a conference held in Tbilisi in December 1919. The conference noted the need for confidence-building measures between Transcaucasian states, and their close interdependence with respect to the issue of Western recognition.[82]

A third major trend was the attempt to establish closer relations with Iran. In the highly volatile context of 1919–20, and despite the above-mentioned frictions with Tehran, relations with Iran were an important structural factor, although obscured by relations with European powers. Iranian authorities were also eager to strengthen these relations in order to better protect Iranians living in the Caucasus and their commercial interests. On 21 September 1919, the Iranian Consul General in Tbilisi alerted his government to the need to enter into more intense relations with Transcaucasian states and restore Iran's former influence.[83] Azerbaijani authorities had already sent a diplomatic mission to Iran in early 1919 in order to foster friendly relations.[84] After months of hesitation, the Iranian government decided to send an extraordinary embassy. The role was entrusted to Seyyed Zia-al-din Tabataba'i, a seasoned anglophile and connoisseur of Russia and the Caucasus, who left Iran in November and started in Baku what was intended to be a Transcaucasian tour.[85] Receiving a warm welcome from Azerbaijani authorities and the local Iranian community, the delegation tried for more than two months to resolve all of the pending issues in bilateral relations. In extracting concessions from Baku, Tabataba'i and his delegation were helped by the Bolshevik denunciation of Tsarist imperialism and the concessions forced upon Qajar Iran. References to Communism were far from innocent, however, as the Red Army accumulated successes in the Civil War and posed an increasing threat to the three Transcaucasian states, which had never been recognized by the Bolsheviks.

Conclusion

All across Central Europe, the demise of empire at the end of the First World War threatened social and political institutions, leading to deep confusion and turmoil. In the Caucasus, the fall of Tsarism actually revealed that despite the nationalism that they routinely professed many Transcaucasian politicians and statesmen were reluctant to abandon a shared destiny with Russia. As successive revolutions and coups undermined plans for a united democratic Russia, the quest for alternatives

involved both local actors and foreign powers, starting with the Ottoman intervention in the region in 1918. Sliding into 'coerced' independence, the history of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan is far from the heroic narrative that was widely presented on the occasion of the recent centenary of the 'first independences'.

Trapped between empires in crisis, the South Caucasian republics experienced a state of economic chaos, territorial uncertainty and partial sovereignty, due to their lack of infrastructural power. The very channels of intergovernmental relations had to be set up from scratch and were always subject to debate. The tools of Western diplomacy and international law, including such innovations of the late nineteenth century as arbitration, were viewed with great interest, in a practical effort to solve disputed issues and an eye to convincing Western leaders of the respectability of the new governments. Arbitration allowed for a blurring of customary distinctions between public and private interests and bypassed the sensitive issues that would have arisen from a strictly diplomatic approach to the Transcaucasian negotiations.

Ironically enough, it was a legacy of the Tsarist period – personal connections and affinities – that often helped maintain workable relations between leaders, who had shared similar experiences in the Russian Duma, in exile or in clandestinity. At the same time, the Caucasus became a venue for multilevel diplomacy, as numerous conferences were convened to resolve the urgent questions of the day: at the local level, in the face of violence and border conflicts, often featuring the presence of Allied representatives; at the regional level, in a series of multilateral and bilateral conferences; and at an international level, despite limited interest in the region at the Peace Conference in Paris and among the Entente powers.

Etienne Forestier-Peyrat is Assistant Professor of Contemporary History at Sciences Po Lille, University of Lille. His research focuses on the Caucasus, the communist world and imperial history. He is author of *Histoire du Caucase au XXe siècle* (Fayard, 2020).

Notes

1. Foreign Office (FO), Minutes of the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, 6 March 1919, IOR Mss Eur F112/275.
2. Neilson, 'For Diplomatic, Economic, Strategy and Telegraphic Reasons'.
3. Bobrovnikov and Babič, *Severnyj Kavkaz*; Gammer; *Muslim Resistance*; Kreiten, 'A Colonial Experiment in Cleansing'.
4. Allen and Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields*; Mohammad, *Târîkh-e ravâbet-e Rûs va Îrân*; Balajan, *Diplomaticheskaja istorija russko-iranskih vojn*.

5. Badem, *Çarlık Rusyası yönetiminde Kars Vilayeti*; Poghosyan, *Karsskaja oblast' v sostave Rossii*; Jelayich, 'Great Britain and the Russian Acquisition of Batum'.
6. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires*, 6.
7. Dessberg and Marès, *Militaires et diplomates français*.
8. Ter Minassian, 'Les géographes français et la délimitation des frontières balkaniques'; Kitsikis, *Le rôle des experts*; Smith, *Sovereignty*.
9. Letter of the Georgian delegation in Paris to the French delegation, 19 February 1919, AMAE, CPC (1918–1940), Série E – Levant, Caucase-Kurdistan, file 4, p. 10.
10. Barr, *A Line in the Sand*.
11. Badel, *Diplomaties européennes*.
12. For a detailed account of such Tsarist-period connections among Georgian socialists, see Jones, *Socialism in Georgian Colors*.
13. Reynolds, 'The East's Eastern Front'.
14. Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking*, 52–53.
15. Nusret, *Erzurum Tarihçesi*, 112–13.
16. Novikov, *Operatsii flota protiv berega na Chernom more v 1914–1917 gg.*, 186–237; Korsun, *Pervaja mirovaja vojna na Kavkazskom fronte*, 63–70.
17. The Russian Foreign Minister to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, 14 (27) June 1916, RGVIA, f. 2005, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 1–2.
18. Adamov, *Razdel Aziatskoj Turtcii*, 211–12; Bakhturina, *Okrainy Rossijskoj imperii*.
19. Ter Minassian, *La république d'Arménie*, 17–18.
20. Forestier-Peyrat, 'Faire la révolution'; Drieu, '1917 au prisme caucasien'.
21. Sürmeli, *Türk-Gürcü İlişkileri*, 24.
22. Harut'junjan, *Turk'akan intervents'ian*, 39–47.
23. The claim was made on several diplomatic occasions, without clear evidence of the alleged violence.
24. Sürmeli, *Türk-Gürcü İlişkileri*, 49–50.
25. Forestier-Peyrat, 'The Ottoman Occupation'; Şahin, *Türkiye ve Maverâ-yı*.
26. Šaraże, *Sak'art'velos pirveli demokratiuli*, 95–96.
27. 'Russia will do all in her power to have the provinces of eastern Anatolia promptly evacuated and returned to Turkey. The districts of Erdahan, Kars and Batum will likewise and without delay be cleared of the Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the reorganization of the national and international relations of these districts, but leave it to the population of these districts, to carry out this reorganization in agreement with the neighboring States, especially with Turkey.' Retrieved December 2021 from https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brest.asp.
28. Cable of ambassador Pallavicini to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 19 April 1918, HHStA, PA X 155, in Ohandjanian, *Österreich-Ungarn*, 439–40.
29. Şahin, *Türkiye ve Maverâ-yı*, 274–76. The archives of the Transcaucasian delegations have been recently published in Iakobashvili, *Trapezundisa da Bat'umis samšvidobo konp'erenc'ia*.
30. Avalov, *Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoj politike, 1918–1921 gg.*, 34.
31. Brisku and Blauvelt, 'Who wanted the TFDR?', 1.
32. Sürmeli, *Türk-Gürcü İlişkileri*, 74–80.
33. Materski, *Georgia rediviva*, 49.
34. Hovannisian, *Armenia*, 4.
35. Minutes of the Georgian government, 31 May 1918, STsSSA, f. 1861, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 10–12.
36. See for example, Gültepe and Aktaş, *Osmanlı devleti*, 214–25.
37. Taglia, 'Pragmatism and Expediency'.
38. For a general history of Georgian-German relations since 1914, see Bakradze, *Germanul-kartuli urtiertobebi*.

39. Shissler, *Between Two Empires*.
40. Imanov, *Azerbaycan-Osmanlı İlişkileri*.
41. Armenian peace delegation to the Ottoman delegation, 3 June 1918, in Badalyan, *Germana-T'urk'akan ōkupantnerĕ*, 168.
42. Şahin, *Diplomasi ve sınır*, 122–23.
43. Cable of general Nazarbekov to general Karabekir, late June 1918, HAA, f. 200, op. 1, d. 30, l. 11.
44. Minutes of the Ottoman-Armenian Commission, 13 July 1918, HAA, f. 200, op. 1, d. 30, ll. 94–96; Şahin, *Türkiye ve Maverâ-yı*, 198–99.
45. Şahin, *Türkiye ve Maverâ-yı*, 283.
46. Şekeryan, 'Rethinking the Establishment of the First Republic of Armenia'.
47. Minutes of the Georgian government, 5 June 1918, STsSSA, f. 1861, op. 1, d. 1,
48. *Iz istorii armjano-gruzinskikh otnoshenij – 1918 god* (Tbilisi: Gosudarstvennaja tipografija, 1919).
49. The mission also featured Antoine Poidebard, a missionary and interpreter, who entered military service in Persia in 1918 and was notably busy establishing maps of roads and communications in the Middle East: Nordiguian and Voisin, *La Grande Guerre au Moyen-Orient*.
50. Ter Minassian, *La république d'Arménie*, 47.
51. Petricioli, *L'occupazione italiana del Caucaso*, 58–76.
52. Badel, *Diplomaties européennes*, 308–9; see also Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality*.
53. Ghazarian, *Boghos Nubar's Papers*.
54. Bournoutian, 'The Unrealistic Territorial Demands of the Armenian Republic', 227.
55. Note of protest to the diplomatic representatives of Entente powers in Istanbul, 2 March 1919, in Topchibashi et al., *Parizhskij arkhiv*, 184–86.
56. Foliard, 'Cartes et contre-cartes à la Conférence de la Paix de Paris'.
57. Letter of Fathali Khan Khoiski to Ali Mardan Topchibashi, 6 January 1919, in Topchibashi et al., *Parizhskij arkhiv*, 175.
58. Suk'iasjan, 'Hajastani Hanrapetut'jan ishkhanut'jan kentronakan marminneri Jerevan teghap'okhvelu harts'i shurj'.
59. Decree of the Azerbaijani government, 18 June 1918, ARDA, f. 2898, op. 1, d. 1, l. 2.
60. Matsch, *Der Auswärtige Dienst*, 165–80; Kecskeméti, 'Saisies d'archives et de bibliothèques', 29–30.
61. Decision of the Abkhazian National Council, 2 June 1918, Gozhba, *Abkhazija*, 34–35.
62. Minutes of the Armenian government, 26 August 1918, in Virabjan, *Hajastani Hanrapetut'jan karavar'ut'jan nisteri ardzanagrut'junneri*, 18.
63. Jeannesson, 'Léon Bourgeois'; Rosenne, *The Hague Peace Conferences*.
64. Hovannisian, *Armenia*, 15.
65. Hovannisian, 'The Armeno-Azerbaijani Conflict'.
66. Kalustian, 'The Newly-Discovered "Rhea Papers"'.
67. Bast, *La Perse et la Grande Guerre*.
68. Clark, *Provincial Concerns*, xviii.
69. Persian ambassador in Vienna to the Austro-Hungarian MFA, 12 July 1918, HHStA, PA X 156, in Ohandjanian, *Österreich-Ungarn*, 468–69.
70. Bast. 'Les "buts de guerre" de la Perse', 96–98.
71. Arfa' Ed Dowleh to the Persian MFA, 22 Djomâdâ al-Avlâ 1338 (5 March 1918), in Bayât and Shahrezâyî, *Âmâl-e Irânîân, az konfrans-e solh-e Pârîs tâ qarârdâd-e 1919 Irân va Inglîs*, 133–34.
72. Report of the Iranian MFA to the prime minister, 8 December 1918, in Ettehâdîye and Pîrâ, *Madjmu'e-ye mokâtebât*, 83–85.
73. Makki, *Mokhtasarî az zandagânî-e siyâsî-e Soltân Ahmâd Shâh Qâjâr*, 137.

74. French embassy in Tehran to the MFA, 21 April 1919, AMAE, CPC (1918–1940), Série E – Levant, Caucase-Kurdistan, file 4, p. 99.

75. Mehdiyev, *ADR-İran diplomatik münasibətləri Qafqaz Fövqəladə Komissiyasının sənədləri işığında*, 9.

76. Taqıyeva and Nəsibzadə, '1918–1920 ci illərdə Azərbaycan-Iran münasibətləri', 66.

77. Consul General Moazzez Ed Dowleh to the Iranian MFA, 16 Djomâdâ al-Avlâ 1337 (17 February 1919), in Bayât and Shahrezâyî, *Âmâl-e Irânîân, az konfrans-e solh-e Pârîs tâ qarârdâd-e 1919 Irân va Inglîs*, 225–28.

78. Sadıqov, *Naxçıvan Muxtar Respublikası Tarixindən*, 15.

79. Minutes of the Caucasian Conference, 30 May 1919, STsSSA, f. 1861, op. 1, d. 8, ll. 14–15.

80. Aristide Briand to Evgeni Gegechkori, 27 January 1921, AMAE, CPC (1918–1940), Série Z – Europe, URSS, file 649, p. 140.

81. Yılmaz, 'An Unexpected Peace'.

82. Minutes of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conference, 15 December 1919, ARDA, f. 970, op. 1, d. 95, ll. 43–45.

83. Consul general in Tbilisi, Moazzez Ed Dowleh, to the Iranian MFA, 24 Dhu-l-hijja 1337 (21 September 1919), in Shahrezâyî, *Hî'at-i favq al-'âdah-i Qafqâzîyah*, 46–48.

84. Instructions of the Azerbaijani government for Ismayıl Xan Ziyadxanov, 20 March 1919, ARDA, f. 2598, op. 1, d. 9, l. 5.

85. Ettefâqfar, 'Talâshhâ-ye Seyyed Ziya'el-Din Tabâtabâyî dar îdjâd-e konfederâsyûn miyân-e Irân va Azarbâidjân'.

Bibliography

Archival Resources

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve (AMAE)
State Archives of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Baku (ARDA)
National Archives of Armenia, Yerevan (HAA)
House, Court and State Archives, Vienna (HHStA)
India Office Records, British Library, London (IOR)
Russian State Military Historical Archives, Moscow (RGVIA)
Georgian Central Historical Archives, Tbilisi (STsSSA)

Published Sources

Adamov, Evgenij Aleksandrovich (ed.). *Razdel Aziatskoj Turcii: Po sekretnym dokumentam byvshego Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del*. Moscow: Litizdat NKID, 1924.

Allen, William Edward David and Paul Muratoff. *Caucasian Battlefields, 1828–1921*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.

Avalov (Avalishvili), Zurab. *Nezavisimost' Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoj politike, 1918–1921 gg*. Paris: Imprimerie de Navarre, 1924.

Badalyan, Kh.H. (ed.). *Germana-T'urk'akan ōkupantnerĕ Hayastanum 1918 t'vakanin*. Yerevan: Erevani Petakan Hamalsarani Hratarakch'ut'jun, 1962.

Badel, Laurence. *Diplomaties européennes, XIXe–XXIe siècles*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2021.

Badem, Candan. *Çarlık Rusyası yönetiminde Kars Vilayeti*. Istanbul: Birzamanlar Yayınevi, 2010.

Bakhturina, Aleksandra. *Okrainy rossijskoj imperii: gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i nacional'naja politika v gody Pervoj mirovoj vojny (1914–1917) gg.* Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004.

Bakradze, Lasha. *Germanul-kartuli urtiertobebi pirveli msoplio omis dros*. Tbilisi: P'egasi, 2010.

Balajan, Boris. *Diplomaticheskaja istorija russko-iranskih vojn i prisoedinenija Vostochnoj Armenii k Rossii*. Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Armjanskoj SSR, 1988.

Barr, James. *A Line in the Sand: The Anglo-French Struggle for the Middle East, 1914–1948*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2012.

Bast, Oliver (ed.). *La Perse et la Grande Guerre*. Tehran: Institut français de recherche en Iran, 2002.

——. 'Les "buts de guerre" de la Perse neutre pendant la Première Guerre mondiale'. *Relations internationales* 160 (2015), 95–110.

Bayât, Kâvah and Âzarî Shahrezâyî Rezâ (eds). *Âmâl-e Irânîân, az konfrans-e solh-e Pârîs tâ qarârdâd-e 1919 Irân va Inglîs*. Tehran: Pardîs-e Dânesh, 1392 (2013).

Bobrovnikov, Vladimir Olegovič and Irina L. Babič (eds). *Severnyj Kavkaz v sostave Rossijskoj imperii*. Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2007.

Bournoutian, George. 'The Unrealistic Territorial Demands of the Armenian Republic, 1919–1920', in Bedross Der Matossian (ed.), *The First Republic of Armenia (1918–1920) on its Centenary: Politics, Gender and Diplomacy* (Fresno: The Press at California State University, 2020), 225–34.

Brisku, Adrian and Timothy K. Blauvelt. 'Who Wanted the TFDR? The Making and the Breaking of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic'. *Caucasus Survey* 8(1) (2020), 1–8.

Clark, James D. *Provincial Concerns: A Political History of the Iranian Province of Azerbaijan, 1848–1906*. Costa Mesa: Mazda, 2006.

Dessberg, Frédéric and Antoine Marès (eds). *Militaires et diplomates français face à l'Europe médiane: Entre médiations et constructions des savoirs*. Paris: Eur'Orbem Editions, 2017.

Drieu, Cloé. '1917 au prisme caucasien', in Ludivine Bantigny et al. (eds), *Une histoire globale des révolutions* (Paris: La Découverte), 389–419.

Ettefâqfar, Fereshte Sâdât. 'Talâshhâ-ye Seyyed Ziya'el-Din Tabâtabâyî dar îdjâd-e konfederâsyûn miyân-e Irân va Azarbâidjân'. *Olûm-e Siyâsî* 1 (Spring 1386 (2007)), 1–20.

Ettehâdîye, Mansure and Sou'âd Pîrâ (eds). *Madjmu'e-ye mokâtebât, asnâd, khâterât ve asar-e Fîrûz Mîrzâ Fîrûz (Nosrat ed-Dovleh)*, vol. III. Tehran: Nashr-e Târîkh-e Îrân, 1378 (1999).

Foliard, Daniel. 'Cartes et contre-cartes à la Conférence de la Paix de Paris (1919–1920): Débats cartographiques au sein de la délégation britannique'. *Comité français de cartographie* 228 (2016), 153–66.

Forestier-Peyrat, Etienne. 'The Ottoman Occupation of Batumi, 1918: A View from Below'. *Caucasus Survey* 4(2) (2016), 165–82.

——. 'Faire la révolution dans les confins caucasiens en 1917: La liberté côté cour et côté jardin'. *Vingtième siècle: Revue d'histoire* 3(135) (2017), 56–72.

Gammer, Mosher. *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan*. Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1994.

Gatrell, Peter. *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Ghazarian, Vatche. *Boghos Nubar's Papers and the Armenian Question, 1915–1918*. Waltham: Mayreni Publishing, 1996.

Gozhba, R.Kh. (ed.). *Abkhazija: Dokumenty i materialy (1917–1921)*. Sokhumi: no publisher, 2009.

Gültepe, Necati and Necati Aktaş (eds). *Osmanlı devleti ile Azerbaycan türk hanlıkları arasındaki münâsebetlere dâir arşiv belgeleri*, vol. II (1575–1918). Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993.

Harut'junjan, Ashot. *Turk'akan intervents'ian Andrkovkas 1918 t'. yev ink'napasht-panakan kr'ivnerě*. Yerevan: Haykakan Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR Hratarakch'ut'jun, 1984.

Hovannisian, Richard G. *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967.

——. 'The Armeno-Azerbaijani Conflict Over Mountainous Karabagh, 1918–1919'. *The Armenian Review* 24(2) (1971), 3–39.

Iakobashvili, Irak'li (ed.). *Trapezundisa da bat'umis samšvidobo konp'erenc'ia: 1918 celi, t'ebervali—maisi: dokumentebi da masalebi*. Tbilisi: National Parliamentary Library of Georgia, 2018.

Imanov, Vügar. *Azerbaycan-Osmanlı İlişkileri (1918)*. Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2006.

Jeannesson, Stanislas. 'Léon Bourgeois aux conférences de La Haye de 1899 et 1907: Solidarisme et démocratisation des relations internationales'. *Histoire, économie et société* 33(2) (2014), 107–20.

Jelayich, Barbara. 'Great Britain and the Russian Acquisition of Batum, 1878–1886'. *The Slavonic and East European Review* 48(110) (1970), 44–66.

Jones, Stephen F. *Socialism in Georgian Colors: The European Road to Social Democracy, 1883–1917*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Kalustian, Mark A. 'The Newly-Discovered "Rhea Papers"'. *The Armenian Review* 35(3) (1982), 245–75.

Kecskeméti, Charles. 'Saisies d'archives et de bibliothèques: L'évolution du droit international', in Alexandre Sumpf and Vincent Laniol (eds), *Saisies, spoliations, restitutions: Archives et bibliothèques au XXe siècle* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012), 26–34.

Kitsikis, Dimitri. *Le rôle des experts à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919: Gestation d'une technocratie en politique internationale*. Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1972.

Korsun, Nikolai. *Pervaja mirovaja vojna na Kavkazskom fronte: Operativno-strategicheskij ocherk*. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR, 1946.

Kreiten, Irma. 'A Colonial Experiment in Cleansing: The Russian Conquest of Western Caucasus, 1856–65'. *Journal of Genocide Research* 11(2–3) (2009), 213–41.

Makki, Hoseyn. *Mokhtasarî az zandagânî-e siyâsî-e Soltân Ahmâd Shâh Qâjâr*. Tehran: Enteshârât-e Mohammad'ali 'Almi, 1327 (1948).

Materski, Wojciech. *Georgia rediviva: Republika Gruzińska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1918–1921*. Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1994.

Matsch, Erwin. *Der Auswärtige Dienst von Österreich(-Ungarn) 1720–1920*. Vienna: Böhlau, 1986.

Mehdiyev, Ramiz (ed.). *ADR-İran diplomatik münasibətləri Qafqaz Fövqəladə Komissiyasının sənədləri işığında (1919–1920-ci illər)*. Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2017.

Mohammad, 'Alî Djamâlzâde. *Târîkh-e ravâbet-e Rûs va Îrân*. Tehran: Bonyâd-e Mavqûfât-e doktor Mahmûd Afshâr Yazdî, 1372 (1993).

Neilson, Keith. 'For Diplomatic, Economic, Strategy and Telegraphic Reasons: British Imperial Defence, the Middle East and India, 1914–1918', in Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (eds), *Far-flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defense in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman* (London: Routledge, 1996), 103–23.

Nordiguian, Lévon and Jean-Claude Voisin. *La Grande Guerre au Moyen-Orient: Antoine Poidebard sur les routes de Perse 1918*. Beirut: Presses de l'Université Saint-Joseph, 2019.

Novikov, Nikolaĭ Semenovich. *Operatsii flota protiv berega na Chernom more v 1914–1917 gg*. Moscow: State Military Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, 1937.

Nusret, Mehmet. *Erzurum Tarihçesi*. Ankara: Türkiye Yazarlar Birliği Vakfı, 2011.

Ohandjanian, Artem (ed.). *Österreich-Ungarn und Armenien, 1912–1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke*. Yerevan: Institut-Museum für Armenischen Genozid der Akademie der Wissenschaften Armeniens, 2005.

Petricioli, Marta. *L'occupazione italiana del Caucaso: 'Un ingrato servizio' da rendere a Londra*. Pavia: Casa Editrice Dott A. Giuffrè, 1972.

Poghosyan, Artashes Mikhaĭlovich. *Karsskaja oblast' v sostave Rossii*. Yerevan: Aĭastan, 1983.

Reynolds, Michael. *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

——. 'The East's Eastern Front: The Ottoman-Russian Clash in the Great War and its Legacies'. *War in History* 28(2) (2021), 333–58.

Rosenne, Shabtai. *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration: Reports and Documents*. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser, 2001.

Sadıqov, Səid. *Naxçıvan Muxtar Respublikası Tarixindən*. Baku: Irşad Mərkəzi, 1995.

Şahin, Enis. *Türkiye ve Maverâ-yı Kafkasya ilişkileri içerisinde Trabzon ve Batum konferansları ve antlaşmaları (1917–1918)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2002.

——. *Diplomasi ve sınır: Gümrü görüşmeleri ve protokolleri, 1918*. Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005.

Šaraże, Giorgi. *Sak'art'velos pirveli demokratiuli respublika da sagareo politika*. Tbilisi: Sak. Sag. Sakm. Saminist'ro, 2003.

Şekeryan, Ari. 'Rethinking the Establishment of the First Republic of Armenia: Reactions of the Ottoman-Turkish and Armenian Press in Istanbul (May–October 1918)', in Bedross Der Matossian (ed.), *The First Republic of Armenia (1918–1920) on its Centenary: Politics, Gender, and Diplomacy* (Fresno, CA: The Press at California State University, 2020), 89–112.

Shahrezâyî, Rezâ Âzarî. *Hî'at-i favq al-'âdah-i Qafqâzîyah*. Tehran: Markaz-e Asnâd ve Târîkh-e diplumâsî, 1389 (2000).

Shimazu, Naoko. *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Shissler, A. Holly. *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2003.

Smith, Leonard V. *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Suk'iasjan, Hamo. 'Hajastani Hanrapetut'jan ishkhanut'jan kentronakan marminneri Jerevan teghap'okhvelu harts'i shurj (1918 t'. majis-hulis)'. *Hajots' patmut'jan harts'ě* 10 (2009), 228–35.

Sürmeli, Serpil. *Türk-Gürcü İlişkileri (1918–1921)*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2001.

Taglia, Stefano. 'Pragmatism and Expediency: Ottoman Calculations and the Establishment of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic'. *Caucasus Survey* 8(1) (2020), 45–58.

Taqıyeva, Şəvkət and Nəsib Nəsibzadə. '1918–1920 ci illərdə Azərbaycan-Iran münasibətləri və Azadistan məsələsi', in Vilayət Quliyev (ed.), *Azərbaycan Demokratik Respublikası: Tarix, ictimai-siyasi və ədəbi mədəni həyat* (Baku: Azərnəşr, 1992).

Ter Minassian, Anahide. *La république d'Arménie 1918–1920*. Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 1989.

Ter Minassian, Taline. 'Les géographes français et la délimitation des frontières balkaniques à la Conférence de la Paix en 1919'. *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 44(2) (1997), 252–86.

Topchibashi, A.M., M. Georgi and A. Ramiz (eds). *Parizhskij arkhiv 1919–1940, Kniga pervaja 1919–1921*. Moscow: Hudozhestvennaja Literatura, 2016.

Virabjan, Amatuni (ed.). *Hajastani Hanrapetut'jan karavar'ut'jan nisteri ardzanagrut'junneri, 1918–1920 t'.t'*. Yerevan: Hajastani Azgajin Arkhivneri, 2014.

Yılmaz, Harun. 'An Unexpected Peace: Azerbaijani-Georgian Relations, 1918–1920'. *Revolutionary Russia* 22(1) (2009), 37–67.

Zirinsky, Michael. 'Riza Shah's Abrogation of Capitulations, 1927–1928', in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941* (London: Routledge, 2003), 84–102.

Chapter 8

Longing for Greatness
Brazil at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919

Thomas Fischer

For many years, the vast majority of accounts of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 foregrounded Europe and its role at the event, largely leaving the representatives of other continents out of the frame altogether. There was good reason for this, considering that the Allies were seeking to put an end to hostilities that had their starting point in Europe. However, since it was a matter of overcoming a worldwide conflict, and due to the participation of officially invited delegations, informal representatives, observers and journalists from Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, recent revisions have sought to deconstruct the predominantly Eurocentric perspective. Among others, Eckart Conze and Jörn Leonhard have set a new standard in this regard in their monographs by drawing on a range of non-European sources.[1] Previous research mostly ignored the ideas and actions of Latin American representatives. Much like the dominant Big Four at the peace conference, who showed little to no interest in the concerns of their non-European counterparts, historiography had long paid no attention to participants viewed as 'lesser countries'. For example, Margaret MacMillan's 2003 bestseller *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* contains just three entries on Latin America in its twenty-five-page index.[2]

In the following analysis, I argue that from an area studies perspective, Latin America's role in the negotiations in the French capital was more than just a mere footnote of history. It took nearly one hundred years for historiography from and about this region of the world to acknowledge this and revisit this chapter of history in the light of the global turn. Although Latin America was not a central theatre of the First World War

and remained largely at the margin of military actions, as Stefan Rinke convincingly pointed out in his overview, the region was very much involved in the war due to its close ties with both Europe and the United States.[3] With regard to the effects, the war may be interpreted as a global-historical watershed that was also felt deeply in the region.[4] Previous, predominantly national historiography has frequently mentioned the formal end of the war as marked by the Paris Peace Conference, to which Latin American states sent a number of delegations – with the political-diplomatic processes and their results referred to in peace and conflict research as 'peacemaking'. But very little consideration has been given to the deeper significance of this for Latin American history. Thus, research on Latin America's role at the Paris Peace Conference, and the Conference's meaning for this world region, is only at its beginnings. While I have previously dealt with Central American and Caribbean representatives at the Paris Peace Conference elsewhere,[5] in this chapter the focus is placed on Brazil's performance – its ideas, and the roles of its representatives and the impact of their actions.

Brazil as a Research Subject

Brazil's starting position was quite different from those of the small Central American and Caribbean states. Much like other South American states, geopolitics played a different role for Brazil due to its distance from the United States, which made it less susceptible to US interventionism.[6] Brazil was the largest state in South America in terms of land area, with a population of about 24.5 million and an export volume surpassed only by that of Argentina. At the end of the war, more than a third of the country's exports went to the United States. Coffee made up the largest share of these exports; in fact, Brazil supplied the world market with over 50 per cent of total global demand.[7] Unlike the rest of Latin America, the republican tradition in Brazil did not reach very far back. It was only in 1889 that the military had intervened and initiated a transition away from the monarchic system, clearing the way for a newly founded federal republic. In what historiography later referred to as the Old Republic, an aristocratic-oligarchic political culture developed. Local politics were intertwined with national politics through clientelistic practices that tied together the local, regional and national political levels, in a structure known as *coronelismo*.[8] The armed forces were also a significant factor. In particular, they played an important role in suppressing social, political and regionalist uprisings and gradually securing the country's external borders. The army was also an important vehicle for social mobility.[9]

The abolition of slavery in 1888, along with increasing European migra-
tion to Brazil, contributed to rapid social change, which nevertheless
did not dismantle the traditional hierarchies and political structures.
Continued internal colonization and urbanization processes were related
to these dynamics.[10] These collisions between innovation and rigidity led
to conflicts caused by social and ethnic tensions. In 1917, these conflicts
escalated and ultimately erupted into a general strike triggered by anar-
chist forces. The first uprising took place in the new and rapidly growing
economic centre of São Paulo. A year later, another took place in the
capital Rio de Janeiro.[11] These conditions specific to the Brazilian context
must be considered in order to understand the country's international
role and actions at the end of the First World War.

   To date, only three scholarly publications based on primary sources
have dealt with Brazil's performance at the Paris Peace Conference. One
is Michael Streeter's hastily written biography of the main Brazilian
delegate Epitácio Pessoa,[12] which is largely based on the evaluation
of diplomatic material from Pessoa's extensive estate, much of which
was published, as well as the previous biography of Pessoa written by
his daughter.[13] Streeter looks in some detail at Pessoa's presence and
activities at the Paris Peace Conference in chapters 5 and 6. In his opin-
ion, Pessoa's appointment as head of the Brazilian delegation was by no
means an obvious and irrefutably compelling choice. In fact, Pessoa was
at the time considered an outsider on foreign policy issues. His assign-
ment, Streeter argues, can be seen as the result of a specific constellation
of different historical factors. Eugênio Vargas Garcia also wrote about
the Brazilian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, making use of
roughly the same material as Streeter, thus leading him to adopt a similar
focus on Pessoa.[14] He uses a traditional approach in diplomatic history to
examine the negotiation of pending material issues from the war, as well
as Pessoa's role as the head of the Brazilian delegation in the drafting of
the League of Nations Covenant. Vargas Garcia emphasizes that Pessoa
was a reliable supporter of US president Woodrow Wilson. In return
for his support, however, Pessoa demanded concessions from Wilson
with regard to Brazil's commercial interests. The third study, by Marcelo
Mangini Dias, deals with the delegation member Pandiá Calógeras. Dias
essentially follows the themes and theses previously addressed with
regard to Pessoa. A special feature of this text is the access that the
author had to Calógeras' diary, and thus to a different perspective on
events – one, however, that Dias does not explore to its full extent.[15]

   Although my study builds on previous research, I aim to take an
approach that differs from these attempts to understand Brazilian foreign
policy by describing the process and issues through the lens of individual

delegation members. Instead, I analyse Brazilian action, which was limited by the design and agenda of the Conference, taking into consideration the context of the First Republic elite and its ideas about Brazil's place in the world. This approach implies exploring not only the traditional diplomatic material but also essays and articles published in the press as well as visual sources. I therefore aim to reconstruct the interplay between imaginaries, ideas and representations in the media, on the one side, and concrete actions, on the other. The approach chosen here is in many ways indebted to global history, the new cultural history, and the so-called 'practice turn' in the history of international relations.[16] In the next section, I discuss Brazilian elites' ideas and imaginative horizons with regard to international politics. Afterwards, I touch upon the political, economic, social and cultural effects of the First World War and the crucial question of whether Brazil should have maintained its neutrality or declared war or actively entered into it. I then go on to examine Brazil's admission to the Paris Peace Conference and the criteria that were used to select the members of the delegation. This is followed by an account of the priorities set by the delegation in Paris, as well as some concluding remarks.

On the Self-Positioning of Brazilian Elites in the World

Stanley Hilton, in an essay published in 1980, interpreted the Brazilian performance both at the Paris Peace Conference and in international relations post-Versailles more broadly as being driven by an explicitly realist view of the world.[17] According to Hilton, this meant that decision-makers in Rio perceived the world as a hierarchically structured system characterized by constant struggles for privileged positions and power. In this sense, Brazilian elites saw the First World War and later the Paris Peace Conference as opportunities to strengthen their country's own position in this power game. I largely agree with this thesis about the view from Rio. However, I would like to extend it with an argument that Brazil's foreign policy actions were driven by the idea that Brazil deserved to count among the great powers. These elites considered their country's diplomacy as serving the principles of greatness and of belonging to the civilized nations. Although they had an aristocratic habitus, they were able to play along with Wilson's discourse of the equality of all nations – when it served their purpose. In fact, they strove for equality with respect to the nations at the top of the hierarchy while clearly distinguishing themselves from the lesser nations. They also knew how to make use of the omnipresent discourse of sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference.[18]

A number of renowned representatives of the Brazilian diplomatic establishment, trained in international law (*direito internacional*), such as the Viscount of Rio Branco (José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior), Rui Barbosa, Joaquim Nabuco, Rodrigo Octávio de Langgaard Menezes, Domício da Gama and Gastão da Cunha, were also active writers and publishers. Rui Barbosa and Joaquim Nabuco were founding members of the Academia Brasileira das Letras, established in 1897. Rui Barbosa, Domício da Gama and Rodrigo Octávio de Langgaard Menezes even became presidents of this renowned institution. They constructed a narrative according to which Brazil was in the midst of a transformation from a vast natural space into a civilized nation, which promised a great future to come. A destiny of 'greatness' and 'civilization' was manifested not least in the country's territorial expansion, large population (which was increasing even more with European, Japanese and Lebanese immigration), economic development (excellent prospects were guaranteed by vast mineral resources and immense land reserves), professionalized army and successful institution-building following positivist principles. In short, Brazil was a country in transition with enormous potential. In order to be able to fulfil this promise in an environment characterized by the rearmament and imperialism of powerful states, general guarantees of sovereignty were indispensable, in the opinion of the country's leading groups. In 1907, Rui Barbosa, the head of the country's delegation at the Hague Peace Conference, made clear demands for the equality of all states in international law on several different occasions. In this context, he suggested the establishment of a permanent International Court of Justice. The national sovereignty of each individual state deserved the same respect, he argued.[19]

In Latin America itself, however, Barbosa, like other Brazilian diplomats, politicians and journalists, believed in a dividing line between civilized and less civilized, developed and less developed, and organized and less organized societies. From these criteria, Barbosa derived a hierarchy or scale both within and between states. According to this gradation, there were stronger and weaker actors, all of whom were allocated a certain position in the ranking according to their capacities. In this mixture, Brazil presented itself to the outside world as a power entitled to regional leadership. This paternalistic approach was perceived with scepticism not only by Brazil's neighbour Argentina but also by various other South American countries. In addition, almost the entire elite in Brazil showed aristocratic and sometimes racist attitudes. On the 'inner front', too, they believed themselves to be naturally entitled to leadership, perceiving themselves as a group set apart from the lower and middle classes, Indigenous people and Afro-Brazilians.

Taking this 'greatness' as inspiration to take action, the country's lead-
ing statesmen and diplomats developed a foreign policy based on pro-
fessional diplomacy. They acquired knowledge and skills in diplomatic
practice not only within the Brazilian Foreign Ministry but also in other
countries, which was subsequently handed down across many diplo-
matic generations. The precedent for professional diplomatic service was
created and set above all by the Viscount of Rio Branco, who was foreign
minister from 1902 to 1912, as well as Joaquim Nabuco, who was Brazil's
representative in Washington from 1905 to 1910. *Paz e Concórdia* (peace
and concord) was Rio Branco's foreign policy principle, which endured
far beyond his time in office. A strategy of rapprochement with the United
States was pursued, which manifested itself not least in Brazil's com-
mitment to Pan-Americanism.[20] Brazilian elites embraced the Monroe
Doctrine and took it as an important guarantee for the development of a
community of sovereign states on the American continent. Unlike many
Hispano-American journalists, intellectuals, diplomats and politicians
horrified by US interventionism, most Brazilian leaders avoided pub-
licly criticizing US unilateralism and military interventionism in Mexico,
Central America and the Caribbean.[21] Journalists, intellectuals and politi-
cians dreamed of a leadership role for Brazil in South America similar to
that of the United States to the north.

Brazil in the First World War

Following the policy direction pursued by the United States, Brazil chose
a policy of neutrality at the beginning of the hostilities in Europe. From
the point of view of decision-makers, it was a sensible stance in order to
keep all options open with regard to foreign trade; Brazil was not ready
to simply lose Germany as a trading partner. The numerous urban media
outlets initially followed and covered the events of the war in Europe
as if they were happening too far away to seriously affect people from
the American continent. Political cartoons often depicted the Brazilian
public watching the violent action at a distance like spectators to a surreal
drama. Nevertheless, given the massive crimes committed against the
civilian population and attacks on symbolic buildings like the cathedral
of Reims from September 1914 onwards, Brazilian people soon came to
be deeply concerned about such atrocities.[22] This was also due to the fact
that the conflicts had offshoots in Brazil itself, because of German and
Italian communities with their own press and schools. The diverging
press coverage in these different communities, as well as direct transat-
lantic communication, led numerous young men to travel to their home

countries in order to support their countries of origin, thus suddenly making some of these countrymen enemies on European battlefields. This separated the German communities in particular from other immigrant groups, but also from the Brazilian population generally. To avoid adding fuel to the fire and guarantee peaceful coexistence within the country, neutrality, propagated in the whole of the American continent, thus seemed to be the best stance.

From 1916–17 onwards, however, due to the course the war had taken, the mood changed, and *aliadófilos* (pro-Allied voices) gained the upper hand in media representation.[23] As a result, most journalists and politicians regarded France's struggle as a morally legitimate defence of civilization as it stood up to the cruel German Empire. In 1916, the Liga Brasileira pelos Aliados (Brazilian League for the Allies) was formed under the leadership of Rui Barbosa and José Pereira de Graça Aranha. The followers of this movement claimed that remaining neutral was not an option: it was only possible to decide between law and justice, on the one hand (the Allies), and criminal action and bloody violence against civil society, on the other (the Central Powers). With this approach, they successfully managed to construct a narrative front in the media against the 'German danger'. As a matter of fact, the media campaign proved so effective that German immigrants living in Brazil were now also seen as a threat.[24]

The *casus belli* occurred when the United States officially entered the war on the Allied side.[25] Two causes were used to justify Brazil's own declaration of war. First, the revenues from the Brazilian coffee in Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp and Trieste, which was to be sold on behalf of the Federal State of São Paulo, were never received by their owners. Second, the expansion of submarine warfare exacerbated the problems of Brazilian foreign trade. German warships had already sunk the steamship *Rio Branco* off the English coast on 1 May 1915. When the *Paraná* was torpedoed by a German submarine off the coast of Cherbourg in early April 1917, this caused an enormous outcry in the press and among the *aliadófilos*.[26] On 11 April 1917, the Venceslau Brás government (1914–1918) finally broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. Subsequently, the foreign minister, Lauro Müller, who was of German heritage, was accused of being a *germanófilo* and replaced by Domício da Gama, who had been the Brazilian representative in Washington since 1911. This adjustment of foreign policy personnel and ideology was justified not least by continental solidarity – although this primarily meant cooperation with the United States – and the Monroe Doctrine, which had originally been developed by the United States to ward off European intervention on the American continent.

Figure 8.1. Woodrow Wilson and Venceslau Brás. Source: *O Malho*, no. 761, 14 April 1917, public domain.

The front page below, drawn by the famous Rio de Janeiro caricaturist Kalixto (Calixto Cordeiro) for the magazine *O Malho*, published in the Brazilian capital, pays tribute to Venceslau Brás as a junior partner standing side by side with the taller Wilson.[27] They are referred to as 'paladins' and as such they are armed with a rapier. Moreover, they carry – as democratically elected representatives of their nations – a US flag and a Brazilian flag respectively. The female figure – 'civilization' personified as an allegory – is lightly dressed in white and seems unable to lend them any significant support; she anxiously wipes away her tears with the tails of the flags held by the two men. The grey civilians in the background welcome the alliance and ask for divine blessings 'in this holy campaign'. The cover ties together national and foreign policy. It suggests that in stepping into armed war Brazil was at the same time entering into the 'big' policy domain along with a great power – America. It portrays Wilson and Brás as showing the world how to fight for justice: in the name of honour, civilization and humanity.

The destruction of further ships by the German Imperial Navy and the outraged press coverage of these events were followed by the declaration of war against Germany, which was recommended by both houses of parliament on 26 October.[28] Brazil perceived itself as the United States' most loyal ally in South America. Brazil even contributed by sending combat troops, a marine division and medical personnel to Europe in 1918, although they had little influence on the course or outcome of the war.[29] When the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918, it was praised by the Brazilian press. Most Brazilians saw themselves as part of an international alliance of the civilized, which was celebrating a moral triumph.[30]

Brazil as a Player at the Paris Peace Conference

Thanks to its loyalty to the United States in the First World War, as well as its demonstrated willingness to commit troops to the Allied cause, Brazil managed to become a player at the Paris Peace Conference. What was to be expected from the conference, and what might Brazil's involvement look like? *O Malho* addressed both of these questions in its Christmas issue of 1918. The issue notably included a cartoon, again drawn by Kalixto, ironically titled 'O Natal dos Alliados' (The Allied Christmas). The image, against a light background, is predominantly red, black and grey, probably symbolizing the colours of the war. There is no blue, no yellow and no green. Gifts hang from a Christmas tree, planted in a large pot labelled 'PAZ' (peace). The Allies, marked with symbols of their

nations, have plucked gifts from the tree. The United States is the only one represented by a concrete historical figure (Wilson): as the leader of the group, he has grabbed two suitcases full of 'Honour and glory', as well as dollars, the hard currency at the end of the war. Behind him is a bearded man in a knight's costume; the treasure chest under his arm reminds us again that wars always have an important financial dimension. Britain, the traditional sea power, is symbolized by a pipe-smoking gentleman who has civilian ships under his arm and is also dragging two behind him. France, drawn as a woman with a Jacobin hat, has her arms around Alsace and another territory (probably Lorraine), depicted as girls (with almost adult faces). Belgium, another country whose civilian population suffered massive damage, is also depicted as a woman; she is hauling compensation packages and flowers (most likely poppies). Italy is striding away with Trento, Trieste and Friuli bursting out of its overflowing Christmas stocking. The man representing Brazil is in the middle of this happy community. Dressed in a black suit and top hat just like Wilson, he looks pleased not to have come away empty-handed. While he remains without material gifts, at least he functions, in the Rio Branco tradition, as the bearer of reason (*juízo*), with which civilization is to be restored.

This picture was published at Christmas time, which is the Christian festival of love; what is captured here, however, are not gifts of love but the spoils of war, divided among the winning Allies. Invisible Russia seems to have been excluded from this event. But the big losers in this zero-sum game are the equally absent vanquished Central Powers, who have suffered territorial losses and been forced to make compensations for material damages. A flabbergasted male figure in light-coloured clothing, shorts and a pith helmet sits with a gaping mouth and wide eyes in front of an open calabash looking like a damaged globe, from which flies are emerging as if from Pandora's box. Is this figure, now in civilian clothes, harmless Germany? In Brazil, the expression '*comer mosca*' (literally, 'to eat flies') means to miss an opportunity and to be outwitted. In any case, the image suggests a sustainable peace would certainly look different from this. Was Versailles, then, the place to arrive at the terms for a worldwide peace, or simply to assert particular interests? And was Brazil's role in the negotiation processes of the Peace Conference really to represent *juízo*?

With regard to the Peace Conference, Brazilian foreign policy was to take a clear line that can be summarized in terms of three goals. The first was simply to be present as an actor – that is, to reach the threshold of the attention of the Big Four and the Supreme Council, who created the rules of the game. The second was to obtain material compensation

Figure 8.2. The Allied Christmas. Source: *O Malho*, no. 849, 25 December 1918, public domain.

for economic war losses. The third and final goal was to participate in shaping the post-war world order, and to secure Brazil's place in it. How successful, then, was Brazil in pursuing these goals?

Not all delegations were allowed to participate actively in the Paris Peace Conference. They were either invited by the Big Four, or they were not. These four major players reserved for themselves the right to take part in every conference body, while only the plenary sessions were open to all representatives who had been admitted to the Conference.[31] Delegations were only allowed to participate in the work of the individual committees if the countries they represented were directly affected by the matter that the committee was convened to address, or had a special interest in the topic.[32] But it was not up to delegations themselves to determine whether they would be allowed to participate in a given committee. Segments of the Brazilian media were aware and very critical of these selection filters.[33]

Brazil was admitted to the Paris Peace Conference because the country had sufficiently demonstrated the main criterion: its pro-Allied stance. From the point of view of Foreign Minister Domício da Gama, participation in the conference was therefore consistent with the policy pursued

during the war.[34] Since hierarchies and rankings determined the size of
the delegation, the Brazilian diplomatic apparatus now had to demon-
strate strength and 'greatness'. It thus engaged in strenuous lobbying
efforts at all levels. Foreign Minister da Gama fought for a delegation of
four.[35] Brazil's government was concerned with prestige and recognition,
as its Chargé A. De Ipanema Moreira in Washington made clear in a letter
to Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk. He warned of 'general disappoint-
ment' in Brazil if the country's wishes were not met. He wrote that 'in the
classification of power it must also be given a thought to the economic
factor and future political interest'. He considered either a rejection or
reduction of the delegation would represent a major setback: 'Reduction
would be humiliating and produce resentment prejudicial to the harmony
of people and ideas in this particularly difficult moment.'[36] This was the
view of the Brazilian Foreign Office and its diplomatic staff, given the fact
that the Paris Peace Conference was an arena of international politics in
which future-defining battles were to be fought. Washington's diplomatic
representatives were inclined to reward Brazil's efforts, and Polk recom-
mended fulfilling Brazil's wishes. Brazil, he said, was 'entitled to every
consideration' by virtue of its geographical size and loyalty.[37] He signalled
that this would pay off for the United States in Paris, as Brazil was well
aware to whom it owed this success. Brazil was thus classified as a 'bel-
ligerent power with particular (special) interests', and eventually, despite
French opposition, allowed three representatives, like Belgium and Serbia.
The French press found the size of the Brazilian delegation inappropriate.
Ultimately, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was not entirely satisfied with
this outcome and decided to dispatch four delegates to France anyway.

The Brazilian Delegation

Once the essential issue of participation was settled, the next step was
to select the delegates and the head delegate. President Francisco de
Paula Rodrigues Alves (1848–1919), who was confined to his bed due
to the Spanish flu, communicated his preferences to Delfim Moreira da
Costa Ribeiro, the vice president and provisional head of government,
on 4 December 1918. He left no doubt that Brazil's outstanding expert
in international law, Rui Barbosa, was the best choice 'by the general
will of the nation'.[38] But Rui Barbosa turned down the post – possibly
because Foreign Minister da Gama himself had flirted with the idea of
going for some time. Only now did the hour strike for Senator Epitácio
Pessoa, who until this point had not been on anyone's radar. Federal
congressman João Pandiá Calógeras, minister plenipotentiary at Paris

Olinto Máximo de Magalhães, and Rio de Janeiro state congressman Raul Fernandes were also appointed as delegates. They were joined by experts in international law as well as two military officers.

The composition of the delegation came as a surprise to most observers. Pessoa was an outsider to foreign policy circles and issues.[39] His regional origins and family background also did not work in his favour. He had grown up as an orphan on a *fazenda* in the north-eastern state of Paraiba but had then received the legal education typical of elites at a renowned university in Recife, the capital of the state of Pernambuco. Building on his social capital, he created a local network that set the stage for an amazing legal and political career. His contacts brought him to prominence at the national level, where he recommended himself for higher positions: he eventually became Minister of Justice, Justice of the Supreme Federal Tribunal, Attorney General of the Republic, and finally Senator. Although he had attended the Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1906 and had published on questions of international private law and border conflicts, ultimately, at the time of his appointment, Pessoa was still much more a national politician than a diplomat with broad experience in international war and peace.

Pandiá Calógeras, the second delegate, also had little experience in international affairs. He first pursued a line of employment similar to that of his father, a Greek engineer in Minas Gerais who held various positions as a geologist. However, in the course of his career, he switched to politics and eventually became a federal deputy of Minas Gerais.[40] In 1914, he became the Minister of Agriculture, Trade and Industry at the national level, and in 1916 he went on to occupy the position of Minister of Finance. Calógeras published prolifically and widely on legal historical and financial matters. In some of his writings, he dealt with issues such as the border disputes over Guyana and Acre. Moreover, like Pessoa, he was a member of the Brazilian delegation to the Pan-American Conference in Rio. Unlike Pessoa, however, he had publicly pleaded for Brazil's entry into the war. Raul Fernandes, the third Brazilian delegate dispatched to Paris,[41] was raised on a rural estate in Rio de Janeiro. He studied law and social sciences in São Paulo and then became a lawyer and a long-term deputy at the national level, representing the state of Rio de Janeiro. Despite his career, he had little experience with foreign policy or international politics. The most professional Brazilian present in Paris in terms of diplomatic experience was the fourth delegate, Olinto Máximo de Magalhães.[42] Magalhães had trained to become a medical doctor in Minas Gerais before becoming a state deputy. He eventually switched to diplomacy and represented Brazilian interests in various European countries (France, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland) and the United States.

During the First World War, Magalhães represented Brazil in France. He was appointed as a member of the Brazilian peace delegation due to his experience in negotiations involving border disputes, his language skills, his worldliness, and above all his knowledge of the diplomatic milieu. He was in frequent contact with the Quai d'Orsay and French negotiators. This was extremely helpful given Brazil's conflict of material interests with France. Magalhães was in fact Pessoa's substitute, and de facto *chefe* of the delegation, before Pessoa arrived in the French capital.

Looking at the delegation as a whole, it can be said that the majority of the representatives that Brazil sent to Paris were nationally well-connected politicians, rather than competent diplomats experienced in international affairs. In terms of diplomatic skills and international know-how, the most important Brazilian selection criteria seems to have been experience with Brazilian border conflict resolution, although this knowledge was not directly required of Brazilian delegates at the Paris conference. In the course of the conference, the politicians Pessoa and Calógeras, who were reasonably well known in Brazil, turned out to be the most important contacts for the Brazilian press. This relationship with Brazilian media seems to have been an important factor in their selection.

Finally, the Brazilian delegation was accompanied by a number of experts in international law and military affairs, as well as by secretaries and secretarial staff.[43] While the experts supported the delegates in their daily conference work with their knowledge and skills, the secretaries and their staff were concerned with economic and financial issues. Rodrigo Octávio de Langgaard Menezes, from the state of São Paulo, who mainly kept a low profile and worked in the background, deserves special mention.[44] He was the founder and first president of the Academia Brasileira de Letras and a professor of international law in Rio de Janeiro. He had demonstrated his expertise in this field in numerous publications on diverse topics. Menezes was an advisor to the government and had been sent on the strength of his professional competence and intellectual reputation to various international conferences. In Paris he also acted as a delegate at certain times.

Alongside the military advisor Alfredo Malan D'Angrogne,[45] the marine commander Armando César Burlamaqui was also sent to the conference,[46] with their presence emphasizing Brazil's ambitions as a rising power. In reality, however, neither of the two men played a significant role at the conference, given that questions of Brazilian defence were not on the agenda of any of the Paris discussions. Last but not least, it should be mentioned that the wives and other family members of some delegates and staff accompanied the Brazilian mission, although they had no official duties.

The delegation's first challenge was to cross the ocean to Paris. With the exception of Olinto Máximo de Magalhães, who was already in the French capital with his team, and Pandiá Calógeras, who left earlier, the delegation arrived late.[47] They did not check in at the Hôtel Plaza Athénée until 27 January, when the first plenary assembly was already over and many important decisions had been made. This was, of course, a very bad start, and certainly reduced the delegation's chances of influencing the agenda of the Conference and the direction of the negotiations. They tried to make up for this setback by way of a charm offensive directed at Balfour, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando and Wilson – the statesmen they considered most influential.[48] Nevertheless, the Brazilian delegation in Paris was at least noticeable in purely quantitative terms. Looking at the photograph below taken by the US Army, it is striking that all members, with the exception of Malan D'Angrogne, wore suits – white shirts and black ties. In their appearance, the Brazilian delegates resembled the male

Figure 8.3. Members of the Brazilian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Seated from left to right: Armando César Burlamaqui, Pandiá Calógeras, Epitácio Pessoa, Rodrigo Octávio Langgaard Menezes and Alfredo Malan D'Angrogne. Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro – IHGB, archive Epitácio Pessoa, 55IP1300.

European bourgeoisie far more than the representatives of the Arabian Commission or India.[49] While the latter groups on certain occasions consciously staged themselves in the traditional dress of their countries and used this cultural branding to set themselves apart from the prevailing Western-dominated universal dress code, the Brazilian delegates, who were of European descent, emphasized their likeness to, and equality with, the European and US delegates in their way of dressing. For this group, it was more important to use their visual appearance to underscore their ties to European counterparts[50] than to other non-European representatives and thereby possibly demonstrate connections with the Global South. Like most of the delegates from the English dominions, they tried to match the (visual) behaviour and role expectations of the majority at the Peace Conference.

In terms of (white) skin colour, too, the Brazilian delegation was similar to the European, US and Dominion delegates. This was no mere coincidence: Brazilian elites saw this as an act of presenting themselves as a civilized nation,[51] set apart from the *povo* (people) with subaltern European or Mestizo, Indigenous or Afro-Brazilian backgrounds, dress habits and skin colours.

Material Goals

In terms of material accomplishments, the first of the Brazilian delegation's goals concerned coffee from the state of São Paulo located in Antwerp, Bremen, Hamburg and Trieste that had been sold at the outbreak of the war, with the revenue deposited in the banking house of S. Bleichröder in Berlin. The Brazilian government now demanded guarantees from the German state that the money would be reimbursed, along with 5 per cent interest. This reimbursement was to be paid at the mark's rate of exchange of the day of deposit. Brazil did not succeed in becoming a member of the Financial Commission, where this issue was to be dealt with. But the US delegation took it upon itself to deal with this case, backing the Brazilian demand. The German delegation subsequently made it clear that the sale of the Brazilian coffee had been voluntary, with the agreement of Brazilian representatives, not compulsory. Moreover, they underscored that Germany had not denied its obligation to pay. However, as the payment had never reached São Paulo, in the end Germany was forced to give in to Brazil's demands. In this way, it was then written into Article 263 of the Treaty of Versailles.[52]

The Financial Commission also sought a solution to the question of forty-five German ships that Brazil had seized in its ports in 1917 and

handed over to the mostly state-owned Lloyd Brasileiro, which incorporated them into its mercantile fleet. This made Lloyd Brasileiro a significant shipping company. However, the biggest ship, Hapag Lloyd's *Blücher*, was placed at the disposal of France. Others were eventually used, in addition to their mercantile purpose, to control the large Brazilian coast. The Brazilian government insisted on keeping the boats, in spite of the problematic legal situation regarding their ownership. In the tough negotiations, the Brazilian delegation successfully overcame initial resistance from the French delegation. The French intended to take over thirty of the forty-five German ships as war compensation. In the end, again with the help of the US delegation, the Brazilian representatives managed to keep them.[53]

The fact that the US delegation supported Brazilian wishes was no coincidence. Pessoa had sought proximity to Wilson from the beginning. He repeatedly succeeded in making a case for his wishes to the president of the United States and his influential advisor, Edward Mandell House. He established contact with Wilson before the negotiations over the ship and the coffee payments had begun, in the commission charged with drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations. The United States' foreign policy establishment and diplomatic apparatus had already adopted a pro-Brazilian stance before the Conference began, thanks to Brazilian foreign policy during the war, as well as da Gama's vigorous lobbying.

The Brazilian media recorded quite favourably that the delegation had achieved its major material goals. Whenever there was a Brazilian success to be reported, Pessoa knew how to use the good news in order to cultivate a good image back at home. He regularly informed the local press and news agencies about the progress of the negotiations and presented himself as a broker in the service of the Brazilian economic elite. In contrast, at the time practically nothing was said in the press about the work of the other delegation members, and notably that of Raul Fernandes, the best-informed Brazilian when it came to economic issues. When President Alves died while the delegation was crossing the ocean to Europe, a successor had to be elected. Usually, the political leadership of the economically and demographically strongest federal states, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, determined the choice of a candidate hailing from one of these states, who was then usually elected. Not least because of these informal agreements, the *bahiano* Rui Barbosa had already run for office three times without success. But this time the *homens publicos* of the *convenção nacional* did not come to an agreement on a candidate from one of these states, allowing Pessoa, despite his disadvantage as a *nordestino*, to be placed on the electoral list in his absence. With this elite agreement, much of the initially rather sceptical media

swayed to his side. Enjoying the support of a comfortable majority in São Paulo and Minas Gerais as well as from that of his network, he finally won the ballot of 13 April 1919, while his famous and eloquent opponent, Rui Barbosa, who unlike Pessoa ran a real election campaign, was once again unlucky in his fourth attempt.

Drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations

The third goal of the Brazilian delegation was to secure as the largest South American country a role in shaping the post-war international order that was commensurate with the self-image of the country's elites. In Pandiá Calógeras' words, this meant nothing other than the idea that Versailles should serve as 'a door that opens wide for our entrance as a Great Power in World Politics'.[54] Equality with those at the top of the international hierarchy and therefore demarcation and separation from the small and weak states was the Brazilian principle. In order to reach this goal, the great powers had to be convinced of Brazil's rightful place among them, Calógeras explained in another diary entry.[55] Many members of the Brazilian elite thought like the Brazilian delegate. They claimed primacy, the leading position in South America, and they even wished Brazil to serve as a representative of the other states of Latin America. At a banquet, Calógeras underscored that while Brazil was indeed strongly shaped by Europe (to the extent that he described the country as 'Europe transplanted to America'), from a 'sentimental and intellectual point of view', 'as [a rising nation in] economic and political [terms] we are ourselves … a young and new nation, full of energies'.[56] While acknowledging the historical ties between Europe and Brazil (as well as to other countries on the continent), he also insisted on the former colonies' right of self-determination. Like the other Brazilian delegates, he did not reflect on European and world peace. This was a task left to the Big Four.

The place for negotiating and deciding on the principles of the post-war world was the commission devoted to drawing up the plans for the future League of Nations. On 25 January 1919, the plenary assembly of all delegates approved the establishment of such a commission, which would meet under the direction of the US president in the office of Colonel House, in the Hotel Crillon. Brazil obtained membership in this body by means of the argument that they were acting as the spokesman for an entire world region, with Wilson's support. The countries that Brazil purported to represent were not asked whether they wanted to be represented by its delegates. In addition to Brazil, this commission

consisted of two representatives each from the principal powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, as well as one delegate each from Serbia, China, Portugal and Belgium. Due to resentment among the excluded countries, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece and Romania were subsequently granted the right to send a representative.

The head of the Brazilian delegation, who represented his country at the League Commission, was hopelessly under-qualified in terms of technical competence to participate in drafting the Covenant that was to govern the international post-war world order. It was probably wise, therefore, that he maintained his silence for the most part and simply supported the position of the United States. In any case, the representatives of the smaller and weaker states had very little say at the meetings of the commission.[57] They had to leave matters in the hands of the US chairman Wilson, Colonel House, the British representatives (the statesman Lord Robert Cecil and the South African General Jan Christiaan Smuts), and the French delegates (the international law expert Ferdinand Larnaude and the politician Léon Bourgeois). The so-called 'Cecil-Miller proposal' served as the starting point for the work on the Covenant. On 14 February, Wilson read the first draft to the Assembly and commented on individual articles. On that day, he uttered the famous sentence: 'A living thing is born.'[58] The revision process then took place from 22 March to 11 April. The complete League of Nations Covenant was inserted into the Treaty of Versailles. The delegates, with Calógeras as the Brazilian representative, signed it on 28 June.

A month earlier, Latin American delegates had organized a banquet in honour of Epitácio Pessoa, the now newly elected Brazilian president. Wilson, who attended the occasion along with Secretary of State Robert Lansing and General Tasker H. Bliss, gave a brief address in which he reiterated his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as the foundation of inter-American relations. Pessoa, in turn, emphasized Brazilian attachment to Pan-American solidarity, peace, law, justice, labour, order and concord. These principles, he declared, were the eternal foundations of sustainable balance in the world.[59] But the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the League of Nations Covenant, which on Wilson's reading was supposed to be the foundation of Pan-American cooperation, was controversial in Latin America. First, many critics suspected a contradiction with the intended universalism of the League, since it was defined in the Covenant as a 'regional understanding'. The use of the word 'regional' could be read as meaning that the American continent should remain untouched by the League. This would contradict the global reach and universal approach of the League. Second, in addition to the Wilsonian interpretation of the doctrine, there was another possible reading derived

from the so-called 'Roosevelt Corollary'. Theodore Roosevelt had invoked the Monroe Doctrine in order to legitimize US military interventionism in the Caribbean basin. The validity of the Wilsonian Monroe Doctrine was thus by no means uncontroversial and required, at the least, further clarification. Despite these differences in opinion, Pessoa saw no need to raise these questions in the commission. He simply ignored the grave concerns of his Central American and Caribbean, and even some French, colleagues. In an interview on his way back to Brazil, in the United States, he explained his view. He pointed out that Brazil had been the first Latin American country to make the US-American doctrine its own. Any problems of interpretation could be cleared up, he said.[60] Given Pessoa's silence, the Honduran delegate Policarpo Bonilla made a move in the final plenary session to clarify the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. But no such discussions took place. The staff who prepared the assembly did not even consider it appropriate to have an authorized translation of the Honduran's motion made from the Spanish original.[61]

The Brazilian delegation's position regarding the Japanese proposal to insert an amendment into the Treaty of Versailles abolishing racial discrimination, which turned into a debate on universal racial equality, was also reserved.[62] Representatives of the colonial powers found this advance highly inconvenient. That the Brazilian delegation chose to not make any statements or comments in favour of the suggested amendment was rather astonishing, considering that the country had recently explicitly welcomed Japanese immigrants in the bilateral agreement of 1907 after Japan's victorious war against Russia. It might thus be assumed that racial equality was an accepted principle in Brazil. But Pessoa commented in this regard only that while the country he represented had managed to integrate different immigrant groups at earlier times, it was now unable to receive Japanese immigration 'in any numbers'.[63] Rui Barbosa's election campaign took advantage of the ambiguous position of Pessoa and the Brazilian delegation regarding the racial equality proposal in order to organize demonstrations in various cities against Pessoa in the fight for the presidency.[64]

The only issue that Pessoa strongly advocated in the commission concerned Brazilian representation on the Council of the League of Nations.[65] The Council was designed by the principal victors of the war as an exclusive body. Legitimized by their central role in the war, they designed the Covenant to establish a permanent seat on the Council for the main powers. The 'others' were to be represented by a few non-permanent members. The fact that Pessoa was unable to achieve equality with the 'Principal Powers' for his country deeply displeased him. However, he had no choice but to accept it whilst continuing his fight for at least a seat

among the non-permanent members of the Council. He was ultimately successful in his cause. Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George acknowledged Brazil's clear commitment to the Allied, although they also shared the opinion that the country had not sacrificed as much as, for example, the Dominions, and that it may even have entered the war simply for opportunist reasons. They thought they had made sufficient concessions to Brazil by explicitly designating the country in the League of Nations Covenant as a non-permanent member of the Council, on the strength of House's view of the country 'as the greatest of … all [Latin American countries] in resources and in population, and in recognition of her early and frank assistance to the Allies during the war, plus her traditional friendship with the United States'.[66] Other than the recognized Principal Powers, only Spain, Belgium and Greece were accorded this status. The Chinese delegates achieved nothing 'because it was held that the country did not enjoy a responsible government'.[67] Belgium's temporary representation on the Council was to be understood as a means of securing reparations for the destruction caused by the war. The decision in favour of Greece was not made due to sympathetic feeling towards the people of the country but as compensation for the much-appreciated work done in the commission by Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos. Spain obtained its non-permanent status because of its huge territory; it was the only country to represent the large community of Spanish-speaking countries on the League Council.

The fact that Brazil was now the only Latin American country on the Council – albeit with no guarantee of permanence – was, as might be expected, by no means an uncontroversial matter in Latin America. After all, the existence of a Latin American bloc with Brazil as its natural leader was more a question of wishful thinking of some US and Brazilian decision-makers and journalists than an accepted reality among these nations. But it was precisely this reading that circulated in Brazil. The newspaper *Noite*, for instance, titled a report 'Brazil Leader of the Small Nations'.[68] Pessoa echoed the same sentiment when he told Agence Havas that Brazil 'should and will defend those powers whose interests are limited' when he announced his presidential candidacy. He also wanted to attend a meeting of Latin American representatives 'in order to assemble the demands/claims [*reivindicações*] of the Americas, as a whole'. But once again, it was the narrative of being more than other Latin American countries, rather than a commitment to smaller nations, that drove him (as well as other Brazilian delegates): 'Brazil comes first, right after the Big Five', he emphasized proudly.[69] Indeed, he took every opportunity to point out Brazil's rightful place in the new world order and take credit for his role in its ascent to this position, as established by the Covenant.

On the occasion of the opening of the Brazilian Congress, he underscored the 'high distinction for our country' represented by the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference.[70] The Brazilian press adopted this rhetoric.[71] Domício da Gama also expressed satisfaction with Brazil's performance in Paris, which he considered outstanding.[72] However, there were also criticisms. Some accused Pessoa of complete submission to the United States and the lack of a true sense of a sustainable world peace with better guarantees for the self-determination of all sovereign states. The reported commitment of the *chefe* of the delegation to the small and weak states was interpreted by his critics as a brazen instrumentalization meant to put Brazil at the head of the Latin American countries.[73]

Conclusion

The above analysis has shown some of the insights that can be gained by reconstructing the intertwinement of local and universal spaces, and the interaction of different actors involved. If we wish to take seriously the global dynamic of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, we must shift away from a Eurocentric perspective that focuses primarily on the thinking and the actions of representatives of strong states and that treats actors from Asia, Africa or Latin America as residual forces. In this respect, research has made great progress in recent years. Even the countries of Latin America, of which only Brazil intervened (albeit in small ways) in the war, have come into focus. When examining small or, as in the Brazilian case, large but less consolidated and influential states, the central point is not the country's impact on the Peace Conference. As far as researching Brazil's role is concerned, the questions of how decision-makers, diplomats and journalists perceived the Conference, what ideas they were driven by, how they tried to position themselves, and what they achieved, are all of great interest.

My case study has shown that there was not only a clear hierarchy in the Brazilian delegation, with Pessoa as its visible head, but also an overreaching mission of stating and demonstrating national 'greatness' and having that 'greatness', and the country's material and symbolic claims more broadly, recognized by others. In short, Brazilian elites aspired to finally complete a decades-long quest – first within the Pan-American context, then at the Hague Conferences – at Paris, which they saw as a global stage where the nation could present itself to other nations. Any Brazilian ambitions that went beyond the economy, trade and national prestige were not discernible in the performance of the Brazilian delegation. Such a debate around the post-war architecture only began with the ratification process of the League of Nations Covenant.

While Brazilian delegates at the Paris Conference were not able to deci-
sively influence the rules of the game when it came to rearranging and
hierarchizing power relations, they at least succeeded in winning a place
on the commission that drafted the Covenant of the League of Nations.
This success was made possible by efficient lobbying. That commission
was the place where (the otherwise silent) Pessoa finally managed to get
Brazil explicitly assigned a seat on the League Council. This was seen in
Brazil as a confirmation by the 'principal powers' of the country's claim
to be an emerging power in the post-war order. However, since the fact
that the seat not being a permanent one was tantamount to relegation to
second-tier power status, from the Brazilian perspective this was merely
an intermediate step.

Compared to other Latin American countries, Brazil had a unique
position at Versailles, not only in terms of participation in the League
Commission but also in terms of its number of delegates. The Brazilian
delegates assumed that they were entitled to represent Latin America.
This was a fatal misjudgement, as would later become very apparent
in the disputes over Brazil's role on the League Council and in other
policy areas.[74] The Peace Conference also made it clear that the US State
Department and the US delegation in Paris (sometimes) had an open ear
to their allies' wishes; Brazilian diplomacy recognized this and knew
how to take advantage of it .

In conclusion, it can be stated that from Brazil's point of view the Paris
Peace Conference was a relatively successful debut in world politics. At
the same time, it also became apparent that Brazilian elites continued to
struggle with cooperation with smaller Latin American countries as they
had in earlier times, in the Pan-American context. Incidentally, these
reservations towards Hispano-America were shared by many European
representatives, who were yet to be faced with the need to learn to take
this large group of delegates in the League of Nations seriously.

Thomas Fischer is Professor of Latin American History at the Catholic
University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. Since 2009, he has been director of
its Central Institute for Latin American Studies (ZILAS). He is co-editor
of the journal *Iberoamericana* and the Americana Eystettensia series. His
recent research projects have focused on the ties of politics, violence and
memory in history (especially Latin America), new diplomatic history
from a Latin American perspective, knowledge and science production
in the first half of the nineteenth century in a global-historical context
of entanglement, frontier spaces in South America in the first half of the
twentieth century, and history of football. He publishes on these topics in
English, German, Portuguese and Spanish.

Notes

1. Conze, *Die große Illusion*; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*.
2. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*.
3. See Rinke, *Im Sog*.
4. Fischer, 'América Latina'.
5. Fischer, 'Der Ort der Karibik'.
6. On the military interventionism of the United States, see Fischer, 'Interventionism'.
7. Luna and Klein, *The Economic and Social History*, 7.
8. Cammack, 'Brasilien', 1065–66.
9. McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria*.
10. Lesser, *Immigration*, 60–88.
11. Wätzold, *Der libertäre Atlantik*, 129–46.
12. Streeter, *Epitácio Pessoa*.
13. Pessoa, *Obras completas*; Pessôa Raja Gabaglia, *Epitácio Pessôa*.
14. Garcia, 'Epitácio Pessoa diplomata'.
15. Dias, 'O Brasil em Versalhes'.
16. See Epple, 'Calling for a Practice Turn'.
17. Hilton, 'Brazil and the Post-Versailles World', 342.
18. This has been addressed by Smith, *Sovereignty*.
19. Cardim, *A raiz das coisas*, 93–164.
20. Bethell, 'Nabuco e o Brasil entre Europa'.
21. Abranches, *Brazil and the Monroe Doctrine*.
22. My interpretation is based here on the arguments of Compagnon, *L'Adieu à l'Europe* and my own research on Brazilian mass media.
23. Ibid., 314.
24. Pires, 'A Liga Brasileira'; Kriegesmann, *Feindbild Fremde*, 73; Luebke, 'The German Ethnic Group', 260.
25. A detailed description of the decision processes, from the perspective of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate as well as both parliamentary foreign policy commissions, is given by Prazeres, *O Brasil na Guerra*, 30–59. The US influence is described by Smith, *Unequal Giants*, 111–26.
26. Compagnon, *L'Adieu*, 135.
27. The discourse of this magazine during the war has been studied by Arouca, 'A Grande Guerra'.
28. Martin, *Latin America*, 67–68; Compagnon, *L'Adieu*, 137–39; Rinke, *Im Sog*, 155–64.
29. Daróz, *O Brasil*, 115–80.
30. Rinke, 'World War I and Brazil'.
31. Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 186.
32. Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*, 650–55.
33. See, for instance, De Pariz, 'A Conferência: Algumas reflexões', *Jornal do Commercio*, 26 March 1919.
34. 'A Acção do Brasil na Conferencia'. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 7 May 1919.
35. Fenwick, 'Organization and Procedure', 202.
36. 'The Brazilian Chargé (Moreira) to the Acting Secretary of State', 10 January 1919, in United States Department of State, *Papers*, 234–35.
37. 'The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace', 10 January 1919, in United States Department of State, *Papers*, 234.
38. 'Por vontade geral da nação'. Garcia, 'Epitácio Pessoa diplomata', 197.
39. See Streeter, *Epitácio Pessoa*; Pessôa Raja Gabaglia, *Epitácio Pessôa*; Melo, *Epitácio Pessoa*.
40. Alves Netto, 'Brasileiros ilustres em Petrópolis'.
41. Pechmann, 'Raul Fernandes'.

42. Luna and Pinheiro, 'Magalhães, Olinto de'.
43. A precise list of the delegation members can be found in *Relatório apresentado*, 19–21.
44. 'Rodrigo Otávio de Langgaard Menezes'.
45. Pantoja, 'Angrogne, Malan d''.
46. Lopes, 'Burlamaqui, Armando César'.
47. The arrival of Pessoa, his wife and Fernandes, as well as some army personnel, can be seen in a video available at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q79zssP762M (retrieved 28 August 2023).
48. Pessôa Pardellas, *Epitácio Pessôa*.
49. On the ideals of bourgeois manhood, see Harvey, *Men in Black*.
50. On increasing cross-border uniformity of clothing and bodily discipline, see Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 12–19.
51. See Schuster, 'História, nação e raça'.
52. Garcia, 'Epitácio Pessoa diplomata', 202; Pessôa Pardellas, *Epitácio Pessôa*, 342–43.
53. Garcia, 'Epitácio Pessoa diplomata', 202–8; Pessôa Pardellas, *Epitácio Pessôa*, 34–35.
54. '… a porta que se abre de par em par para nosso ingresso como Grande Potência na Política Mundial'. Dias, 'O Brasil em Versalhes', 8.
55. Ibid.
56. As quoted by Dias, 'O Brasil em Versalhes': 'du point de vue sentimentail [*sic*] et intelectuel [*sic*]'; 'mais, comme essor [*sic*] économique et politique, nous sommes, nous-mêmes …, une nation jeune et neuve, pleine d'énergies'. Ibid., 9.
57. MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 83–97.
58. Wilson, 'Address'.
59. 'Almoço ao sr. Epitácio Pessoa'. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 28 May 1919.
60. 'O Brasil e a Liga das Nações – Declaração do Sr. Epitacio Pessoa'. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 20 March 1919.
61. Fischer, 'Der Ort der Karibik', 361–66.
62. See the overview of Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality*.
63. Bonsal, *Unfinished Business*, 39.
64. 'O Comité Nacional Ruy Barbosa e a questão da igualdade das raças'. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 25 April 1919.
65. Telegram from Pessoa to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 1919 in Pessoa, *Obras Completas*, 9–10.
66. Bonsal, *Unfinished Business*, 187.
67. Ibid, 204.
68. 'O Brasil leader das pequenas Nações'. *A Noite*, 27 February 1919.
69. 'Brasil deveria defender e defenderá as potencias cujos interesses são limitados'. He also wanted to attend a meeting of Latin American representatives, 'afim de reunir, em blóco, as reivindicações americanas'. 'A escolha da candidatura do sr. Epitácio Pessoa a presidencia do Brasil'. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 4 March 1919; 'O sr. Epitácio Pessoa – sua ação na Conferencia – felicitação'. *Jornal do Commércio*, 4 March 1919; 'O senador Epitacio Pessoa recebe felicitações na França'. *Jornal do Commércio*, 4 March 1919.
70. 'A Abertura do Congresso: A Mensagem Presidencial'. *Diario da Manha*, 4 May 1919.
71. *Diario da Manhã*, 11 June 1919.
72. 'A Acção do Brasil na Conferência'. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 7 May 1919.
73. See, for example, 'A Liga das Nações e a Constitução brasileira'. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 3 May 1919.
74. Fischer, *Die Souveränität*, 224–62.

Bibliography

Alves Netto, Jeronymo Ferreira. 'Brasileiros ilustres em Petrópolis – João Pandiá Calógeras'. *Instituto Histórico de Petrópolis*. Retrieved March 2022 from http://ihp.org.br/?p=3756.

Arouca, Fernanda Bana. 'A Grande Guerra em O Malho: construção de um projeto civilizador (1914–1918)'. *Anais da XII Jornada de Estudos de Históricos Professor Manuel Salgado* 3 (2017), 501–15.

Bayly, Christopher Allen. *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

Bethell, Leslie. 'Nabuco e o Brasil entre Europa, Estados Unidos e América Latina'. *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 88 (2010), 73–87.

Bonsal, Stephen. *Unfinished Business*. London: Michael Joseph, 1944.

Cammack, Paul. 'Brasilien', in Walther L. Bernecker et al. (eds), *Handbuch der Geschichte Lateinamerikas*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996), 1049–166.

Cardim, Carlos Henrique. *A raiz das coisas, Rui Barbosa: O Brasil no Mundo*. Rio do Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2007.

Compagnon, Olivier. *L'Adieu à l'Europe: L'Amérique latine et la Grande Guerre*. Paris: Fayard, 2013.

Conze, Eckart. *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt*. München: Siedler, 2018.

Daróz, Carlos. *O Brasil na Primeira Guerra Mundial: A longa travessia*. São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2016.

De Abranches, Dunshee. *Brazil and the Monroe Doctrine*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1915.

Dias, Marcelo Mangini. 'O Brasil em Versalhes: Calógeras e a política internacional', in Sérgio Ricardo da Mata, Helena Miranda Mollo and Flávia Florentino Varella (eds), *Anais do 3° Seminário Nacional de História da Historiografia: aprender com a história?* (Ouro Preto: Edufop, 2009), 1–11.

Epple, Angelika. 'Calling for a Practice Turn in Global History: Practices as Drivers of Globalization/s'. *History & Theory* 57(3) (2018), 390–407.

Fenwick, Charles G. 'Organization and Procedure of the Paris Peace Conference'. *The American Political Review* 13(2) (1919), 199–212.

Fischer, Thomas. *Die Souveränität der Schwachen: Lateinamerika und der Völkerbund, 1920–1936*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2012.

——. 'América Latina y la Primera Guerra Mundial'. *Iberoamericana* 63 (2016), 259–72.

——. 'Der Ort der Karibik und Zentralamerikas in der Welt – schwache Staaten auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz'. *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas/ Anuario de Historia de América Latina* 55 (2018), 335–72.

——. 'Interventionism', in Olaf Kaltmeier et al. (eds), *The Routledge Handbook to the Political Economy and Governance of the Americas* (London: Routledge, 2020), 383–92.

Garcia, Eugênio Vargas. 'Epitácio Pessoa diplomata: de Versalhes ao Catete', in *Trajetória internacional do Brasil: Artigos selecionados* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018), 195–222.

Harvey, John. *Men in Black*. London: Reaktion Books, 1995.

Hilton, Stanley. 'Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy, 1919–1929'. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12(2) (1980), 341–64.

Kriegesmann, Karina. *Feindbild Fremde: Xenophobie als mediale Praxis in Brasilien (1917–1930)*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2020.

Leonhard, Jörn. *Der überforderte Frieden: Versailles und die Welt 1918–1923*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018.

Lesser, Jeffrey. *Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 1808 to the Present*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Lopes, Raimundo Helio. 'Burlamaqui, Armando César'. Retrieved March 2022 from https://cpdoc.fgv.br/sites/default/files/verbetes/primeira-republica/BUR LAMAQUI,%20Armando%20C%C3%A9sar.pdf.

Luebke, Frederick C. 'The German Ethnic Group in Brazil: The Ordeal of World War'. *Yearbook of German-American Studies* 18 (1983), 255–67.

Luna, Cristina and Luciana Pinheiro. 'Magalhães, Olinto de'. Retrieved March 2022 from http://cpdoc.fgv.br/sites/default/files/verbetes/primeira-republica/ MAGALHÃES,%20Olinto%20de.pdf.

Luna, Francisco Vidal and Herbert S. Klein. *The Economic and Social History of Brazil Since 1889*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2003.

Martin, Percy Alvin. *Latin America and the War*, 2nd edn. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. 1967.

McCann, Frank D. *Soldiers of the Pátria: A history of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Melo, Fernando. *Epitácio Pessoa: Uma Biografia*. João Pessoa: Idebia, 2005.

Miller, David Hunter. *The Drafting of the Covenant*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928.

Pantoja, Silvia. 'Angrogne, Malan d''. Retrieved March 2022 from http://www.fgv. br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/alfredo-malan-d-angrogne.

Pechmann, Robert. 'Raul Fernandes'. Retrieved March 2022 from http://cpdoc.fgv. br/sites/default/files/verbetes/primeira-republica/FERNANDES,%20Raul.pdf.

Pessoa, Epitácio. *Obras completas*. *Vol. 14: Conferência da Paz, diplomacia e direito internacional*. Rio de Janeiro: INL, 1961.

Pessôa Pardellas, Carlos Alberto. *Epitácio Pessôa: Na Europa e no Brasil*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018.

Pessôa Raja Gabaglia, Laurita. *Epitácio Pessôa 1865–1942*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympo, 1951.

Pires, Livia Claro. 'A Liga Brasileira pelos Aliados e o Brasil na Primeira Guerra Mundial', in Associação Nacional dos Professores Universitários de História (ed.), *Anais eletrônicos do XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História* (São Paulo, 2011), 1–15. Retrieved April 2022 from http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/ anais/14/1308163763_ARQUIVO_apresentaco.pdf.

Prazeres, Otto. *O Brasil na Guerra (Algumas notas para a história)*. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1918.

Relatório apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores comprehendendo o período decorrido de 1 de Maio de 1918 a 3 de Maio 1919. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1921.

Rinke, Stefan. *Im Sog der Katastrophe: Lateinamerika und der Erste Weltkrieg*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2015.

——. 'World War I and Brazil'. Retrieved March 2022 from https://oxfordre. com/latinamericanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/ acrefore-9780199366439-e-143.

'Rodrigo Otávio de Langgaard Menezes'. *Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*. Retrieved March 2022 from https://ihgb.org.br/perfil/userprofile/ROLMenezes. html.

Schuster, Sven. 'História, nação e raça no contexto da Exposição do Centenário em 1922'. *História, Ciências, Saúde – Manguinhos* 21(1) (2014), 1–13.

Shimazu, Naoko. *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Smith, Joseph. *Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1991.

Smith, Leonard V. *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Streeter, Michael. *Epitácio Pessoa: Brazil*. London: Haus Publishing, 2010.

United States Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. 1. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942.

Wätzold, Tim. *Der libertäre Atlantik: Unsere Heimat ist die ganze Welt*. Hamburg: Barrikade, 2015.

Wilson, Woodrow. 'Address at the Third Plenary Session of the Peace Conference in Paris, France', 14 February 1919. Retrieved March 2022 from http://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=117774.

Chapter 9

Washington of the World, Vatican of the East

Imagining Istanbul in a New Global Order

Carolin Liebisch-Gümüş

> At the turn of the 20th century, Istanbul had become one of the most com-plex and ambiguous cities of the world: one million inhabitants, only half of whom were Muslims; the capital of an empire, but entirely subservient to European politics, trade, and finance; a paragon of modernity in many ways, yet at the same time deeply entrenched in tradition.
> —Edhem Eldem, 'Istanbul (Byzantium; Constantinople)'

The capital of first the Byzantine and then the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, with its significant location between three seas and two continents, was a major trade hub, an imperial power centre and a multicultural mosaic, with a population including Muslim Turks and Kurds, Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Rum and foreigners of all trades and origins. From the eighteenth century, growing cultural exchange with Western Europe started to leave its mark on the city. During the Ottoman reform period in the nineteenth century, the influence of modern ideas, Western govern-ments and economic ties in the city further intensified. Now, however, against the background of increasingly unequal power relations and the infamous 'Eastern Question', Istanbul and the Ottoman Empire more generally became targets of European imperial ambitions.

Drawing on the above description by Turkish historian Edhem Eldem, one could say that Istanbul stood at the crossroads between being an imperial metropolis – the seat of the Sultan's sovereign power – and being a cosmopolis,[1] in which certain domains of state governance came under the influence of foreign governments and stakeholders. At the turn of the twentieth century, the city was permeated by a network of institu-tions that were dominated by Westerners (and their mostly non-Muslim

Ottoman associates) and that undermined Ottoman sovereignty in certain domains, such as consular courts, the Supreme Council of Health and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919–20, the future of the defeated Ottoman Empire and particularly the status of Istanbul – now occupied by British, French and Italian forces – gave the peacemakers serious headaches. What to make of a city that was entangled in the vested interests of various foreign governments, and whose location on the Bosporus Strait was of international importance? How to handle a cosmopolis that was still the Ottoman capital, the seat of the Caliphate (and thus, at least in theory, important to Muslims around the world), while also being home to a large Christian population and the Ecumenical Patriarch, leading the Greek government to claim it in the name of a revived Byzantine Empire? Should 'the Turk' be forced to withdraw from the city and 'entirely wiped out of Europe', as many demanded?[2] Could Istanbul then be turned into an international city, maybe even become the future seat of the League of Nations – the global equivalent of the District of Columbia, as some imagined?

In confronting Istanbul's heterogeneous population and complicated trans-regional relations, the peacemakers in Paris faced typical dilemmas of post-war planning. And yet among all the cities for which the Allies made special arrangements, including Danzig and Fiume, Istanbul was arguably the most complex in terms of its global importance and political entanglements. Finding a consistent solution for the city posed a challenge but also a unique opportunity. The weakness of the Sultan's government and the starkly colonial attitude of the Western powers made Constantinople a mental laboratory for the international city of the future.

The internationalist visions of Istanbul that flourished after the war are the main subject of this chapter. The principal studies on Turkey in the post-war negotiations provide detailed accounts of the various proposed partition plans for the Ottoman Empire.[3] They also portray the Allied occupation of Istanbul (1918–1923),[4] the formation of Turkish-Muslim underground resistance and the ensuing War of Independence (culminating in the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres) as well as the recovery of sovereignty at the Lausanne Conference in 1923.[5] Existing accounts also describe different proposals regarding Istanbul, but they have certain limitations. For one, they focus almost exclusively on high politics and the plans proposed by the Allied governments. Moreover, they look at the topic mainly through the prism of realpolitik. This is not to deny that strategic interests lay at the heart of all of the proposed schemes. But they were equally informed by certain ideologies and normative conceptions of the future international order.

In this chapter, I use archival sources and published memoranda to reconstruct different plans for Istanbul formulated by people outside Allied government circles – from the heads of an American expert commission, Henry Churchill King and Charles R. Crane, to the League of Nations General Secretary Eric Drummond, the prominent internationalist David Davies, and W. G. Middleton Edwards, a British businessman and resident of Istanbul. In various ways, they all imagined that the solution for Istanbul was internationalism and the creation of an international city.

Taking a closer look at each of their imaginaries, I ask how their visions of cosmopolitan order related to broader visions of global order. What were the ideological underpinnings of their internationalist schemes? And how did they deal with the main challenge, the diversity and spatial ambiguity of a cosmopolis that did not fit easily into the principles that guided post-war planning in other cases: namely nationality, self-determination and mandate colonialism? In tackling these questions, this chapter contributes to a body of scholarship that stresses the relevance of spatial arrangements discussed during the 'Paris moment' that transcended the dominant paradigm of national sovereignty.[6]

An Internationalized Cosmopolis Before and After the First World War

One of the first to imagine the transformation of Istanbul into an international city was the Scottish lawyer and co-founder of the Institute of International Law, James Lorimer.[7] In a lecture at the University of Edinburgh in 1876, he argued that Istanbul should be denationalized and devoted 'to international purposes'.[8] A 'joint occupation of Constantinople by the European Powers', he argued, should put an end to Turkish rule and make the city the 'common property of civilised mankind' (which for him meant Western mankind only). This rather drastic take on the 'Eastern Question' was at once pragmatic, idealistic and deeply chauvinistic. Lorimer recommended shared rule to forestall future conflicts between the Great Powers. At the same time, being an early proponent of the political unification of Europe, he envisioned Istanbul as the future seat of a European parliament. Because of its 'cosmopolitan character' and strategic importance, which made it 'the key of Europe to Asia, and of Asia to Europe', the city, in Lorimer's eyes, was fit to become a future centre of internationalism. As for the future of the Ottomans, Lorimer argued that only civilized nations could rightfully claim sovereignty. The Turks, 'bankrupt as they are of every quality of nation', he explained,

could not count as such, and Westerners should 'make of the Turk all that a civilised man can ever make of a barbarian – namely, a pupil'.

In an age of colonialism and imperialism, international law and internationalist agendas often perpetuated the supremacist hierarchies of the time.[9] The Ottoman Empire was an interesting case. Formally accepted as a sovereign state and since 1856 a member of the Concert of Europe, the Sultan's government actively sought to participate in international cooperation in line with its modernization efforts. On the other hand, the Empire's dwindling power made it a target for European imperialism and the undermining of its sovereignty through Western-run international bodies and treaties.[10]

If one were to walk through Istanbul in the late nineteenth century, one could observe this ambivalence as if under a magnifying glass. The tensions between modernization, traditionalist currents and Western influence were manifest in the cityscape – as were the traces of internationalization. Galata and Pera were the quarters that, 'transformed by Westernization, stood for the new international order'.[11] Pera was home not only to many European-style hotels, galleries and shopping arcades but also to foreign schools, embassies and consular courts, which protected the extraterritorial legal privileges granted to foreigners and their Ottoman intermediaries through the Capitulations.[12] In Galata, the Ottoman Bank opened its doors in 1856. An Ottoman-British-French joint venture run by a European board and its chiefly non-Muslim administrative staff, the bank was de facto an international body assisting the capitalist opening of the Ottoman Empire.[13] Not far from the bank, next to the Underground Mosque, was the main bureau of the Supreme Council of Health. This organization and its mainly European members were in control of health checks and quarantine at Ottoman ports, giving them a certain degree of control over ship traffic and making it, in the eyes of critical Turkish observers, a kind of public health Capitulation.[14] Across from Galata and Pera, separated by the Golden Horn, lay old Istanbul with its bazaars and medieval palaces and mosques. The fact that in 1856 Sultan Abdülmecid I moved his residency from there to the new Dolmabahçe palace, with its shining Europeanized architectural splendour, was of obvious symbolic importance. So was the building of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881 in the middle of the old governmental district. As a state agency that was in fact an international body, it gave European creditors considerable influence over Ottoman economic and financial affairs.[15]

Istanbul's network of imperialistic international institutions came with a specific social fabric. Foreign merchants, diplomats and other expatriates – drawn together by their shared sense of class, exterritorial privileges and

professed superiority as members of 'European civilization' in an 'outpost of progress' – formed a community of 'cosmopolitan imperialists'.[16] But the First World War disturbed international life in the cosmopolis. The expatriate community broke up; as foreigners from the Allied countries and the Central Powers antagonized each other, 'enemy aliens' had to leave the Ottoman Empire, and the Young Turk government took action against imperialistic international structures by unilaterally abolishing the Capitulations upon the Ottoman entry into the war in 1914.[17]

After the First World War, the Allies tried to restore previous international structures in Istanbul. Their ambassadors, representatives and businessmen returned together with soldiers, navy vessels and High Commissioners to occupy the city in November and December 1918, long before the official declaration of occupation in March 1920. The Sultan's government tried to be cooperative and persuade the Allies to respect the country's sovereignty. Many Muslims and Turks in the city felt shocked and humiliated. The occupiers kept their distance from the urban Muslim elite, associating instead with 'the cosmopolitan elements of Istanbul'.[18] Meanwhile, the Supreme Council of Health and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (together with the Ottoman Bank) continued their work in the interest of Western governments and stakeholders. The Allies also de facto reinstated the extraterritorial legal privileges previously guaranteed through the Capitulations.[19] Moreover, they pushed for a new international regime over the strategically vital Turkish Straits. For geographical reasons alone, any scheme to internationalize the Bosporus had to address the question of Istanbul as well.

In retrospect, James Lorimer's call for a joint European occupation and denationalization of Istanbul had foreshadowed the post-war situation. The Allies, together with many public voices,[20] even used the same legitimation discourse as Lorimer: namely, the paternalistic and pejorative rationale that the Turks were uncivilized and not fit to govern a cosmopolitan society that included Christian minorities and foreigners.[21] This discourse was echoed on the ground. Members of the British High Commission in Istanbul, witnessing Christian refugees flocking into the city, perceived Istanbul as a 'microcosm of the misery'[22] that they thought necessarily resulted from Ottoman-Muslim rule. Biases blended together with humanitarian concerns for Christians, particularly the Armenians, who had been deported and murdered under the Young Turk regime. Since the nineteenth century, the fate of Christian minorities together with supposed Turkish 'backwardness' had served to justify European interventionism in the Ottoman Empire.[23]

Unlike Lorimer, however, the British, French, Italian and American delegations at the Peace Conference were undecided about the future

status of the city and Ottoman sovereignty. They agreed only that unrestricted Turkish control over the city was undesirable and that the Greek government's claim on the city did not deserve serious consideration. In June 1919, both the French premier Georges Clemenceau and the American president Woodrow Wilson signalled readiness to adopt the original plan of British premier Lloyd George and his entourage, who wanted to expel 'the Turk' from Istanbul and Europe. This suggestion came up several times – as, however, did objections that the expulsion of the Sultan-Caliph might trigger unrest among Muslims in the British and French colonies. As a result, British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon proposed a compromise dubbed the 'Vatican proposal'. Based on a stunningly simplistic comparison between Islam and the Catholic Church, it suggested the internationalization of Istanbul and the transferral of the Turkish capital to Anatolia, while allowing the Sultan-Caliph – in his spiritual function – to reside in Istanbul like the Pope in Rome.[24]

What is striking about the different schemes is that basically all relied on modes of joint administration, internationalization or a League mandate. No party, though, was eager to shoulder the burden of such a mandate under the League of Nations, nor did they want any other power to have sole unchecked control.[25] Instead, all the powers wished to secure and extend the city's internationalized character, which so conveniently served their economic and political interests. They could agree on no practical solution. Not only did they fear Muslim protests and growing national resistance in Anatolia, which led them to seek better terms with the Sultan's government. They also struggled with spatial arrangements that would compel them to adjust their own sovereign power to supranational responsibility or even a form of international sovereignty.[26] On the one hand, the Allies seemed, as James Lorimer had demanded decades before, 'sensible of the inadequacy of that conception [i.e. national sovereignty] when brought to bear on cosmopolitan interests'.[27] On the other hand, they were hesitant about 'transcending the conception of nationality', as Lorimer had urged. After all, national sovereignty was the guiding principle of the Paris order.[28]

On the road to Sèvres, the Allies dropped the plan to internationalize the entire city of Istanbul and decided to go with an extended status quo ante. The peace treaty allowed the Ottomans to keep their capital while undercutting Ottoman sovereignty in economic, health and other domains (and threatening to change the status of Istanbul if Turkey did not adhere to the terms of the treaty). Meanwhile, while the Allies were rather conservative on supranational responsibility and full internationalization, a number of nongovernmental actors embraced the idea. The most elaborate and utopian schemes for how to turn Istanbul

into an international city were devised not by the Allied delegations but by American and British internationalists and private individuals, who articulated their visions of cosmopolitan order during the highly public Paris moment.

A New Constantinopolitan State under an American Mandate?

In June 1919, the so-called 'King-Crane Commission' travelled to the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the US government. Handpicked by Woodrow Wilson, the delegation was led by the Protestant theologian and academic Henry Churchill King along with Charles R. Crane, a wealthy entrepreneur and foreign policy lobbyist with a keen interest in the Middle East. They were tasked with evaluating the situation and coming up with suggestions regarding the future territorial order in the Ottoman regions. The final report they submitted to the Peace Conference in August 1919 has often been described as unrealistic. Two main reasons are given for this judgement. The first is that the report failed to have an impact on the peace treaties; the second that its far-fetched recommendations – among them the proposal to put both Armenia and Anatolia under a US mandate – were based more on Wilsonian idealism and an American sense of mission than an understanding of the complexities on the ground.[29] Their basic approach was to identify peoples that they assumed could form separate nations in the future and assign them mandate territories.[30] Evidently, this would not work for the case of cosmopolitan Istanbul. Thus the commission came up with the proposal to separate the city, together with the Straits, from Turkey and make them an international territory. Instead of the Ottoman capital, Istanbul would be part of a new 'Constantinopolitan State'.

The region, the commission explained, was of 'great international interest', whereas 'Turkey is simply not conceivably equal to a great world responsibility'. Such a 'markedly cosmopolitan city' was better off in international hands than under Turkish rule, and 'the larger world interests must prevail'.[31] This normative assessment was clearly informed by the evolutionist thinking of the time, according to which non-Western polities such as the Ottoman Empire were not modern and advanced enough to govern cosmopolitan Istanbul. According to the report, a permanent solution putting Istanbul under international control would be in everyone's interests. The 'common people of Turkey', too, the report stated paternalistically, would be happier in the long term if they were freed from Istanbul and 'outreaching imperialism'.

The commission recommended that the Constantinopolitan State be permanently administered through a single mandatory, which would be directly responsible to the League and disinterested enough to act as trustee for international interests. Besides guaranteeing good government and peaceful coexistence in the city, the mandatory and the League would secure the free passage of ships and commerce through the Straits, as well as the end of imperialistic 'intrigue' and the Eastern Question. In maybe the most literal example of the 'city upon a hill' mindset in foreign policy (Istanbul was nicknamed 'seven hills' in Turkish), the commission nominated the United States as the most suitable candidate for this task, adding that Americans could make Istanbul a second 'District of Columbia', a place with a flourishing cosmopolitan cultural sphere where both Muslim and non-Muslim educational and spiritual life could thrive.

For all its US-centric hegemonic zeal and naivety, the commission was aware that the idea of internationalizing Istanbul would 'be unwelcome to most Turks'. And Muslim Ottomans were indeed united in protest against any scheme to separate the city: the Sultan's government itself; organized protesters in Istanbul; the Turkish National Movement around Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), which defined the recovery of Istanbul from the Allied occupiers as one of its key goals; and petitioners appearing at the Peace Conference, like the former Ottoman ambassador Mehmet Şerif, who argued that separating Istanbul would mean 'to cut away from the body of Turkey … its very heart'.[32] The general idea of an American mandate, on the other hand, appealed at least to some Ottoman liberal-nationalist politicians and intellectuals, who viewed a unified mandate over Turkey and Istanbul as the lesser evil compared to partition. This group, the so-called 'Turkish Wilsonian League', shared the Wilsonian ideals of progress and a liberal world order – as well as its paternalistic implications. A US mandate for a fixed 'period of instruction', the group declared in a letter to Woodrow Wilson in December 1918, could help Turkey govern its 'different peoples and complex problems'[33] and develop into a modern nation state. While conceding that they were not yet fit to govern their own cosmopolitan society, they also strongly insisted that they did not desire 'a tutelage which would limit … ultimate independence' but a kind of assistance under the condition of national sovereignty. The fact that basically all Muslim Ottomans and Turks insisted on national sovereignty and territorial integrity with regard to Istanbul did not keep planners and peacemakers in Europe from indulging in internationalist visions.

Istanbul – The League of Nation's First Own Territory?

The League of Nations was a key component in many of the propos-
als for Istanbul that were on the negotiating table in Paris. How did
the League's own administration react to them? After the League had
taken up its provisional work in Sunderland House in London in April
1919, it was no longer just a passive element in the settlements but an
institution with its own minds and voices. In December 1919, its first
Secretary-General, the former member of the British Foreign Office Eric
Drummond, met for lunch with British Secretary of State for India Edwin
Montagu, who expressed great concern over the question of Istanbul. As
he told Drummond, his government was about to convince Clemenceau
that the Sultan-Caliph should be expelled from Istanbul and the city,
together with the Straits, placed under the control of France, Great Britain
and Italy. Such a decision, Montagu feared, could provoke protest and
insurrections among Muslim populations across the British Empire.

Returning from his lunch meeting, Drummond figured out a solution.
In letters to the members of the British peace delegation, he proposed that
'Constantinople, and sufficient territory round it, should become a Free
City and placed under the protection of the League of Nations'.[34] This
international city-state, Drummond explained, could be governed by a
mixed commission of five members, two Muslim and the other three – if
the Allies insisted – British, French and Italian.

This solution, Drummond explained, would guarantee 'that the Turk
should no longer be allowed to remain in Europe' (a goal that Drummond
himself explicitly shared) without provoking global Muslim backlash.
Because both India and Persia were already League members, 'it could,
with justice, be asserted that they had an equal share with other members
of the League in the administration and protection of Constantinople,
and could make their voices heard on behalf of Moslem opinion'.[35] This
reasoning shows that the administrative head of the League was seek-
ing to consolidate imperial interests with his mission of creating a new
international organization of global reach.[36]

But Drummond and his close staff members, who also supported the
plan to end Ottoman rule in Europe, were not mere proxies of Empire.
Rather, they saw the chance to maximize the League's capacity for
international governance while limiting the authority of single powers,
including Great Britain. This is underlined by a brief exchange between
Drummond and Eric Colban, the Norwegian director of the League's
Administrative Commissions and Minorities Section. Both men agreed
that under ideal circumstances the mixed commission would have no
seats reserved for the Great Powers but consist of members elected by

the League Council who would feel 'responsibility toward the League'[37] instead of only following 'the interests and instruction of their governments'.[38] It would be no less of a mistake to deem this idea anti-imperialist. Colban stressed that most seats on the Council belonged to the Great Powers in any case, providing 'the most absolute guarantee of their interests'.[39] The League staff suggested that imperial interests could be maintained within a new form of international governance.

Writing back from Paris, British diplomat Harold Nicolson, who had read Drummond's proposal with great interest, remarked that 'if the policy of turning the Turk out of Europe prevails' in the negotiations, this would likely lead to a point 'in which the whole responsibility is thrown in some form or another upon the League'.[40] But if that happened, could the League of Nations, an international organization, really take on sovereignty over a territory? Because of this doubt, Nicolson advised Drummond to speak of the League's 'protection' of, rather than 'sovereignty' over, Istanbul.[41] For the next two weeks, internal discussions among the Secretariat staff in Sunderland House continued. Eager to push his plan, Drummond and his team sought to justify the idea that the League – and not the Allied states – should exercise sovereignty over the city.[42]

This was quite a radical approach. To be sure, internationalized territorial administration had occurred before 1919: for example, the International Settlement of Shanghai (1863), the International Squadron for Crete (1897), or the Anglo-French condominium of New Hebrides (1906). Those arrangements, however, had all been multinational in nature; the territories were jointly administered by small groups of states. The Paris order marked the beginning of 'a new era of territorial administration'[43] as the League began to directly administer certain territories. Those cases differed from the mandates (including the so-called 'A' mandates in the Middle East), where the League's influence was indirect and the mandatory powers had full governing authority.

At the time when Drummond wrote his proposal for Istanbul, only the former German Territory of the Saar Basin stood already under the direct authority of the League in this way. The Treaty of Versailles had charged the League with installing a commission that would administer the region for fifteen years before returning it to Germany. In Drummond's eyes, the Saar Basin offered a potential model for Istanbul and the Straits. The director of the League's Legal Section, the Dutch international law expert Joost Adriaan van Hamel, dismissed the comparison with the Saar Territory, which formally still belonged to Germany, particularly because 'it might be somewhat dangerous to allow the Turk even a shadowy right to sovereignty'.[44] He and Drummond also rejected other models such as

the New Hebrides on the grounds that they implied 'the co-sovereignty of the combined nations'.[45] What they wanted was direct League control over a territory without any national sovereignty.

Responding to Nicolson's doubts as to whether international law would allow the League to exercise sovereignty over a territory, Drummond reasoned that, during the fifteen-year League Mandate over the Saar, 'if sovereignty exists, it is in the hands of the Governing [League] Commission'. He further argued that 'the Treaty of Peace has created a new international legal conception – namely, a territory over which there is no sovereignty; and if this is so, I do not see why the analogy should not be extended to the Constantinople territory'.[46] Van Hamel supported Drummond's position that '"[i]nternational" in this case should express the exclusion of national sovereignty'.[47] He compared Istanbul's future status to that of the Danube River. Since 1856, the waterways had been administered as an 'international unit'[48] by a special international organization.

It is hard to overlook the drastic implications of this comparison. It was one thing to place shipping traffic under a regime but a very different thing to consider a similar technocratic arrangement for a city[49] whose numerous inhabitants included male Ottoman citizens with the constitutional right to vote. In his original proposal, Drummond had suggested the establishment of a free city-state. Danzig later became such a free city under the League of Nations, which meant it had local elections and a parliament. No such possibility was considered for Istanbul, as Drummond hastily withdrew his original proposal after Nicolson questioned 'whether, in view of the racial difficulties, it would be possible to make Constantinople and the Straits into an independent State'.[50] Adopting Nicolson's anti-republican, paternalistic approach, Drummond decided to replace the words 'free city' with 'international territory' in the sense of the Danube.[51]

Istanbul and the Straits should become, in Drummond's own words, a territory 'under the protection of most of the nations of the world'.[52] With no local autonomy and all sovereignty shifted to the League, Drummond's Istanbul could hardly have been called a protectorate in the sense of Danzig or the Saar Basin. Instead, the city's inhabitants would have been subject to foreign rule by an international body. Reminiscent of James Lorimer's 'denationalisation of Constantinople', the idea implied nothing less than making Istanbul the League's first own dependent territory, and thus creating a form of full international sovereignty.[53]

The proposal was indeed radical – too radical for the taste of the British and French governments. Although it remained hypothetical, it provides us with telling insights into the League Secretariat's approach

to cosmopolitanism and international governance. Recent scholarship on the League of Nations has pointed to the fact that the League's colonial heritage was not limited to the mandate system.[54] The case of Istanbul illustrates that the Secretariat members conceived of international governance as a way to secure the power interests of the old imperial powers. One might object that they did so for pragmatic reasons, while their actual ideal was a neutral commission acting only on behalf of the League. This ideal, however, not only rested on the policy of 'turning the Turk out of Europe' and seizing the Ottoman capital. It also came with the paternalistic assumption that cosmopolitanism was too complex for the local population to govern by themselves and that it was necessary to plan instead for a kind of international technocratic regime.

Istanbul – The Seat of the League of Nations?

Ottoman residents in Istanbul reading the newspaper *Hâdisat* on Sunday 9 February 1919 probably gazed with some surprise at the headline: 'Important News: Istanbul the Centre of the League of Nations?'[55] It was the fourth week of the Peace Conference in Paris, and neither the future existence and location of the League nor the fate of Istanbul had yet taken clear shape. There were many rumours and plenty of room for imagination. According to *Hâdisat*, a British politician had suggested that Istanbul would make a good site for the League of Nations, especially due to its location 'in the middle between Europe, Asia, and Africa'.[56]

He was not alone in thinking so. The idea popped up repeatedly over the course of the peacemaking process in both British and American political circles.[57] The American political commentator George D. Herron (himself strongly in favour of Geneva as the League's seat) noted with dismay that there were in Paris 'strong influences at work to locate it at Constantinople'.[58] Whereas Wilson favoured Geneva from early on, and his closest advisor, Colonel House, favoured Lausanne, other members of the American delegation supposedly preferred Istanbul.[59] The idea did not gain a serious foothold in either the British or the US delegation, though, and soon the choice was between Geneva and Brussels. Of further interest here, however, are two figures who were particularly enthusiastic about the idea of Istanbul becoming the centre of the international order even though decision-makers in Paris showed little interest in it: the British liberal politician David Davies and the British entrepreneur W.G. Middleton Edwards. In memoranda and letters, they sketched quite detailed plans.

Nobody was as persistent and detailed in his lobbying for the choice of Istanbul as the seat of the League of Nations as David Davies. A liberal

member of the House of Commons and an ardent supporter of Wilson and liberal internationalism, he participated in the British League of Nations Union and endowed the first chair for International Relations in Great Britain in honour of Wilson at Aberystwyth University in 1919.[60] In the same year, he wrote numerous newspaper articles and even a booklet with images and a map illustrating his view 'that Constantinople should be internationalized, and as a permanent freehold of the world should become the permanent headquarters of the League'. It would belong to no single state, 'just as Washington'[61] was the US capital and '[j]ust as [the District of] Columbia was allotted to the United States as a whole'.[62] Davies enjoyed prominent support in Great Britain. He gathered a group of journalists and politicians, among them the Conservative MP Samuel Hoare, the historian and former intelligence chief John Buchan, and the leftist editor of the *Daily Mail* Henry Hamilton Fyfe, who all publicly embraced Davies' arguments.

Some of his arguments were of a practical nature. Like the peace-makers in Paris, Davies thought that Istanbul's 'magnificent strategical position'[63] formed a potential peril to peace, hence neither a too powerful state, that is a European power, nor a weak state like the Ottoman government should control the city single-handedly. Davies, being a maximalist internationalist who advocated that the League should have a physical policing force, turned the dilemma into virtue by suggesting that such a global peacekeeping force should be located right where potential wars could arise – close to the Straits and the 'cradle of war'[64] on the Balkans. The city's geographical location also appealed to him for another reason. If delegations from America, Europe and all over the world had to travel to Istanbul on a regular basis, this 'would greatly stimulate the developments of routes by air, land, and sea'. Again reflecting a maximalist, almost futuristic take on internationalism, he stressed the opportunity of 'testing the transportation progress of the era, which should ensure that the question of distance becomes a matter of secondary importance'.[65]

Davies' main argument, however, was cultural. The city as he saw it was a 'meeting place of East and West',[66] a historical and spiritual centre of both Christianity and Islam. If Geneva (or Brussels, Versailles or Strasbourg) was chosen as the League capital, 'it might be said that the League had been established only for the convenience of the Western powers',[67] with fatal consequences for its recognition outside the West. Instead, it should 'find its home where it will give the utmost benefit to the nations as a whole' and provide 'the same opportunities for progress' for all.[68] And it is in fact striking that many of those in favour of choosing Geneva pointed not only to the city's track record in humanitarian internationalism and the Red Cross Movement but also to its symbolic role

in a Western intellectual tradition. Writing to Woodrow Wilson, Herron highlighted that it was 'out of this city that both religious liberty and political democracy have gone forth to the world'.[69] And, appealing to Wilson's Christian ideals and American exceptionalism, he added that as the home of Calvin and Rousseau, Geneva was basically the cradle of both Puritanism and the Declaration of Independence. In comparison, Davies' proposal appeared less Eurocentric. The choice of Istanbul, he wrote, 'will impress Eastern peoples that the League is a World institution – not an alliance of Western powers'.[70] Muslims in particular could be satisfied, he added with regard to British fears of pan-Islamism, as the League 'would be housed within a mile or two of the palace of the Sultan, Commander of the Faithful'.[71]

If most of the options were too European, and others (Davies mentioned Jerusalem) 'too Eastern in character', Istanbul, with its 'international character',[72] seemed an ideal fit. Clearly, it was the strong influence of Europeans and international bodies that made the city appear less Eastern, and thus more qualified for international governance, in Davies' eyes. As uncompromisingly internationalist as his proposal undoubtedly was, it was neither egalitarian nor non-partisan. Instead of reading it simply as an idealistic pledge for global unity, then, we might see it as a prescient attempt to secure Western influence in a changing global order. Like other intellectuals of the interwar period, most prominently Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler, Davies was convinced that the West was in decline and 'the East will play a more important part in the evolution of the World during the next hundred years than the West'.[73] Instead of falling into cultural pessimism, Davies believed in liberal progress, seeing the 'opportunity to demonstrate to our children our faith and our foresight'[74] by including the so-called 'East' in the Western project of creating a liberal world order.

Having read Davies' proposal with great excitement, the British businessman W.G. Middleton Edwards became another ardent supporter of the idea. He prepared a memorandum that he sent to influential British and American personalities at the Peace Conference. In his opinion, it was time to think big and anticipate the far future, in which the nation states making up the current system could merge to form the 'United States of the World'.[75] He envisioned Istanbul as the seat of a world government, a 'World District of Columbia'[76] – a comparison also used by Davies and the King-Crane Commission. 'I see in my mind's eye', Middleton Edwards wrote, 'the Executive [of the League] consisting of almost a city, dealing actively in matters we do not at the present moment dream of as subjects for world consideration'.[77] Middleton Edwards shared most of Davies' arguments, with a few exceptions. He did not like Davies stressing the

strategic position of Istanbul for international policing, as he himself was hoping ('somewhat utopian', he admitted) 'that the League will mean no defence anywhere and that respect for the Law will dominate'.[78]

The main difference between the two, however, was that Middleton Edwards had an insider's view. Born in Istanbul to British parents, he had graduated from two of the city's foreign elite schools before following in the footsteps of his father, who had come to Istanbul as a ship-building expert and advisor for the Ottoman government. After the war, Middleton Edwards continued working in Istanbul as an entrepreneur in the naval industry and a member of the British Chamber of Commerce.[79] When he thought about the transformation of Istanbul into an international city, then, he imagined the city he himself would want to live and do business in. It is thus no surprise that he recommended that its citizens should enjoy complete economic freedom, minimal trade taxes and the right to political participation.

What he had in mind was the creation of a free city state. The citizens of the independent 'Republic of Constantinople', as he called it, would all be people who had lived in the city for a minimum of ten years. They would elect a president, who would then be nominated by the executive body of the League of Nations. A Chamber of Deputies would form the legislative assembly, and its seats would be allocated in proportion to the presence of different nationalities in the city: ten seats for Turks, eight for Greeks, seven for Armenians, five for Jews, five for each nationality from the Balkans, four for Americans, British, French, Germans and so forth. The official language would be French, 'unless it is possible to adopt Esperanto'.[80] There would be no fortifications around the city, and no munitions would be kept there, but a US police force would recruit and train local policemen over the next ten years.

Unlike the delegations in Paris, in particular the British and French, who devised schemes for mandates and joint control in accordance with their own imperial interests, Davies and Middleton Edwards stressed that they wanted the city to be a freehold: 'an area entirely free from any possibility of political ambition of an imperialistic character',[81] as Middleton Edwards put it. Both were more determined to reject European imperialist claims than Eric Drummond and his fellow Secretariat members. Their schemes, utopian and internationalist as they were, were nevertheless biased towards and driven by Western hegemony. In comparison to Davies or Drummond, Middleton Edwards' plan may have been more democratic in the sense that it envisaged local self-government, but it too pursued a basic imperialistic premise: the idea that Westerners would decide who was worthy of sovereignty and who was not. Middleton Edwards shared the widespread conviction that Turkey had proven

'her distinct inability to govern alien peoples',[82] and had therefore lost the right to govern a cosmopolitan entity that included minorities and Westerners like himself. The fact that he suggested that the League could reside in the Dolmabahçe Palace, at that time still the residence of Sultan Mehmed VI, underlines his disdain for Ottoman sovereignty.

Similarly, Davies wrote in *The Times* in October 1919 that the city and the Straits should become 'international soil', as the 'city is the hot-bed of [international] intrigue merely because it is the Turkish metropolis. When the Turk is cast out the intrigue will go with him'.[83] This statement contradicted an earlier memorandum in which he had argued that the League's seat should be located outside the old city centre and harmoniously coexist with the Sultanate. He may have adapted his plan to make it more appealing to Lloyd George and Curzon, who still insisted on ending Turkish rule at the Bosphorus and in Europe. The sources suggest, though, that Davies was anything but a defender of Ottoman sovereignty. In his memorandum he had cited James Lorimer, who clearly demanded that the city be taken from the 'barbaric' Turks. Moreover, in 1921, months after the Treaty of Sèvres had stipulated that Istanbul would remain the Ottoman capital, and in face of strong resistance in Turkey against any infringement of national sovereignty, Davies and the British League of Nations Union argued in favour of the Vatican proposal.[84]

Conclusion: 'Whose Cosmopolitanism?'

None of the internationalist visions for Istanbul presented in this contribution ever materialized.[85] The city became neither a mandate territory nor a free city state or an international territory under League sovereignty, nor, of course, the seat of the League. Those far-fetched plans and utopias scarcely received any support at all from the Allied governments. My point is that they matter nonetheless. Although they took only the form of short-lived thought experiments and paperwork, they provide us with unique insights into conceptions of international governance and sovereignty in the Paris moment.

Research on the Versailles order has stressed that the nation-state principle and national sovereignty were the overarching paradigm of political reordering after the First World War.[86] The fact that the Paris Conference also introduced a new type of internationalized governance, the mandate system, is but a case in point. It shows that even the imperial powers themselves had to account for the nationality paradigm by adopting mandates in lieu of colonies, and thus commit to self-rule at least as a theoretical long-term goal. There is therefore good reason to

maintain, as Marcus Payk does, that within the nationality-based Paris order, 'supra- and multinational forms of organization', as in Danzig and the Saar Basin, were fundamentally 'alien to the system'.[87] This, it would seem, is even more true for the kind of full international sovereignty suggested for Istanbul by the different actors in this chapter: the King-Crane Commission, Drummond and his League colleagues, Davies, and Middleton Edwards.

On the other hand, as Glenda Sluga stresses, national sovereignty was never monolithic or absolute, and since the nineteenth century it has evolved alongside conceptions and practices of internationalized sovereignty.[88] The historiography on international territorial administration supports this view,[89] as does the history of the late Ottoman Empire, in which internationalization, used as a tool to undermine national sovereignty, played a crucial role. As so many have pointed out, the Paris Peace Conference transformed an imperial world order into an order based on nation states. Ideas and practices of international(ized) sovereignty, however, were alien to neither the old nor the new system. After the First World War, a new form of territorial governance directly through the League of Nations emerged. Its goal was to settle claims on 'disputed or strategically important regions',[90] such as Danzig, the Saar Basin or – hypothetically – Istanbul. While these are all cases of forced international administration,[91] this chapter has underlined the importance of differentiation. The proposed internationalization of Istanbul was based on a specific legitimizing discourse implying that the governance of cosmopolitanism was an international concern, and a task too demanding to be taken on by a government seen as backward by Western standards. In addition to this discourse, the future status of Istanbul was also conceptualized differently, and in particular more illiberally, than international administration in the German borderlands. It was thought to be permanent, with national sovereignty completely abrogated and no local political participation (except, to some extent, in Middleton Edwards' proposal). While claiming to pursue objective and cosmopolitan ends, these internationalists were shaped by the tradition of nineteenth-century imperialist internationalism. By showing how they devised ways to replace national imperial control with international administration while maintaining Western hegemony and interests, the chapter contributes to a body of research underlining the imperialist legacy of liberal internationalism beyond the well-known case of the mandate system.[92]

Furthermore, the chapter throws a different light on the role of Wilsonian national self-determination during the Paris moment. The peacemakers' recognition of self-determination and sovereignty is commonly seen as

emancipation from a previously dependent or colonized status. The Peace Conference's assignment of national self-determination to the 'Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire',[93] on the contrary, was more of a degradation, linked to the argument that Turks could only legitimately determine their own fate, and not that of cosmopolitan communities. In the euphemistic wording of the King-Crane Commission report, freeing the Turks from the burden of Istanbul would leave Turkey 'at liberty to devote itself to the welfare of its own citizens [i.e. Turks/Muslims]'.[94]

This chapter has focused on the perspective of Western planners and internationalists. Muslims and Turks are largely absent precisely because they were deliberately marginalized in the schemes discussed here. The chapter thus ends with a brief change of perspective and what can only be loose remarks on some of the Ottoman-Turkish responses to the question of Istanbul. As mentioned above, Muslim Ottomans from various political camps resisted and protested any plan to detach and internationalize the city. Many evoked Wilson's Fourteen Points and stressed the alleged Turkishness of the capital to make their own case for national self-determination and sovereignty. Some countered the peace planners' emphasis on the city's cosmopolitanism and international importance by stressing a different kind of cosmopolitanism: referring to Istanbul's role as the seat of the Caliphate, they mobilized pan-Islamic solidarity networks to increase pressure on the Allies. After the Lausanne Conference 1922/23 confirmed the new Turkish state's sovereignty and territorial integrity in Anatolia, pan-Islamism lost its relevance for the secular state leadership, who abolished the Caliphate soon after. As a symbol of their break with the Ottoman past and of the new national identity, the government chose Ankara, not Istanbul, as the capital of the Republic of Turkey. Not only was Istanbul strongly associated with Ottoman-Islamic heritage; it also stood for the intertwined histories of ethnoreligious diversity and European imperialistic outreach, and thus for two sides of a cosmopolitanism that the new nationalist government strongly opposed.

Carolin Liebisch-Gümüş is a Research Fellow in Global and Transregional History at the German Historical Institute Washington. During her Ph.D., she worked on Turkey and the League of Nations. Her fields of research include international history, modern Ottoman-Turkish and German history as well as the history of mobility and migration.

Notes

1. That is, a cosmopolitan city. The use of the word 'cosmopolitan' in this chapter follows its contemporary usage by Americans and Europeans. In describing Istanbul as cosmopolitan, they referred not only to its multiethnic inhabitants but first and foremost to the extensive foreign influence on, and Western interests connected with, the city. On imperialist cosmopolitanism in the Ottoman Empire, see also Lafi, 'Kosmopolitismus als Governance', 329–32.
2. 'Christians Unsafe Where Turk rules', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1 March 1920.
3. Among the vast literature on the topic, it is the classic accounts that offer the most detail on the different partition schemes: Evans, *United States Policy*; Howard, *The Partition of Turkey*; Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres*.
4. The seminal work on the topic is Criss, *Istanbul under Allied Occupation*.
5. On resistance and the National Movement, see Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy*. For an overview of post-war peacemaking in the Middle East in general, see Fromkin, *A Peace to End all Peace*.
6. Most recently: Sluga, 'The International History of (International) Sovereignty'. See also, on the case of Danzig, Payk, '"Emblems of Sovereignty"'.
7. Already in 1821, France's foreign minister had received a proposal by a French officer to turn Istanbul, along with its surrounding territory and the Straits, into a 'State of the Powers of the Holy Alliance'. See Ydit, *Internationalised Territories*, 22–23.
8. All quotations in this paragraph are from Lorimer, *Studies National and International*, 121–31.
9. Among the many works in the rich literature on this topic, see Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization'*; Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, 40–41; Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations* (on Lorimer's chauvinistic worldview and legal theories, see 77–78 and 104–5). On Ottoman perspectives on imperialism and international law, see Genell, 'The Well-Defended Domains'.
10. Herren, 'International Organizations', 91–112, 95.
11. Eldem, 'Istanbul (Byzantium; Constantinople)', 290.
12. Kayaoğlu, *Legal Imperialism*, 104–34.
13. Autheman, *The Imperial Ottoman Bank*.
14. Uludağ, 'Son Kapitülasyonlardan Biri: Karantina'. On the founding of the Council, see Sarıyıldız, 'Karantina Meclisi'nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri'.
15. Birdal, *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt*.
16. Fuhrmann, 'Cosmopolitan Imperialists'. On expatriate community-building in the context of imperialistic internationalism, see also Herren, 'Strength through Diversity?'.
17. Ahmad, 'Ottoman Perception of the Capitulations', 10. On the disruption of expatriate communities in 1914, see Fuhrmann, 'Cosmopolitan Imperialists', 149.
18. Criss, *Istanbul Under Allied Occupation*, 4.
19. MacArthur-Seal, 'Resurrecting Legal Extraterritoriality'.
20. *The Times* (London), for example, stated that 'the unfitness of the Turk to determine the fate of any race but his own should be one of the axioms of any rational Eastern policy', and the American *Christian Science Monitor* cited politicians concluding that 'the Turks should be entirely wiped out of Europe and Constantinople be made an international port'. 'The Plight of Armenia', *The Times*, 2 May 1919, 13; 'Christians Unsafe Where Turk Rules', *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 March 1920, 2.
21. See the Allies' response to the Ottoman delegation in Paris: 'Answer to the Turkish Delegates (Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on 23rd June, 1919)', in Fuller and Dennett, *Papers*, vol. 6, 688–91.
22. Attrep, '"A State of Wretchedness and Impotence"', 7.
23. Rodogno, *Against Massacre*.

24. Criss, *Istanbul Under Allied Occupation*, 7; Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres*, 123, 192.
25. On the different schemes, see also Macfie, 'The British Decision'.
26. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 470.
27. Lorimer, *Studies National and International*, 123.
28. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 470.
29. For a detailed account of the history, travels, methods and conclusions of the commission, see Patrick, *America's Forgotten Middle East Initiative*.
30. Smith, 'Wilsonian Sovereignty'.
31. All quotes from the 'Report of the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey (The King-Crane Commission)', in Fuller and Dennett, *Papers*, vol. 12, 745–863.
32. Mehmet Şerif Paşa, Statement, ca. February 1919, CAC, Cambridge 2/107/18–19.
33. Letter from the Turkish Wilsonian League, 5 December 1918, HIA VW TURKEY T939.
34. Drummond to Kerr (copy of letter), 13 December 1919, LNA, R564-11-2432-2432. With slightly more careful wording: Drummond to Balfour (copy of letter), 13 December 1919; Drummond to Curzon, 13 December 1919, LNA, R564-11-2432-2432.
35. Drummond to Kerr, 13 December 1919.
36. In debates on League mandates, Drummond similarly backed Great Power interests: La Porte, 'Dissenting Voices', 453.
37. Noel-Baker to Colban, 31 December 1919, LNA, R564-11-2610-2432.
38. Drummond to Kerr, 13 December 1919.
39. Colban to Drummond, 16 December 1919, LNA, R564-11-2432-2432.
40. Nicolson to Drummond (copy of letter), 12 December 1919, LNA, R564-11-2475-2432.
41. Ibid.
42. Barros, *Office Without Power*, 102–4.
43. Stahn, *The Law and Practice*, 7.
44. Quoted in Drummond to Nicolson (copy of letter), 15 December 1919, LNA, R564-11-2475-2432.
45. Van Hammel, memo to Drummond, 16 December 1919, LNA, R564-11-2432-2432.
46. Drummond to Nicolson, 15 December 1919.
47. Quoted in ibid.
48. Van Hammel, memo to Drummond, 16 December 1919, LNA, R564-11-2432-2432.
49. The King-Crane Commission had also compared the future government of Istanbul to the Danube Commission, but they had made the point that governing a city was more complex than controlling river traffic, and thus argued against an international commission and instead for a single mandatory.
50. Nicolson to Drummond, 12 December 1919.
51. This second letter is mentioned in Barros, *Office Without Power*, 104.
52. Drummond to Kerr, 13 December 1919.
53. Or, in other words, it would mean that ownership of and control over the territory were one and the same – unlike in many other cases of international administration where they are split between different authorities. On this topic, see Wilde, *International Territorial Administration*.
54. Herren, 'Internationale Zwangsverwaltungen', 143–62.
55. *Hâdisat*, 9 February 1919, front page: استانبول جمیت اقوام مرکزیمی؟ : مهم حوادثلرمز
56. Ibid.: اورتهسنده [sic] اقریقانك و آسیا اوروپا According to the report, said politician was (probably Austen) Chamberlain.
57. Among others, the Briton Walter Long, First Lord of the Admiralty, the American journalist and historian Frank Herbert Simonds, and Arnold J. Toynbee are said to have at least briefly sympathized with the idea.
58. Herron to Chapuisat, 21 March 1919 (copy of letter), LoN item XVI, George Davis Herron papers [hereafter Herron papers], Volume XII, HIA.

59. Herron to Stovall, 20 March 1919 (copy of letter), LoN item XIV, Herron papers, HIA.
60. For a short biography, see Kenneth, 'Davies, David'.
61. David Davies et al., 'Constantinople an International City: Headquarters of Peace', *The Times*, 13 January 1920, 8.
62. David Davies, 'The Seat of the League of Nations', *The Times*, 15 October 1919, 8.
63. Davies, *An Unexampled Honour*, 7.
64. Ibid., 10.
65. Davies et al., 'Constantinople an International City'.
66. Davies, *An Unexampled Honour*, 11.
67. Ibid., 13.
68. Davies et al., 'Constantinople an International City'.
69. Herron to Wilson (copy of letter), 20 March 1919, LoN item XIV-A, Herron papers, HIA.
70. Davies, *An Unexampled Honour*, 11.
71. Ibid., 9.
72. Ibid., 4, 12.
73. Ibid., 11.
74. Ibid., 16.
75. Middleton Edwards to Herron (copy of letter), 20 March 1919, LoN item XIV-C, Herron papers, HIA.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. For biographical information, see Mehmet Zeki, *Türkiye Teracimi Ahval Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 3 (Istanbul, 1930–32), World Biographical Information System, entry no. Q13083.
80. Middleton Edwards, 'Constantinople: A European District of Columbia', 20 March 1919, LoN item XI-A, Herron papers, HIA.
81. Middleton Edwards to Herron (copy of letter), 22 February 1919, LoN item X, Herron papers, HIA.
82. Middleton Edwards, 'Constantinople: A European District of Columbia', 20 March 1919, LoN item XI-A, Herron papers, HIA.
83. David Davies, 'The Seat of the League of Nations', *The Times*, 15 October 1919, 8.
84. David Davies, 'Resolutions of the British League of Nations Union About the Revision of the Peace Treaty with Turkey', 21 May 1921, LNA, R585-11-8694-8692.
85. Schiller and Irving, *Whose Cosmopolitanism?*
86. For example, Prott, *The Politics of Self-Determination*.
87. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*, 470.
88. Sluga, 'The International History of (International) Sovereignty'.
89. For a critical overview, see Orford, 'Book Review Article'.
90. Stahn, *The Law and Practice*, 72.
91. On the topic, see Herren, 'Internationale Zwangsverwaltungen'.
92. Ibid.
93. A formulation from Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' speech.
94. 'Report of the American Section'.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge (CAC)
Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford (HIA)
League of Nations Archives, Geneva (LNA)

Published Sources

Ahmad, Feroz. 'Ottoman Perception of the Capitulations, 1800–1914'. *Journal of Islamic Studies* 11(1) (2000), 1–20.

Attrep, Abe. '"A State of Wretchedness and Impotence": A British View of Istanbul and Turkey, 1919'. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9(1) (1978), 1–9.

Autheman, André. *The Imperial Ottoman Bank*, trans. James Amery Underwood. Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2002.

Barros, James. *Office Without Power: Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond 1919–1933*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Birdal, Murat. *The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010.

Criss, Nur Bilge. *Istanbul under Allied Occupation 1918–1923*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999.

Davies, David. *An Unexampled Honour: A Suggestion Concerning the First Meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations*. London: Haycock Cadle and Graham Ltd, 1919.

Eldem, Edhem. 'Istanbul (Byzantium; Constantinople)', in Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (eds), *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Facts On File, 2009), 286–90.

Evans, Laurence. *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey 1914–1924*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.

Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End all Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Holt, 1989.

Fuhrmann, Malte. 'Cosmopolitan Imperialists and the Ottoman Port Cities: Conflicting Logics in the Urban Social Fabric'. *Cahiers de la Méditeranée* 67 (2003), 149–63.

Fuller, Joseph V. and Tyler Dennett (eds). *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. 6. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946.

——. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. 12. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947.

Genell, Aimee M. 'The Well-Defended Domains: Eurocentric International Law and the Making of the Ottoman Office of Legal Counsel'. *Journal of Ottoman and Turkish Studies* 3(2) (2016), 255–75.

Glick Schiller, Nina and Andrew Irving (eds). *Whose Cosmopolitanism? Critical Perspectives, Relationalities and Discontents*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2015.

Gong, Gerrit W. *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Helmreich, Paul C. *From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919–1920*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1974.

Herren, Madeleine. 'Strength through Diversity? The Paradox of Extra-territoriality and the History of the Odd Ones Out'. *Journal of the History of International Law* 22 (2020), 306–28.

——. 'International Organizations 1865–1945', in Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd and Ian Johnstone (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

——. 'Internationale Zwangsverwaltungen: Perspektiven einer postkolonialen Geschichte internationaler Organisationen', in Fabian Frommelt (ed.), *Zwangsadministrationen: Legitimierte Fremdverwaltung im historischen Vergleich, 17.–21. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014), 143–62.

Howard, Harry N. *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913–1923*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1966.

Iriye, Akira. *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1997.

Kayaoğlu, Turan. *Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Kenneth, Morgan O. 'Davies, David, first Baron Davies (1880–1944)', in H.C.G. Matthew (ed.), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: From the Earliest Times to 2000*, vol. 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 348–50.

Koskenniemi, Martti. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Lafi, Nora. 'Kosmopolitismus als Governance: Das Beispiel des osmanischen Reiches', in Bernhard Gißibl and Isabella Löhr (eds), *Bessere Welten: Kosmopolitismus in den Geschichtswissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2017), 317–42.

La Porte, Pablo. 'Dissenting Voices: The Secretariat of the League of Nations and the Drafting of Mandates, 1919–1923'. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 32(3) (2021), 440–63.

Lorimer, James. *Studies National and International, Being Occasional Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh 1864–1889*. Edinburgh: William Green and Sons, 1890.

MacArthur-Seal, Daniel-Joseph. 'Resurrecting Legal Extraterritoriality in Occupied Istanbul, 1918–1923'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 54(5) (2018), 769–87.

Macfie, Alexander Lyon. 'The British Decision Regarding the Future of Constantinople, November 1918–January 1920'. *The Historical Journal* 18(2) (1975), 391–400.

Orford, Anne. 'Book Review Article: International Territorial Administration and the Management of Decolonization'. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59(1) (2010), 227–49.

Patrick, Andrew. *America's Forgotten Middle East Initiative: The King-Crane Commission of 1919*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2015.

Payk, Markus M. '"Emblems of Sovereignty": The Internationalization of Danzig and the Polish Post Office Dispute, 1919–25', in Markus M. Payk and Roberta Pergher (eds), *Beyond Versailles: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and the Formation of New Polities after the Great War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2019), 215–36.

——. *Frieden durch Recht? Der Aufstieg des modernen Völkerrechts und der Friedensschluss nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018.

Prott, Volker. *The Politics of Self-Determination: Remaking Territories and National Identities in Europe, 1917–1923*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

'Report of the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey', in Joseph V. Fuller and Tyler Dennett (eds), *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. 12 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), 745–863.

Rodogno, Davide. *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Sarıyıldız, Gülden. 'Karantina Meclisi'nin Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri'. *TTK Belleten* 58(222) (1994), 329–76.

Sluga, Glenda. 'The International History of (International) Sovereignty', in Matthias Middell and Steffi Marung (eds), *Spatial Formats Under the Global Condition* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 257–74.

Smith, Leonard V. 'Wilsonian Sovereignty in the Middle East: The King-Crane Commission Report of 1919', in Douglas Howland and Luise S. White (eds), *The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws, Populations* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 56–74.

Sonyel, Salahi Ramsdan. *Turkish Diplomacy 1918–1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement*. London: Sage Publications, 1975.

Stahn, Carsten. *The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Uludağ, Osman Şevki. 'Son Kapitülasyonlardan Biri: Karantina'. *TTK Belleten* 2(7–8) (1938), 445–67.

Weitz, Eric D. 'From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions'. *American Historical Review* 113(5) (2008), 1313–43.

Wilde, Ralph. *International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Ydit, Méir. *Internationalised Territories: From the 'Free City of Cracow' to the 'Free City of Berlin'*. Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1961.

Chapter 10

Cultural Modernity, Political Maturity and Modern Womanhood
Soumay Tcheng's Feminist Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference

Mona L. Siegel

Sometime in late 1919, the British newspaper the *Daily Mail* published a lavish book titled *The Peace Conference in Pictures*: undoubtedly one of the first commemorative retrospectives on the historic negotiations that had unfolded in Paris at the end of the First World War. Boasting sixty-one pages of black-and-white photographs, all taken by *Daily Mail* photojournalist Victor Console, the book offers a gripping visual representation of the people and places that commanded the world's attention for the first six months of 1919. Allied generals in polished boots, Arab attachés astride camels, and an Indian maharaja appear in its pages. So too do a group of Greek guards standing attentively in tasselled shoes, and two Polish peasants bundled warmly in fur caps. Most of all, the book portrays dozens of Allied diplomats: men in starched collars and neckties who came to Paris in the winter of 1919 to remake the world.[1]

What the book contains little of in its otherwise panoramic snapshot of the Peace Conference is women. A mere handful of female faces can be discerned among the sea of statesmen. Two typists pose with hands on their machines, a female translator stands with the members of the Labour Commission, and a trio of Alsatian girls celebrate the Festival of St. Joan of Arc. A few wives appear dutifully at their husbands' sides, while the British-born Queen Marie of Romania is caught in conversation with the Belgian king. As far as women go, that is about it. All, that is, but for one last enigmatic figure staring determinedly out from the top of page four (Figure 10.1). With a hat tipped fashionably on her head and shoulders covered by a fur stole, the female subject of this portrait – the only woman pictured alone in the entire book – stands out from the

Figure 10.1. Victor Console, *The Peace Conference in Pictures* (Paris: The Continental Daily Mail, 1919), p. 4, public domain.

crowd in almost every imaginable way. Not only is she female but she is also young and Chinese. 'Mlle. Chang', the caption reads, 'a Chinese revolutionary, once condemned to death, who came to lay her views before the Peace Conference'.[2] Who was this woman who has all but disappeared from historical accounts of 1919?

Soumay Tcheng (given name Zheng Yuxiu, married name Madame Wei Tao-ming) was indeed a revolutionary who helped topple the Qing dynasty.[3] She was also a bomb-smuggler, a would-be assassin, a law student, a feminist and, most remarkable of all, an official delegate to the Paris Peace Conference: the only Allied woman sent to the French capital with such authoritative credentials behind her name. Although Victor Console had no way of knowing it as he focused his lens on her serious gaze in April 1919, Soumay Tcheng was poised to make history. Two months after this photo was taken, Tcheng would engineer a dramatic, eleventh-hour confrontation with Lu Zhengxiang, China's chief delegate to the Peace Conference, to prevent her country from signing the Versailles Treaty.

Tcheng's actions in defence of her nation in 1919 had dramatic diplomatic ramifications for the nascent Chinese republic. They also signalled a much broader movement of global female activism catalysed by the Paris Peace Conference. Tcheng was one of dozens of feminists who travelled to the French capital – and one of thousands of women who congregated, petitioned and protested around the world – boldly insisting that a peace settlement could be neither just nor enduring unless it was built with women's active collaboration. Like Tcheng, these women believed that the peacemakers could not build a stable world rooted in *national* self-determination if they did not attend to the equally pressing need of

guaranteeing women's right to *individual* self-determination within the constituent nations of the international community.

China's perilous position in the peace negotiations, we will see here, forced Tcheng to put her feminist ambitions on the back burner in the spring of 1919, but even as she championed her nation's interests, Tcheng's commitment to women's equality never wavered. Through her unconventional diplomacy on behalf of her nation at the Paris Peace Conference, Tcheng firmly wed China's claim to sovereignty to female emancipation. Once back home in China, moreover, Tcheng would inject feminist concerns into the heart of the May Fourth Movement and the Nationalist Republic it nurtured. In tandem with women from across North America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East, Tcheng seized upon the promise of the 1919 peace negotiations to demand that male statesmen welcome women as equal partners in the construction of a just and peaceful world.

From Revolutionary to Diplomat

Born in 1891, Soumay Tcheng began paving the path that would eventually lead to Paris early in life. A self-described 'problem child' growing up in a very wealthy Mandarin family in the southern port city of Guangzhou, Tcheng staged her first major rebellion around the age of six, when her grandmother attempted to bind her feet to prepare her for a life of domesticity. Tcheng wanted nothing of it. Tearing off the bandages, the young girl screamed until her grandmother relented.[4] The showdown was a prelude of things to come. As a teenager, Tcheng would refuse an arranged marriage because her intended husband did not approve of 'modern, educated women'.[5] Tcheng's actions heaped dishonour on her family, and to save face, her father, an official in the Manchu court in Beijing, packed her off to an American missionary school in Tianjin. Tcheng was delighted. She began to learn English and 'applied (herself)', she says, 'to diligently acquiring some knowledge of the modern world'.[6]

Where did the young Chinese woman acquire her defiant streak? Later in life, Tcheng would attribute her rebelliousness to her mother, a woman who suffered visibly from the customs that severely constricted the life choices of so many elite Chinese women in the late Qing dynasty: lack of formal education, limited mobility due to bound feet and inability to choose her own husband. Tcheng's earliest memories were of sitting on her mother's lap listening to the story of Hua Mulan, China's legendary woman warrior who disguised herself as a man to replace her father on the battlefield, winning glory for her nation and honour for her family.

'I never grew tired of hearing about her', Tcheng would later recall, 'and begged for the story over and over again'. As an adult, Tcheng would view the story as 'a projection of the dreams [my mother] held originally for herself and later gave to me'.[7]

Tcheng's early rebelliousness transformed into revolutionary fervour in Tianjin, a city known for its undercurrent of political dissent. There, Tcheng learned of Dr Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui), which was plotting to overthrow the inept Manchu regime. During a brief stay in Japan in 1905, Tcheng swore herself to the republican cause and returned home to establish her father's home in Beijing as a secret revolutionary headquarters.[8] In the years that followed, southern China rose up in revolt, and Tcheng's revolutionary cell, the 'Dare to Die' unit, was ordered to prepare for a final confrontation with the imperial government in Beijing. Heeding the call, Tcheng volunteered to smuggle bombs from the coast to the capital city. For three months, twice a week, Tcheng travelled the train route from Tianjin to Beijing, carrying suitcases loaded with explosives. In mid-February 1912, the Dowager Empress formally abdicated the throne, and Sun Yat-sen recognized Chinese premier Yuan Shikai (who claimed to be the only person capable of unifying the country) as provisional president of a new Republic of China.[9]

Tcheng was unable to enjoy victory for long. One of the first acts of Yuan Shikai's provisional government was to disband the women's armies that fought in the revolution.[10] Soon after, the new national parliament announced that women would not be allowed to vote or hold elected office.[11] In the spring and summer of 1912, Tcheng joined Tang Qunying and other Chinese feminists in demanding the parliament recognize women's political rights. In one famous incident, having been denied entry to the parliament building, the women smashed windowpanes and staged an hours-long protest outside, demanding female suffrage, but the provisional government held firm.[12] Returning to Tianjin, Tcheng founded a fortnightly women's newspaper in which she continued to advocate for women's rights as well as to denounce Yuan's autocratic government.[13] Yuan tried to buy her off, and when that failed, he issued orders for her execution: information relayed to Tcheng quietly by a family friend.[14] To get her out of harm's way, in late 1913, Tcheng's parents put her on a ship bound for France.[15]

A Chinese Woman in Paris

Tcheng's chosen destination was not serendipitous. In 1912, in addition to publishing articles in the feminist and republican press, Tcheng

had enrolled in a study group for young Chinese women interested in pursuing an education in France.[16] 'Before I even touched foot on shore', Tcheng recalls, 'I was a most ardent Francophile. To me, France was the mother and progenitor of everything I believed in: the words *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, were wonderful living ideas, not just cold letters engraved in stone over a classic doorway; and I felt an emotional kinship with the French whose grandfathers had given their lives in the cause of freedom.'[17] Her initial months in France were difficult ones. 'I was very lonely', Tcheng would later confess. She struggled to learn the language, and she was shocked to discover that many French people saw her more 'as a savage than an equal'.[18] Tcheng suffered from such overt displays of cultural racism, though she would eventually learn to manipulate Western stereotypes about the East to serve her own ends. In the meantime, her unconquerable spirit began to work its magic on the French. Within a year she began to pick up the rudiments of the language, and her home became a lively gathering space for overseas Chinese and a growing circle of French and American friends.[19]

Just as Tcheng began to acclimate to her life abroad, however, Europe erupted in war. Later in life, she would remember soldiers bidding farewell to their loved ones at the train station and Parisian taxi drivers ferrying soldiers to the front. Undaunted by the conflict, in 1915 she entered the Sorbonne to study law.[20] An ardent supporter of the Allied cause, Tcheng began addressing public meetings advocating that China join France, Britain and (later) the United States in the fight against the Central Powers. In late 1916, Tcheng paused her studies to return home to recruit Chinese labourers to come to France's aid. Ultimately, some 140,000 Chinese men would heed the call.[21] Back in Paris in August the following year, she addressed a mass meeting at the Sorbonne, convened to celebrate China's declaration of war. Tcheng was proud, she told the audience, to see China array itself 'against the enemies of democracy and freedom'.[22]

When news of the 11 November Armistice reached Asia, the Chinese people were elated. Having helped the Allies to secure victory, China would now have a seat at the peace table and, they hoped, finally achieve Great Power status. Specifically, China hoped to recover Shandong, a wealthy coastal province to the southeast of Beijing, which the Germans had claimed as a territorial concession in the late nineteenth century and to which the Japanese had laid claim during the war.[23]

These goals were complicated by China's own internal divisions. Yuan Shikai had died of natural causes in 1916, and China had broken into a series of competing warlord states, with two main centres of power. In Beijing, the northern government claimed to be the legitimate ruling body,

while Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Party (now known as the *Guomindang*) established a competing government in the south. In order to advance China's interests in Paris, the two governments agreed to nominate a single slate of delegates to the Peace Conference. Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang, appointed by the Beijing government, would serve as the chief delegate. He and four other plenipotentiaries, including the Chinese ambassador to the United States, V.K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), were joined by some sixty official attachés tasked with helping the delegation achieve its goals. Tcheng, who was in southern China at war's end, was appointed to this elite list by the Nationalist government in Guangzhou. Charged with serving as a press liaison as well as with representing Chinese women at the Peace Conference, Tcheng prepared to return to France as an official representative of her party and state.[24]

Tcheng hurriedly packed her bags and left for Europe via Vancouver, Seattle and New York, and finally by steamer across the Atlantic. From the moment she arrived in North America on 4 March 1919, Tcheng embraced the media spotlight. Western journalists returned the favour, singing the praises of the vivacious spokeswoman whom they touted as a 'one of the most brilliant and highly-educated girls that ever came out of China'.[25] Speaking to reporters, Tcheng drove home the message that China had freed itself from Manchu rule in the Revolution of 1911, had allied itself on the side of democracy during the war, and was now prepared to take its place among the Great Powers. Western journalists made note of her feminist credentials. She is 'almost a Chinese suffragette', the *Vancouver Daily World* declared.[26]

In these and other interviews in North America, Tcheng rehearsed rhetorical strategies that would become an integral part of her diplomacy abroad. She described China as a nation awakening from the dark ages of Manchu rule. She insisted the Chinese people were peace-loving and on the verge of establishing a unified democracy. Finally, and most significantly, Tcheng began sharing her life story to serve nationalist ends. Western journalists described her youthful rebellion in colourful detail and drew parallels between Tcheng's political awakening and China's own. 'For a Chinese woman to be fitted for public service abroad, and to undertake such a journey independently, may seem a small matter', concluded one particularly popular story, which ran in dozens of newspapers across North America, 'but after all, it is a milestone toward modernism in the progress of an ancient race'.[27] Pleased at the attention she garnered and encouraged by her 'pleasant experience with the American press', Tcheng boarded a ship in New York and crossed the Atlantic to fulfil her mandate as a member of China's peace delegation.[28]

Rosebush Gun Diplomacy

Tcheng arrived in Paris on 6 April 1919, and again Western journalists were on hand to greet her at the station. The French newspaper *Excelsior* hailed Tcheng as a 'Chinese Feminist and Sincere Francophile' and guessed that she had returned to France to collaborate with Western suffragists, who had been actively lobbying for female representation in the peace negotiations.[29] *Le Petit Parisien* offered a slightly different suggestion: Tcheng had come to join forces with a 'feminist peace group', most likely referring to the large group of feminist peace activists, led by the American future Nobel Peace Prize winner Jane Addams, who were convening in Zürich to lay out women's vision of an equitable peace.[30] American journalists continued to keep tabs on China's 'Revolutionette' in Europe too. 'One of the most popular misses in Paris today', one syndicated story proclaimed, 'is Mademoiselle Tcheng', who has come to Paris to 'aid world feminists in presenting women's claims to the peace congress'.[31] Tcheng too told reporters that feminist questions were 'uppermost in her mind', but no sooner had she unpacked her bags than news began to leak that the Supreme Council planned to award China's Shandong Province to Japan.[32] Putting matters of women's rights temporarily aside, Tcheng sprang to the aid of her beleaguered country.

Despite Allied sympathy for China's position at the Peace Conference, when it came to the fate of Shandong, matters of *realpolitik* won out over moral principles. When Japan entered the First World War in 1914, one of its first moves had been to seize Shandong from the Germans and strong-arm Yuan Shikai's government into recognizing the legitimacy of the Japanese occupation.[33] At the Peace Conference, China's delegates argued that their government had only signed away rights to Shandong under duress. Woodrow Wilson, who abhorred secret treaties and was wary of Japanese imperialism, was inclined to agree. In early April, however, Wilson had rejected Japan's proposal to include a clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations prohibiting member states from discriminating on the basis of race. The Japanese were incensed, and Wilson feared alienating them further. On 30 April 1919, he announced the Supreme Council's decision to recognize Japanese rights to Shandong.[34]

News of the Allies' betrayal hit Beijing like a bombshell. On 4 May 1919, university students poured into the streets of the northern capital in angry demonstrations. The May Fourth Incident, as the protests would collectively be called, quickly spread to other cities and to Chinese abroad, where intellectuals and workers joined with students to express their dismay and to demand that the Chinese delegation reject the peace

treaty.[35] It was a pivotal moment in China's evolution as a modern, independent state.[36]

In the meantime, in Paris, the news that Shandong would be granted to the Japanese propelled China's female delegate into action. On May 4, while students were gathering in Beijing, Tcheng began meeting with overseas Chinese students and workers to devise a response. Organized as the 'Chinese Society for the Promotion of International Peace', the group decided to approach the leaders of the major powers to demand China be treated fairly in the peace negotiations. On May 9, the same group, along with members of the Chinese delegation, staged a public protest in Paris attended by over five hundred people. At the meeting, Western journalists reported, 'Miss Tcheng, a well-known feminist' addressed the crowd and 'severely criticized' the decision on Shandong. China, she insisted, could not sign a treaty that offered only a 'dark future' for her people.[37]

The question of whether to endorse the Versailles Treaty consumed the Chinese delegation right up until the signing ceremony on 28 June 1919. The May Fourth protests demonstrated clear public opposition, and most of the Chinese delegation was opposed to signing as well, but chief plenipotentiary Lu Zhengxiang refused to commit to a course of action without official instructions from Beijing. Such orders never came. Lu was torn, and on 27 June, on the eve of the signing ceremony, he disappeared from Paris entirely.[38]

When Tcheng and her group of Chinese students and workers in Paris got word of Lu's disappearance, they feared the worst, convinced that the chief delegate had slipped out of the capital to travel to the signing ceremony unimpeded by angry protestors. Such concerns were only amplified when Tcheng learned from a fellow delegate's wife that Lu had taken up temporary residence in the western suburb of St. Cloud, conveniently located on the road between Paris and Versailles. Leaving word for the others to follow as quickly as possible, Tcheng and a friend took a taxi straight to St. Cloud, determined to track down the errant chief delegate.[39]

The two co-conspirators found the address without a problem, but Lu refused to open the door. By nightfall, several hundred Chinese students and workers had joined them. The restless group was milling around the garden outside the residence when an automobile drove up carrying the secretary to the Chinese delegation: an older man who dashed from the car to the house with a 'bulging brief-case under his arm'. Sensing trouble, Tcheng and the others agreed that they needed to get their hands on the documents he carried. In an act worthy of her childhood heroine, Hua Mulan, Tcheng 'armed' herself in defence of her nation

by snapping a branch off a nearby rosebush and rubbing it in the dirt until it resembled a firearm. When the secretary finally emerged from the house, Tcheng 'stepped out of the shadows in front of him and pointed (her) rosebush gun right at him'.[40] Years later, Chinese plenipotentiary Wellington Koo, who was at the St. Cloud residence that evening, would describe the secretary's alarming experience as he attempted to leave the house: 'Two or three minutes after he left he rushed back in looking pale. He told the Foreign Minister that he had been attacked in the garden. … The crowd closed in on him … they threatened to kill him, and one of the members, a girl student actually pointed a pistol at him through her overcoat pocket.' The 'girl' in question, Koo said, was Soumay Tcheng.[41]

Tcheng and her co-conspirators stood vigil in the garden through the night. Around 10:00 the next morning, Lu agreed to hear them out. 'We stated our case', Tcheng would later write, 'and as usual, I fear I did a good deal of the talking'. As the hour of the signing ceremony drew near, Tcheng recalls, 'Mr. (Lu) still sat – a crumpled and sulky figure in a chair, with us firing verbal ammunition at him from all sides. … The hour came and went. Mr. (Lu) did not go to Versailles.' On 28 June 1919, China became the only Allied country to refuse to sign the Versailles Treaty, in part due to the determination of the nation's female peace delegate, Soumay Tcheng.[42]

Flapper Diplomacy

As an official delegate to the Peace Conference, Tcheng rose up in a spirited defence of China's right to national self-determination and played a central role in a pivotal moment in her nation's history, but what about the feminist issues that Tcheng hoped to champion when she first stepped off the train in Paris? Tcheng would tell reporters later in 1919 that she 'gave up all idea of doing anything for the women of China as soon as the [Shandong] award was made to Japan'.[43] It is true that pressing diplomatic concerns drew Tcheng away from the various feminist initiatives she might have contributed to in Europe that spring. But in direct and indirect ways, Tcheng's unconventional diplomacy of 1919 was deeply informed by her feminist commitments and foretold a future dedicated to championing women's equality.

The Nationalist government specifically charged Tcheng with two seemingly distinct responsibilities at the Peace Conference: serving as a media liaison and representing Chinese women. In fact, Tcheng combined the two roles by using her own image to cement the idea – both at home and abroad – that emancipated womanhood was central to China's

emergence as a modern state. As an appointed representative of her nation, Tcheng quickly came to realize the fascination that she evoked among a Western population culturally conditioned to see Chinese women as submissive and subjugated: one sign among many, they thought, of the politically immature state of 'the Orient'. Tcheng sought to undo such stereotypes. By promoting herself as the embodiment of modern China, she firmly linked her nation's political maturity to female emancipation.

The effectiveness of this strategy is strikingly apparent in the interview that Tcheng granted to the *Daily Mail* in April 1919, almost certainly at the time that Victor Console snapped the photograph that would appear in *The Peace Conference in Pictures*. Andrée Viollis, the French reporter who interviewed Tcheng for the *Daily Mail*, was a feminist herself, a pioneering journalist and intrepid New Woman.[44] Despite her cosmopolitan background, however, Viollis was dumbfounded when she met Tcheng, and she crafted her amazement into the lead paragraph for the article: 'Confess it', she began. 'What do you know – what do most of us – know of China?' Poetry, light opera, polychrome figures on vases, she wrote, all evoke images of 'ladies dressed in glowing silks with curved-up eyes, long pointed nails, and painfully small, mutilated feet'. Some are even prone to view China as 'barbarous', but such old-fashioned thinking, Viollis warned, 'is not only ridiculous; it may, it will, become a serious danger'.[45]

In both North America and in Europe in 1919, Tcheng artfully fashioned her dress, mannerisms and linguistic skills to embody Chinese modernity for a Western audience. Her style was anything but accidental. 'Miss Tcheng', stated the *Vancouver Daily World*, 'does not dream of wearing her oriental costume of silk trousers and loose jacket. Her hair is done in a strictly modern new world fashion and her clothing bears the stamp of Paris dressmakers'.[46] Knee-length skirts, transparent stockings, bare arms and bobbed hair were all the unofficial uniform of the Modern Woman, and Tcheng wore them well. Dozens of French, British and American newspapers published photos of Tcheng, and almost all commented on her choice of fashion. In December 1919, for example, the *New York Times* printed a head-to-toe picture of Tcheng, claiming to depict the Chinese attaché in her first 'Occidental Costume' (Figure 10.2). A decade later, when Tcheng would return to France and the United States on another diplomatic mission, multiple American newspapers would publish a close-up photograph of the Chinese envoy in bobbed hair, declaring, 'Here is Mlle. Soume Tcheng, typical representative of the modern Chinese flapper' (Figure 10.3).[47] Articles on Tcheng's diplomacy moved seamlessly from discussing her disappointment with the peace negotiations to describing her 'modern European garb'.[48]

Figure 10.2. Portrait of Soumay Tcheng in the *New York Times*, 14 December 1919, public domain.

FROM CHINA — Here is Mlle. Soume Tcheng, typical representative of the modern Chinese flapper, as she arrived in Paris the other day on a government mission. She is president of the Supreme Tribunal of Shanghai, and is trying to foster friendship between the Nanking government and European countries. At one time Mlle. Tcheng is said to have carried bombs for the Nationalist government in China.

Figure 10.3. Portrait of Soumay Tcheng in the *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 15 June 1928, public domain.

Granted, newspapers often commented on women's clothing in the early twentieth century, regardless of the wearer's ethnicity or country of origin. What was unique in Tcheng's case was journalists' tendency to equate Tcheng's style with the cultural and political evolution of an entire nation. In her April 1919 *Daily Mail* article, Viollis made this equation explicit. 'Yesterday', Viollis wrote, 'while Mlle. Cheng, wearing a dainty Parisian dress, her dark lustrous eyes glowing with sincerity in her delicate ivory face, was talking to me, now in French and now in English, about her mission to Paris and all the peace problems, young China stood suddenly revealed to me with its great possibilities, its aims,

its ideals'.[49] In adopting the demeanour of New Womanhood, Tcheng promoted herself as the personification of a modern, liberated nation that was ready to emerge as a Great Power in the international arena. The French newspaper *Le Figaro* captured the effect in a 1920 article proclaiming that Tcheng 'incarnates the modern soul of her country'.[50] Throughout her many years in the West, including several more as a law student in France in the 1920s, an official diplomatic visit to Europe at the behest of the Nationalist government in 1928, and a stint as the wife of the Chinese ambassador to the United States during the Second World War, Tcheng embraced self-presentation as a diplomatic tool; her clothing, style and deportment were always a studied reflection of her feminist and nationalist ideals.[51] In associating cultural modernity, political maturity and liberated womanhood, Tcheng worked simultaneously to advance the interests of China as a sovereign nation and of Chinese women as citizens deserving of civil and political rights.

Feminism and Nationalism

If the Shandong question overrode all other concerns for Tcheng in Paris in 1919, women's rights were never far from her mind. Indeed, for Tcheng, like for many other women from the colonized world in the early twentieth century, feminism and nationalism appeared as two sides of the same coin. In Asia and the Middle East, women battled simultaneously for sovereignty on multiple fronts: they fought for national emancipation from Western and imperial subjugation even as they pursued personal emancipation from discriminatory customs and laws.[52] To Tcheng, working to safeguard Chinese democracy and sovereignty was the surest means of advancing women's status in society and securing their political rights.

Tcheng was already drawing this link in interviews with American journalists on her way home from Paris in late 1919. In a widely syndicated article that first appeared in the *New York Tribune*, Tcheng asserted, 'Chinese women believe that the greatest handicap they have to face is the Japanese military influence in China.' In making this claim, Tcheng bolstered the Chinese delegation's case for Shandong and tied women's interests directly to the establishment of a peaceful, united and autonomous republican state. Tcheng elaborated: 'All over my country women are working for the progress of the republic. I am sure that when the time comes for a woman to take her place in the Chinese Parliament, there will be no opposition to her on the score that she is a woman.'[53] Less than a decade later, Tcheng would fulfil her own prophecy, becoming a member

of the Nationalist government's provisional parliament (Legislative Yuan).[54] From this post, Tcheng would find herself in an unparalleled position to translate Chinese feminist objectives directly into concrete law.

Tcheng's feminist commitments became even more central to her activism after the 1919 Peace Conference. In 1920, Tcheng toured China giving lectures about her experiences in Paris. In these speeches, Tcheng drew a direct link between China's emergence as a global power and female emancipation. At one such public engagement in Chongqing, for example, Tcheng 'dwelt on the war and the Peace Conference, the part that the new China must play in world affairs, and [emphasized] the important role of women[,] who must have every opportunity for education if they were to exercise their rights'.[55] Such speeches found a receptive audience. When Tcheng returned to France in 1921 to continue her legal education, she was accompanied by twenty young Chinese female wards determined to pursue advanced educational opportunities in France.[56] 'Today', reported the French paper *L'Illustration*, 'by welcoming and guiding … her sisters from the Far East', Tcheng 'is consecrating her lively intelligence and tireless activity to a peaceful mission that serves her ideas as a renovator of Chinese feminism' (Figure 10.4).[57]

In 1925, the Sorbonne awarded Tcheng a doctorate in law, making her the first Chinese woman to earn such a degree. Tcheng's achievement was heralded around the world. 'The scene was historic', enthused the American magazine *Good Housekeeping*.[58] Feminists in Egypt agreed, running a picture of Tcheng in her graduation robes in their monthly periodical *L'Egyptienne* under the caption '[T]he great female figures of the Orient'.[59] With degree in hand, Tcheng returned home the following year and set up a legal practice in Shanghai with her Sorbonne classmate (and future husband) Wei Tao-ming. In so doing, Tcheng became China's first practising female lawyer, representing women in some of the nation's first modern divorce proceedings. 'I was rather pleased', Tcheng would remember, 'because I felt that it was an opportunity to start helping the many unhappy Chinese women in their struggle for freedom'.[60]

In 1928, after the Guomindang secured control over the whole of China, Tcheng married Wei Tao-ming and accepted a position on the Supreme Tribunal of Shanghai, making her China's first female judge. Soon after, Tcheng left the court to return to the United States and Europe for several months as a government emissary, sent abroad to reassure the West of the purported liberal and democratic intentions of the new Chinese Nationalist regime. The French government hailed her return, bestowing upon her its highest civilian award, the *Légion d'honneur*, for her work promoting Sino-French relations.[61] French journalists also

Une féministe chinoise à Paris : Mlle Soumé Tcheng, et trois de ses jeunes compagnes.

Figure 10.4. Portrait of Soumay Tcheng in *L'Illustration*, 19 February 1921, public domain.

welcomed back China's 'charming diplomat', although one reporter could not help but point out the irony of the French government's extending a warm welcome to the 'ultra-modern Madame Soumé Tcheng' even as it continued to deny French women political rights.[62] Tcheng had in fact supported French suffragists in their campaign for the vote during her student days in Paris.[63] Now back in France, she used her celebrity to draw attention to Chinese women's emancipation since the end of the Qing dynasty. 'I wonder', Tcheng said during one speaking engagement in Nice, 'if the world realized that women revolted in China at the same time as the political revolution took place. … Men and women started to overthrow existing conditions at the same time and the result was that the women found themselves in a position of equality which otherwise would have taken them years to reach'.[64]

Americans were equally eager to welcome Tcheng as she passed through the United States again on her return trip to China. Upon arriving in San Francisco on 4 July 1928, Tcheng and her travel companions (including her husband) were greeted by enthusiastic crowds, 'who led their guests in an impromptu celebration and parade up Market Street'.[65] 'Even in the land of age-old customs', another journalist covering her visit reported, 'the ranks of the dominant male are being broken by the feminist revolt'.[66] Back in China, Tcheng was approached by the Nationalist government to see if she would accept a position as Chinese ambassador to France. 'It would have been a great honor to be the first Chinese woman to represent her country in such an important European post', she would later write. But by then, Tcheng had an ailing mother to take care of, and she declined.[67]

Tcheng's decision to remain in China after 1928 proved fortunate, for it was followed by an appointment to the Nationalist government's provisional parliament, the Legislative Yuan. In this capacity, Tcheng was tapped to serve on a five-member commission charged with drafting a new Chinese Civil Code. 'My advice was chiefly sought where women's rights were concerned', she would later recount. 'I always fought for equality.'[68] The resulting Republican Civil Code, which recognized equal inheritance rights between brothers and sisters, endowed married women in China with full legal capacity, allowed them free choice in selection of a marriage partner, and codified their right to control their own property, represented, in many respects, the culmination of Tcheng's battle for women's self-determination, which had been inherent in her fight for national self-determination ever since the 1919 Peace Conference.[69]

Civil rights crucial to Chinese women's equality and happiness thus became entrenched in the Nationalist period and have been sustained ever since, regardless of whether the Nationalists or the Communists

were in power.[70] China's Tutelage Constitution of 1931 promised women full political rights as well, although the Nationalists delayed holding democratic elections in the 1930s, and the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 led to the suspension of many constitutional rights.[71] The Second World War put further democratic reform on hold indefinitely.

Tcheng, for her part, would enjoy one more diplomatic stint, this time in the more traditionally gendered role of ambassador's wife, when her husband, Wei Tao-ming, was appointed to represent China, first in Vichy, France, and then in Washington DC in the middle of the Second World War. Once again, Tcheng found herself in the position of defending China against Japanese militarism, this time in the company of a powerful American ally. In interviews with American journalists in the mid-1940s, Tcheng harkened back to the warnings she had issued about Japanese designs on China as a peace delegate in 1919. She also leveraged her diplomatic experience to call for a substantive role for women in international policymaking after 1945. 'Women', she insisted, 'should play a large part in the writing of the peace after the war'.[72] 'Having seen one world peace conference in action', one journalist reported, 'Mme. Wei is keenly anxious that women shall be represented at the next peace table'.[73] As the lone female diplomat at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Tcheng was severely limited in her ability to act on feminist concerns. A quarter century and another bloody world war later, she hoped that female peacemakers would no longer be an anomaly and their interests would help shape the world to come.

Conclusion: Soumay Tcheng and the Advent of Global Feminism

Tcheng's remarkable career as a revolutionary, diplomat, lawyer, judge and legislator made her anything but a typical woman of her generation, in China or anywhere in the world. Western journalists struggled to find language to describe her. 'Soumay Tcheng is a torch, an oriflamme – anything you like that is sufficiently moving and colorful – in women's break for freedom', ventured one California paper.[74] Few women past or present seemed her match. Joan of Arc sprang to the mind of one Montana reporter, who wrote, '[Tcheng] was driven by a power akin to that which drove the Maid of Orleans to fight for France.'[75] The Chinese drew different analogies. To the Secretary to the Chinese Consulate in New York, Tcheng's 1919 diplomacy earned her a place among China's pantheon of women warriors, dating back to the legendary Hua Mulan.[76]

Such a comparison would have pleased Tcheng; yet, in most respects, China's female peace delegate foreshadowed women's political future far more than she reflected their mythical past. In simultaneously demanding national self-determination for her country and individual self-determination for her sex at the Paris Peace Conference, Tcheng helped both launch and inspire a wave of anti-colonial feminism in the Global South, the effects of which were already being felt across Asia and the Middle East in 1919. In that year, catalysed by the Peace Conference, women participated actively in nationwide anticolonial revolts in Egypt and Korea, voicing demands for national sovereignty and democratic governance.[77] At the same time, Indian feminists were pushing their way into the halls of parliament in London to demand women's suffrage along with expansive rights to Home Rule in the British Raj.[78] In the years after 1919, Soumay Tcheng became something of icon, celebrated not only in Europe, the United States and Egypt but also in Indochina, where, in 1927, nationalist Phan Boi Chau called for Annamite schoolgirls to be taught about Tcheng's life to encourage them to challenge both traditional gender roles and French colonial rule.[79]

Nor was Tcheng alone in promoting women's rights in the French capital at the end of the First World War. Western feminists worked tirelessly throughout the winter and spring of 1919 to bring women's demands before the plenipotentiaries. In dozens of meetings with male diplomats, and in two hard-won hearings before the League of Nations Commission and the Labour Commission, Western suffragists repeatedly warned world leaders that an enduring peace could not be built to the exclusion of half of humanity. In separate conferences that year in Paris, Zürich and Washington DC, Pan-Africanist, pacifist and labour feminists issued their own urgent appeals, calling for peace terms that explicitly recognized the fundamental humanity and equality of all people, regardless of sex, race, class or nationality. In 1919, such pleas generally fell on deaf ears, but for Soumay Tcheng and other feminists from around the world who seized the international stage during the Paris Peace Conference – and who proceeded to build thriving national, international and transnational movements in the decades that followed – they also served as a clarion call for ongoing feminist activism and for a radically reimagined diplomatic agenda firmly rooted in democracy and human rights.[80]

Mona L. Siegel is Professor of History at California State University, Sacramento. She has published extensively on global feminism during and after the First World War, including articles in *French Historical Studies*, *Gender & History*, the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*. She is the

author of the prize-winning book *Peace on Our Terms: The Global Battle for Women's Rights After the First World War* (Columbia, 2020), published in French translation as *Artisanes de la paix: La lutte mondiale pour les droits des femmes après la Grande Guerre* (Des femmes-Antoinette Fouque, 2022).

Notes

1. My heartfelt thanks to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to the College of Arts and Letters and the Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activities subcommittee at California State University, Sacramento for generously funding this research. This chapter expands on Chapter 5 of my book, Siegel, *Peace on Our Terms*, published in French translation as *Artisanes de la paix*.
2. *The Peace Conference in Pictures*, Paris: The Continental Daily Mail, 1919, 4. Retrieved February 2022 from https://archive.org/details/peaceconferencei00dail/page/n9. An unidentified woman also appears in the book in a photo of the German delegation arriving in Vaucresson. The woman could be Marie Juchacz, whom French feminists reported as having been appointed as a technical advisor to the German delegation. See 'Une Allemande déléguée à la Conférérence de la paix', *La Française*, 29 March 1919.
3. When she first came to Europe in 1913, Zheng Yuxiu went by the name Soumay Tcheng, but Western journalists still struggled with how to render it in writing. Her given name was commonly spelled Soumay in English and Soumé in French. Her family name was usually written Tcheng, but Cheng and other spellings were employed as well. In the 1940s and 1950s, she generally went by her married name, Madame Wei Tao-ming. This chapter, which focuses on her diplomatic relations with the West, will refer to her as Soumay Tcheng unless her name appears otherwise in a direct quote.
4. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 5. Tcheng published two earlier versions of her memoir, one in French and one in English. While I rely most heavily on the 1943 edition, as it provides the most detail on 1919, I cross-reference all three here. See Tcheng and Van Vorst, *Souvenirs d'enfance*; and Van Vorst, *A Girl from China*.
5. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 25.
6. Ibid., 28.
7. Ibid., 1 and 5.
8. Tcheng's parents did not initially know of her revolutionary sympathies, but her older brother did and helped facilitate her activities. See Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 41–54. On Sun Yat-sen and the Tongmenghui, see Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 454–65.
9. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 55–62, and Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 473–74.
10. Edwards, *Gender, Politics, and Democracy*, 31–64; Edwards, *Women Warriors*, 40–64, and Croll, *Feminism and Socialism*, 64.
11. Edwards, *Gender, Politics, and Democracy*, 85.
12. Ibid., 81, and Tang, *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang*, 155–58. My deepest thanks to Xiaoliang Sun for the translations of this biography referenced in this chapter.
13. Tcheng founded two anti-government papers in 1912, the *Women's Traditional Chinese Journal* (*Nüzi Guo Xue Bao*) in Tianjin, produced entirely by female journalists, and the *Patriotic Daily* (*Ai Guo Ri Bao*), in Beijing. See Tang, *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang*, 160–64, 355–56.
14. Tang, *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang*, 167 and 171.

15. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 78–82. Tcheng initially delayed leaving for France when she learned that fellow revolutionary Song Jiaoren had been murdered. Tcheng volunteered to carry out a retaliatory assassination. The attempt was aborted when two government secret service agents followed Tcheng to Beijing. See Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 86–92.

16. This Beijing-based 'Study Group for Women in France' was started by Nationalist educator Li Shizeng. See Tang, *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang*, 153.

17. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 103–4. On the Association for Frugal Study, see Bailey, 'The Chinese Work-Study Movement'.

18. Van Vorst, *A Girl from China*, 229–30.

19. Tang, *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang*, 191.

20. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 105–8.

21. Xu, *China and the Great War*, 130. Tang, *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang*, 192.

22. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 108–9.

23. Xu, *China and the Great War*, 236 and 248.

24. According to Tcheng, Sun Yat-sen's close ally, Lin Sen, recommended appointing her to the delegation. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 114. On the selection of the Chinese delegation, see Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 244–47.

25. 'Declares China is Waking Up', *Victoria Daily Times*, 5 March 1919.

26. 'Chinese Woman Lawyer', *Vancouver Daily World*, 6 March 1919.

27. For example, 'Miss Tcheng of Pekin and Paris', *Evening Review*, 11 March 1919 and the *Oxnard Courier*, 12 March 1919.

28. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 115.

29. 'Mlle. E. Tcheng, féministe chinoise et francophile sincère est arrivé à Paris', *Excelsior*, 7 April 1919. On the Inter-Allied Women's Conference, see Siegel, *Peace on Our Terms*, 12–50 and Sluga, 'Female and National Self-Determination'.

30. 'Une jeune révolutionnaire chinoise à la Conférence de la paix', *Le Petit Parisien*, 7 April 1919. On the International Women's Congress in Zurich, see Siegel, *Peace on Our Terms*, 129–62.

31. 'Chinese Revolutionette is Feted in Paris', *Buffalo Times*, 16 May 1919. See also, 'Chinese Revolutionette Feted in French Capital', *Battle Creek Enquirer*, 4 May 1919.

32. 'Chinese Woman in U.S. to Aid Countrymen', *Los Angeles Evening Herald*, 3 December 1919.

33. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 178.

34. On Wilson and Shandong, see Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 183; and MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 319–20.

35. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 187.

36. Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*, 84–116.

37. 'Chinese to Appeal to American Senate', *New York Times*, 11 May 1919, and 'Chinese to Ask America for Aid', *Los Angeles Times*, 11 May 1919. 'Dark future', cited in Tang, *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang*, 202.

38. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 193, and Ministères des affaires étrangères et la guerre, 'La Chine et le traité de la paix', *Bulletin périodique de la presse chinoise du 15 mai au 15 juillet 1919*, 5.

39. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 120.

40. Quotes from Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 123. The incident is also described in Tang, *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang*, 203–4.

41. 'The Eve of June 28', *The Wellington Koo Memoir* (Chinese Oral History Project Microfilm Publication), Reel 1.

42. Quotes from Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 124–25. On China's absence at Versailles, see Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 193, and Xu, *China and the Great War*, 264.

43. 'Chinese Portia Indignant at Award', *Evening Tribune* (San Diego), 18 November 1919.

44. Stewart, *Gender*, 97–120; Jeandel, *Andrée Viollis*; and Renoult, *Andrée Viollis*.
45. 'Miss Cheng of China, What Her Country Wants, A Vicious Advocate', *Daily Mail*, 16 April 1919.
46. 'Chinese Woman Lawyer', *Vancouver Daily World*, 6 March 1919.
47. See, for example, *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, 15 June 1928; *Santa Cruz Evening News*, 26 May 1928; and *The Tuscaloosa News*, 24 May 1928.
48. 'Chinese Woman in U.S. to Aid Countrymen', *Los Angeles Evening Herald*, 3 December 1919.
49. 'Miss Cheng of China', *Daily Mail*, 16 April 1919.
50. 'Souvenirs d'enfance et de révolution par Soumé Tcheng', *Le Figaro – Supplément lit-téraire du dimanche*, 29 August 1920.
51. For a sampling of later media coverage of Tcheng, see 'A Girl from China', *Good Housekeeping*, November 1925; 'Sourires', *L'Ouest-Éclair*, 31 January 1928; and 'New Chatelaine – Madame Wei, Wife of Envoy, Is Personality in Her Own Right', *Washington Post*, 9 October 1942. On Chinese Modern Womanhood, see Edwards, 'Policing the Modern Woman' and Dong, 'Who is Afraid'.
52. On feminism and nationalism in China, see Gilmartin, *Engendering the Chinese Revolution*, 20–24, and Wang, *Women in the Chinese Enlightenment*, 42. Egyptian women were fighting a similar and simultaneous battle for national and female emancipation. See Badran, 'Dual Liberation'. On feminism and nationalism in the Global South, see Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism*.
53. 'Chinese Women Dread Japan's Growing Power', *New York Tribune*, 21 December 1919.
54. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 167.
55. Ibid., 130.
56. 'Feminist Movement Spreading in China', *Fremont Tribune*, 18 April 1921.
57. 'Les étudiantes chinoises à Paris', *L'Illustration*, 19 February 1921, 165.
58. 'A Girl from China', *Good Housekeeping*, vol. 81, no. 5, November 1925, 14.
59. 'Les grandes figures féminines de l'Orient', *L'Egyptienne*, October 1927.
60. Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 147.
61. 'Mlle. Soumé Tcheng, chevalier de la Légion d'honneur', *Le Journal*, 6 October 1928.
62. 'La guerre du Chantoung', *L'Ouest-Éclair*, 10 May 1928; and 'Sourires', *L'Ouest-Éclair*, 31 January 1928.
63. Tcheng spoke at a demonstration for French women's suffrage at the Sorbonne in 1922. See 'Une manifestation internationale à la Sorbonne pour le suffrage des femmes', *Le Petit Parisien*, 17 November 1922.
64. 'Goodwill Ambassadress Believes in New China', *Lancaster New Era*, 28 April 1928.
65. 'High Officials of China Feted', *Oakland Tribune*, 5 July 1928.
66. *The Daily Reporter*, 3 November 1928.
67. Many American papers announced the appointment. See, for example, the *Clayton Record*, 23 November 1928. On her decision to decline, see Wei, *My Revolutionary Years*, 165.
68. 'Chinese Aide's Wife Wants Women Represented at Peace Conference', *Morning Post*, 8 October 1942. This article is listed as having appeared originally in the *Christian Science Monitor*.
69. On Tcheng's role in drafting China's Republican Civil Code, see Kuo, *Intolerable Cruelty*, esp. 12, 68 and 145–46.
70. Kuo, *Intolerable Cruelty*, 16; and Edwards, *Gender, Politics, and Democracy*, 182–85.
71. Edwards, *Gender, Politics, and Democracy*, 176.
72. 'Lady from China', *Amarillo Globe-Times*, 13 November 1942. See also 'Says Chinese Feminist Women Have Earned Right to Help Make, Keep Peace', *Tampa Bay Times*, 27 February 1944.

73. 'Chinese Aide's Wife Wants Women Represented a Peace Conference', *Morning Post*, 8 October 1942.
74. 'China', *Oakland Tribune*, 3 October 1926.
75. 'A Chinese Emancipator', *The Billings Gazette*, 17 August 1926.
76. 'About Plays Concerning the Chinese', *New York Herald*, 28 December 1919.
77. On Egypt, see Badran, 'Dual Liberation'. On Korea, see 'Overlooked No More: Yu Gwan-sun, a Korean Independence Activist Who Defied Japanese Rule', *New York Times*, 28 March 2018. Retrieved in October 2021 from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/obituaries/overlooked-yu-gwan-sun.html; and Insook, '"The New Women's Movement"'.
78. Mukherjee, *Indian Suffragettes*, 51–68.
79. Cited in Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism*, 203–4.
80. For the multiple global women's rights initiatives catalysed by the Paris Peace Conference, see Siegel, *Peace on Our Terms*.

Bibliography

Badran, Margot. 'Dual Liberation: Feminism and Nationalism in Egypt, 1870s–1925'. *Feminist Issues* 8 (1988), 15–34.

Bailey, Paul. 'The Chinese Work-Study Movement in France'. *The China Quarterly* 115 (1988), 441–61.

Croll, Elisabeth. *Feminism and Socialism in China*. New York: Schocken Books, 1980.

Dong, Madeleine Y. 'Who is Afraid of the Chinese Modern Girl?', in Alys Eve Weinbaum et al. (eds), *The Modern Girl around the World: Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 194–219.

Edwards, Louise. *Women Warriors and Wartime Spies of China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

——. *Gender, Politics, and Democracy: Women's Suffrage in China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.

——. 'Policing the Modern Woman in Republican China'. *Modern China* 26(2) (2000), 115–47.

Gilmartin, Christina Kelley. *Engendering the Chinese Revolution: Radical Women, Communist Politics, and Mass Movements in the 1920s*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995.

Hsü, Immanuel C.Y. *The Rise of Modern China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Jayawardena, Kumari. *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*. London: Zed Books, 1986.

Jeandel, Alice-Anne. *Andrée Viollis: Une Femme grand reporter. Une écriture de l'événement, 1927–1939*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006.

Kuo, Margaret. *Intolerable Cruelty: Marriage, Law, and Society in Early Twentieth-Century China*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.

Kwon, Insook. '"The New Women's Movement" in 1920s Korea: Rethinking the Relationship between Imperialism and Women'. *Gender & History* 10(3) (1998), 381–405.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Colonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Mukherjee, Sumita. *Indian Suffragettes: Female Identities and Transnational Networks*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Renoult, Anne. *Andrée Viollis: Une Femme journaliste*. Angers: Presses de l'université d'Angers, 2004.

Siegel, Mona L. *Peace on Our Terms: The Global Battle for Women's Rights after the First World War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2020.

——. *Artisanes de la paix: La lutte mondiale pour les droits des femmes après la Grande Guerre*. Paris: Editions des femmes-Antoinette Fouque, 2022.

Sluga, Glenda. 'Female and National Self-determination: A Gender Re-reading of "The Apogee of Nationalism"'. *Nations and Nationalism* 6(4) (2000), 495–522.

Stewart, Mary Lynn. *Gender, Generation, and Journalism in France, 1910–1940*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018.

Tang, Dongmei. *Chuan yue shi ji cang mang: Zheng Yuxiu zhuan* (*Across the Boundless Century: A Biography of Zheng Yuxiu*). Beijing: Zhongguo she hui chu ban she, 2003.

Tcheng, Soumé and B. van Vorst. *Souvenirs d'enfance et de révolution*. Paris: Payot, 1920.

Tse-tsung, Chow. *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Van Vorst, Bessie. *A Girl from China (Soumay Tcheng)*. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1926.

Wang, Zheng. *Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999.

Wei Tao-ming, Madame. *My Revolutionary Years: The Autobiography of Madame Wei Tao Ming*. New York: Scribner, 1943.

Xu, Guoqi. *China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Chapter 11

A Conference for Africa?
Racialization and the New World Order in 1919

Emmanuelle Sibeud

In 1919, the African-American sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois and the Senegalese deputy Blaise Diagne organized a 'Pan-African Congress for the protection of the natives of Africa and of peoples of African origin', to take place from 19 to 21 February in Paris. It brought together fifty-seven delegates representing fifteen states and colonies in Africa.[1] The purpose was to gather 'people of colour, subjects or citizens of all the major countries of the world' for 'a demonstration of the union of the black race and a demonstration through which this race would set out its demands in the League of Nations'.[2] The congress revived the Pan-African movement, which had been at a standstill since the London conference in 1900, but Du Bois failed to submit its – very moderate – resolutions to the Paris Peace Conference. The four Pan-African Congresses that followed from 1921 to 1927 were marginalized, and echoing events in Africa were severely repressed. The 1919 Pan-African Congress was thus one of the unfortunate incarnations of the ambiguities of the 'Wilsonian moment'.[3]

However, it is important to go beyond the complementary and inverted narratives presenting the Congress as either a visionary initiative that was doomed to failure or as a cynical concession that was used to disguise the ongoing redistribution of the former German colonies and parts of the Ottoman Empire among the colonial powers.[4] Many works on the history of international law and global institutions during the interwar period highlight just how complex and challenging to manage were the mutual adjustments between logics of imperial rule and international order.[5] Using the same approach of subjecting the participants' initiatives to a careful critical review, this chapter aims to demonstrate

that the debates on Africa and colonization were not settled in advance in 1919, and that the delegates to the Pan-African had good reasons for being eager to attend. The organization of a subsidiary conference devoted to colonialism in Africa was a possibility in 1919, and its abandonment contributed in itself to the construction of the new world order. This resulted in the marginalization of those who presented themselves as the 'civilized Negroes'.[6] Revisiting the debates of 1919 on Africa and colonization offers us an opportunity to analyse the silent convergence between the new world order and the 'color line' that Du Bois, in particular, had denounced and relentlessly fought since the turn of the century.[7] As indicated by the full title of the February 1919 congress, these debates were based on a more consensual objective: determining what protections should be accorded to colonial subjects who were relegated to the generic default category of 'natives' or 'native races'.[8] Since the 1880s, the rhetoric of 'protecting the natives' had once again become the basic justification for colonial expansion. The Covenant of the League of Nations followed in this line with its reference to the 'sacred trust of civilization'.[9] The meaning and the principles of such a trust nevertheless continued to be hotly debated in 1919. The colonial powers used the peace negotiations to present the philanthropic provisions contained in the 1885 Berlin Act and the 1890 Brussels Act as useless and humiliating 'international servitudes'.[10] Yet the revision of the two acts was not enough to close the debates opened by initiatives that had multiplied since 1903 to develop a 'code of laws for the international protection of natives'. The war had partly reshuffled the deck, bringing new credibility in the eyes of imperial authorities to some aspiring protectors of natives and their potential protégés. To shed light on this change, this chapter will focus on three of these figures, including John H. Harris, the British secretary of the influential Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society (AS&APS), along with Du Bois and Diagne. In 1919, the time had come for each of these men to renegotiate his place in the metropole and in relation to the new international institutions. They met with highly unequal success, and the rapidly widening gap between them showed that the terms of the new world order were indeed cast in black and white.

'International Servitude' versus the International Status of Africa

The nine demands presented by the 1919 Pan-African Congress were actually very restrained. They merely set out some general principles, calling on the colonial powers to draft a 'code of law for the international

protection of natives'. A year before, in January 1918, Du Bois had sent Clemenceau a much more radical proposal: to create an independent state in central Africa, placed 'under International guarantees and control' and entrusted to 'Negro' elites.[11] The possibility that African Americans could return to Africa to bring 'civilization' had been a recurring theme since the early nineteenth century. Moreover, plans to reorganize central Africa by transferring colonial territories from one metropolis to another experienced a significant revival in the years leading up to the First World War. Replacing Belgian and Portuguese rule was presented as the solution to the criminal exploitation and slavery of the populations of the Congo Basin and Angola, with Germany presented as the ideal candidate for this transfer.[12] In 1918, in contrast, the atrocities that Germany was charged with in its colonies justified the stance that they were not to be returned.[13] But the status of Central Africa remained unclear. Since the Berlin Conference, the area known as the 'Conventional Basin of the Congo', though divided into French, Portuguese and Belgian colonies, was theoretically an area of free trade and movement. From 1908 to 1913, the cumbersome transformation of the Congo Free State into the Belgian colony of the Congo embodied the tensions between colonial and international logics. The Congo Free State was created in 1885 by bilateral agreements signed on the sidelines of the Berlin Conference, and the Belgians had to request that each signatory power accept its new national status, with Great Britain deferring its ratification until 1913 and carefully monitoring the implementation of reforms on the ground through a tight consular network.[14]

In the summer of 1919, the revision of the Berlin and Brussels Acts somewhat clumsily sought to undo this singular set of arrangements in the centre of the continent, freeing the colonial powers present in this part of Africa from the 'international servitudes' that infringed their 'sovereign rights' with philanthropic provisions – provisions that, they claimed, humiliatingly challenged and undermined their ability to properly manage territories and populations.[15] The question of the oversight in the Berlin and Brussels Acts was raised as early as April 1916 by the Bureau Français d'Etudes Economiques and was quickly settled at the legal level.[16] As some of the signatory powers remained neutral, both acts were suspended and their revision postponed till the end of the war. Beginning in 1917, Belgium and France sought to establish a preliminary agreement. They were obsessed with defending 'the freedom of action necessary for the sovereign powers in Central Africa',[17] taking a revanchist approach to the scandals of the pre-war period. The British refused to join these discussions, emphasizing their untimely nature. The British disapproval of French and Belgian eagerness also underlined by contrast

the continuity that Britain sought to maintain between British colonial rule and the future mandates system.[18]

Yet this initial distance from the negotiations did not prevent Britain from contributing to the revision of summer 1919, nor from arguing that colonial subjects' freedom of conscience and religion should be made conditional on respect for 'public order and security' – a principle whose vague definition allowed the exercise of this right to be drastically limited.[19]

This logic, generally defensive and repressive towards colonial populations, produced a text in which the conditions for the concessions of land for economic exploitation were of greater importance than the (unchanged) philanthropic provisions. These provisions had never had any practical content for colonial subjects, since only 'Christian missionaries, scientists, and explorers' or 'religious, scientific, or charitable institutions, and undertakings' could, either before or after 1919, invoke them as grounds for consular protection from their state.[20] However, the main weakness of the text lay elsewhere. Cloaked in their status as victims, the Belgians, with the tactical support of the French and the British, refused to allow Germany, or any other state that was not a signatory to the Berlin and Brussels Acts, to sign the Saint-Germain-en-Laye Convention. While signatories of the initial acts could not be excluded from the new treaty, the explicit intent was to prevent any scrutiny from states that did not have colonies in that part of Africa. Yet as Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for equal treatment for all member states with regard to trade and movement, this restriction was contrary to the new international rules. As early as July 1920, Switzerland, which had not signed the Berlin and Brussels Acts, protested in the name of Article 23.[21] The dispute was provisionally resolved in 1922 by bilateral agreements, but it highlighted the profound contradiction between the new international order and the logic of colonial empires, with their rejection of 'international servitudes'.

Congresses and Races

Two reactions to the first discussions on the revision of the Berlin and Brussels Acts from the French side showed that it was difficult to predict the outcome of this process in advance. In September 1917, the Governor General of French West Africa, Joost van Vollenhoven, proposed an ambitious project to redefine the international status of Africa. He called for the creation of an Anglo-French federation in West Africa. The proposal was intended to definitively defuse any conflict of interest between Great Britain and France, suppressing Liberian independence

and redistributing central Africa among all of the colonial powers. This included Germany, dismissing the 'mad notion [*folle idée*]' of excluding the country from the African continent.[22] Africa would thus become the quintessential object of European and white supremacy. In January 1918, President Wilson's Fourteen Points speech rejected this type of settlement, but the invention in 1919 of the category of 'peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world'[23] justified discrimination that surreptitiously maintained this logic of colonial and racial supremacy. In a more pragmatic and preoccupied fashion, Paul Cambon, the influential French ambassador in London, warned that the revision of the Berlin and Brussels Acts inappropriately revived debates over pre-war scandals and, in particular, the project of organizing a second Berlin conference.[24]

This possibility had already been suggested to all the signatories of the Berlin Act by the British Foreign Office in 1903. The House of Commons then called on the Foreign Office to act, spurred on by the accusations of missionaries settled in the Congo Free State and confirmed by the Casement Report on abuses there written by the British consul in Boma. This was obviously a ploy, and the networks that orchestrated the scandal did not miss their mark. Between 1903 and 1917, they mobilized other resources to organize half a dozen conferences, mostly of modest size, to discuss colonization, the fate of Africa and Africans, or both at the same time. In 1907, a Nationalities and Subject Races Committee met for the first time in The Hague, in conjunction with the Second Peace Conference, and again in London in 1910 and 1914. Although its title suggested that specific populations or races were destined to be subjected to colonization, it did not yet establish the explicit distinction between established nations and 'peoples not yet able to stand by [i.e. govern] themselves', which crystallized in 1919. In 1911, the First Universal Races Congress, organized in London by Gustav Spiller, a psychologist of Hungarian origin, with the support of the philosopher Felix Adler and British anthropologists, more explicitly challenged the 'color line'.[25] The over two thousand luminaries of colour who attended, from at least fifty different countries and colonies, represented a striking, globalized embodiment of Du Bois' notion of the 'talented tenth' in the United States. With this phrase coined in 1903, Du Bois called for this African-American intellectual elite to take a leadership role in the fight for equality in the United States and elsewhere.

Scheduled for Paris in 1915, the second Races Congress never took place, but the unannounced success of the first immediately sparked rival initiatives. In 1912, the African-American pedagogue Booker T. Washington convened an 'International Conference on the Negro' at his Tuskegee

Institute in Alabama with a view to exporting his model of gradual and deferential integration through labour to the colonies in Africa.[26] It was attended by a handful of West Africans who belonged to the small intelligentsia of British African subjects well connected both to London and across the Atlantic to Black universities in the United States. As the evolution of the land laws in West Africa in the 1910s threatened to deprive most local elites of their estates and their function as intermediaries with European investors, this intelligentsia took the lead in protest movements, putting the reform of colonial policies on the imperial agenda. In 1913, the Lagos auxiliary of the AS&APS sent a delegation to London to address the newly created West African Lands Commission, which the parent organization escorted to this hearing despite disapproving of its presence.[27] All of these events underlined the search, and indeed the competition, for new forms of championship on behalf of Native people within the colonial empires, on the trans-imperial and international scale.

The war momentarily silenced these initiatives, without making them entirely disappear, and even offered them new opportunities. In July 1917, the AS&APS was able to convene a conference – albeit with attendance limited to its patrons and parliamentary supporters – on the future of the populations of the former German colonies. The society asked that those populations be consulted on the matter and hastened to offer its services to act as their representatives on the strength of the knowledge of Africans acquired before the war by its secretaries John and Alice Harris. The pair had been missionaries in the Congo Free State for ten years and had gone on an extensive tour of Africa for the organization in 1911–12. The conference was authorized by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, which intended to use this unofficial channel to influence the debates in Britain and among the Allies. Once the Armistice was signed in November 1918, there was every reason to hope that the time for more congresses had arrived and that it could finally lead to a conference that would meet if not the expectations of colonial subjects themselves at least the expectations of those who presented themselves as their protectors.

The War of the Protectors of the Natives

New networks devoted to the 'protection of natives' were formed in Europe in the decade before 1914. In 1909, two British philanthropic societies founded in the 1830s amalgamated to become the AS&APS. In France, the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH) also claimed the role of imperial watchman. Within the two empires, these associations encouraged the formation of auxiliary organizations in the colonies that

would be open to local elites, particularly in West Africa. The Bureau International pour la Défense des Indigènes, or 'International Office for the Protection of Native Races', was established in Geneva in 1913 to coordinate these various initiatives.[28] In 1914, the restructuring had just been completed, and the aspiring 'protectors' of 'natives' had only just begun to assert their mediation skills on behalf of their ostensible protégés, who were able to act without them and who themselves played the role of protectors within their own societies. The war was a severe test for these new imperial networks, depriving them of their youngest members and monopolizing both public and private generosity. However, it also allowed potential new 'protectors' to find a place in this still-open game.

The AS&APS continued its struggle in southern Africa, where it defended the native populations of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) against the encroachments of the British South African Company while supporting the creation of native reserves in the Union of South Africa.[29] It thus adapted to the growing influence of the Dominions within the British Empire, as they took control of the German colonies in the Pacific and southwest Africa and demanded that they become Class C mandates, to be administered as 'integral parts' of the territory of the mandatory power. In 1916, the AS&APS exhausted its financial reserves, and its members argued over what name to use to register it with the authorities, a new obligation spurred on by the war, as societies needed to be officially registered. The executive committee wanted to make its mission of 'protection' more explicit but hesitated over how to refer to those who were to be protected: the 'coloured races' or 'aborigines' (i.e. 'natives')? The second term, vaguer and broader in scope, was rejected by the few West Africans the society managed to consult on the issue, and it had already been banned from administrative documents in India as insulting.[30] Inertia nonetheless prevailed, along with the refusal to drop the mention of the anti-slavery movement and its reference to the abolitionist struggle.

In October 1916, the secretary of the AS&APS, John H. Harris, created an assistance committee for South African workers who had been sent to France as sappers (not combatants, due to racial segregation). This initiative drew enough funds from Liverpool's trading houses, the usual sponsors of the AS&APS, to restore its finances and allow Harris to become its full-time salaried secretary once again.[31] The assistance committee demonstrated the society's ability to supervise indigenous people living in the metropole; Harris logically sought to extend this role after the war by proposing to host African students but was unsuccessful, as West African networks raised the funds necessary to purchase a hotel in London first. Accordingly, the war enabled AS&APS to practically demonstrate its usefulness for the empire with regard to Africans settled in the

metropole. The society maintained its ties to interlocutors in the British colonies in western Africa, but they too became subjects to be monitored rather than potential partners. Its good offices at the 1917 conference were again called upon in 1921. The draft Class B mandates that the AS&APS submitted to the League's Permanent Mandates Commission helped to clarify the debate by embodying the threat of inopportune interference from international opinion. This initiative, undertaken in collaboration with the British delegation and the director of the Mandates Section of the League Secretariat, William Rappard, settled it into a comfortable position among the associations gravitating around the Section and the Commission.[32] By 1927 the AS&APS was able to disband its West African branches without notice, on the grounds that 'the system of having auxiliary bodies established in the West African Colonies in the interests of the native peoples, has not proved so effective or useful in promoting [our] work as had been hoped'.[33]

The situation in France was more confused. Because other associations did not survive the war, the LDH got increasingly involved. In 1917, the LDH devoted part of its annual congress to the question of the granting of political rights to Algerians, continuing the debates at its 1913 congress against the perpetuation of the repressive *indigénat* system in the French colony. In 1921, it set up a Colonial Commission, which extended the discussion to all colonial subjects and supported the demands of soldiers from the colonies who were still stationed in France for a change of status. Yet its members were deeply divided on the issue. Some believed that the individual obtention of French citizenship impeded the construction of indigenous citizenships, and thereby contravened the right of self-determination. Félicien Challaye, who played a crucial role in the renewal of French networks for the 'protection of natives' in the 1910s, was part of the commission. He was clearly caught between supporting the soldiers from the colonies, his brief involvement with the Communist Party, and his integration into the circles of experts consulted by the Ministry of the Colonies. In late 1916, he had been demobilized and was sent by the Parliamentary Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on missions in Indochina, Japan and Korea, countries he had already visited in 1899–1900 on a world travel fellowship awarded to him by the Albert Kahn Foundation.[34] In 1918, his report was incorporated into the documentation compiled by the Commission d'étude des questions coloniales posées par la guerre, created in February 1918 to define the colonial claims that France would submit to the Paris Peace Conference. The war thus set in motion a reorganization of the unofficial and official networks for the 'protection' of 'natives', which was quickly and efficiently disrupted by the political ascent of Blaise Diagne.

Diagne's initial election as MP in 1914 was contested on the grounds that neither he nor his constituents in the Four Communes of Senegal who had maintained their '*statut personnel musulman*' ('personal Muslim status')[35] were French citizens – the colonial administration considered the two statuses incompatible. Diagne made use of the context of the war to settle the issue definitively.[36] In 1915, he obtained the approval of the first law establishing the incorporation of soldiers from the Four Communes into metropolitan regiments, rather than with the *tirailleurs sénégalais*. The following year, in the name of this commitment, he proposed a second law confirming the citizenship of the inhabitants of the Four Communes, which was also passed.

On the strength of these legislative successes, Diagne played a leading role in parliament and its Commission des Affaires Etrangères et des Colonies (Commission on Foreign Affairs and the Colonies). In January 1918, Clemenceau appointed Diagne *Commissaire de la République*, entrusting him with the – reputedly impossible – mission of recruiting an additional 57,000 more soldiers in French West Africa. The previous large-scale recruitment operations, in 1916, had led to widespread rebellion. Travelling at the head of a grand caravan, Diagne toured French West Africa from February to June 1918 and returned with 77,000 recruits. His recruitment methods varied little from established French colonial practices;[37] on the political front, however, the mission was a deliberate disruption of them. Diagne had set out to demonstrate that he had the power to reform local administrative practices and that colonization was compatible with racial equality. He had demanded and obtained a higher rank than the Governor General, who played a supporting role in the recruitment drive, as well as the right to dismiss violent or locally contested European civil servants, which he exercised. He was escorted by the only four African army officers in French West Africa and brought back the first African soldiers on leave, entrusting them with spreading the message of the mission locally, much to the alarm of the local administration.

This set piece in black and white stood in calculated contrast to the racial segregation that had been rapidly taking over in the colonies since the start of the century. But Diagne's objective was not assimilation for all – on the contrary, maintaining the hierarchy between citizens and colonial subjects was part of his strategy. Seeking to take advantage of the relations of patronage between the inhabitants of the Four Communes and Senegalese elites and, since 1895, with elites from throughout French West Africa who came to Dakar for schooling, Diagne was looking to position himself as the protector of all French colonial subjects in Africa. This meant building upon pre-existing networks to which aspiring

protectors in the metropole had at best only limited access. Soldiers and workers displaced from the West African colonies to the metropole were the first to be drawn into his protective net, and the renewal of his role as high commissioner in 1919 suggested that he could expand this role to the level of the empire and continue it after the war.

Du Bois' position in 1919 was much more fragile. He travelled as a journalist to Paris, without waiting for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to be given permission to send a representative. At the request of the US delegation, a close watch was kept over his moves throughout his stay, despite the fact that from the very beginning of US involvement in the war he had encouraged African Americans to join the army, even though its segregated structure confined them to ancillary, generally non-combatant roles. Indeed, one of the objectives of his stay was to gather documentation demonstrating the abilities and bravery of African-American soldiers, in the hope of transforming the war into a civic experience and achievement that would help to end segregation. When soldiers returned to the United States, they were met instead with increasing numbers of lynchings directed at quelling any demand for acknowledgement.

In 1915, Du Bois published an analysis of the causes of the war in the prestigious *Atlantic Monthly*, highlighting its 'African roots'. He argued that the colonial exploitation of African societies had reinforced capitalism and racism by ensuring that 'the "Color Line" … [paid] dividends' and by broadening the distribution of the 'spoils of trade-empire' to white workers. Colonization thus gave rise to endless conflicts between colonial powers over those spoils, and a 'new democratic despotism'.[38] Hence the need to escape from this doubly harmful logic through peace negotiations, by urgently convening the first world congress of representatives of Black elites throughout the world as well as organizations devoted to advancing the cause of Black rights and interests, to discuss the question of their situation in the world and their place within the new world order.[39] As secretary of the first Pan-African Conference in 1900, emblematic personality of the 1911 Universal Races Congress, co-founder of the most influential association for the defence of African-American populations in the United States, and editor of its increasingly influential magazine, *The Crisis*, Du Bois was a well-connected figure. He thus had many contacts, some of which he shared with Harris but which Diagne and the Black members of French parliament who constituted the organizing committee of the 1919 Pan-African Congress lacked. In practice, attendance at the Congress was limited to personalities invited to the Peace Conference, or capable of inviting themselves to it like Du Bois, but it echoed demands emanating from well beyond these elitist circles.

Du Bois, the AS&APS and Lord Balfour, all corresponded, for example, with the National Association of Loyal Negroes, created by West Indian migrant workers in Panama.[40] It called for the creation of an independent Black state in Central Africa and the consultation of all African populations on how best to govern them. And it represented the diasporas of subjects who, while essential to the European empires, had suffered particularly harshly under regimes of racial segregation since the beginning of the twentieth century, and who expected a great deal from the new world order promised by the Peace Conference. While Du Bois was unsuccessful in leveraging the war to loosen the regime of segregation in his own country, he embodied the exciting yet vague internationalism that had kindled these expectations, which prove even more difficult to suppress than the international servitudes of the Berlin and Brussels Acts.

Conclusion: New World Order and Racialization in 1919

Contrary to its depiction in the following years in colonial propaganda and by the imperial political police forces organized or reinforced in the period, the 1919 Pan-African Congress did not in fact represent an attempt to radically challenge colonial domination and its racial – and indeed racist – unity. Rather, it was one of the logical end points of the reformist dynamics that emerged in the decade preceding the war around repeated colonial scandals, and as such represented a judicious answer to the multiple questions that the end of the war either raised or required to be formulated in new terms. It was also intended to create a convergence of all the 'protectors' of the 'native races', though Harris was missing because he was not authorized to go to Paris. Although his absence did not affect the content of the resolutions, it was indicative of the strategy used to dismiss the debates, some of their participants, and the roles as mediators that they proposed to take on. While Panama's 'Loyal Negroes' were too far away to make their voices heard, the war brought many colonial subjects into the metropoles as soldiers and workers, obliging the imperial centres to recognize their contribution in one way or another. The difficulty in defining and organizing a positive protection of colonial subjects was not a practical one: the networks of aspiring protectors were quickly reorganizing and already offering their arbitration. The difficulty was instead a deeply political one. During the war, the colonial empire-states had considerably expanded their obligations and domains of intervention in favour of citizens in the metropole. That which Du Bois denounced in 1915 as 'the astonishing doctrine of the natural inferiority of most men to the few'[41] became a functional

requirement to deny these political and social rights to the vast majority of their colonial subjects.

It would be a caricature to present the manifest racialization of European societies during the First World War as the result of a cynical choice imposed from above. The process was much broader and more diffuse. In France, for example, racial segregation was normalized around the example of African soldiers, who were treated in separate hospitals where nurses were banned and, when sent to warmer climes during the cold winter months to pre-empt disease (a practice known as '*hivernage*'), were confined to camps away from the civilian population. This held even more strongly for colonial and Chinese labourers, who were also kept apart from other workers, underpaid and assigned the most arduous and gruelling tasks. The 'color line' was enforced only 'behind the lines', with the trenches symbolically spared, as Tyler Stovall has shown.[42] In Britain, racial riots flared up in the very first years of the 1920s, during the post-war recession, killing Indian and Caribbean sailors who had previously been accepted in metropolitan ports. These events reinforced the identification of white British workers with the 'white race' over any common identity as workers. This identification had been institutionalized through 'white labourism' since 1914, when a massive demonstration was held in London in solidarity with the white miners of South Africa, who were calling for a reinforcement of legal discrimination against black miners.[43] This continuity also highlights the previously mentioned success of the assistance committee for South African workers created by Harris in 1916, who argued that his initiative to help workers of colour on the imperial periphery was a way of fulfilling the promise not to import colonial workers to replace white workers in the metropole. At the 1919 Pan-African Congress, Du Bois and Diagne made precisely the opposite pledge, to move towards racial equality through what one of their few high-profile supporters, the Belgian jurist and internationalist Paul Otlet, described as an 'effort towards elevation starting from the most inferior elements of our humanity'.[44]

And it is for precisely this reason that the Pan-African Congress of 1919 became a key, negative element of the new world order, to the detriment of its organizers and, even more, its potential beneficiaries. In this order, race served as a silent determining criterion for exclusion from the law and the international community. In this context, the logic of integration defended by Du Bois and Diagne, however cautious, was nonetheless seen as dangerously subversive.

Emmanuelle Sibeud (Université Paris 8 and IDHES) is a historian and a specialist of imperial culture in Africa in the twentieth century.

She recently edited (with Sylvain Pattieu and Tyler Stovall) *The Black Populations of France: Histories from Metropole to Colony* (Nebraska University Press, 2021).

Notes

1. One hundred representatives were invited, but half did not obtain a passport. The Congress was funded by the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP, 2400 francs out of 2800). W.E.B. Du Bois' personal archives are kept in Amherst, Massachusetts and have been partially digitized. Online documents are referenced where they exist. Retrieved October 2021 from http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b015-i037.
2. '… les gens de couleur, sujets ou citoyens de tous les grands pays du monde entier [pour] une manifestation d'union de la race noire et une manifestation par laquelle cette race préciserait ses revendications dans la Société des Nations.' Gratien Candace, 'Le congrès panafricain', in *Les Annales coloniales*, 27 February 1919.
3. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*.
4. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*.
5. See in particular Anghie, *Imperialism* and Pedersen, *The Guardians*.
6. The eighth resolution of the Congress was devoted to 'civilized Negroes', defined as 'persons of African descent … civilized and able to meet the tests of surrounding culture', WBP, PAC, Resolutions, 21 February 1919. Retrieved September 2023 from http://credo.library.umass.edu/cgi-bin/pdf.cgi?id=scua:mums312-b015-i036.
7. He first used this expression as early as 1900 in the 'Address to the Nations of the World', which concluded the Pan-African Conference in London: 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line'. He repeated it in his 1903 essay 'The Souls of Black Folk', which was widely distributed in the United States. See Lewis, *W.E.B. Du Bois*.
8. Benton, Clulow and Attwood, *Protection and Empire*.
9. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Retrieved October 2021 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22.
10. 'International servitudes' imposed by Germany in Morocco were conspicuously abolished by the Allied Supreme Council. French and Belgian diplomats unofficially used the phrase in subsequent talk regarding the revision of the Berlin and the Brussels Acts, hoping to be relieved at least of some of the duties arising from the treaties. AMAE, 1914–1918 War, 1CPCOM/Afrique, 1501: Revisions of the Berlin and Brussels Acts.
11. Du Bois' proposal was for this 'great Independent State' to cover the colonies of German East Africa and German Southwest Africa, the Belgian Congo, Uganda, French Equatorial Africa, Angola and Mozambique. WBP, Series 1A, General Correspondence, W.E.B Du Bois to Primier of France, 14 January 1918. Retrieved September 2023 from http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b011-i283.
12. The transfer of the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese colonies to Germany was proposed, for example, by John H. Harris in his 1912 book *Dawn in Darkest Africa*. On the scandals of the early twentieth century, see Grant, *A Civilised Savagery*.
13. France and Britain sought accounts of Germany's misdeed from the populations of these territories, while fighting the right to petition that the Permanent Mandates Commission and the Mandates Section of the League secretariat managed to impose in a truncated form: the petitions had to be transmitted through the colonial administration, at great risk to the petitioners. Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 78–85; Callahan, *Mandates and Empire*.

14. Vellut, *Congo*.
15. The French Minister of the Colonies indicated to his counterpart in Foreign Affairs that there was no need 'to multiply international obligations to ensure the observance of universally accepted and applied principles' ('de multiplier les obligations internationales pour assurer l'observation de principes universellement admis et appliqués'): AMAE, 1914–1918 War, Africa, 1501: Revision of the Berlin and Brussels Acts, 1914–1918, Minister of the Colonies to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 1917, 6.
16. It acted to prohibit any exchange with Germany in this region, or passing through it, but the problem was also a structural one: contrary to the principle of free trade, the Brussels Act introduced customs duties in 1890, limiting them to a maximum of 10 per cent and a period of 15 years. It was never completely revised afterwards. At the end of the war, Belgium and France wanted to be able to impose taxes of more than 10 per cent on trade.
17. Minister of the Colonies to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, AMAE, 8 June 1917, 11.
18. Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 17–44.
19. The Foreign Office asked for the addition of 'security' to the convention so that any unwelcome religious activity could be suppressed even if it did not threaten 'public order': AMAE, series K, Africa 1918–1940, 1 CPCOM53/1, Charles Strachey to René Massigli, 23 August 1919.
20. General Act of the Conference of Berlin: 'All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave Trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific, or charitable institutions, and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization. Christian missionaries, scientists, and explorers, with their followers, property, and collections, shall likewise be the objects of especial protection.' Constructing positive rights for their colonial subjects on the basis of these lofty principles was up to the colonial powers themselves; the lack of alterations in 1919 underlines the emptiness of these purely declamatory provisions.
21. AMAE, series K, Africa 1918–1940, 1 CPCOM53/1.
22. AMAE, War 1914–1918, Africa, 1501: revisions of the Berlin and Brussels Acts, 1914–1918, P 1325 (microfilm), Governor General of the AOF to Jules Cambon, 20 September 1917.
23. Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22. Retrieved December 2021 from https://www.ungeneva.org/en/covenant-lon.
24. Cambon, who was given the responsibility of convincing the British to participate in these discussions, suggested instead seeking the support of South Africa by threatening the application of both Acts in German South West Africa. This manoeuvre failed: according to the French *Chargé d'affaires* in Johannesburg, the South Africans had never even heard of the two Acts. AMAE, War 1914–1918, Africa, 1501: revisions of the Berlin and Brussels Acts, Paul Cambon to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 1917 and correspondence exchanged with the *Chargé d'affaires* in Johannesburg in March 1917.
25. Tilley, 'Racial Science, Geopolitics, and Empire'.
26. The Germans had already called on Tuskegee graduates to develop cotton farming in Togo: Zimmermann, *Alabama in Africa*. Du Bois built his political and intellectual career on challenging the submission that Washington recommended.
27. Okonkwo, *Protest Movements in Lagos*.
28. Sibeud, 'Entre geste impériale et cause internationale'.
29. Africans, who made up two-thirds of the total population, were confined to one tenth of the available land and barred from leaving these areas without a pass. Fauvelle-Aymard, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Sud*, 338–59; Grant, *A Civilised Savagery*.

30. RHL, Papers of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, MSS Brit Emp S 16–24, box G 417.
31. Ibid., boxes H 1–2.
32. Forclaz, *Humanitarian Imperialism*.
33. RHL, Papers of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, MSS Brit Emp S 16–24, box G 210 (Sierra Leone), letter of 11 April 1927.
34. Sibeud, 'Intellectuals for Empire?'.
35. Although the inhabitants of four cities in Senegal (Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufique, Dakar) were French citizens, they could choose to be governed by Muslim law instead of French civil law (the Code civil). French Indians enjoyed the same choice, which was denied to other colonized people. From 1912 onwards, Algerian elites demanded to be allowed to keep their Muslim civil status when becoming citizens. Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal*.
36. The colonial administration waged a war of attrition against the citizens of the Four Communes by revising the voters' lists and reducing the number of eligible voters by a quarter. Black citizens were also treated and punished as mere colonial subjects outside the boundaries of the four cities. Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal*.
37. The proportion of volunteers increased very slightly (by a fifth). The majority of recruits were coerced by chiefs, the usual intermediaries of the colonial administration, which rewarded them in proportion to the number of men enlisted. Michel, *Les Africains et la Grande Guerre*.
38. Du Bois, 'The African Roots of War'.
39. Du Bois, 'Memorandum à M. Diagne & autres sur un Congrès Pan-Africain qui doit être tenu à Paris en février 1919', 1 January 1919. Retrieved October 2021 from http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b015-i044.
40. Milian and Nwankwo, 'Interoceanic Diasporas'; RHL, MSS Brit. Emp. S 16–24, G440, letters of April, July and November 1918; RHL, AS&APS Papers, S 22, E2/14, Minute Book 1915–1920, letter to Balfour (1919); letter to Du Bois, 15 January 1919 (retrieved October 2021 from http://credo.library.umass.edu/cgi-bin/pdf.cgi?id=scua:mums312-b014-i344).
41. Du Bois, 'The African Roots of War'.
42. Stovall, 'The Color Line'.
43. Hyslop, 'The Imperial Working Class'; Tabili, *We Ask for British Justice*.
44. Paul Otlet, 'Les Noirs et la Société des Nations', *La Patrie Belge*, 19 January 1919.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve (AMAE)
Rhodes House Library, Oxford (RHL)
University Archives, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, W.E.B Du Bois Papers (WBP), Pan-African Congress (PAC)

Published Sources

Anghie, Anthony. *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Benton, Lauren, Adam Clulow and Bain Attwood (eds). *Protection and Empire: A Global History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Callahan, Michael. *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914–1931*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008.

Diouf, Mamadou. *Histoire du Sénégal: Le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries*. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001.

Du Bois, William E.B. 'The African Roots of War'. *Atlantic Monthly* 115(5) (1915), 707–14. Retrieved October 2021 from http://www.webdubois.org/dbAfrican RWar.html.

Fauvelle-Aymard, François-Xavier. *Histoire de l'Afrique du Sud*. Paris: Seuil, 2006.

Forclaz, Amalia Ribi. *Humanitarian Imperialism: The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880–1940*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Grant, Kevin. *A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884–1926*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Harris, John H. *Dawn in Darkest Africa*. London: Smith, Elder & Company, 1912.

Hyslop, Jonathan. 'The Imperial Working Class Makes Itself "White": White Labourism in Britain, Australia, and South Africa before the First World War'. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 12(4) (1999), 398–421.

Johnson, George Wesley. *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900–1920*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Lewis, David Levering. *W.E.B. Du Bois: A Biography, 1868–1963*. New York: H. Holt, 1993.

Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Mazower, Mark. *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Michel, Marc. *Les Africains et la Grande Guerre: L'appel à l'Afrique (1914–1918)*. Paris: Karthala, 2003.

Milian, Claudia and Ifeoma Kiddoe Nwankwo. 'Introduction: Interoceanic Diasporas and the Panama Canal's Centennial'. *The Global South* 6(2) (2012), 1–14.

Okonkwo, Rina. *Protest Movements in Lagos, 1908–1930*. New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995.

Pedersen, Susan. *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Sibeud, Emmanuelle. 'Entre geste impériale et cause internationale: Défendre les indigènes à Genève dans les années 1920'. *Monde(s). Histoire, espaces, relations* 6 (2014), 23–43.

——. 'Intellectuals for Empire? The Imperial Training of Félicien Challaye (1899–1914)', in Martin Thomas (ed.), *The French Colonial Mind, Volume 1: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters* (Lincoln, NE: Nebraska University Press, 2011), 26–48.

Stovall, Tyler. 'The Color Line Behind the Lines: Racial Violence in France During the Great War'. *The American Historical Review* 103(3) (1998), 737–69.

Tabili, Laura. *We Ask for British Justice: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.

Tilley, Helen. 'Racial Science, Geopolitics, and Empires: Paradoxes of Power'. *Isis* 105(4) (2014), 773–81.

Vellut, Jean-Luc. *Congo: Ambitions et désenchantements, 1880–1960, carrefours du passé au centre de l'Afrique*. Paris: Karthala, 2017.

Zimmermann, Andrew [Angela Elisabeth]. *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Chapter 12

Woodrow Wilson and His Domestic Critics

The United States and the World Order after the Great War

Manfred Berg

When the United States entered the Great War in April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson's vision of a new international order predicated upon the equality of all nations, the right to national self-determination, free trade, democracy and collective security guaranteed by a League of Nations was transmuted from a seemingly utopian idea into a blueprint for peacemaking. In November 1918, all belligerents accepted Wilson's Fourteen Points of 8 January 1918 as the basis for peace negotiations. Hopes for a 'Wilsonian Peace' inspired war-weary Europeans as well as colonial subjects across the globe. When the president arrived in Europe in December 1918, huge crowds greeted him like a messiah. Alas, at the end of the Paris Peace Conference, victors and vanquished alike were deeply disappointed with the Treaty of Versailles. At home, disenchanted internationalists condemned the League of Nations as a new Holy Alliance, while traditional American nationalists opposed membership in the League as a betrayal of the time-honoured principles of US foreign relations and a conspiracy against American sovereignty. Eventually, the US Senate failed to ratify the Treaty, and the United States never joined the League. By repudiating the new world order devised by their own president, Americans abandoned their new role as a world leader and thus paved the way for a second world war – exactly as Wilson had predicted when he implored Americans that failing to join the League would 'break the heart of the world'.[1]

This, in a nutshell, is the popular narrative of Woodrow Wilson's 'tragic failure'. It was shaped first by Wilson's contemporary admirers and later by foreign policymakers and scholars, who championed

America's mission to create a liberal-democratic world order. Contrary to his image as a 'crusading idealist', Arthur S. Link famously argued, Wilson was inspired by a 'higher realism' because he understood that America's leadership in world affairs served the best interests of both mankind and the United States. In this view, the president's domestic opponents appear as parochial isolationists and selfish partisans who sabotaged Wilson's visionary plan for a reform of world politics.[2] In contrast, Wilson's realist critics have depicted him as a self-righteous ideologue who lacked a deeper understanding of the pluralism and interdependence of the modern world, and who left Americans with a perilous legacy of moral crusading and militaristic interventionism.[3] New Left scholars have interpreted Wilson's foreign policies as an attempt to expand American capitalism and shield liberal-democratic capitalism against the threat of revolution.[4] It is no exaggeration to say that Woodrow Wilson is one of the most controversial American presidents. Scholars have disagreed over virtually every aspect of his personality, his policies, his legacies and especially his ideas for world order. In this chapter, I will shift the focus to Wilson's domestic critics on both the left and the right and examine the question of whether they had alternative ideas for world order and America's place in it. The debate over the League of Nations, I argue, was in essence a contest between competing varieties of American nationalism, which entailed different implications for America's role in the world.

The Treaty Fight: Internationalism versus Nationalism?

Historians have exhaustively studied the struggle over the ratification of the League of Nations Covenant in the United States Senate, known as 'the Treaty fight' or 'the League fight'.[5] Most scholars agree that Wilson killed his own brainchild by refusing to compromise with his arch-enemy Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and leader of the Republican opposition, who insisted on binding reservations that the League must not supersede American sovereignty and the constitutional prerogatives of Congress, including the right to declare war. Twice, in November 1919 and in March 1920, Wilson loyalists, who rejected all modifications of the treaty, joined forces with the so-called 'irreconcilables', who opposed joining the League under any circumstances. On the second ballot, ratification with reservations fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority by only seven votes. In both Senate votes, roughly 80 per cent of senators voted for ratification either with or without reservations. However, because the Wilsonians

and the reservationists were unable to agree on a common position, the small minority of irreconcilables, which included a mere sixteen senators, eventually triumphed. In retrospect, the failure of the League Covenant in the Senate may thus be seen as a historic accident mainly caused by Wilson's intransigence. The president's inflexibility was exacerbated by the severe stroke he suffered in early October 1919. Confined to his sickbed for months, Wilson was temporarily incommunicado and unable to discharge his duties. 'He should not have remained in office', writes his otherwise friendly biographer John Milton Cooper. 'If he had not, the League fight would have turned out differently, and the nation and the world would have been better off.'[6]

Undoubtedly, Wilson's dogmatism and stubbornness played a key role in frustrating a possible compromise. However, focusing on the president's personality distracts attention away from the essential political differences over America's proper international role that separated Wilson and his critics. To begin with, the president's commitment to having the United States take a leading role in a new League of Nations and accept responsibility for world peace within a system of collective security represented a sharp break with America's hallowed tradition of non-alignment going back to George Washington's Farewell Address of 1796 and the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Wilson claimed that joining the League was the logical consequence of American tradition and history, but his opponents strongly disagreed. Senator William Borah of Idaho, the leader of the irreconcilables, condemned the League as 'the most radical departure from our policies … that has been proposed at any time since our government was established'. In its 1920 electoral platform, the Republican Party attacked Wilson for his 'unnecessary and unjustifiable' repudiation of 'the time-honored policies … declared by Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe'.[7]

Wilson's critics raised numerous objections against the peace treaty, but the core of the controversy was Article 10 of the League Covenant, which read: 'The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.' Senator Borah feared that this clause would commit the United States to send 'our boys to fight throughout the world by order of the League'. The reservationists wanted clarification that the United States would accept no military obligations unless Congress consented in each individual instance. Wilson denied that Article 10 entailed an automatic military alliance but insisted that without it the League 'would be hardly

more than an influential debating society'.[8] Wilson scholars agree that replacing the old balance of power system with a system of collective security was the key tenet of the president's precept for world order.

The president's Republican antagonists, alleging that he was prepared to subordinate US sovereignty to an international organization, defined the controversy as a contest between internationalism and nationalism. In the early twentieth century, the term nationalism still had a positive connotation and was often used as a synonym for patriotism and Americanism. In the summer of 1918, former President Theodore Roosevelt, a leading Republican voice on foreign policy until his unexpected death in January 1919, sharply rebuked his successor's proposal for a League of Nations: 'We are not internationalists. We are American nationalists. … To substitute internationalism for nationalism means to do away with patriotism.' In June 1920, Henry Cabot Lodge kicked off the Republican presidential campaign with the demand: 'We must be now and forever for Americanism and nationalism, and against internationalism.' And the GOP's presidential nominee, Senator Warren G. Harding, promised to 'hold the heritage of American nationalism unimpaired and unsurrendered'.[9]

In contrast, Wilson and his supporters saw themselves as internationalists in the sense that they advocated American leadership in a collective effort to reform the international system and to bring about world peace. However, framing the 'Treaty Fight' as an ideological contest between 'internationalism versus nationalism' is misleading because all of the protagonists in the controversy were staunch nationalists who firmly believed in American exceptionalism and America's historical mission of progress. In fact, the League fight pitted two competing varieties of American nationalism against each other. On one side was the traditional belief that America's mission was to lead by moral example without interfering with the quarrels of the Old World, on the other the new creed that the nation's ideals and interests necessitated the active promotion of democracy worldwide. In the course of the twentieth century, this latter variety of universalizing nationalism became so closely associated with the twenty-eighth president that it is frequently termed Wilsonianism. In its Wilsonian version, argues the political scientist Tony Smith, 'American nationalism is thus transmuted from being parochially self-interested into being universal in its concerns. … American patriotism thus becomes a form of internationalism.'[10] In contrast, its detractors see Wilsonianism as an imperious and ultimately futile project to remake the world in the American image, or simply as an ideological disguise for US hegemony.

Beyond Isolationism: Progressive Internationalists, Irreconcilables, Atlanticists

Unfortunately, the key terms that have shaped the debate over Wilson's foreign policy have remained elusive and contested. This includes 'isolationism', a label that Wilson's supporters tried to pin on the opponents of the League of Nations. Although few historians consider it a useful analytical concept, it has nevertheless retained traction in American political discourse.[11] Indeed, on a closer look, the front lines in the Treaty fight become blurred. There were 'internationalist' critics of the League of Nations who agreed with its 'isolationist' opponents on many issues. The political forces that supported Wilson's call for a new world order in one way or another ranged from 'progressive internationalists' on the left to moderate Republicans on the right.[12] Moreover, it is no coincidence that historians continue to disagree over Wilson's goals, as well as over the ideological content of Wilsonianism, since Wilson himself remained exceedingly vague not only on the details of his peace programme but also on his ideas for collective security and a new world order.

A prime example is his famous demand in his war message of April 1917: 'The world must be made safe for democracy.' Was Wilson really revealing that America was launching a crusade to spread democracy across the globe, or was he merely calling for an international order in which democracy and self-government could thrive, as John Milton Cooper has suggested? During the war, the president insisted: 'I am not fighting for democracy except for the peoples that want it.' At the same time, however, he kept asserting that peace and democracy were inextricably linked. The root causes of war were autocratic rule and secret diplomacy (self-governed nations would never wage wars of aggression); hence 'a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations'.[13]

Wilson envisioned the League of Nations as an association of, preferably, democratic nation states committed to upholding world peace. In the view of his adversaries, however, he dodged the key issue of how the League could attain that noble dream. Article 10, the president told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was 'a moral, not a legal, obligation … binding in conscience only, not in law', yet hastened to add that the article to him constituted 'the very backbone of the whole covenant'. Perhaps these words reflected Wilson's aversion to legalism and his Presbyterian faith in the moral force of covenants, but his critics surely had a point in arguing that such an interpretation would leave every member of the League free to ignore its obligations at will.[14]

Wilson may have believed that Article 10, backed by the Great Powers represented in the League of Nations Council, would deter all potential aggressors and thus be self-executing. But how inclusive was Wilson's idea of collective security? Since Germany was excluded from the League and, according to the president, would have 'to pass through a probationary period before being admitted',[15] in the eyes of many progressive internationalists – a term coined by the historian Thomas Knock for a loose non-partisan coalition of agrarian populists, social reformers, moderate socialists, pacifists, anti-imperialists and women's rights advocates – the League looked very much like a continuation of America's wartime alliance. Progressive internationalists shared the president's conviction that America must lead in bringing about world peace and reforming a corrupt system of power politics. After the out-break of war in August 1914, they had called for strict neutrality and American mediation; in the 1916 elections they had rallied behind the president and his party's slogan: 'He kept us out of war!'. When Wilson declared war on Germany anyway, many pacifists broke ranks with him and subsequently became targets of government repression. Other pro-gressive internationalists continued their support because they hoped that Wilson's 'new diplomacy', enshrined in the Fourteen Points and the League of Nations, could secure peace, disarmament, social progress and self-determination for all nations.[16]

When the terms of the peace treaty and the content of the League Covenant became publicly known in the spring of 1919, leading voices in the progressive camp expressed shock and disbelief. Instead of a Wilsonian peace, the *New Republic* thundered, the peace conference had created 'an inhuman monster in the spirit of the traditional diplomacy of Europe'. Many of Wilson's erstwhile supporters chastened him for having betrayed his Fourteen Points and imposed a vindictive peace on Germany that would saddle the new democracy in Berlin with unbearable burdens. The League Covenant, wrote the sociologist Thorstein Veblen, was 'an instrument of realpolitik, created in the spirit of nineteenth cen-tury imperialism'. To its critics on the left, the League was a 'new Holy Alliance', and Article 10 would commit the United States to defending an untenable status quo in Europe as well as the colonial empires of Britain and France. They insisted that America must have no part in such a scheme. An American retreat, the *New Republic* reasoned, would force the Allies to revise the treaty. Once the European victor powers had come to their senses, the United States could join and lead a true 'League of Free Nations'.[17]

At first glance, the progressive internationalists look more Wilsonian in their commitment to the ideals of international peace, justice and

democracy than Woodrow Wilson himself. On a closer look, however, it becomes clear that their concept of reforming world order was deeply rooted in the 'exemplarist' variety of American exceptionalism. When the principles of internationalism foundered on the rocks of realpolitik, they opted for retreat in order to preserve America's moral authority. That many progressive internationalists came to similar conclusions about the League as Wilson's isolationist foes was no coincidence. Indeed, the most prominent irreconcilable senators, including William Borah (R-ID), Hiram Johnson (R-CA), Robert La Follette (R-WI) and George Norris (R-NE), were pro-labour progressives, anti-militarists and anti-imperialists who believed that keeping America at peace was a condition for reform at home. Like the progressive internationalists, they had favoured strict neutrality before April 1917. They had either voted against Wilson's declaration of war or distanced themselves from the president's rhetoric about fighting for the liberation of mankind. 'I join no crusade. I seek or accept no alliances … I make war alone for my countrymen and their rights, for my country and its honor', William Borah insisted.[18]

Not surprisingly, the irreconcilables' indictment of the League and Article 10 partly echoed the arguments of the progressive internationalists. According to Robert La Follette, whose home state of Wisconsin was home to many German-Americans, the League was a victors' alliance and the peace treaty 'a spoils-grabbing compact of greed and hate' aimed at keeping Germany down. By joining the League, America would tie itself to the strategic interests of the Allies; it would have to raise a large standing army and turn into a permanent war state, which would destroy freedom and democracy at home. Borah warned against committing 'this Republic to a scheme of world control based upon force'. Instead, America must preserve its ability to lead 'by precept and example, through influence and counsel … in the world struggle for free government'.[19]

Unlike the progressive internationalists, who were willing to join a 'true' League of Nations, the irreconcilables opposed the very idea of collective security as repugnant to American tradition and national interest. Their exemplarist outlook was based on a belief in unfettered national sovereignty, which often took on a xenophobic and conspiratorial tone. Borah saw the League as 'a deliberate attempt to sell our country to the domination of foreign powers' and claimed that it would force the United States to admit large numbers of Asian immigrants. Borah, writes the historian Christopher Nichols, distinguished himself as 'the foremost spokesman for a new nationalistic, populist, and unilateralist isolationism that became the archetype for opposition to the world order that President Wilson hoped to establish'. Actually, the Idaho senator would most likely have contested that there was anything new about

his nationalism or his conception of world order. Borah subscribed to what he labelled 'the foreign policy of George Washington and James Monroe, undiluted and unemasculated'. He wanted to restore America as a neutral hemispheric power and argued that it could only retain its exceptional character by staying out of European quarrels. Like most isolationists, Borah did not believe that war could ever be abolished, but he firmly believed that the United States should stay out of war unless its national interest was directly threatened. Nichols points out that the isolationist worldview reflects deep-seated American ideals of local self-government and states' rights. Americans who distrusted a powerful federal government certainly had no taste for world government.[20]

It has often been said that isolationism never meant disengagement from cultural and commercial intercourse with the world. Still, isolationists insisted that America's autonomy, sovereignty and freedom of action must always enjoy precedence over its foreign entanglements. Sovereignty and freedom of action were also the major concerns of Wilson's Republican opponents, who made their consent to the League conditional on explicit reservations. 'We insist', Henry Cabot Lodge proclaimed, 'that we shall be the judges, and the only judges, as to the preservation of our rights, our sovereignty, our safety, and our independence'. There was nothing selfish about such reservations, Lodge explained; in fact, America owed it to the world 'to say precisely what we will do and exactly what we will not do'. Lodge took strong exception to what he saw as Wilson's attempt 'to establish a monopoly of idealism'. 'Our first ideal', he insisted, 'is our country, and we see her in the future, as in the past, giving service to all her people and to the world. … [S]he should continue to render that service of her own free will'.[21]

In contrast to the isolationist wing of their party, Republican leaders such as Lodge, former presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, as well as former Secretary of State Elihu Root, had no doubt that America was and must be a great power with global interests. Around the turn of the twentieth century they had been the architects of America's turn towards imperialism. The commercial and security interests of the United States necessitated its participation in the concert of great powers, preferably in close cooperation with Great Britain. After the outbreak of the Great War, these 'Atlanticists', as historian Ross Kennedy calls them, favoured vigorous support of the Western Allies and detested Wilson's pursuit of neutrality. Republican hawks like Roosevelt and Lodge saluted the declaration of war against Germany but sharply distanced themselves from Wilson's internationalist rhetoric. War should be waged only in defence of national interest and national honour. 'I am not voting for war in name of democracy. … [I]t is none of our business

what type of government any nation on this earth may choose to have', declared conservative Republican Senator Warren G. Harding.[22]

The Republican establishment was not opposed to a League of Nations in principle but envisioned it as an institution that would mediate in international conflicts, albeit without coercive power or binding obligations for its members. Wilson's League seemed to fritter away US sovereignty, freedom of action and hegemony in the western hemisphere. Without ironclad reservations, it would bind America to 'the interests and quarrels of other nations', Lodge warned. Basically, Lodge and the so-called 'strong reservationists' looked at world order from a realist perspective. International politics meant the pursuit of national interest and the rivalry of great powers. As ardent American nationalists, they took America's moral superiority for granted but harboured no ambitions to actively spread the American model across the globe. Rather, in Lodge's view, the United States' interests, ideals and culture tied it into 'a good understanding of all English-speaking peoples' and to the security of Great Britain.[23]

Because they viewed Germany as the most dangerous among potential aggressors, the Republican mainstream had no qualms about the punitive clauses of the Versailles Treaty. In fact, many of the Republicans most inclined to join the League of Nations – the 'mild reservationists' – argued that America must not desert its wartime allies and had a stake in a system of collective security, provided that its commitments were carefully circumscribed. In March 1919, former president Taft, a leading figure in the bipartisan League to Enforce Peace and a supporter of international arbitration, had even spoken alongside Wilson at a public rally. Historians therefore see Wilson's refusal to accommodate the internationalist wing of the Republican Party as a major blunder that led to the ultimate defeat of the League in the US Senate.[24]

Conclusion

In retrospect, it may seem difficult to comprehend why Wilson and his Republican opponents failed to reach a compromise. They shared a deep faith in American exceptionalism and Anglo-Saxon civilization, as well as the conviction that the Versailles Treaty justly punished Germany for its aggression against world peace. Moreover, Wilson, contrary to his crusader image, did not advocate an American mission to police or democratize the world. His concept of collective security entailed military force only as a last resort. The issue was not whether America had global interests and responsibilities but whether it should

exert international leadership within a multilateral framework. Wilson believed that in a world thrown into turmoil by the Great War America's national interest was to lead in establishing a liberal world order. This meant the United States would have to accept new security commitments beyond the Americas and abide by the rules of international organizations.

Apart from the progressive internationalists, who rejected the League of Nations because it failed to live up to their internationalist ideals, Wilson's domestic critics took issue with what they perceived as the president's radical departure from America's time-tested tradition of non-alignment and unilateralism. The irreconcilables were opposed to any participation whatsoever in an international system of collective security; the reservationists would only accept the United States' entry into such a system if it retained complete freedom of action. For Wilson, any reservations to Article 10 were anathema because, as he explained to one of his key supporters shortly before the Senate vote of March 1920, they would 'cut the very heart and life out of the Covenant itself' and reduce it to 'a futile scrap of paper, as ineffective in operation as the agreement between Belgium and Germany which the Germans violated in 1914'. Only if America was unequivocally committed to Article 10 could it become an effective instrument to prevent war. In contrast, the reservations proposed by his opponents would 'perpetuate the old order … the juggling of provinces, the old balances of power, and the inevitable wars attendant upon these things'. Moreover, the president was convinced that his antagonists did not seek reservations but the complete nullification of the League Covenant.[25]

Rather than pursuing legislative compromise, Wilson embarked on a national speaking tour, firmly convinced that the American people backed him and that his opponents in the Senate did not represent the true will of their constituents. In 1920, the ailing president hoped that he might be able to turn the upcoming elections into a popular referendum on the League of Nations and even considered seeking an unprecedented third term.[26] In reality, it is very doubtful if Wilsonian internationalism ever had a solid domestic base in American politics and among American voters. Arguably, a majority of Americans would have favoured ratification with reservations in early 1919. However, when the Republicans promised them a 'return to normalcy' in the 1920 electoral campaign, voters gave them a landslide victory, among other reasons because Wilsonian internationalism represented the very opposite of normalcy. Although Wilson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1920, the outgoing president was deeply unpopular among the American public, including many of his erstwhile supporters. There can be little

doubt that Woodrow Wilson, although his name no longer appeared on the ballot, was the real loser of the elections in 1920.[27]

In his public espousals of the League of Nations, Wilson insisted that rather than a break with the nation's foreign policy tradition of non-alignment and freedom of action, US participation in the League was fully in accordance with 'American principles, American policies'.[28] In reality, most of his contemporaries, whether or not they favoured joining the League, viewed Wilson's proposals as a radical experiment that they would not have contemplated before the outbreak of the Great War. Wilsonian internationalism was a response to the unprecedented crisis that the war represented; its failure reflected not only widespread disillusionment among Americans with both the war and the ensuing peace but also its feeble roots in American political culture. The historian Frank Ninkovich even calls Wilsonianism 'an eccentric and ephemeral creed, an aberrant episode in the history of US foreign relations'.[29]

Ninkovich may overstate his case, but once we understand the exceptional and contingent position of Wilsonianism in the history of US foreign relations, the consequences of its failure look less dramatic. Even if the Senate had voted to join the League with reservations, US foreign policy in the 1920s would not have been much different from the limited engagement pursued by the Republican Harding, Coolidge and Hoover administrations.[30] Backed by a broad consensus, Republican foreign policymakers tried to stabilize Europe by financial and economic means but refused to accept any commitments to collective security or enforcement of the Versailles Treaty.[31] In the early thirties, this approach collapsed under the burden of the Great Depression. Given the popularity of isolationism before Pearl Harbor, it is doubtful whether American membership could have enabled the League to stand up to the aggressor states.

US foreign policymakers and opinion leaders only embraced multilateral internationalism after the Second World War, albeit in highly selective ways that ensured American dominance. When American leaders at the end of the Cold War sought to perpetuate 'the unipolar moment', they acted on the premise that world order should be based either on an American-dominated system of collective security, as President George H.W. Bush proposed in 1989, or on unilateral American domination, which President George W. Bush pursued in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. As Ross Kennedy observes, the notion of the United States being one player in a multipolar system of peer competitors was absent from American foreign policy discourse in Wilson's time and has remained absent until today.[32] President Barack Obama, it is often said, employed Wilsonian rhetoric while trying to reduce American

global security commitments.[33] President Donald Trump responded to the problems of overstretch by espousing an assertive, even aggressive, unilateralism. Although Trump's conduct of foreign policy often appeared unpredictable, his 'America First' slogan echoed the isolationist, anti-Wilsonian tradition of the early twentieth century, albeit without the redeeming features for which historians have credited the isolationists of old.[34] Trump touted a xenophobic and conspiratorial nationalism but did not care about America's moral prestige. His isolationist instincts were not matched by a progressive domestic agenda. His unilateralism was erratic and opportunistic and lacked a sense of the limits of American power. President Joseph R. Biden has worked hard to restore US leadership and credibility, but the future direction of US foreign policy remains an open question. America, it seems, has yet to find its response to the emergence of a multipolar world that it can no longer dominate but also cannot ignore.

Manfred Berg is the Curt Engelhorn Professor of American History at Heidelberg University. Berg is the author of numerous books on American history, including a biography of US President Woodrow Wilson: *Woodrow Wilson: Amerika und die Neuordnung der Welt* (C.H. Beck, 2017). In 2019, the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and the Humanities elected him as a regular member.

Notes

1. 'An Address to the Senate, 7 July 1919', in Link, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (PWW), 61, 426–36, 434. – The literature on Wilson and Wilsonianism is immense. For an excellent introduction to the historiography, see Kennedy, *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson*, esp. the essays by Keylor, 'Wilson's Project', 470–91, and Ambrosius, 'Legacy and Reputation', 569–87. For recent biographies, see Berg, *Woodrow Wilson*, and Cooper, *Woodrow Wilson*.
2. Link, 'Higher Realism'. For other influential accounts that portray Wilson as a prescient prophet, see Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace*; Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal*; Divine, *Second Chance*. For neo-Wilsonian perspectives, see Knock, *To End All Wars*; Smith, *America's Mission*; Smith, *Why Wilson Matters*; Throntveit, *Power Without Victory*; Ikenberry, *The Crisis*.
3. The most influential realist critic is Lloyd Ambrosius. See esp. Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft*; Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism*; Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism*. See also Graebner and Bennett, *The Versailles Treaty*. For a pungent critique of Wilsonianism as misguided missionary globalism, see McDougall, *Promised Land*; McDougall, *The Tragedy*.
4. See Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy*; Levin, *Woodrow Wilson*; Gardner, *Safe for Democracy*; Gardner, *Wilson and Revolutions*.
5. For standard accounts of the League fight, see Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition*, and Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*; 'The League Fight'.

6. Cooper, *Woodrow Wilson*, 560.
7. Borah quoted in: Nichols, *Promise and Peril*, 253. See also Porter and Johnson, *National Party*, 231.
8. 'A Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 August 1919', *PWW* 62, 339–411, 343.
9. Roosevelt quoted in Knock, *To End All Wars*, 169; Lodge and Harding quoted in Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*, 384, 391.
10. Smith, *Why Wilson Matters*, 15–16; on the distinction between the two varieties of American exceptionalism in foreign affairs, see Brands, *What America Owes the World*, VII–X, 1–21.
11. See Blower, 'From Isolationism to Neutrality', 345–76.
12. On the political camps in the League fight, see Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition*; Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*; Knock, *To End All Wars*; Kennedy, *The Will to Believe*.
13. 'An Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 2 April 1917', *PWW* 41, 519–27, 525; 'Remarks to Foreign Correspondents, 8 April 1918', *PWW* 47, 284–89, 288.
14. 'A Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 August 1919', *PWW* 62, 339–411, 343; on Wilson's aversion to legalism, see Mazower, *Governing the World*, 119–20.
15. 'From the Diary of William Christian Bullitt, 10 December 1918', *PWW* 53, 350–53, 352; 'A Discussion with the American Delegation, 3 June 1919', *PWW* 60, 45–71, 64.
16. On the progressive internationalists, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, esp. 48–55; Kazin, *War Against War*, esp. 113–45.
17. Quotes in Knock, *To End All Wars*, 252–54; Kennedy, *The Will to Believe*, 207–9; McDougall, *The Tragedy*, 161–62.
18. Kennedy, *The Will to Believe*, 203–9, thus treats them as a single progressive camp. For accounts that emphasize the progressive and anti-militaristic outlook of isolationists, see Johnson, *The Peace Progressives*; Stone, *The Irreconcilables*; Nichols, *Promise and Peril*, 229–72; Borah quoted in Knock, *To End All Wars*, 125.
19. La Follette and Borah quoted in Kennedy, *The Will to Believe*, 204, 207.
20. 'William Borah to Frank S. Rea, 19 June 1919'; 'Borah to James Phelan, 24 March 1919', in LC MD; Nichols, *Promise and Peril*, 229 (quotation), 234 (Borah quotation), 256, 270.
21. Lodge, *The Senate*, 176, 410.
22. Harding quoted in Kennedy, *Over Here*, 20; Kennedy, *The Will to Believe*, esp. 215–18; Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*, esp. 126–33; for a sympathetic account of Lodge's attitude towards the League, see Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 300–48.
23. Lodge, *The Senate*, 409; Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 304.
24. See Kennedy, *The Will to Believe*, 210–14; Margulies, *The Mild Reservationists*; Margulies, 'The Moderates in the League of Nations Battle'. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 246–70, *passim*, sees the League to Enforce Peace and the mild reservationists as conservatives who differed little from Lodge and the strong reservationists. In Knock's view, Wilson had no choice but to stay firm if he wanted to preserve his ideal of the League.
25. 'To Gilbert Monell Hitchcock, 8 March 1920', *PWW* 65, 67–71.
26. On Wilson's illusory hopes for a third term, see Berg, *Woodrow Wilson*, 209–12.
27. Even Thomas Knock, a Wilson admirer, concedes that Wilson was deeply unpopular at the end of his presidency: see Knock, *To End All Wars*, 269. Cf. Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*, 425–26, who argues that only the Republicans interpreted the 1920 election as a rejection of the League.
28. See, for example, his 'Peace without Victory Speech, 22 January 1917', *PWW* 40, 433–39, 439.
29. Ninkovich, *The Global Republic*, 96–118, 97; see also Ninkovich, 'Wilsonianism after the Cold War', 299–325.

30. Even Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World*, 426–433, concedes this point but then, oddly, concludes that Wilson's defeat 'did break the heart of the world'.
31. See Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion*.
32. Kennedy, *The Will to Believe*, 226–27.
33. See, for example, Suri, 'Liberal Internationalism', 195–211.
34. Works that emphasize the progressive domestic agendas of isolationists include Nichols, *Promise and Peril*; Johnson, *The Peace Progressives*; Stone, *The Irreconcilables*; and Blower, 'From Isolationism to Neutrality'. For a tentative assessment of Trump's foreign policy views, see Laderman and Simms, *Donald Trump*, esp. 2–16.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

William E. Borah Papers, Box 767, Library of Congress, Washington DC, Manuscript Division (LC MD)

Published Sources

Ambrosius, Lloyd E. *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
——. *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism During World War I*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1991.
——. *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations*. New York: MacMillan, 2002.
——. 'Legacy and Reputation', in Ross A. Kennedy (ed.), *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 569–87.
——. *Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Bailey, Thomas. *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace*. New York: Macmillan, 1944.
——. *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal*. New York: Macmillan, 1945.
Berg, Manfred. *Woodrow Wilson: Amerika und die Neuordnung der Welt*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2017.
Blower, Brooke L. 'From Isolationism to Neutrality: A New Framework for Understanding American Political Culture 1919–1941'. *Diplomatic History* 38(2) (2014), 345–76.
Brands, Henry W. *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Cooper, John M. *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
——. *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography*. New York: Knopf, 2009.
——. 'The League Fight', in Ross A. Kennedy (ed.), *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 518–27.
Costigliola, Frank. *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.
Divine, Robert A. *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II*. New York: Athenaeum, 1967.

Gardner, Lloyd C. *Wilson and Revolutions, 1913–1921*. Washington DC: University Press of America, 1982.

——. *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–1921*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Graebner, Norman A. and Edward M. Bennett. *The Versailles Treaty and Its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Ikenberry, John G. et al. *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Johnson, Robert D. *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Kazin, Michael. *War Against War: The American Fight for Peace, 1914–1918*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017.

Kennedy, David. *Over Here: The First World War and American* Society, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Kennedy, Ross A. *The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America's Strategy for Peace and Security*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2009.

Kennedy, Ross A. (ed.). *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

Keylor, William. 'Wilson's Project for a New World Order of Permanent Peace', in Ross A. Kennedy (ed.), *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 470–91.

Knock, Thomas J. *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Laderman, Charlie and Brendan Simms. *Donald Trump: The Making of a World View*. London: Endeavour Press, 2017.

Levin, Norman Gordon. *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Link, Arthur S. 'The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson'. *Journal of Presbyterian History* 41 (1963), 1–13.

Link, Arthur S. (ed.). *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vols 40–65. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982–1992.

Lodge, Henry C. *The Senate and the League of Nations*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.

Margulies, Herbert F. *The Mild Reservationists and the League of Nations Controversy in the Senate*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1989.

——. 'The Moderates in the League of Nations Battle: An Overlooked Faction'. *The Historian* 33(2) (1997), 273–88.

Mayer, Arno J. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968.

Mazower, Mark A. *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*. London: Penguin, 2013.

McDougall, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997.

——. *The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy: How America's Civil Religion Betrayed the National Interest*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.

Nichols, Christopher McKnight. *Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.

Ninkovich, Frank A. 'Wilsonianism after the Cold War: Words, Words, Mere Words', in John M. Cooper (ed.), *Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 299–325.

——. *The Global Republic: America's Inadvertent Rise to World Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.

Porter, Kirk and Bruce Johnson (eds). *National Party Platforms 1840–1964*, 3rd edn. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1966.

Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

——. *Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and its Crisis Today*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017.

Stone, Ralph A. *The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations*. New York: Norton, 1973.

Suri, Jeremi. 'Liberal Internationalism, Law, and the First African American President', in Julian E. Zelizer (ed.), *The Presidency of Barack Obama* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 195–211.

Throntveit, Trygve. *Power Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the American Internationalist Experiment*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017.

Widenor, William. *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980.

The Paris Moment
Experiences of War and Challenges of Peace, 1919–20

Eckart Conze

On 5 June 1919, exactly 100 years before the opening of the colloquium at the German Historical Institute in Paris in 2019 that led to this volume, the Paris Peace Conference was in a state of considerable anxiety.[1] In the Council of Four, Poland was vigorously resisting the principle that the inclusion of particular regions in either Germany or Poland be determined by referendum, as well as raising further, far-reaching territorial claims of its own, on all of its borders. Alongside the Poles, in addition, the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia were vehemently protesting any attempt to restrict their military strength. And from the German delegation came defiant signals that it would sign no treaty that apportioned the blame for the war – *Kriegsschuld*, or war guilt – solely to Germany.[2] Woodrow Wilson had already been haunted by the prospect that the peace conference would become 'a tragedy of disappointment' during his crossing of the Atlantic in December 1918. It now seemed that his fears would come true. As the President remarked on that day: 'I wish I could take an optimistic view, but I can't, for there is nothing in the situation to warrant it.'[3]

Disappointment and disillusionment were not restricted to the negotiating rooms of Paris, however. Across the world, an appreciable shift in mood occurred during the spring of 1919. Developments in China can serve as an example. In Beijing on 4 May 1919, hundreds of mostly young Chinese gathered in front of the Tiananmen Gate and embarked on a protest march through the districts that housed government buildings and the embassies of the Western powers. Though the demonstrations were initially peaceful, riots soon broke out. Embassy buildings were

pelted with stones and incendiary devices, while Western diplomats were attacked. Nor was the protest restricted to Beijing; it soon spread throughout the country, and it was even taken up by Chinese in Europe and North America, especially students. Western media reported extensively on these disturbances, including the banners the protesters carried with them: 'Give us back Qingdao!'; 'Boycott Japanese goods!'; 'Protect our land!'; 'China to the Chinese!'; 'Down with the traitors!'.[4]

What had happened? A few days earlier, at the end of April 1919, the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference – the four Western powers and Japan – had made a fateful decision on the destiny of the Shandong Peninsula. This region of Kiautschou and its fertile Yellow River hinterland had been a German lease before the war. Now, however, the Council had decided not to return it to China but to put it under Japanese rule. An angry and disappointed outcry was the result. The principal target was the American President Woodrow Wilson, who before 1919 had been revered like a saint in China. Now a leaflet of the Shanghai Student Union said that the Chinese were waiting 'for the dawn of this new Messiah; but no sun rose for China. Even the cradle of the nation was stolen'.[5]

Not for the first or last time an illusion had been destroyed at the Paris Conference. The consequences were enormous. The broad-based, nationwide protest that took only a few days to form in China was directed not only against the Shandong decision but against the policy of the West in general. Once again, and in keeping with the overall trend of nineteenth-century imperialist politics, China had been humbled. It had been humbled by Japan, and above all by the West, without which Tokyo would not have been able to prevail in Paris. But this time more and more voices were raised to say that China had to defend itself. As one Chinese student later recalled:

> When the news of the Paris Peace Conference finally reached us we were greatly shocked. We at once awoke to the fact that foreign nations were still selfish and militaristic and that they were all great liars. I remember that in the evening of May 2nd very few of us slept. I and a group of my friends talked almost the whole night. We came to the conclusion that … we could no longer depend upon the principles of any so-called great leader like Woodrow Wilson. … We couldn't help feel that we must struggle![6]

The protests did not abate. Indeed, they gave birth to a national movement, a reactive, anti-Western Chinese nationalism that spanned regional, cultural and social divisions. In fact, despite their policies in China, Western nations had long been viewed there as role models, as points of political, social and cultural orientation. But after the Paris Conference, this seemed inconceivable. In the spring of 1919, the idea of a Western-capitalist

modernity imported directly to China experienced a shattering, perhaps irrecoverable loss of meaning and credibility.[7] And among the consequences of this profound disappointment over Western imperialist capitalism and its power politics was also the rise of Communism in China. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in June 1921 in Shanghai, with the support of the Comintern. For the young Mao Zedong, who was 25 years old at the time, the significance of the events of 1919 went far beyond China. 'India', he wrote, 'has earned herself a clown wearing a flaming red turban as representative to the Peace Conference' – that is, the Maharaja of Bikaner, a member of the British Empire delegation – but 'the demands of the Indian people have not been granted'. Korea also 'bewails the loss of its independence … but it was simply ignored by the Peace Conference. So much for national self-determination!'.[8] The profound humiliation experienced by China in 1919 in Paris is not only of historical significance; it has become deeply ingrained in the collective memory of the Chinese. Its effects can still be felt today.

But the major powers' dealings with China, and their consequences, also point to the global nature of developments in Paris. The First World War was a global war, followed by a global peace agreement. This made the Paris Conference a world historical moment in the truest sense of the word – and in 1919 made Paris into the capital of the world. As the French philosopher and poet Paul Valéry wrote, 'there are no more local questions, there are no more questions that are settled because they are settled at one point'.[9] Paris was the centre point, the Conference an expression of global connectivity. Everything seemed connected; everything could be and indeed was somehow related to everything else. Global interactions and interdependencies determined the Paris negotiations and the thoughts and actions of the key actors, whether these actors belonged to the official delegations or whether they tried, from the outside, to influence the deliberations and decisions in keeping with their goals and interests – mostly without success, though not necessarily without effect.

However, globality did not constitute a unitary, closed-loop context of action or sense of purpose among the actors. Rather, it was multifaceted and differentiated. It was profoundly influenced by local interests and sensitivities resulting from local or regional constellations and problems. Furthermore, one of the consequences of this globality and complexity was ignorance and uncertainty on the part of decision-makers about the connections between cause and effect. This could lead to unanticipated outcomes. It also illustrates how enormously complicated the Paris negotiations were. Indeed, the record of the conference reveals the extent to which this complex globality contributed to the overburdening of the delegates, as well as to the inconsistency and incoherence of some of

their decisions. These were not propitious conditions for engineering a widespread acceptance of, or satisfaction with, the subsequent peace agreement.

Wilsonian Moment – Global Moment – Paris Moment

The important expression the 'Wilsonian moment' (Erez Manela) only partially encapsulates these global dynamics and global complexities. The primary aim of this metaphor is to capture the interaction of, on the one hand, American universalism and universal American war propaganda and, on the other, the resulting efforts towards independence and autonomy both within and beyond Europe. But the 'Wilsonian moment' was joined by other 'moments' that have been discussed in recent years in connection with the First World War and the challenge of constructing a post-war global order, such as the 'Leninian moment', the 'Pan-Islamic moment' or the 'Kemalist moment'.[10] Each of these terms stands for a particular narrative, a particular ideological orientation, which exercised a key influence on the peace negotiations in Paris. But what distinguishes Paris in 1919 is the simultaneity of these different political goals and ideas of global order, which were birthed and sustained by the First World War and its end. In 1919, Paris became the focal point for these different 'moments'. Against this background, we can also speak of a 'Paris moment'[11] in and of itself: the unique situation at the end of the First World War in which different hopes, expectations and visions influenced the dynamics of global order and global reorganization, as well as the situation in which these politically and ideologically different hopes, expectations and visions came face to face. Paris 1919 was not only a global event, then, but a 'global moment'.[12] The negotiations, decisions and conflicts in Paris had a worldwide resonance. At the same time, global forces and actors had an impact on Paris and were brought into the same context through the 'notion of an interconnected future'.[13]

From a historiographical point of view, the metaphor of the moment is highly attractive. It expresses the interplay of different lines of development but also of different ideas or expectations in a historical event. But there are also dangers inherent to the idea of the moment: the danger of giving priority to events over long-term developments; the danger of implying that different lines of development led inevitably towards singular events. This can result in teleological narratives, and it can also lead all too easily to narratives that take a single point in time and space as their point of origin – in this case, Paris in 1919. Such narratives can causally derive all manner of later developments from that one point;

some of them, in the case of the Paris Conference, reaching into the present day. George F. Kennan's overused characterization of the First World War as the 'seminal catastrophe' of the twentieth century provides an obvious point of comparison here.[14]

Such a treatment in terms of globality and global connectivity, however, does not yet fully capture the dynamics, problems and conflicts of the peace negotiations of 1919–20. The universalism of the American idea of a liberal-capitalist order and the universally articulated imperative of a national right to self-determination do not suffice to explain developments in China, India, Poland or Germany. From an analytical point of view, it is essential to combine universality and particularity, to ask how universal ideas or claims were perceived in particular contexts. How did universal concepts unfold in national contexts? How were they perceived in national societies, and what effects did they have? Wilson clearly became a truly global phenomenon. But this does not explain what the references to the American president or the United States meant in different contexts, what these concepts were aimed at, or what political interests or motives they were joined to or mobilized by. The same applies to the universal claims of Leninist Communism, whose effects are not adequately explained simply with reference to the internationalism of the 'world revolution'. Under certain conditions and against the backdrop of imperial rule, Communism could function as an anti-imperialist ideology of liberation. At the same time, and particularly within industrial societies, it was first and foremost an ideology of class struggle.

Nevertheless, the dynamics of the Peace Conference and of the peace treaties were determined by the tremendous expectations that had built up in the war years, and to which the war had contributed. In this light, the 'Paris moment' was also the situation where these expectations, which had been fostered and shaped in war, had to be transformed into concrete regulations for peace, and for the creation of a peaceful and stable international order. The same was true of the war aims of the belligerent powers, the victors as well as the losers.

Of course, every great peace conference and peace treaty of the modern age – from the Peace of Westphalia to the Peace of Utrecht and the Congress of Vienna – was faced with the task not only of ending a long war but also of establishing a new and stable order. But no peace agreement before 1919 was the focal point for such elevated, divergent and contradictory expectations. The Peace Conference could never do justice to the complexity birthed by these expectations. This complexity overwhelmed not only the politicians in Paris but also armies of consultants and experts. Added to this was the need to reorganize the world not just in the closed corridors of power but also before the eyes of an expectant

global public. The actors involved were under constant observation and, even more, constant pressure, a pressure from which they could not free themselves. This pressure was felt particularly keenly by the representatives of democratic states. Foreign and domestic policy exercised a mutual influence on each other, and they stood in continuous interdependence.

A key component of the pressure bearing down on the actors in Paris was generated by the experience of the war itself. The First World War had been a cruel, four-and-a-half-year long conflagration, characterized by mass destruction and millions of victims. There were no historical precedents for making peace after total war. Indeed, all prior historical experiences ran contrary to this requirement. On the one hand, even during the war, mass death and suffering had already produced a widespread desire for peace. In exhausted, war-torn societies that had been bled dry, an enormous yearning for peace had arisen, especially in the last years of the war. At the same time, however, a profound hatred had developed between the belligerent societies. This hatred, fuelled by war propaganda and increasingly desperate efforts at mobilization, had established itself in hearts and minds, and it was constantly recharged through continued suffering and dying. Nor did the war propaganda abate in 1918; it had anchored itself in countless minds, and its mental effects were not reversible from one day to the next. What Gerd Krumeich has called the 'war in the minds' – '*Krieg in den Köpfen*'[15] – continued, contributing inimitably to a collective emotionalization that barred the way to rational decision-making and negotiation. Indeed, there were constant, deliberate attempts to exploit these emotions. For months, the French urged the American president to visit the battlefields in north-eastern France, to get a sense of the devastation caused by the war, caused by the Germans. Wilson resisted because he did not want himself or his negotiating team to be emotionalized.[16]

Thus, a key influence on the peace agreement was exercised by feelings of hatred – a hatred nationalized above all between the European antagonists (especially France and Germany), and which was not mitigated by mourning. This was never likely to be a peace of reconciliation but rather a continuation of the war by other means – on all sides. The delegation of *gueules cassées*, a group of five veteran French soldiers with terrible wounds disfiguring their faces, who were presented in Versailles on 28 June 1919, symbolized this hatred, which proved so deleterious to peace and reconciliation.[17] They represented the French victims of the war and were intended not only to justify the harsh conditions of the peace treaty but also to inform a long-term policy aimed at security through domination and weakening rather than compensation and understanding. In this light, the peace conference and treaties were aspects of a longer-lasting

continuation of the war itself. The end of the war, and the effort to bring to an end the state of war, had begun before 18 January 1919, and it continued beyond 28 June 1919, when the Versailles Treaty was signed. In fact, the peace treaties were an attempt to freeze developments at a certain point in time; they were snapshots in a much longer process of tension between the end of the war and its continuation.

A New Order: Obstacles and Possibilities

For this reason, and despite the ongoing 'war in the minds', the trea-
ties contained opportunities for the loser states, and for the creation of a peaceful international order. To begin with, things could have been much worse, especially in the German case with respect to French ambi-
tions on the Rhine or British ideas of astronomical reparations. Moreover, however, the Treaty left Germany as a potential great power, though it certainly imposed harsh political, military and economic conditions. But Germany had the chance to get back on its feet – either co-operatively or once again through confrontation. For as harsh as the Treaty appeared in 1919, it also held out to Germany the chance of a future recovery. Indeed, as an instrument of international politics, the Treaty of Versailles was quite flexible. To this day, it is still insinuated – and not only from the German side – that the Treaty embodied a targeted and deliberate system of stringent punishment. But such a system never existed in Paris. In fact, the Versailles Treaty and the other peace treaties resulted from a series of precarious compromises between the victors. This resulted in consider-
able scope for political action – including for the losers.[18]

For German politics in particular, the openness and flexibility of the treaty provided opportunities to move from a disempowering peace to a peace of understanding and cooperation, at least on the European level. But this did not depend only on Germany; it also required co-operation and understanding on the part of the victorious powers, especially France. As became evident during the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, a policy of coercion and confrontation did not create long-term security. It also high-
lighted the importance of well-intentioned pressure from outside powers such as Great Britain and, even more important, the United States. After 1923, and with Germany's policy of confrontation also exhausted, these factors brought about the transition to the Locarno policy. Traditional security politics had been found wanting, for insecurity only seemed to intensify the more unilateral security was sought, especially when this was done with military considerations in mind and through military means. This led to the development of new forms and instruments of

international security, some of which were created as early as 1919 but which had since been developed and expanded into what Patrick Cohrs has termed a 'hybrid security order'. These notably included collective security institutions, particularly the League of Nations, which flourished during the second half of the 1920s; multilateral border treaties such as Locarno; and efforts to integrate international financial relations, including the questions of reparations and war debt, into a Euro-Atlantic security system.[19] This too is what the 'Paris moment' stands for. Indeed, the cradle of this European-Atlantic security system lay in Paris, even though the American and British guarantees to France, signed together with the Versailles Treaty, never actually came into force.

But the principal problem of the peace agreement – the widespread lack of acceptance it faced, on the part of both the losers and the victors – cannot be addressed by focusing solely on the German dimension and the specific conditions of the Treaty of Versailles. To be sure, these were of crucial importance.[20] But if we look beyond Germany to the broader European and global context, then we are met with no shortage of other, broader criticisms of the peace treaties that were articulated by contemporaries. In fact, the gathering rejection of the peace settlement was linked to factors that extended well beyond the settlement itself.

Among these factors we must number the collapse of the multinational Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and the creation of independent nation states that was triggered by their dissolution. Especially in east-central and south-eastern Europe, the withering-away of the continental empires was compounded by the consequences of the war, which clearly placed a tremendous burden on the peace agreement. Hardly any of the problems faced by the three empires in the decades before the war were solved by the conclusion of the peace. Nor did the imperative towards national self-determination or policies of nationalization provide a satisfactory solution to the question of the coexistence of different ethnic groups.

This much was already clear in Paris. As mentioned above, and to give only one example, on 5 June 1919, the focus of the Council of Four was Poland. The dominant concern was Polish territorial claims to Silesia, Pomerania, Lithuania and Galicia. British Prime Minister Lloyd George asked Polish Prime Minister Paderewski, 'Does Poland claim all of Galicia?'. The reply was: 'Poland wants to assure her autonomy.' Clemenceau asked, 'Do you or do you not claim Galicia?' This time, Paderewski answered: 'We claim it.' This drew an angry reaction from Lloyd George, who was anything but a friend to the Poles: 'It is impossible to draw ethnographic boundaries in these areas.' This bad-tempered exchange pointed to the crux of the problem. As Lloyd George put it:

'We liberated the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, the Yugoslavs, and today we have all the trouble in the world preventing them from oppressing other races. … I have the warmest and most profound sympathy for small nations which are fighting for their independence, but I am seized with despair when I see them more imperialistic than the great nations themselves.'[21]

After the formal end of the war, there was an intensification of ethnic conflicts and the problems associated with ethnic minorities. The new east-central and south-east European order was based on the idea of an ethnically homogenous nation state. The triumph of this model contributed to a continuity – indeed, to an increase – of conflict and violence, to wars, civil wars, pogroms and expulsions. A genocidal potential was part of these dynamics from the beginning. The old empires had at least provided stability and had successfully contained – at least to some extent – national, ethnic, religious and cultural tensions and conflicts.[22] Generally speaking, however, the newly emerging or newly created nation states were neither able nor willing to assume the ordering and balancing functions that the old empires had provided. The new states often had unsettled and weak institutions, and they understood themselves primarily as the representatives of particular ethnic or cultural identities. This tended to aggravate rather than dampen inner and inter-state tensions and conflicts – and it certainly did not eliminate them. For these reasons, the years after 1919 saw an eruption of violence in what Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz have referred to as the 'shatterzone of empires'.[23] This unrestrained violence was a key contribution to the quick transformation of the young democracies of the continent into authoritarian regimes that based their rule on violence and repression. Of the new democracies founded after 1918, only Czechoslovakia survived until 1939, when the state and its democracy was destroyed by Nazi Germany. The statehood that flourished under such conditions remained precarious and spatially limited, and there emerged areas remote from state power and in some cases entirely removed from it, in which violence could scarcely be contained.

There has long been a perception – again, not just in Germany – that the Paris treaties, especially the Treaty of Versailles, not only constituted a 'dictated peace' ('*Diktatfrieden*') but also a 'peace of violence'. However, this perception has obscured the fact that the Paris Conference and the resulting treaties also represented an attempt to achieve 'peace through justice', as Marcus Payk has recently shown in an important study.[24] Indeed, the negotiations and the peace agreements are full of references to the law, to legality, to justice and to the combination of law – including international law – and politics. These linkages had intensified in the second half of the nineteenth century, and they arguably reached their

apotheosis in Paris. But what did this legalization of politics – and this politicization of the law – really mean for the peace agreement of 1919? Did it constitute a successful attempt to make peace based on clear legal principles? Or was the law, as the normative basis of the international order, damaged by the peace treaty because the losers in particular perceived it merely as a weapon in the hands of the victors?[25]

During the war, the rise of international law, not least in the form of international humanitarian law, created expectations that influenced the conclusion of the peace. German breaches of international law, from the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 to the use of poison gas, were not only used to justify the Allied campaign but contributed to its moral escalation – indeed, to its idealization. This war, the argument went, was being fought for the restoration of the rule of law and – inevitably – for the punishment of the lawbreakers, for whom international treaties were obviously just 'scraps of paper'.[26] From this premise followed the criminalization of Germany. The German war was regarded as a violation of the law on multiple counts, a crime committed by the Germans and their allies (but mainly by the Germans). In Germany, this criminalization was perceived as a defamation, as was the inclusion of international criminal law provisions in the Versailles Treaty (Articles 227–30). As far as the Germans were concerned, this had nothing to do with the 'just peace' that they had hoped for, and in relation to which Woodrow Wilson's name was constantly invoked.[27]

The legal imperative and obligation to observe treaties not only determined the peace agreement with Germany; they also helped to stabilize an international order centred around the legally mandated coexistence of individual and independent nation states, as set out in the Paris agreements, including the League of Nations Covenant.[28] The international community envisioned by the peacemakers was based on the idea of the coexistence of sovereign nations. Through mutual co-operation, these nations would create an international, legally secure, peaceful order. This claim, however, was valid only for the global North. The principled ability to create and maintain order was never even contemplated for much of Africa and Asia. In practice, ideas of sovereignty, self-determination and self-government – and the putative inability to implement these objectives – constituted a justification for the continuation of imperial politics and neo-colonialism, which found expression not least in the creation of the League mandates.[29] Only a 'civilized' nation could be a sovereign nation. This conception was the foundation of the League of Nations' internationalism. Internal nation building and state sovereignty were the prerequisite for internationalization, for recognition by the international community in the form of the League of Nations. Recent work

focusing on the example of Turkey has laid bare the interrelation of internationalization and internal nation building under Kemalist auspices. In Turkey, the struggle for sovereignty was directed against any form of outside determination or foreign rule (especially through League mandates) and also against the internal enemies of nation building – which in the Turkish case meant the Kurds in particular. From the Turkish point of view, this 'civilization through integration' into a Turkish nation state was a central prerequisite for sovereignty as a basis of international recognition.[30]

Comparable dynamics were perceptible in the newly established states of eastern central and south-eastern Europe, whose claims to sovereignty were articulated not least in their policies towards minorities. These policies were guided by the double imperative of homogenization and ensuring the non-intervention of external powers. This is one of the reasons why minority protection was anchored – more or less effectively – in bilateral minority protection treaties but not in the League of Nations charter. The latter would have entailed a restriction of sovereignty by leaving the door open to an external right to intervene.[31]

The same applied to Allied attempts to involve states such as Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in arms control regimes. As Yugoslavian delegate Milenko Vesnić observed in 1919, this was perceived as an attempt to 'diminish, if not to nullify, our rights of sovereignty'. The Serbian politician went on to say: 'I must declare formally that one of the principal objectives for which we fought was to obtain for ourselves – small nations – the same sovereignty, the same political rights, the same legal situation, which has always been acknowledged for independent states since there has been any international law.'[32] The more the League of Nations became associated with such regimes of protection or control, the more it appeared as a restriction on the sovereignty of the young nation states – with sovereignty increasingly understood as absolute autonomy of action. This was enormously damaging to the League's legitimacy, and thus to its effectiveness.

Conclusion

In the perception of contemporaries, the Paris Conference was a moment of disillusionment and disappointment. The hopes and expectations that had arisen and accumulated during the war, and that had further intensified in the face of the experiences of suffering and dying on all sides, could not be fulfilled in Paris. The pressure of expectation was simply too high, the experience of the war too titanic. These factors overburdened

not only the peacemakers in Paris but also the societies of Europe and the world. A peaceful, stable international order could not arise in this way while the vision of a liberal, democratic peace was discredited.[33] This left space for alternative ideas of order, Bolshevik or fascist, which owed their attractiveness and successes in no small part to the disappointed expectations of 1919.

And yet there was no direct route from 1919 to 1939 or, from the German perspective, from 1919 to 1933. Paris 1919 cannot be reduced to a prehistory of National Socialism or the Second World War. For the people of 1919, the future was open. They did not conceive of themselves as entering an 'interwar period', even if there were voices warning of a new war or, indeed, predicting it. As historians, we must take this into account: that neither the First World War nor the peace concluded at its end rendered inevitable what came after. Against this background and keeping this in mind, it is important to take a fresh look at Paris 1919 and the challenge of a new world order. Instead of limiting our agenda to the question of what went wrong, we should also try to identify forward-looking approaches, ideas and solutions. What worked, what did not? For what reasons? And what do the answers mean for our present?

A century later, it sometimes seems as if the time after the First World War has drawn closer once again. After 1990, multipolarity replaced bipolarity in the international system. But multipolarity has not been accompanied by a rise of multilateralism. The opposite seems to be the case. On the anniversary of the Armistice of 11 November 1918, French President Emmanuel Macron, with explicit reference to the years after 1919, spoke of the 'old demons' – of nationalism, of authoritarianism, of populism and identitarianism – once again emerging to threaten peace, freedom and democracy.[34] He could have added unilateralism. This is how the past truly affects our present. This past is not finished, nor has it passed on. Rather, in the experience of violence and war, and in the hope for peace, it remains a part of our present.

Eckart Conze is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History and Co-Director of the International Research and Documentation Centre for War Crimes Trials (ICWC) at the University of Marburg (Germany). He has held visiting professorships at the Universities of Toronto, Cambridge, Bologna, Utrecht and Jerusalem. His main areas of research are the history of international relations (nineteenth to twenty-first centuries), the history of elites and the aristocracy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the history of security. His books include *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (with Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes and Moshe Zimmermann;

Karl Blessing, 2010), *Geschichte der Sicherheit: Entwicklung – Themen – Perspektiven* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017) and *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt* (Siedler, 2018). His latest book is *Schatten des Kaiserreichs: Die Reichsgründung 1871 und ihr schwieriges Erbe* (dtv, 2020).

Notes

1. This is a slightly revised version of my lecture at the opening of a colloquium at the German Historical Institute Paris in June 2019. My thanks go to Laurence Badel, Axel Dröber and Stefan Martens for their wonderful cooperation in planning and organizing this event and this volume.
2. Mantoux, *Deliberations*, vol. 2, 307–23.
3. See Creel, *The War*, 163, and Mantoux, *Deliberations*, vol. 2, 312.
4. See Vogelsang, *Geschichte Chinas*, 508, and Dillon, *China*, 177.
5. Quoted in Manela, *Wilsonian Moment*, 188.
6. Ibid., 186–87.
7. See Dabringhaus, *Geschichte Chinas*, 66, and Vogelsang, *Geschichte Chinas*, 508–9.
8. Quoted in Manela, *Wilsonian Moment*, 194.
9. '[I]l n'y a plus de questions locales, il n'y a plus de questions finies pour être finies sur un point.' Valéry, 'De l'histoire', in *Regards*, 65.
10. See Liebisch-Gümüş, *Verflochtene Nationsbildung*, and, for example, Marung, '"Leninian Moment?"', Hidvégi, 'Der Erste Weltkrieg' ('Leninian moment'); Aydin, *The Idea*, 122–27 ('Pan-Islamic moment'); Fernée, *Enlightenment and Violence* ('Kemalist moment').
11. The term is used, for example, in Herren, Rüesch and Sibille, *Transcultural History*, 1.
12. On the concept of 'global moments', see Conrad and Sachsenmaier, 'Introduction'.
13. Ibid., 12–13.
14. Kennan, *The Decline*.
15. Krumeich, 'Versailles 1919'.
16. See Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 184–85.
17. Audoin-Rouzeau, 'Die Delegation'.
18. This seems to be the consensus in international historiography, including recent German books on the Versailles Treaty: Conze, *Die große Illusion*; Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden*; Schwabe, *Versailles*.
19. See Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace*; Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power*.
20. See Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 276–382.
21. Mantoux, *Deliberations*, vol. 2, 312.
22. With regard to Austria-Hungary, recent historiography has relativized the older idea of the Habsburg empire as a 'prison of nations' ('Völkergefängnis'), which dates back to national movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; see, for example, Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.
23. Bartov and Weitz, *Shatterzone of Empires*.
24. Payk, *Frieden durch Recht?*.
25. See Miloš Vec's contribution to this volume.
26. In an encounter with Sir Edward Goschen, British ambassador on 4 August 1914, German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg called the Treaty of London (London Protocol, 1839), establishing Belgium's neutrality a 'scrap of paper'. See Hull, *A Scrap of Paper*, 42.

27. See Conze, *Die große Illusion*, 383–403.
28. See Payk, *Frieden durch Recht*, or Smith, *Sovereignty*.
29. See Pedersen, *The Guardians*.
30. See Liebisch-Gümüş, *Verflochtene Nationsbildung*, 241–398.
31. On the question of minority protection, see among others Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*.
32. Mantoux, *Deliberations*, vol. 2, 315.
33. Schwabe, *Versailles*.
34. From the speech of the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, at the international ceremony marking the centenary of the Armistice of 11 November 1918 at the Arc de Triomphe, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/11/12/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-la-ceremonie-internationale-du-centenaire-de-larmistice-du-11-novembre-1918-a-larc-de-triomphe. Retrieved February 2022.

Bibliography

Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane. 'Die Delegation der "gueules cassées" in Versailles am 28. Juni 1919', in Gerd Krumeich (ed.), *Versailles 1919: Ziele – Wirkung – Wahrnehmung* (Köln: Klartext, 2001), 280–87.

Aydin, Cemil. *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.

Bartov, Omer and Eric D. Weitz. *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013.

Cohrs, Patrick. *The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain, and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Conrad, Sebastian and Dominic Sachsenmaier. 'Introduction: Competing Visions of World Order, Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s', in Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (eds), *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Conze, Eckart. *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt*. Munich: Siedler, 2018.

Creel, George. *The War, the World and Wilson*. New York: Harpers and Brothers Publishers, 1920.

Dabringhaus, Sabine. *Geschichte Chinas im 20. Jahrhundert*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009.

Dillon, Michael. *China: A Modern History*. London: Bloomsbury, 2010.

Fernée, Tadd. *Enlightenment and Violence: Modernity and Nation-Making*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2014.

Fink, Carole. *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Herren, Madeleine, Martin Rüesch and Christiane Sibille. *Transcultural History: Theories, Methods, Sources*. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2011.

Hidvégi, Mária. 'Der Erste Weltkrieg in Ostmitteleuropa: Eine Zäsur in Transnationalisierungsprozessen?', in *Bohemia* 49(1) (2009), 184–87.

Hull, Isabel V. *A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law During the Great War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.

Jackson, Peter. *Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Judson, Pieter M. *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.

Kennan, George F. *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875–1890*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Krumeich, Gerd. 'Versailles 1919: Der Krieg in den Köpfen', in Gerd Krumeich (ed.), *Versailles 1919: Ziele – Wirkung – Wahrnehmung* (Essen: Klartext, 2001), 53–64.

Leonhard, Jörn. *Der überforderte Frieden: Versailles und die Welt 1918–1923*. München: C.H. Beck, 2018.

Liebisch-Gümüş, Carolin. *Verflochtene Nationsbildung: Die Neue Türkei und der Völkerbund 1918–1938*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2020.

Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Mantoux, Paul. *The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24–June 28, 1919): Notes of the Official Interpreter*, 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Marung, Steffi. '"Leninian Moment"? Soviet Africanists and the Interpretation of the October Revolution, 1950s–1970s'. *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* 33(3) (2017), 21–48.

Payk, Marcus M. *Frieden durch Recht? Der Aufstieg des modernen Völkerrechts und der Friedensschluss von Versailles nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018.

Pedersen, Susan. *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Schwabe, Klaus. *Versailles: Das Wagnis eines demokratischen Friedens 1919–1923*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019.

Smith, Leonard V. *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Valéry, Paul. *Regards sur le monde actuel*. Paris: Librairie Stock, 1931.

Vogelsang, Kai. *Geschichte Chinas*. Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 2012.

Conclusion

Paris 1919: Perspectives and Boundaries of
Internationalization

Laurence Badel, Eckart Conze and Axel Dröber

The state of today's knowledge about the world in 1919 and the clear and
vigorous desire expressed since the early 2000s by non-Western states to
build an international order that is not defined by the dominant principles
of the last two centuries have led historians to look, often with some anxi-
ety, for signs that the past may have been misinterpreted or neglected in
previous readings of history. With the focus on the agentivity of hitherto
minority or ignored actors, on world regions long treated as peripheral,
and on temporalities other than those of the Western agenda, a major
shift has taken place. Growing health and environmental concerns in our
societies have led historians to reconsider the ways in which they were
analysed and managed decades ago by the first international organiza-
tions and states.

   The authors and editors of this book set out to revisit and reinterpret
an international event, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, about which so
many books have already been written, aiming to shed light on major
trends that had not been sufficiently highlighted and to assess the event
anew while avoiding excessive presentism. While the studies in this book
pay close attention to what was said at the Paris Conference, they also
look at what was said and done at the same time by social actors outside
the official sphere of negotiations. In this context of a century ago, new
balances were established between politics and the law, between the public
and private spheres, without spectacular initiatives but with far-reaching
consequences. The timing of the Conference, which was partly shaped by
the agenda of the President of the United States, coexisted with regional
temporalities. But the fact that it was held in an old European diplomatic

capital, Paris, confirms that the epicentre of international relations was still in the West.

The negotiations of 1919–20 confirmed both the judicialization of international relations and the transformation of global governance. The settlement of the conflict paved the way for a century marked by an intensifying trend towards the use of judicial proceedings to settle an expanding range of questions. Recourse to judicial arbitration by both state and social actors, and the increasingly frequent shift from the political to the judicial arena in the handling of conflicts, certainly predated the conference. The United States played a central role in the nineteenth century in establishing this alternative to diplomatic negotiations as a means of settling inter-state disputes. For their part, the Latin American states were very much at the forefront of this trend. The use of the courts was extended to emerging humanitarian law in armed conflicts. A Permanent Court of Arbitration was set up in The Hague in 1899, entrusting the settlement of inter-state conflicts to an international judicial body, whose prerogatives encroached on the sovereignty of states. The creation in 1922 of a permanent Court of International Justice, which Brazil in particular had been calling for since the Second Hague Conference (1907), was part of this continuity.

But the Conference went further by introducing the recognition of the principle of international criminal justice. Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles provides for the establishment of a tribunal to try the former Emperor Wilhelm II 'for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties'. Articles 228 and 229 added that Germany was to hand over to the Allies those accused of war crimes to be tried by military tribunals set up by one or more of the Allied Powers. These provisions of the Treaty were not applied – Kaiser Wilhelm II was never tried, because the Netherlands refused to extradite him, and Germany refused to extradite its nationals – but the principle had become established and was put into practice after 1945. Its recognition was based on a legitimizing principle: 'international morality'. This principle paved the way for a process of moralizing the world, which was in part a continuation of the civilizational discourse of the previous century, but which was intended to be backed by international criminal courts and international conventions.

The 1919 conference was also the time of the multiplication of private forms of transnational regulation, as shown by the negotiations on new wireless communications technologies. While the question of submarine cables was directly included in the Versailles negotiations, the standards for wireless telegraphy were drawn up by a group of military engineers working autonomously on the fringes of the official negotiations.

Similarly, in the commercial sphere, states lost certain judicial prerogatives to the new International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), a private organization that set up an arbitration body for commercial disputes. Internal private arbitration to settle disputes between investors and traders on London-based markets had already been instituted in the 1870s. This practice served as a model for the new institution created in 1923. To a certain extent, the ICC's creators bypassed states by establishing a direct relationship with high-ranking officials in the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations. The structures of international governance were thus transformed *mezzo voce* on the periphery of the conference, accentuating the work of undermining state sovereignty that the first administrative unions, like the International Telegraph Union (1865), had been carrying out since the mid-nineteenth century.

In the commercial sphere, Western states developed new skills to compensate for the shortcomings of business. Since the last third of the nineteenth century, they had increasingly entered into competition with companies on the terrain of information. The conduct of the war accentuated this rivalry, driving states to build national systems of economic diplomacy built on the compilation and analysis of information about foreign markets. It also forced them to embark on an unprecedented process of coordinating economic data, as embodied in the *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, which was taken over by the League of Nations in the 1920s. The journal's reputation and popularity reflect the enduring importance of these figures, which helped to legitimize political decisions and also enabled certain states to aspire to the status of regional power. However, this cooperation remained limited to a restricted circle of states. Not all were able to compile high-quality information. The lack of specialist knowledge of statistics or cartography handicapped (aspiring) states that were seeking to legitimize their claims: in particular, this was very clearly the case of those in the Caucasus, on the eastern margins of Europe.

In the political sphere, inter-state rivalry to redefine the foundations of the international order was confined to a very limited group of Western states, as is well known. Following the departure of Japan's representative from the Peace Conference, that order was reshaped diplomatically by the three major Western powers, on the basis of a Euro-Atlantic vision, which remained fundamentally hierarchical, and which in particular was based on a racial hierarchy whose terms had been developed in the nineteenth century in the context of European colonization. The move to enshrine the principle of racial equality failed, not so much because of the failure of the Japanese representative's opportunistic proposal – whose main aim was to counter discrimination against Japanese migrant workers in the United States, not to seek a genuine universal equality – but because

of the Conference's reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a debate on the recognition of the rights of Africans and Afro-descendants as urged by the Pan-African Congress of February 1919. Nevertheless, there were strong signs that the Western vision of order was being challenged. Japan's approach to multilateralism was historically very circumspect. Its policy in the 1930s later demonstrated its own distinctive interpretations and uses of the concepts of 'universality' and 'cooperation'. On the other hand, Soumay Tcheng, one of the Chinese representatives at the Conference, gave the concept of 'self-determination' new content, different from that of the Leninist or Wilsonian concepts. In her use, it (also) refers to the individual emancipation of women in societies that are still very male-dominated. Moreover, the assertion of the primacy of 'national sovereignty' did not prevent Westerners themselves from continuing to explore different notions of *international* sovereignty, following on those already experimented with in multinational form in imperial territories (Shanghai or Crete, for example). The idea of Istanbul as an international (or internationalized) city under the sovereignty of the League of Nations, following the example of the Saar Basin, was one of the bold projects that emerged around the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire.

In Paris, the Group of Four made attempts to reach agreement on a number of universal principles for settling the conflict, but the reality on the ground was often one of pragmatic regional accommodations. Brazil wanted to obtain from the Paris negotiators the universal recognition of its status as a great power and the leader of Latin America, which it had asserted on a regional scale at the Pan-American Conferences, without jeopardizing its observance of traditional diplomatic standards. But on the margins of Europe, in the context of the dismantling of the Russian Empire, the practices of the new republics of the Caucasus, which had fought for recognition as independent states, deviated in some respects from recognized norms. This is perceptible in linguistic usage. Just as German continued to be spoken in modern times in Baltic Europe and Italian on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, so Ottoman Turkish became the main language of regional negotiations, with Russian and French sidelined. More generally, the attempt to rebuild a non-Russian-centric regional order had to take into account imperatives and practices on multiple scales.

In the immediate aftermath of the war and in the early 1920s, the global venues for redefining the international order remained predominantly European, starting with Paris. In 1919, the city was once again hosting a major international diplomatic congress, after the one in 1856 that had re-established its place on the international stage. In the meantime, it had become the seat of the first international organization: the

International Bureau of Weights and Measures was established under Article 1 of the Metre Convention of 1875. The subsequent choice of Spa, London, Genoa, Locarno, Lausanne and San Remo as the locations of international conferences confirmed the supremacy of European diplomatic capitals. The sole exception was Washington DC, where the return to peace between Spain and the United States was negotiated in 1898 (although the treaty was signed in Paris). The east coast city became the venue for the October 1920 conference that brought together the four major telecommunications companies (Radio Corporation of America, CSF, Marconi and Telefunken). In 1921, it was the venue for the negotiation of a peace settlement between the world's major naval powers. On the other hand, the idea floated by a few political and economic leaders of making Istanbul the headquarters of the League of Nations, on the model of the District of Columbia, had no chance of succeeding in the face of Geneva's pre-existing international know-how and support from Wilson. The real de-Westernization of diplomatic capitals did not come until the early 1970s, when Nairobi was chosen to host the headquarters of the United Nations Environment Programme.

The choice of Paris in 1919 was, among other things, the marker of a restricted, imperialist multilateralism, which continued until well after 1945. At the end of the Cold War, the principles and standards of international order established by the Western Allies in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 extended to Eastern Europe and Russia in 1990 and prevailed in world affairs, perhaps for the last time, with the signing of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The Charter has been interpreted as the triumph of the principles of a Western order inherited in part from the nineteenth century but conceived above all as a response to the challenges of the post-First World War period. The Peace Conference and its long-term impact confirm, if confirmation were needed, its role as the matrix of the world order(s) that followed.

The fact remains that, a hundred years after the end of the phase opened by the Armistice of November 1918 and closed by the Lausanne Conference of 1923, the gulf between the Western world and the rest of the world is striking. Another short phase, which began with the new Paris Peace Forum in mid-November 2018 and was a vehicle for Western ambitions to renew multilateralism, was brutally buried by Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The return of inter-state war in Europe is taking place against a backdrop of a revival of the arms race and unprecedented over-armament in the Asian region. While the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the USSR led to a reduction in military equipment in the early 1990s, ten years later the trend was reversed, with the West's military technological superiority more sharply contested. The

multilateral framework, weakened by the revisionist behaviour of many countries and by heightened Sino-American rivalry, no longer plays its stabilizing and moderating role. The multilateral system's ability to generate cooperative behaviour has greatly diminished. Tensions can no longer be eased through co-management by Western states alone. States that were on the periphery of international relations a century ago – China, India (which was still under British domination), Brazil, etc. – and those that have emerged since, such as the Gulf States and some African states that have become active on a regional scale, intend to play a full part in the new ordering of the world.

Laurence Badel is Professor of Contemporary History of International Relations at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University. A specialist of European diplomatic practices, she is developing work in two directions: the history of women in diplomacy and international relations and the history of diplomatic capitals. Her recent publications include *Diplomaties européennes: XIXe–XXIe siècle* (Presses de Sciences Po, 2021), which won the Institut de France's 2022 Prix Edouard Bonnefous; as editor, *Histoire et relations internationales: Pierre Renouvin, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle et la naissance d'une discipline universitaire* (Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2020); and 'Diplomacy and the History of International Relations: Redefining a Conflictual Relationship', *Diplomatica* (2019). Her latest book, *Ecrire l'histoire des relations internationales, XVIIIe -XXIe siècle: Genèse, concepts, perspectives*, was published by Armand Colin in 2024.

Eckart Conze is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History and Co-Director of the International Research and Documentation Centre for War Crimes Trials (ICWC) at the University of Marburg (Germany). He has held visiting professorships at the Universities of Toronto, Cambridge, Bologna, Utrecht and Jerusalem. His main areas of research are the history of international relations (nineteenth to twenty-first centuries), the history of elites and the aristocracy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the history of security. His books include *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (with Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes and Moshe Zimmermann; Karl Blessing, 2010), *Geschichte der Sicherheit: Entwicklung – Themen – Perspektiven* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017) and *Die große Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt* (Siedler, 2018). His latest book is *Schatten des Kaiserreichs: Die Reichsgründung 1871 und ihr schwieriges Erbe* (dtv, 2020).

Axel Dröber is a researcher at the German Historical Institute Paris and visiting lecturer at Université Sorbonne-Nouvelle. He studies nineteenth

and twentieth-century Western European history, with a focus on the history of public security and the state monopoly on violence in post-revolutionary Europe. His book-length study on the National Guard during the Restoration and the July Monarchy in France, *Nation, Militär und Gesellschaft*, was published in 2022 (Heidelberg University Publishing). He is currently working on the topic of migration and citizenship after the First World War. Taking a transnational perspective, he is investigating the history of citizenship in the context of the international peace order of 1919, the development of naturalization in France, and transnational German migration.

Index